The preparation of the BIS is a complex undertaking that requires the integrated contribution of a multidisciplinary group of experts covering the various disciplines involved in a nuclear project (e. g. licensing, nuclear safety, nuclear, mechanical, electrical, instrumentation and control (I&C), civil-structural, procurement, construction, commissioning, operation and maintenance, quality assurance (QA), legal, contracting, commercial, financ­ing). Depending on the experience available, the owner’s organisation and the availability of the required resources, the BIS may be prepared either by the owner’s own personnel or with the assistance of an experienced outside architect-engineering (A/E) or consultancy company.

In the event that an external A/E or consultancy company is used, it should act in an advisory role. This means that it is highly recommendable that a parallel owner’s team supervise, review and follow up the work per­formed by the external companies assisting the owner with the BIS prepara­tion and take final responsibility for the decisions taken.

The composition of the team preparing the BIS will depend on the con­tractual approach. For a plant to be contracted on a turnkey basis, a team composed of 20 to 30 experts should be sufficient. The more segregated the procurement approach for plant acquisition, the more effort will be required on the part of the team. If the plant is contracted using large, split-package contracts (e. g. the NI separate from the TI), however, although the process would take longer, the resources required would not be substantially greater.

Six to eight months is a reasonable period for preparing the BIS. This would include the preparation of BIS criteria by the owner, preparation of several drafts of the BIS documents by the external A/E, review of the draft documents by the owner, and incorporation of the owner’s comments into

the documents by the A/E. This process is completed by a final review and

approval of the complete BIS by the owner’s management in time for

issuing the BIS to prospective vendors.

When licensing a nuclear power plant, some general safety considerations as well as detailed requirements have to be taken into account. Some of the most relevant general considerations are:

• The plant and the site on which it will be built are closely related and have a mutual interaction. There should not be any unacceptable adverse impact from plant operation on the site and, similarly, no unacceptable adverse impacts from site characteristics on the safety of the plant.

• There is assurance of control of reactivity, reactor core cooling and containment of radioactivity; these three basic safety functions have to be achieved at all times, under all design basis conditions including design basis accidents. For beyond design basis accident conditions, it should also be possible to control the progression of an accident and mitigate its consequences.

• There is a close relationship between the safety of the NPP and the persons operating it, i. e., the human-machine interface. It is therefore important that the plant is operated by well-trained and qualified per­sonnel to ensure that the plant operating configuration and its process parameters are kept within the safety envelope and license conditions prescribed by the RB.

• Security measures and emergency preparedness plans should be in place and tested satisfactorily before nuclear fuel is loaded in the core.

Various other licensing requirements should be clearly prescribed by the RB for each one of the phases in the life of the plant. When a license is given in sequential steps, each step normally includes an explanation of the basic requirements for the following step. Some of these requirements include the following:

• The regulatory process for the various stages of licensing of the NPP should be clearly laid down by the RB in a formal manner that should include a list of technical documents to be submitted by the applicant, the lead time for their submission, the list of safety requirements and standards to comply with, and the methodology for their detailed review within the RB.

• The Site Evaluation Report (SER), the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) and the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) are the primary documents submitted by the applicant to the RB in support of the site, construction and operating license applications, respectively. These reports and their supporting technical documents should meet the RB’s specifications and should be of a high quality and in sufficient detail.

• The RB should carry out inspections during manufacture of safety — related components to confirm that they meet the prescribed standards. Likewise, the RB will conduct periodic inspections of the NPP during its construction phase to ensure that the construction of the safety — related systems, structures and components (SSC) meets the safety and quality standards.

• On completion of construction, management of the NPP is transferred from a construction group to a commissioning and operations group. The licensee submits an application to the RB for authorization of commissioning activities, according to a well-defined sequence and detailed procedures for all activities. After a satisfactory review, the RB authorizes commissioning. Initial fuel loading in the reactor core marks the start of operations and hence needs authorization from the RB. At this stage, a complete operational discipline must be in force with a full complement of trained and authorized operational personnel in position, along with security and emergency plans satisfac­torily tested and in place. Subsequently, the RB authorizes the raising of the reactor power in predefined steps, each step being reviewed as appropriate.

• During the operational phase of the NPP, the RB reviews periodic operational reports, accounts on safety-related incidents and ageing status of the SSCs to confirm that the NPP continues to successfully meet the applicable license conditions and current safety standards.

• At the end of its operating life, the NPP is decommissioned, though only after the RB issues a license for this purpose after a review of the decommissioning plan.

A strategy needs to be developed for licensing of a country’s first NPP to meet the project schedule, while maintaining a high level of quality in the licensing process. Significant assistance from an ER and use of the safety evaluation of the reference NPP during the design safety review are the key elements that should be appropriately included in the strategic plan.

The time available between award of contract for setting up the NPP and start of its construction are likely to be insufficient for a detailed review of the PSAR. A possible approach could be to divide the PSAR review work into suitable sub-stages. A brief review of the PSAR can be conducted, focusing on the differences in design from that of the reference NPP and ensuring that the design safety criteria are met, to ensure the award of the license to start construction.

Detailed review of the PSAR can be carried out in parallel with civil construction work at the site but should be completed before the start of activities that cannot be reversed, e. g. the erection of major equipment like the reactor pressure vessel and the steam generators. It should also be completed well before commissioning activities are undertaken. The requirements of licensing and the schedule of technical submissions by the applicant should be clearly identified in advance for each sub-stage of licensing.

20.7 Acknowledgements

The authors acknowledge John Moares, independent consultant, author of Chapter 5, ‘Responsibilities of the nuclear operator in nuclear power pro­grammes’, and Erwin Lindauer, independent consultant, author of Appendix 4 ‘Simulator training for nuclear power plant control room personnel’, for their valid inputs to the Appendix on ‘Examples of licensing systems’ and their comments and suggestions for this chapter.

Periodic staff appraisals and personnel performance management pro­grammes are important in the process of determining training and develop­ment needs and for assessing the potential of individuals for future roles in the organisation. It is important therefore that managers and supervisors conduct them objectively and effectively as their importance merits.

5.1.9 Continuing training

Continuing training can be in two forms, refresher training or remedial training. Refresher training is systematically determined in the SAT process and is designed to ensure that personnel maintain the knowledge and skills vital to the safe and effective execution of the tasks assigned to them and to enhance their performance. Plant modifications and/or involvement in infrequently performed tasks and operations evolution can also give rise to the need for such training.

Remedial training can be determined from event investigations, peer reviews or staff appraisals, for example.

142 Infrastructure and methodologies for justification of NPPs

Lifespans of nuclear power plants significantly exceed the working life of a single generation of plant staff. This presents the challenge of retaining knowledge and operating experience as the workforce ages and new gen­erations of personnel are hired. This area, termed ‘knowledge management’, is particularly important in establishing both information databases and the transfer of knowledge and experience to new personnel.

Key considerations related to knowledge management are:

• Selection, copying, and reclassification of documents from one step applicable to the next, such as licensing documents, construction details, operating experience and design modifications

• Retention of personnel with knowledge of especially important aspects applicable to the next step. Technicians involved in commissioning for the operation and maintenance of the plant, or operators or key main­tenance technicians for decommissioning

• Programme for the transfer of know-how to other workers, through on-the-job training, mentoring and other techniques to complement the formal training.

The subject of knowledge management is treated in more detail in IAEA (2004).

After consideration of the above criteria, the selected site has to be checked for its engineerability to meet the safety requirements, given its character­istics such as its seismicity, geology, hydrology, soil characteristics and vul­nerability to flooding. These assessments can be made by local experts with appropriate outside support where required. Another consideration in site selection should address the capability of the site to host future NPPs. The reason is that worldwide it is now recognized that it is advantageous to install several NPP units at one site, the ‘cluster concept’ as it is called. This concept facilitates better utilization of the infrastructure developed at the site including the trained manpower available readily. While doing this, due consideration has to be given to factors like the adequacy of the ultimate heat sink, sharing of systems between the units, and feasibility of construc­tion of new units with one or more units in operation at the site. Security implications of the presence of a large construction force including contrac­tor personnel at the site with operating units in existence also need to be addressed. One other benefit of the cluster concept is that a nuclear training centre including a training simulator for NPP units of the same design can be established at the site to cater to the manpower training requirements. Experienced personnel from the operating units who will be readily avail­able to impart training to newcomers will be another advantage for the functioning of the training centre at such a site.

The site should also be checked from the consideration of storage and disposal of radioactive waste that will be generated from the operation of the NPP. In case it is planned to have the waste repository at a different location, it should be ensured that temporary storage of the waste at the site is feasible before it is shipped out.

The radiation dose to the public, by both direct as well as indirect expo­sure pathways, should be ensured to be well within the prescribed limits. Appropriate apportionment of the committed radiation dose to the public for the first NPP unit should be done, keeping sufficient reserve for future units that are planned to be installed at the site. The site should also be amenable for implementation of countermeasures that may be required in the unlikely event of an accident with significant impact in the public domain.

A detailed radiological survey of the environment around the site should be carried out well before the start of the NPP operation towards establishing the background radiation levels. These surveys should then be carried out periodically after the NPP goes into operation to assess the radiological impact of plant operation on the site. It is useful to establish an environmental survey laboratory for this purpose. Such surveys involve measuring very low background radiation levels and extremely low levels of radioactivity in samples of soil, air, water, vegetation and food items. To carry out such measurements a good deal of expertise using sophisticated instruments is required and the instruments have also to be calibrated periodically using standards. Towards ensuring correctness of measure­ments a good practice is to engage in intercomparison exercises with other laboratories carrying out similar work. As the environmental survey work starts before the NPP is established and continues throughout the operating life of the NPP and beyond, it is important that national expertise in this field is developed early and maintained at the state-of-the-art level.

The work done for the siting of the first NPP should be utilized to further augment the expertise in this field in the operating organization and the regulatory body as well as the technical support organizations, taking into account new technological developments and worldwide experience in siting. This will be of immense use in siting future NPPs as also during periodic safety review of operating units towards ensuring that the site continues to meet the current siting criteria.

Nuclear science and technology is highly demanding intellectually, and nuclear deployment requires a high level of expertise in human resources (as presented in Chapter 6 of this book). Past experience has shown that the introduction of nuclear power in a country can be the driver for the establishment of new educational programmes, scientific and technological institutions, and organizations and research centres. As nuclear science and technology also have other uses, these new institutions and activities can be considered beneficial for a country as a whole.

The stagnation of nuclear development created in many countries after the Three Mile Island unit 2 (TMI-2) and Chernobyl-4 accidents was imme­diately detected in educational systems. Nuclear courses that were very prominent and well attended in the 1970s and during the first half of the 1980s in European and American universities almost completely disap­peared. Most of the high-level experts prominent in those years are now entering retirement age, and thus a gap in high-level human resources is growing. This situation has been recognized by international and suprana­tional organizations such as the IAEA, the NEA/OECD and the European Council, as well as by leading nuclear technology countries. INSAG has also voiced its concern over the need for human resources in nuclear safety research (INSAG, 2003) and new educational programmes have been created to cope with the situation.

The IAEA has created a new series of teaching modules and materials which are described in Appendix 3 of this book. A World Nuclear University (WNU) was created within the World Nuclear Association (WNA) and the World Association of Nuclear Operators, which also has the support of the

IAEA and the NEA/OECD, and which includes leading universities and nuclear education institutions in more than 30 countries. The WNU is a ‘global partnership committed to enhancing international education and leadership in peaceful applications of nuclear science and technology’.

Similarly, in Europe, a programme (within the fifth framework pro­gramme for research and training activities) was launched on high-level nuclear engineering education, giving rise to the European Nuclear Education Network (ENEN), a non-profit association formed in 2003. As of March 2011, the ENEN has 60 members and partners in 18 EU countries, South Africa, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and Japan, consisting of 33 effective members, primarily academics, and 27 associate members, includ­ing nuclear research centres, industries and regulatory bodies.

A similar organization, the Asian Network for Education in Nuclear Technology (ANENT), was created within the auspices of the IAEA to serve the Asian countries, ‘to promote, manage and preserve nuclear knowl­edge and to ensure the continued availability of talented and qualified human resources in the nuclear field in the Asian region and to enhance the quality of the resources for sustainability of nuclear technology’. As of May 2011, the ANENT network had 17 State Members, six Collaborating Members and six potential Collaborating Members. In a similar way, many countries are fostering high-level nuclear education with positive results, and education and training at the technician level has also been fostered in many countries and organizations.

Research and development also declined during the stagnant period following the TMI-2 and Chernobyl-4 accidents, with the exception of research into severe accidents, nuclear safety research into operating nuclear power plants, and the management of radioactive waste and used fuel. Research on severe accidents was increased in the USA after the TMI-2 accident within an international context initiated by the International LOFT Project. Research projects were undertaken on all associated phe­nomena, including an investigation of the behaviour of the molten core when outside the pressure vessel. The knowledge gained has been used to improve the design of new reactors and presented at many national and international conferences, as part of the Euratom-driven FISA meetings (FISA, 2001, 2003, 2006).

Nuclear safety research into how to operate nuclear power plants is nec­essary to understand the ageing mechanism and to provide information for the longer-term operation of these plants. The NEA is the international organization of reference, publishing documents on research needs. INSAG has also expressed concerns about the importance of nuclear safety research (INSAG, 2003).

Countries with already operating nuclear power plants as well as new entrants building their first nuclear power plants should boost education at university and vocational level, and reinforce or create nuclear research centres, participating in international research projects commensurate with their needs. There will be direct and indirect benefits as a result of such efforts. Once a nuclear power plant is transferred from the reactor supplier to a national operating organization, the primary responsibility for its oper­ation rests within the licensee, under the supervision of the regulatory authority. That responsibility requires knowledge and expertise and cannot easily be transferred to contractors.

Knowledge and expertise of nuclear matters also gives indirect benefits such as an improvement of the scientific and technical development of the country, which can be applied to other industries and activities. An evalua­tion of these benefits can be made by analysing the technical and scientific developments which other former entrant countries have achieved.

SMART is a 300 MWt/100 MWe integral-type PWR designed by KAERI in the Republic of Korea. SMART incorporates inherent safety features such as the integral configuration of the reactor coolant system, its improved natural circulation capability, a passive residual heat removal system and an advanced LOCA mitigation system. SMART has a low power density core that uses 5 w/o UO2 and results in a thermal margin of more than 15% to accommodate any design basis transients with regard to the critical heat flux. SMART has been conceived as a multipurpose energy source including non-electric applications such as seawater desalination, district heating or other industrial applications.

This term is used to identify abnormal events that are initiated from outside the nuclear station. Some examples are earthquakes, tornadoes, aircraft crashes, and floods. The plant can be protected from many of these events before the fact by careful location and investigation of the potential conse­quences of their occurrence combined with the estimated probabilities. The designer is expected to provide either passive or active defence against such events; the acceptability of these provisions is one of the major components of regulatory review for approval of a nuclear station site.

Recent events (e. g. earthquakes and tsunamis at the plants at Kashiwazaki and Daiichi in Japan) have underlined the importance of seismicity in plan­ning for location of a nuclear station, and for the facilities needed for its protection. Specifically, the Daiichi situation highlights the hazards of the operating state known as ‘station blackout’, meaning the total loss of electri­cal power for an extended time period. Other external events may prove to be equally important in different situations.

The World Nuclear Association (WNA, 2010) is the international organiza­tion that promotes nuclear energy and supports the many companies that comprise the global nuclear industry.

WNA arose on the foundations of the Uranium Institute (UI) established in London in 1975 as a forum on the market for nuclear fuel. In 2001, spurred by the expanding prospects for nuclear power, the UI changed its name and mandated itself to build a wider membership and a greater diver­sity of activities. The goal was to develop a truly global organization geared to perform a full range of international roles to support the nuclear industry in fulfilling its enormous growth potential in the twenty-first century.

Since WNA’s creation in 2001, the effort to build and diversify has born fruit. WNA membership has expanded three-fold to encompass (1) virtually all world uranium mining, conversion, enrichment and fuel fabrication; (2) all reactor vendors; (3) major nuclear engineering, construction, and waste management companies; and (4) nearly 90% of world nuclear generation. Other WNA members provide international services in nuclear transport, law, insurance, brokerage, industry analysis and finance. WNA will remain a work in progress. Its rapid growth reflects recognized value and represents major advance in building toward universal industry membership. Today WNA serves its membership, and the world nuclear industry as a whole, through actions to:

• Provide a global forum for sharing knowledge and insight on evolving industry developments

• Strengthen industry operational capabilities by advancing best-practice internationally

• Speak authoritatively for the nuclear industry in key international forums

• Improve the international policy and public environment in which the industry operates.