A mature nuclear energy system includes a large number of people and related organizations. However, one finds that there is a common basic structure needed for successful conduct of any program. This is here identi­fied as the safety management system.

Nuclear safety in nuclear power programs 303 Safety management system

Maintaining and improving nuclear energy’s safety record requires careful attention to authorities and responsibilities so that safety responsibility is always placed only along with commensurate authority. Proper assignment of responsibility and authority is the very foundation of safety. Note that a very similar description of the roles of various groups in plant operation can be found in INSAG-13 (1999b).

The fact that safety is an operational matter places the operating company in the central position of safety responsibility. Figure 10.1 shows the rela­tionship between the operating company and the other major participants. This is not an organization chart, but is used to indicate the relationship of authority and responsibility between the main participants. The top report­ing relationship is to the public. Supporting roles are played by technocrats on one side and by bureaucracies on the other side — the safety tribunal authority and the safety performance regulator.

The first level of safety is always to be found in the education and training of all those involved in the nuclear energy enterprise, from designers to senior management and finally to junior operating staff. The concept of safety culture (INSAG-4, 1991) is carefully fostered in the industry, to build and sustain the habits of management and job execution that are known to support safe operation of the system.

Current radiation protection approaches acknowledge the importance of protecting not only humans but also the environment. Previously the concern focused on mankind’s environment only with regard to the transfer of radionuclides through it, mainly in the context of planned exposure situ­ations. In such situations, the standards of environmental control needed to protect the general public would ensure that other species are not placed at risk. To provide a sound framework for environmental protection in all exposure situations, there has been proposed the use of ‘reference animals

Bands or constraints and reference levels (mSv) Characteristics of the exposure situation Radiological protection requirements Examples Greater than 20 Individuals are exposed by sources Consideration should be given to reducing Reference level set to 100bc that are not controllable, or where actions to reduce doses would be disproportionately disruptive. Exposures are usually controlled by action on the exposure pathways. doses. Increasing efforts should be made to reduce doses as they approach 100 mSv. Individuals should receive information on radiation risk and on the actions to reduce doses. Assessment of individual doses should be undertaken. for the highest planned residual dose from a radiological emergency. Greater than 1 Individuals will usually receive benefit Where possible, general information Constraints set for to 20 from the exposure situation but not necessarily from the exposure itself. Exposures may be controlled at source or, alternatively, by action in the exposure pathways. should be made available to enable individuals to reduce their doses. For planned situations, individual assessment of exposure and training should take place. occupational exposure in planned situations. 1 or less Individuals arc exposed to a source that gives them little or no individual benefit but benefits to society in general. Exposures are usually controlled by action taken directly on the source for which radiological protection requirements can be planned in advance. General information on the level of exposure should be made available. Periodic checks should be made on the exposure pathways as to the level of exposure. Constraints set for public exposure in planned situations.

and plants’. In order to establish a basis for acceptability, additional doses calculated to these reference organisms could be compared with doses known to have specific biological effects and with dose rates normally experienced in the natural environment. Nobody, however, is proposing to set any form of ‘dose limits’ for environmental protection.

It should be recognized that until recently the word environment itself was absent in normal parlance and, unsurprisingly, concerns for environ­mental protection are a relatively new phenomenon. The term ‘environ­ment’ derives from the old French environ, ‘surroundings’, from en ‘in’ + viron ‘circuit’, strictly referring to the surroundings of an object. More recently it has evolved to mean the surroundings or conditions in which a person, animal or plant lives or operates and, even more recently, it has become equated to the natural world, especially as affected by human activ­ity. It will certainly take time to develop comprehensive protection doc­trines for such a relatively contemporary concept, one that encompasses this relatively new human apprehension. Over the last years, two fundamen­tal environmental protection approaches (rather than ethics) are being constructed: the so-termed biocentrism and ecocentrism.

In spite of this apparent vacuum of an environmental protection ethics, some basic principles are being developed for protecting not only humans but also the environment in itself from the detrimental effects of radiation exposure. The aim is to ensure that the development and application of approaches to environmental protection are compatible with those for radiological protection of humans, and with those for protection of the environment from other potential hazards (IAEA, 2005b).

As indicated heretofore, within the context of planned exposure situa­tions, the standards of environmental control needed to protect the general public should ensure that other species in the human habitat are not placed at risk. However, the situation could be different in emergency and existing situations and in the environment at large. Thus, the radiation protection community is adhering to some international basic environmental protec­tion objectives such as:

• to maintain biological diversity

• to ensure the conservation of species

• to protect the health and status of natural habitats, communities and ecosystems.

Under these premises, a framework for assessing the impact of ionizing radiation on non-human species (ICRP, 2003) and the techniques for imple­mentation (ICRP, 2008) have been recommended by ICRP.

Ultimately, the protection of the environment from radiation exposure will be achieved through international efforts for restricting discharges of radioactive substances (Gonzalez, 2005).

360 Infrastructure and methodologies for justification of NPPs

M. S. PELLECHI, International Atomic Energy Agency

(IAEA), Austria

Abstract: This chapter explores non-proliferation from the point of view of international safeguards and recommends what ‘newcomers’ should be familiar with if they are to successfully assess, manage or participate in the expanded use of nuclear energy. It provides a basic understanding of the safeguards requirements to be addressed by stakeholders, and offers some technical guidance and advice on safeguards-relevant operational measures that may be taken. The subject matter is presented in simplified terms, such that it may be of particular benefit to stakeholders with limited or no nuclear energy experience.

Key words: International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT, safeguards, non-proliferation, safeguards agreement, additional protocol, state system of accounting for and control of nuclear material, SSAC.

13.1 Introduction

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (otherwise known as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or NPT) was brought into force in part out of a desire to contain the spread of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons technology, while legitimizing the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The text of the NPT can be found in INFCIRC/140 (IAEA, 1970). From a global perspective, an increasing number of countries are today assessing, or plan to include, the use of nuclear power as part of the mix of sustainable energy sources. According to Amano (2010), the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in excess of 20 countries

This chapter is the copyright of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and is reproduced by the Publisher with the IAEA’s permission. Any further use or reproduction of the chapter, in whole or in part, requires the permission of the IAEA. The chapter has been written by a staff member of the IAEA in his personal capacity and not on behalf of the IAEA or the Director General of the IAEA. The views expressed in the chapter are not necessarily those of the IAEA and that the IAEA disclaims all liability in connection with the chapter and any use made thereof.

might very well bring their first nuclear power plant online within the next 20 years. Towards that end, the IAEA, one of the specialized agencies1 of the United Nations (UN), has established a website dedicated to helping Member States develop a nuclear power infrastructure. Readers of this chapter may want to familiarize themselves with some of the authoritative publications, specifically IAEA (2007a) and IAEA (2008a), as the informa­tion contained in them will assist in gaining an understanding of where safeguards fits into the development of a State’s nuclear power infrastruc­ture. An overview of the IAEA Safeguards System can be found in footnote.[10] [11]

If, as projected, any manner of a nuclear renaissance is realized, it is expected that some of these States will be developing countries. And therein arises a necessity for the safeguarding of nuclear material and facilities in countries that previously had very limited or no experience with the nuclear fuel cycle and international safeguards. As indicated in the IAEA (2007a) ‘Milestones’ publication, it is essential for all concerned stakeholders to understand the safeguards requirements and obligations, in addition to the other 18 topical areas requiring commitment and resources.

This chapter’s objective is to provide guidance to stakeholders with an understanding of what is needed for the effective implementation of safe­guards, when it is needed, and how, through the transparent application of safeguards, they may advance their interests in the peaceful use of nuclear energy nationally and internationally. It begins with a discussion on the underlying safeguards requirements as they derive from the NPT. The chapter examines, in general terms, the international non-proliferation obli­gations of countries/stakeholders within the context of a comprehensive safeguards agreement (IAEA, 1972) and additional protocol (IAEA, 1997a). Together with examples of the application of safeguards measures, the chapter explores the establishment of an effective state system of accounting for and control of nuclear material, and offers some technical perspective on the NPT and the IAEA. It also provides a brief discussion on transparency and the future of safeguards.

Each subsection of the chapter is self-contained which, while building on the previous subsection(s), can be read in a stand-alone fashion for quick reference. Nevertheless, an underlying theme throughout the subsections is that stated intentions alone are not enough to assure the global community that any new pursuit or expansion of a civilian nuclear option is entirely for peaceful purposes. The chapter is written with the presumption that it is primarily through demonstrable, transparent actions by prospective govern­ments and nuclear facility operators that a country convinces its stakehold­ers that their efforts represent a positive, peaceful use of nuclear material and technology.

A short glossary of frequently used terms is provided below (IAEA, 2001, and IAEA Statute, Article XX: Definitions):

• Additional Protocol (AP): A protocol additional to a safeguards agree­ment (or agreements) concluded between the IAEA and a State, or group of States, following the provisions of the Model Additional Protocol. The Model Additional Protocol provides for those measures for strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of IAEA safeguards which could not be implemented under the legal authority of safeguards agreements.

• Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA): An agreement that applies safeguards on all nuclear material in all nuclear activities in a State.

• Facility: A reactor, a critical facility, a conversion plant, a fabrication plant, a reprocessing plant, an isotope separation plant or a separate storage installation; or any location where nuclear material in amounts greater than one effective kilogram is customarily used.

• Location Outside Facilities (LOF): Any installation or location, which is not a facility, where nuclear material is customarily used in amounts of one effective kilogram or less.

• Nuclear material: Any source material or special fissionable material as defined in Article XX of IAEA Statute.

• Source material: Uranium containing the mixture of isotopes occurring in nature; uranium depleted in the isotope 235; thorium; any of the foregoing in the form of metal, alloy, chemical compound, or concen­trate; any other material containing one or more of the foregoing in such concentration as the Board of Governors shall from time to time deter­mine; and such other material as the Board of Governors shall from time to time determine.

• Special fissionable material: Plutonium-239; uranium-233; uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233; any material containing one or more of the foregoing; and such other fissionable material as the Board of Governors shall from time to time determine; but the term ‘special fis­sionable material’ does not include source material.

• Uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233: Uranium containing the isotopes 235 or 233 or both in an amount such that the abundance ratio

of the sum of these isotopes to the isotope 238 is greater than the ratio

of the isotope 235 to the isotope 238 occurring in nature.

A closed reactor can in its entirety be seen as waste, and the decommission­ing and dismantling process can be seen as waste management. A key component in the management process is to segregate non-radioactive waste from radioactive waste. The larger part of the reactor, e. g. buildings and systems that have not been in contact with process waters or gases, can be regarded as non-radioactive waste and be taken care of like normal industrial waste. The remaining radioactive waste covers a wide spectrum of types and activity concentrations, ranging from core components with a very high radiation level to very low-level waste, similar to the maintenance waste.

A key component for successful decommissioning and dismantling is an effective and well-planned waste management system including choosing the right size of the waste packages and the right level of decontamination. The optimal levels will differ between countries depending on their entire waste management system, in particular the transport system and disposal facility and the possibilities of recycling decontaminated material. Ideally, recycled material should be used without restrictions, but also some mate­rial with a radioactivity concentration above the release limit could be recycled in the nuclear industry for waste packages or some reactor components.

While currently not included in standard electricity cost accounting schemes, decision makers should be aware of cost factors imposed on the public by the production and use of electricity. These costs are real and a fair share have directly and indirectly been compensated by the public purse (or resulted in reduced government revenue). Since investors normally do not consider externalities in investment decision making, it falls upon gov­ernment policy to ‘internalize the external costs’ of the health and environ­mental damages resulting from power generation. In fact, in the past, internalization has been imposed on electricity generation[99] but insuffi-

Wave and tidal CSP PV South PV Central Wind offshore Biofuel steam turbine Nuclear

Natural gas (with carbon capture and storage)

Natural gas

Lignite

Lignite LGCC Lignite LGCC (with carbon capture and storage)

Hard coal Hard coal IGCC

Hard coal IGCC (with carbon capture and storage)

0 10 20 30 40 50 60

Euro per MWh

15.12 External costs of different generating options. Adapted from Preiss and Friedrich (2009).

ciently by far for a full internalization.14 The most recent studies addressing life-cycle externalities from electricity generation show nuclear power as one of the technologies with the lowest externalities (Preiss and Friedrich, 2009; NRC, 2009). One of the externalities of nuclear power is the cost of a severe nuclear accident (e. g., Chernobyl or Fukushima). These are calcu­lated on a probabilistic basis (low probability — high consequence) and given the large amount of kWhs produced by nuclear power plants are still small despite the enormous damage costs of an accident. Figure 15.12 sum­marizes the findings of the NEEDS study (Preiss and Friedrich, 2009). Clearly, factoring these externalities into the price of electricity would fun­damentally change the merit order of generating options in favour of nuclear power and renewables.

Protection Administration (SEPA) in China, Directive 2001/77/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 September 2001 on the Promotion of Electricity Produced from Renewable Energy Sources that mandates the integration of more expensive, non-dispatchable electricity from renewables, the European Emissions Trading Directive (2003/87/EC), the Price-Anderson Indemnity Act which governs liability-related issues for all non-military nuclear facilities in the United States, the EU Directive on Nuclear Safety (2009/71/EURATOM) and the Kyoto Protocol limiting greenhouse gas emissions in industrialized countries.

14 There is a host of issues yet to be resolved ranging from attribution of damages to their monetary valuation.

540 Infrastructure and methodologies for justification of NPPs

The requirement in the UK to site nuclear power stations in coastal loca­tions can have an environmental impact on marine processes. Paragraph 4.4.1 of the draft NPS recognises this and provides that ‘the development and construction of new coastal and fluvial defences and possible marine landing jetties/docks could affect coastal processes, hydrodynamics and sediment transport processes at coastal and estuarine sites. These impacts could lead to localised or more widespread coastal erosion or accretion. There could also be changes to offshore features such as submerged banks and ridges and marine ecology.’ Applicants will be expected to identify, and develop, appropriate mitigation measures to address the impacts on marine biodiversity and coastal geomorphology in their EIA.

The preparation of the BIS is a complex undertaking that requires the integrated contribution of a multidisciplinary group of experts covering the various disciplines involved in a nuclear project (e. g. licensing, nuclear safety, nuclear, mechanical, electrical, instrumentation and control (I&C), civil-structural, procurement, construction, commissioning, operation and maintenance, quality assurance (QA), legal, contracting, commercial, financ­ing). Depending on the experience available, the owner’s organisation and the availability of the required resources, the BIS may be prepared either by the owner’s own personnel or with the assistance of an experienced outside architect-engineering (A/E) or consultancy company.

In the event that an external A/E or consultancy company is used, it should act in an advisory role. This means that it is highly recommendable that a parallel owner’s team supervise, review and follow up the work per­formed by the external companies assisting the owner with the BIS prepara­tion and take final responsibility for the decisions taken.

The composition of the team preparing the BIS will depend on the con­tractual approach. For a plant to be contracted on a turnkey basis, a team composed of 20 to 30 experts should be sufficient. The more segregated the procurement approach for plant acquisition, the more effort will be required on the part of the team. If the plant is contracted using large, split-package contracts (e. g. the NI separate from the TI), however, although the process would take longer, the resources required would not be substantially greater.

Six to eight months is a reasonable period for preparing the BIS. This would include the preparation of BIS criteria by the owner, preparation of several drafts of the BIS documents by the external A/E, review of the draft documents by the owner, and incorporation of the owner’s comments into

the documents by the A/E. This process is completed by a final review and

approval of the complete BIS by the owner’s management in time for

issuing the BIS to prospective vendors.

When licensing a nuclear power plant, some general safety considerations as well as detailed requirements have to be taken into account. Some of the most relevant general considerations are:

• The plant and the site on which it will be built are closely related and have a mutual interaction. There should not be any unacceptable adverse impact from plant operation on the site and, similarly, no unacceptable adverse impacts from site characteristics on the safety of the plant.

• There is assurance of control of reactivity, reactor core cooling and containment of radioactivity; these three basic safety functions have to be achieved at all times, under all design basis conditions including design basis accidents. For beyond design basis accident conditions, it should also be possible to control the progression of an accident and mitigate its consequences.

• There is a close relationship between the safety of the NPP and the persons operating it, i. e., the human-machine interface. It is therefore important that the plant is operated by well-trained and qualified per­sonnel to ensure that the plant operating configuration and its process parameters are kept within the safety envelope and license conditions prescribed by the RB.

• Security measures and emergency preparedness plans should be in place and tested satisfactorily before nuclear fuel is loaded in the core.

Various other licensing requirements should be clearly prescribed by the RB for each one of the phases in the life of the plant. When a license is given in sequential steps, each step normally includes an explanation of the basic requirements for the following step. Some of these requirements include the following:

• The regulatory process for the various stages of licensing of the NPP should be clearly laid down by the RB in a formal manner that should include a list of technical documents to be submitted by the applicant, the lead time for their submission, the list of safety requirements and standards to comply with, and the methodology for their detailed review within the RB.

• The Site Evaluation Report (SER), the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) and the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) are the primary documents submitted by the applicant to the RB in support of the site, construction and operating license applications, respectively. These reports and their supporting technical documents should meet the RB’s specifications and should be of a high quality and in sufficient detail.

• The RB should carry out inspections during manufacture of safety — related components to confirm that they meet the prescribed standards. Likewise, the RB will conduct periodic inspections of the NPP during its construction phase to ensure that the construction of the safety — related systems, structures and components (SSC) meets the safety and quality standards.

• On completion of construction, management of the NPP is transferred from a construction group to a commissioning and operations group. The licensee submits an application to the RB for authorization of commissioning activities, according to a well-defined sequence and detailed procedures for all activities. After a satisfactory review, the RB authorizes commissioning. Initial fuel loading in the reactor core marks the start of operations and hence needs authorization from the RB. At this stage, a complete operational discipline must be in force with a full complement of trained and authorized operational personnel in position, along with security and emergency plans satisfac­torily tested and in place. Subsequently, the RB authorizes the raising of the reactor power in predefined steps, each step being reviewed as appropriate.

• During the operational phase of the NPP, the RB reviews periodic operational reports, accounts on safety-related incidents and ageing status of the SSCs to confirm that the NPP continues to successfully meet the applicable license conditions and current safety standards.

• At the end of its operating life, the NPP is decommissioned, though only after the RB issues a license for this purpose after a review of the decommissioning plan.

A strategy needs to be developed for licensing of a country’s first NPP to meet the project schedule, while maintaining a high level of quality in the licensing process. Significant assistance from an ER and use of the safety evaluation of the reference NPP during the design safety review are the key elements that should be appropriately included in the strategic plan.

The time available between award of contract for setting up the NPP and start of its construction are likely to be insufficient for a detailed review of the PSAR. A possible approach could be to divide the PSAR review work into suitable sub-stages. A brief review of the PSAR can be conducted, focusing on the differences in design from that of the reference NPP and ensuring that the design safety criteria are met, to ensure the award of the license to start construction.

Detailed review of the PSAR can be carried out in parallel with civil construction work at the site but should be completed before the start of activities that cannot be reversed, e. g. the erection of major equipment like the reactor pressure vessel and the steam generators. It should also be completed well before commissioning activities are undertaken. The requirements of licensing and the schedule of technical submissions by the applicant should be clearly identified in advance for each sub-stage of licensing.

20.7 Acknowledgements

The authors acknowledge John Moares, independent consultant, author of Chapter 5, ‘Responsibilities of the nuclear operator in nuclear power pro­grammes’, and Erwin Lindauer, independent consultant, author of Appendix 4 ‘Simulator training for nuclear power plant control room personnel’, for their valid inputs to the Appendix on ‘Examples of licensing systems’ and their comments and suggestions for this chapter.