The IAEA’s goal has been, and remains today, to draw soundly based safe­guards conclusions through effective and impartial implementation of safe­guards agreements. In fact, the IAEA’s safeguards conclusions regarding correctness and completeness of a State’s declaration for States with com­prehensive safeguards agreements in force depends on the extent to which the Agency is equipped to detect undeclared nuclear material and activities in such States. Under a safeguards system that is based on INFCIRC/153 (Corrected) (IAEA, 1972) alone, the IAEA is limited in its ability to assess undeclared nuclear material and activities. It is recognized that with the AP-related access provisions, availability of expanded State-declared infor­mation and broader access to locations in the State, the Agency’s capability to detect and deter undeclared nuclear material or activities is significantly advanced.

When both a CSA and an AP are in force for a NNWS, and the IAEA finds that there is no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful activities, and no indication of undeclared nuclear material and activities for that State, the IAEA is able to draw a safeguards conclu­sion for the State that ‘all nuclear material remained in peaceful activities’. However, if the evaluations regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for a State remain ongoing as part of the State evalu­ation process, then the IAEA concludes for the State that ‘declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities’.

In those NNWSs where a CSA is in force alone (i. e., AP is not in force), based on the IAEA’s findings that there is no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful activities in the State, the IAEA is able to draw a conclusion that the ‘declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities’ for that State.

In the case of NNWS Parties to the NPT who have not yet brought com­prehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA into force as required by Article III of the NPT, the IAEA cannot draw any safeguards conclusions.