To mitigate potential damage that could arise from unwanted situations, every nuclear facility incorporates in its organization a number of emer­gency provisions, which are laid down on the assumption that the safety systems are not sufficient to control such extraordinary situations. Strictly speaking, the emergency arrangements are not part of the design of the facility, although they provide an additional guarantee of protection from the risk associated with nuclear facilities.

These arrangements should be set out in a specific emergency plan that reflects the likelihood and the possible consequences of nuclear accidents, the characteristics of the radiation risks and the nature and location of the facilities. These emergency plans are designed and prepared to ensure that arrangements are in place for a timely, managed, controlled, coordinated and effective response at the scene, and at the local, regional, national and international level, to any nuclear or radiological emergency. The emer­gency plans are usually structured in two levels: on-site emergency plans and off-site emergency plans.

The on-site emergency plans are direct targets to lead the facility that has suffered an accident to safe conditions as soon as possible, to minimize potential consequences of the accident on the staff and the installation, and to reduce the release of radioactive material to the environment. The on-site emergency plan is a primary responsibility of the plant operator and is a part of the safety documentation needed for obtaining the operating licence of every facility. The plant operator is also responsible for maintaining on-site emergency plans in an operational state by checking their effective­ness before the facility becomes operational and whilst the facility is in operation by performing suitable emergency exercises.

The off-site emergency plans are aimed at the preparation and, where appropriate, implementation of the emergency measures necessary to protect the population living around a nuclear facility against any damage caused by any accident occurring at the facility. The public authorities are responsible for designing and implementing the off-site emergency plans as a part of the national response plans established for protecting the popula­tion from any unwanted situation that could damage their health, their property or the environment. Off-site plans have to be established before every facility becomes operational and their effectiveness should be checked during the pre-operation testing period and periodically whilst the facility is in operation. Off-site emergency plans include suitable international interfaces when trans-boundary consequences of accidents that could occur in a facility are possible.

Milestone 1

The system of safeguards modelled on INFCIRC/153 (Corrected) (IAEA, 1972) is designed to provide assurance about the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear material within the territory of a State, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere. Such a comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) applies safeguards on all source and special fissionable material in all peaceful activities. As expressed in the Appendix to IAEA (2005a), concluding a safeguards agreement (and/or additional protocol) with the IAEA generally requires two or three steps:

1. The State notifies the Agency of its intention to conclude a safeguards agreement and/or an additional protocol, and asks the Agency to submit the draft text(s) to the IAEA Board of Governors for approval, in order for the Board to authorize the Director General to sign and implement it. The notification should contain information on the applicable entry into force procedure (see step 3 below). The text(s) will then be submitted to the Board of Governors, which needs to authorize the Director General to sign, and will subsequently imple­ment the agreement or protocol. After this, the documents are open for signature. Model letters are available from the IAEA (IAEA, 2008b, Annexes 1 and 2).

2. A representative of the State and the Director General sign the text(s). This may be done by the Head of State, Head of Government or Minister for Foreign Affairs or by any other government official — such as the Resident Representative to the Agency — with full powers to sign.

3. The State has two options to bring into force its safeguards agreement/ protocol: either upon signature or on the date the Agency receives from the State written confirmation that its domestic requirements for entry into force have been met. If the latter option is applied, the third step required is for the State to provide such notification to the Agency. Again, a model letter is available from the IAEA (IAEA, 2008b, Annex 3).

From a State’s point of view, there are two fundamental points that a ‘newcomer’ may want to keep in mind, especially when the NNWS is in the early stage of its considerations for launching a nuclear power programme (e. g., prior to Milestone 1): [41]

2. For the exclusive purpose of verifying fulfilment of a State’s obligations assumed under the NPT,[42] the IAEA is the international authority vested with the right and obligation to ensure that safeguards are applied on all source and special fissionable material in all peaceful activities.[43]

In connection with a CSA, the IAEA applies safeguards with a general working hypothesis: non-compliance cannot be excluded and there is low but non-zero probability that a diversion can take place. In this respect, the objective of IAEA safeguards is the timely detection of diversion (of nuclear material) and deterrence through a risk of early detection. The IAEA achieves this objective by the tasks it performs and the safeguards measures that are implemented. For all NNWSs party to the NPT, the task is verifying the correctness and completeness of a State’s declaration. Verifying the correctness of a State’s declaration refers to providing mean­ingful assurance on the non-diversion of declared nuclear material, while verifying completeness of a State’s declarations refers to providing credible assurance on the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.[44] From the analysis of all information available to it, including the results of the IAEA’s field and headquarters activities, the IAEA derives safeguards conclusions that are reported annually to the Board of Governors in the Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR) for the previous calendar year.[45] Any cases of non-compliance with safeguards agreements are also reported in the SIR. The kinds of conclusion(s) that can be drawn depend upon the agreements that are in force.[46]

In this respect, it is essential for ‘newcomer’ States to readily understand the obligations arising from implementation of a Model Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/153 (Corrected)) (IAEA, 1972). In terms of a State’s commitment, the reporting of nuclear material (e. g., all source and special fissionable material in all peaceful activities) and facili­ties includes:

1. Nuclear material which has reached the stage of processing where its composition and purity make it suitable for fuel fabrication or for iso­topic enrichment

2. Export and import of material containing uranium or thorium which has not yet reached that stage of processing

3. Any nuclear material produced at a later stage

4. Any existing or planned nuclear facility.

As a matter of procedure, once a safeguards agreement based on INFCIRC/153 (Corrected) (IAEA, 1972) enters into force, the NNWS has an obligation to declare all of its nuclear material and facilities to the IAEA (referred to as a State’s initial report).[47] The initial report (i. e., State decla­ration) is then verified by the IAEA and maintained on the basis of account­ing reports submitted by the State and verification by the IAEA (for correctness and completeness).

Other important CSA-related obligations concern the State’s commit­ment to:

• Establishing an effective system of accounting for and control of nuclear material

• Provision of timely access to the nuclear material, facilities and locations outside facilities[48]

• Provision of early design information for each nuclear facility (planned and existing).

In verifying the correctness of a State’s declaration, the IAEA applies nuclear material accountancy, complemented by containment and surveil­lance measures. As indicated earlier, in a safeguards regime based only on INFCIRC/153 (Corrected), the IAEA does not have all the tools necessary to fully assess the completeness of the State’s declaration.[49] Despite the limitations, the IAEA does evaluate whether there are any indications of undeclared nuclear material and activities as part of a State evaluation process.[50] However, without the additional measures available under the AP, the IAEA remains unable to draw a conclusion on the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in the State as a whole.

Consequently, the focus of IAEA safeguards in these NNWSs has been to independently verify the correctness of the State’s nuclear material accounting and operating records and reports that are maintained by the facility operators and the SSAC. This requires that the State provide accu­rate and complete declarations on all nuclear material and facilities/LOFs in order that appropriate safeguards measures can be implemented and relevant IAEA verification activities completed.

The IAEA verification activities for a NNWS with only a CSA in force are performed in accordance with prescribed requirements.[51] The technical requirements specify the activities considered necessary by the IAEA to provide a reasonable probability of detecting the diversion of a significant quantity of nuclear material from declared facilities and locations outside facilities. These IAEA verification activities are carried out during inspec­tions and design information examination/verification visits.

Under a CSA, there are three types of inspections, each with defined IAEA access. In simple terms, these include:

1. Ad hoc inspections, which typically are made to verify a State’s initial report on the nuclear material subject to safeguards, or reports on changes thereto, and to verify the nuclear material involved in interna­tional transfers. The IAEA’s right of access is to any location where the

initial report, or any inspections carried out in connection with it, indi­cate that nuclear material is present.

2. Routine inspections, which are carried out to verify the declared nuclear material and to verify the consistency of the Operator’s records with the State’s reports. These inspections may be conducted according to a defined schedule or they may be of an unannounced (or short-notice) character.47 IAEA access is limited to strategic points defined in the relevant Subsidiary Arrangements and to locations with relevant records.

3. Special inspections, which may be carried out in circumstances according to defined procedures, if the IAEA considers that information made available by the State concerned, including explanations from the State and information obtained from routine inspections, is not adequate for the Agency to fulfil its responsibilities under the safeguards agreement. Access to information and/or to locations other than those specified for ad hoc and routine inspections may be made.

In addition to the above inspections, design information verification visits (called DIVs) to nuclear facilities may be conducted. Such visits would occur at appropriate times during the lifecycle of a declared facility, in order that the IAEA can verify the safeguards-relevant design information. For example, such visits may be carried out as follows:

• During construction of a nuclear power plant to determine the com­pleteness of the declared design information

• Periodically during routine facility operations and/or following a plant maintenance outage to confirm that no safeguards-relevant modifica­tion was made to the NPP that would allow unreported activities to take place

• As part of a facility decommissioning to confirm that essential equip­ment was removed or rendered unusable.

The information above is intended to be a helpful addition to understanding the State’s safeguards obligations referred to in Milestones 1-3 in the IAEA Milestones document (IAEA, 2007a).

H.-H. ROGNER, International Atomic Energy Agency

(IAEA), Austria

Abstract: The economics of nuclear power are reviewed from the perspectives of investments, finance and overall competitiveness versus alternatives on a life-cycle basis. Nuclear power plants, once built, are cheap to operate but their construction is expensive, and with current commercially available unit sizes they represent a sizable financial exposure and economic risks to investors. Long lead times for planning, licensing and construction as well as payback periods counted in decades further compound investor risks. Policies that reward environmental performance generally improve the competitiveness of nuclear power. The chapter touches upon direct economic costs as well as externalities and government policy in support of the technology.

Key words: nuclear power economics, finance, generating cost, externalities.

15.1 Introduction

I. SALTER, P. ROBINSON, M. FREEMAN and J. JAGASIA, Burges Salmon LLP, UK

Abstract: This chapter analyses how the environmental impacts of nuclear new build are taken into account in government policy, planning decisions and the regulation of plants at all stages in their lifecycles, summarises the legal regime that underpins the requirement for strategic environmental assessments and environmental impact assessments, and considers the key features of land use planning systems and regulatory systems and the role that they play in the control of environmental impacts.

Keywords: strategic environmental assessment, environmental impact assessment, land use planning, environmental regulation, nuclear new build.

17.1 Introduction

The risk of harm to the natural and human environment associated with nuclear installations is undeniably significant, and thus requires proper management. Uncontrolled discharges of radioactive waste will necessarily cause chemical and biological disruption to local ecology and biodiversity, unregulated exposure to radiation is medically proven to pose risks to human health, and the severe environmental consequences of incidents such as Three Mile Island (United States, 1979) and Chernobyl (Soviet Union (Ukraine), 1986) have demonstrated that nuclear operations can have significant implications for internal relations. As a result, there has been long-standing social and political opposition to the development of new nuclear installations on the basis of environmental impacts. The recent events at the Fukushima Daiichi No.1 nuclear plant (Japan, 2011) have served as a stark reminder of the risks associated with nuclear installations, and many countries around the world have paused to reflect on their own national nuclear programmes.

In order to recognise and address these concerns, legal systems, national, supranational and international, have had to develop and evolve suitable processes and mechanisms to ensure not only that the safety of nuclear installations is maximised, but also that the public has the fullest confidence that a thorough consideration of environmental impacts has been fully integrated in the development and planning process. Many jurisdictions now reflect certain internationally accepted legal mechanisms, the primary function of which is to ensure that national public authorities carry out a series of environmental assessments before a decision is taken as to whether to authorise the development of new installations. These assessments will identify the likely environmental impacts of the project, and suggest ways of mitigating these impacts. In addition, the land use planning system is employed in most civil nuclear jurisdictions to decide whether or not new developments should be approved. Amongst other things, planning bodies will take into account the findings of environmental assessments (and other environmental impacts brought to their attention) in their decisions and the resulting conditions that are imposed on successful applicants.

This chapter aims to identify the key procedural and substantive aspects of two types of environmental assessment, and then to demonstrate how environmental impacts associated with nuclear installations are reflected by national planning authorities in their decision making and subsequently regulated throughout the life of an installation.

The analysis of the radiological impact on the surrounding population and the environment requires the analysis of the vectors causing the dispersion of radioactive nuclides, i. e. the wind and the water, the use of the land and water bodies, the food chain pathways, population distribution and habits. All these studies will serve to limit the radioactive releases to air and water in such a way that the safety objectives are fulfilled in normal operation and countermeasures introduced into the design basis to limit the conse­quences from accidental releases of radioactive nuclides.

The principle on the feasibility of the emergency plans is offered in the following way:

The technical requirements (TR) document is where the owner specifies the technical requirements applicable by the supplier to the plant design, licensing, procurement, construction, commissioning, operation and main­tenance, and which shall be taken into account by the bidders in the prepa­ration of their bids.

19.8.1 Main topics

The main topics addressed in the TR document are as follows:

• Applicable codes, standards and regulatory requirements

• Licensing requirements and procedures

• Site data, including geography and topography, geology, geotechnical and seismic information, methodology and environment (including site ambient and cooling water temperatures and humidity), demography, site access

• Design criteria and requirements for all project disciplines (e. g. civil — structural, mechanical, electrical, instrumentation and control, radiation protection, nuclear safety)

• Material requirements

• Requirements and specifications for plant structures, systems and equipment

• Power grid requirements

• Construction and erection

• Plant operation and maintenance

• Nuclear fuel requirements, including length of fuel cycle, spent fuel storage, refuelling operations

• Plant simulator requirements

• Personnel training.

The construction license establishes the prerequisites under which the com­missioning of a plant is conducted. These conditions include arrangements under which the RB will specify what is to be done, conditions under which approval must be given and where consent has to be sought before moving to the next stage of commissioning. Chapter 22 covers the activities to be conducted during commissioning.

Well before the end of construction, the licensee makes and implements adequate arrangements for commissioning the NPP, mainly with regard to those processes that may affect safety. Such arrangements need the approval of the RB. These arrangements provide documentation to justify the safety of the proposed commissioning. It is recommended that the licensee appoints a suitably qualified person or persons to control, witness, record and assess the results of any tests carried out in accordance with the require­ments of the commissioning arrangements. The licensee should ensure that full and accurate records are kept of the result of every test and operation carried out in pursuance of these requirements.

The RB considers the proposed arrangements for commissioning very closely and makes preparations for licensing this phase, and for witnessing the nuclear tests that are to be performed and analyzed. The RB creates a commissioning group with experience on the subject but, if that experience is missing, outsiders can be hired (usually commissioning experts from the RB in the country of origin of the project). Nevertheless, responsibility for making an analysis of the commissioning programme, establishing the limits and conditions for their conduct, witnessing the tests and accepting the results remains with the RB.

It is customary to divide the commissioning into stages. If the RB so specifies, the licensee should not commence commissioning, or proceed from one stage to the next, without the consent of the RB. The licensee should ensure that, once approved, no alteration or amendment is made to the arrangements unless the RB agrees to such alteration or amendment. The commissioning phase is terminated when all foreseen tests have been successfully conducted and approved by the RB.

The long-term commitment and involvement of the corresponding govern­mental organizations (ministries such as the Department of Trade and Industry, Energy Planning Commission, etc.) is very important in order to guarantee the adequate development of the nuclear infrastructure needed for the country.

This commitment will provide credibility for the nuclear programme investors whose involvement is critical to support policies on human resources development, technology selection (‘justification process’), licens­ing and regulation development, national infrastructure needs and the nec­essary international agreements related to nuclear power. A minimum number of highly qualified personnel will be necessary at this level.

The ENEF is a unique platform for a broad discussion on transparency issues as well as the opportunities and risks of nuclear energy. Founded in 2007, ENEF gathers all relevant stakeholders in the nuclear field: govern­ments of the 27 EU Member States, European institutions including the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee, nuclear industry, electricity consumers and the civil society.

Within ENEF there exists a Working Group concerning education and training in the Permanent European Human Resources Observatory.

In addition to maintenance and surveillance checks on various equipment and instrumentation items, it is necessary to undertake special periodic in­service inspection (ISI) of certain structures and components that are criti­cal for safety and continued operation of the NPP and are not easily replaceable. ISI results form an important input for the ageing assessment of systems, structures and components for long-term operation of the reactor. Examples of ISI are the assessment of the extent of radiation — induced embrittlement of the reactor pressure vessel through periodic examination of test coupons installed for the purpose, integrated leak rate testing of the reactor containment, periodic assessment of loss of prestress­ing in the reactor containment building, checking of steam generator tubes for thinning and existence of flaws, periodic examination of welds in the primary coolant pressure boundary, and checking of critical piping of the primary and secondary coolant system and steam system for loss of thick­ness or any fatigue-induced degradation. ISI is done by highly trained personnel using special techniques such as ultrasonic testing, eddy current testing and radiography. Some of the inspections, such as those of test coupons for reactor pressure vessel health assessment, may have to be carried out in hot cells of post-irradiation examination laboratories. Thus it is necessary to develop technical competence in the operating organization and in the technical support organization such that ISI can be done follow­ing specified standards and the inspection results can be properly inter­preted to arrive at important decisions concerning long-term operation of the NPP