In 2008, the French Minister for Higher Education and Research created a co-ordination committee for nuclear education and training in order to ensure the expansion of the French nuclear energy sector through the renewal of its workforce. This committee, recently renamed the ‘French Council for Education and Training in Nuclear Energy’ (CFEN), assesses the adequacy between the education offer, the student population in differ­ent curricula and the industrial/research needs, advises the Office of Higher Education on opening new academic curricula, informs students of various educational curricula and possible professional careers and opportunities in nuclear power technology, coordinates the international recruitment of students, and promotes international curricula such as the new International Master of Science in Nuclear Energy starting in Paris in 2009.

The members of the CFEN include representatives of government authorities in education, research and industry, of academic institutions (universities and engineering schools), of the chief industrial actors (AREVA, EDF, GDF-SUEZ, ANDRA, and subcontractors), and of the main nuclear R&D public institutions: CEA and IRSN.

More than 20 chief universities and engineering schools, distributed all over the country though with many located in the Paris area, provide nuclear engineering-related education programmes. CEA/INSTN (Institut National des Sciences et Techniques Nucleaires) also plays an important role in this field through its establishments located in Saclay, Cherbourg and Cadarache.

After the decision on the design and capacity of the first NPP to be installed in the country is made, an appropriate site for the NPP is to be selected. For this purpose it is advisable to first identify a few candidate sites that meet the basic criteria for setting up a NPP. This can be done by a team of national experts who have the knowledge and experience in similar work performed earlier for locating thermal power plants, hydroelectric power stations and other conventional industries. Expertise in specific scientific fields related to siting is also likely to be available in various national sci­entific and academic institutions, and personnel from such institutions should be appropriately included in the work. It may still be necessary to include a few experts from outside and if necessary the report of the national team may be subjected to a peer review. However, it is essential that national expertise in all relevant areas for site selection be developed at the earliest. This can possibly be done during the time when the docu­ment detailing the design requirements of the proposed NPP that defines its technical parameters including its power rating is being developed.

The regulatory body should also obtain the required technical know-how for safety evaluation of the proposed site at an early date and should develop a core group for the purpose. This group will carry out the initial safety evaluation of siting proposals and provide support to the expert com­mittee constituted by the regulatory body to perform the detailed safety evaluation for consideration of licensing of the site.

Nuclear power has a distinct global dimension and its potentially wide­spread deployment will bring to the world an intense commercial and fruitful technological interchange, with the potential to improve other tech­nologies too. It demands modern science and high technology and requires a complex fuel cycle and, as such, its global introduction will create an exchange of experts who will disseminate scientific and technological knowledge and experience for the benefit of every country involved.

During the pioneering years, the so-called nuclear countries developed many different technologies for the peaceful use of nuclear power. Although many prototypes were tested, today those technologies have been reduced to light water reactors (LWR) in the form of pressurized water reactors (PWR) and boiling water reactors (BWR), first developed in the United States and in the old Soviet Union, and heavy water reactors (HWR), the CANDU models, which have been developed in Canada and India. The UK chose to continue with their advanced gas-cooled reactors (AGR). Other industrialized countries have developed their own copies: France, in par­ticular, developed its own PWR models, the former West Germany several PWR and BWR versions, and Sweden a BWR reactor system. France and Germany also developed the EPR model which is now promoted by the French company, Areva.

Other countries, in particular Japan, South Korea, Italy and Spain, bought several PWR and BWR models and established a well-developed scientific and technical infrastructure. In 1987, Italy decided to cancel and dismantle all its nuclear power plants, whilst in 1983 Spain decided to establish a moratorium on the construction of new nuclear power plants. By contrast, Japan and South Korea decided to continue their nuclear development and have now become providers of nuclear designs. The now united Germany decided in 2000 to dismantle its well-developed nuclear industry. More recently, after installing different foreign models, China has been able to develop its own PWR model.

It is expected that light water reactors (with possibly a few heavy water reactors) will be the preferred option in the near future, supplied by a limited number of providers. The country importing the technology will have an opportunity to participate in the design, manufacturing of compo­nents, assembly and construction of its plants, and will be responsible for their operation and the management of radioactive waste and used fuel. Moreover, the technology associated with the fuel cycle is equally compli­cated and global. Uranium mining and milling could be performed by nationals of the countries where reserves are found. Enrichment and fuel manufacture are more complex technologies but they can be managed in many countries. Reprocessing is more technology intensive and non-prolif­eration sensitive, and may not be open to all. The activities mentioned above need international transportation of heavy components, radioactive materi­als and nuclear fuels. All these activities create positive international com­merce and a transfer of technology.

The mPower, designed by Babcock and Wilcox (B&W) in the USA, is a scalable and modular system in which the nuclear core and steam genera­tors are contained within a single vessel. It is a modular reactor designed to match customer demand in 125 MWe increments. mPower employs an integral nuclear system design, passive safety systems, a 4.5-year operating cycle between refueling, 5% enriched fuel, secure underground contain­ment, and spent fuel pool capacity for the life of the plant. A scaled proto­type of mPower using electric heating instead of nuclear heating is currently under construction in the USA to verify the reactor design and safety per­formance, supporting its licensing activities with the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Over the past several decades the IAEA has utilized the technical expertise of its member states to formulate and publish standards related to all aspects of nuclear reactor safety. These standards can be used immediately by the regulatory authorities of member states, to establish their own unique safety regulations as befit their unique circumstances and to incorporate these regulations, as desired, into their national governance structure.

The standards and guides developed by the IAEA have been augmented over the years by the work and publications of the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group, appointed by the Agency’s Director General.

Because of their concise format and their high standard of intellectual integrity, this summary of the international safety regime uses these INSAG documents as the primary source of guidance to new plant users.

The world inventory of available published literature already contains much of the history and technology of the nuclear energy enterprise over the past 60 years. Many conference proceedings, reports and textbooks are freely available in libraries, a few of which are listed here. Naturally, some information is restricted for reasons of commercial interest.

10.8.1 Owners’ groups

Owners’ groups mentioned in Section 10.6.1 are sharply focused on sustain­ing good performance of their own power plants. These groups encourage joint R&D and education of operating staff. For example, the CANDU group website can be found at COG (2010). Generally, this site offers infor­mation to the owners of CANDU power plants; other examples are AREVA-NP (2010), General Electric (2010), and the Westinghouse Owners’ Group (WOG; unfortunately, no reference available). One general charac­teristic of these groups is that they maintain all or some of their information confidential to group members. This is understandable due to the large commercial interests involved.

E. GIL LOPEZ, IAEA Radiation Safety Regulator, Austria

Abstract: Despite nuclear facilities being designed, constructed and operated according to the most stringent safety regulations, accidents, human failures, extreme external events or malicious acts can occur that require the implementation of adequate emergency actions. Since the Chernobyl accident in 1986, many efforts have been devoted to improving the nuclear emergency response at national and international levels, and emergency planning and preparedness have become a significant activity of the safety provisions needed to put in service a nuclear power plant. National regulations, usually based on international standards, establish the technical requirements for emergency planning and allocate responsibilities to plant operators and governmental bodies in charge of its implementation. Giving a suitable response to a nuclear accident requires efficient coordination among intervention organizations, emergency coordination centres are operated to facilitate such coordination, and regular exercises are performed to train intervention staff and improve emergency plans and procedures at every level.

Key words: emergency plans, emergency response, coordination centres, intervention organizations, international standards and recommendations.

12.1 Introduction

Nuclear and radiological emergencies can occur in a wide range of facilities, including fixed and mobile nuclear reactors; facilities for the mining and processing of radioactive ores; facilities for fuel reprocessing and other fuel cycle facilities; facilities for the management of radioactive waste; the trans-

This chapter is the copyright of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and is reproduced by the Publisher with the IAEA’s permission. Any further use or reproduction of the chapter, in whole or in part, requires the permission of the IAEA. The chapter has been written by a staff member of the IAEA in his/her personal capacity and not on behalf of the IAEA or the Director General of the IAEA. The views expressed in the chapter are not necessarily those of the IAEA and that the IAEA disclaims all liability in connection with the chapter and any use made thereof.

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port of radioactive material; sources of radiation used in industrial, agricul­tural, medical, research and teaching applications; facilities using radiation or radioactive material; and satellites and radio-thermal generators using radiation sources or reactors. The common characteristic of nuclear and radiological emergencies is that both involve hazards associated with ion­izing radiation. In coherence with the rest of this book, this chapter is specifically aimed at emergency planning at nuclear power plants.

Nuclear facilities contain large amounts of nuclear material that can generate radioactive material by a chain reaction or by activation of stable nuclides that have been exposed to high neutron flux. Nuclear reactors can accumulate a large amount of radioactive materials, depending on their thermal power, the fuel burn-up and the time elapsed since the last shut­down. Multiple barriers contain these radioactive materials and prevent their radiation from damaging facility workers and the environment. Some critical components of a nuclear facility, such as the reactor core, need per­manent cooling because radioactive decay of fission products generates a large amount of energy that could damage them if it is not extracted effi­ciently. An accident or an intentional action could disable the reactivity control systems, the cooling systems or the barriers containing radioactive materials. In this case, large amounts of these materials could escape to the environment. The energy accumulated within the facility can contribute to the spreading of radioactive materials into the environment over a wide area.

The fundamental safety objective in the use of nuclear and radiation techniques is to protect people and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation. This objective has to be achieved without unduly limit­ing the operation of facilities or the conduct of activities that give rise to radiation risks. To reach this objective all reasonable efforts must be made to prevent nuclear or radiation accidents and mitigate their consequences.

The most harmful consequences arising from nuclear facilities and activi­ties have come from loss of control over the nuclear reactor core, nuclear chain reaction or radioactive source. Consequently, in order to ensure that the likelihood of an accident having harmful consequences is extremely low, measures have to be taken:

• To prevent the occurrence of abnormal conditions, including breaches of security, that could lead to such a loss of control

• To prevent the escalation of any such failures or abnormal conditions that do occur

• To prevent the loss of control over radioactive sources.

Taking measures towards achieving these goals by undertaking interven­tions, which are defined as any action intended to reduce or avert exposure or the likelihood of exposure to sources which are not part of a controlled practice or which are out of control as a consequence of an accident, is governed at all times by the principles of justification and optimization recommended by the International Commission on Radiological Protection, ICRP (ICRP, 1991, 1993). According to the ICRP, any proposed interven­tion that does more good than harm is justified, and the form, scale and duration of any intervention shall be optimized so that the net benefit is maximized.

Every nuclear facility is designed to prevent any accident that can occur according to the applicable regulation. Two approaches are commonly used to demonstrate the compliance with regulation: the deterministic approach is used to demonstrate that the design is enough to prevent all regulated design-basis accidents and mitigate their consequences if they were to occur; the probabilistic methodology is used to verify that the accidents behind the design basis, that is the so-called severe accidents, should have a very low probability of occurrence and their consequences should be mitigated by dedicated design features. In addition, every nuclear facility has an emergency plan to be activated in case of an accident or malicious act to prevent severe damage to the facility and uncontrolled release of radioactive material, which could produce direct or delayed health effects on facility workers and the population that could be affected by radioactive material released.

The IAEA’s goal has been, and remains today, to draw soundly based safe­guards conclusions through effective and impartial implementation of safe­guards agreements. In fact, the IAEA’s safeguards conclusions regarding correctness and completeness of a State’s declaration for States with com­prehensive safeguards agreements in force depends on the extent to which the Agency is equipped to detect undeclared nuclear material and activities in such States. Under a safeguards system that is based on INFCIRC/153 (Corrected) (IAEA, 1972) alone, the IAEA is limited in its ability to assess undeclared nuclear material and activities. It is recognized that with the AP-related access provisions, availability of expanded State-declared infor­mation and broader access to locations in the State, the Agency’s capability to detect and deter undeclared nuclear material or activities is significantly advanced.

When both a CSA and an AP are in force for a NNWS, and the IAEA finds that there is no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful activities, and no indication of undeclared nuclear material and activities for that State, the IAEA is able to draw a safeguards conclu­sion for the State that ‘all nuclear material remained in peaceful activities’. However, if the evaluations regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for a State remain ongoing as part of the State evalu­ation process, then the IAEA concludes for the State that ‘declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities’.

In those NNWSs where a CSA is in force alone (i. e., AP is not in force), based on the IAEA’s findings that there is no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful activities in the State, the IAEA is able to draw a conclusion that the ‘declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities’ for that State.

In the case of NNWS Parties to the NPT who have not yet brought com­prehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA into force as required by Article III of the NPT, the IAEA cannot draw any safeguards conclusions.

The waste packages that are produced have been adapted to the require­ments for storage and transport as well as for disposal. Different types of packages are used. The most common are standard 220-litre steel drums or standard 10- or 20-foot shipping containers. Other types of containers are steel packages of other sizes and packages with a concrete wall that pro­vides some shielding. The packages are normally clean on the outside so that the further handling can be made without the need to consider con­tamination. The packages, however, still emit radiation that needs to be considered during the handling. In many cases the radiation level is such that the packages can be handled, stored and transported without extra shielding, i. e. the packages fulfil the transport regulations. For waste with a higher activity concentration, the dose rates from the waste packages are higher and they will need extra shielding during handling, storage and transport.

LLW and ILW can be stored in fairly simple warehouse-type buildings. Normally the walls are made of concrete of appropriate thickness to provide shielding for the outside.

Transports of LLW and ILW need to fulfil the transport requirements. LLW packages that by themselves fulfil the requirements can be trans­ported in simple standard shipping containers, while packages with a higher dose rate will need to be transported in sturdy thick-walled containers. In many cases it should be enough to fulfil the requirements for so-called type A containers, while in some cases with a higher activity concentration type B containers will be needed (IAEA, 2009c).

LLW and ILW can be transported in a similar way to spent fuel and high — level waste on trucks, trains or ships, depending on the locations of the nuclear power plant and the repository.

It must be remembered that there is always a gap between intuitive percep­tions and probabilistic evaluation of risk, in any field: we know that the probability of having a fatal accident when travelling by plane is far lower than having one when travelling by car but, nevertheless, many people are more afraid of being in planes than they are of being in cars. In the energy field, many studies comparing lethal risks resulting from different energy sources (ExternE, NEA, 2010) show that nuclear energy’s risk of a lethal accident is lower than that for fossil sources (coal, oil and even gas). Nevertheless, the risk of accident is more spontaneously linked to nuclear power than to coal mining or oil extraction. This risk remains the main argument of nuclear opponents and it is also an obstacle for people who have ambivalent perceptions of nuclear energy.

In the 2007 Eurobarometer, respondents had to choose between two answers: ‘The advantages of nuclear power as an energy source outweigh the risks it poses’ and ‘The risks of nuclear power as an energy source out­weigh its advantages’ (NEA, 2010: Fig. 2, p. 22). With regard to nuclear power, people’s threats are focused on catastrophic accident and radiologi­cal risk for human health, often seen as insidious in the neighbourhood of nuclear sites. Objective knowledge may limit fear of these threats, but there always remains some unconscious distrust. But the more people feel well informed on nuclear safety, the less they feel threatened by nuclear safety risks (NEA, 2010, pp. 22-23).

The best way to convince people of nuclear safety is by the example of safe operation: this is why confidence in safety authorities is more pro­nounced in nuclear countries than in non-nuclear countries and, moreover, more pronounced in the neighbourhood of nuclear plants (Eurobarometer, NEA, 2010, p. 22): 59% of respondents in nuclear countries think that nuclear plants can be operated safely against 31% who do not. This puts the NIMBY syndrome into perspective: opposition particularly applies before the building of a nuclear facility in newcomer countries but is less observed in nuclear countries in the neighbourhood of nuclear plants.