The IAEA has developed the Electronic Nuclear Training Catalogue (ENTRAC) which provides a method for gathering, sharing and maintain­ing training information and materials. The Internet site http://entrac. iaea. org (accessed 22 May 2010) provides access, after registration, to informa­tion and documents on personnel training, to the related IAEA technical documents, and also to the documents and data the Member States provide to IAEA for information exchange and sharing.

The IAEA has also established a programme to support the development of standardized training packages and distance learning tools in the field of nuclear safety. Information on this programme and the training materials available can be found at http://www-ns. iaea. org/training/ (accessed 22 May 2010).

International cooperative activities are an excellent means of learning the good practices in operation and regulation of NPPs followed in different countries. They can also help in enhancing national capabilities in design, analysis and research pertaining to a number of areas like seismic design of structures and components, thermal hydraulic analysis, probabilistic safety assessment, ageing management of NPPs, analysis of severe accidents and means for their management, radioactive waste management, decom­missioning, safety of computer-based systems and operator response under challenging situations. There are several ways for using international coop­eration for advancing the knowledge and technical competence of staff in the operating organization, regulatory body and technical support organiza­tion, such as through participation in coordinated research programmes and standard problem exercises organized by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Deputing staff to research centres abroad for advanced training in specific areas is another useful method.

It is well recognized that use of operating experience feedback not only is helpful for improving safety but also improves technical capability for analysing incidents to arrive at the root causes and lessons learned to make necessary improvements in hardware and procedures. There are several means for utilizing the international operating experience feedback such as by participation in the Incident Reporting System operated by the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Nuclear Energy Agency of OECD and a similar system operated by the World Association of Nuclear Operators. There are also the operating experience and other information reporting systems operated by vendors of NPPs of specific designs.

As already mentioned earlier, another dimension of international coop­eration that is of very significant use for enhancing national technical com­petence is through international peer reviews. Examples of such peer reviews are the operational safety review and regulatory system review services offered by the International Atomic Energy Agency and the peer reviews organized by the World Association of Nuclear Operators. Peer reviews under the various international conventions such as the Convention on Nuclear Safety are also useful in this regard.

Cooperation with the regulatory bodies of other countries and participa­tion in the forums of regulatory bodies of countries operating or construct­ing NPPs of similar designs is also very useful for improving technical capabilities of regulatory staff. Lastly, participation of staff in international conferences related to design, operation and safety of NPPs and in work­shops on specific topics will also help in enhancing their technical compe­tence by way of learning the latest developments around the globe and exchange of information with international experts.

GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy’s Economic Simplified Boiling Water Reactor (ESBWR) is a 1520 MWe power plant design based on the earlier 670 MWe Simplified Boiling Water Reactor (SBWR) design. The ESBWR design incorporates innovative, yet proven, features to further simplify an inher­ently simple direct cycle nuclear plant. The ESBWR completely relies on passive safety systems for both normal and off-normal operating conditions, such as natural circulation, isolation condensers or gravity-driven cooling systems. The core of the ESBWR is shorter and the overall vessel height is larger than a conventional BWR, in an effort to maximize natural circula­tion and avoid the use of recirculation pumps or their associated piping. The US NRC provided the ESBWR with an advanced Safety Evaluation Report (SER) with no open items in August 2010, and the final design certification is expected by September 2011.

A mature nuclear energy system includes a large number of people and related organizations. However, one finds that there is a common basic structure needed for successful conduct of any program. This is here identi­fied as the safety management system.

Nuclear safety in nuclear power programs 303 Safety management system

Maintaining and improving nuclear energy’s safety record requires careful attention to authorities and responsibilities so that safety responsibility is always placed only along with commensurate authority. Proper assignment of responsibility and authority is the very foundation of safety. Note that a very similar description of the roles of various groups in plant operation can be found in INSAG-13 (1999b).

The fact that safety is an operational matter places the operating company in the central position of safety responsibility. Figure 10.1 shows the rela­tionship between the operating company and the other major participants. This is not an organization chart, but is used to indicate the relationship of authority and responsibility between the main participants. The top report­ing relationship is to the public. Supporting roles are played by technocrats on one side and by bureaucracies on the other side — the safety tribunal authority and the safety performance regulator.

The first level of safety is always to be found in the education and training of all those involved in the nuclear energy enterprise, from designers to senior management and finally to junior operating staff. The concept of safety culture (INSAG-4, 1991) is carefully fostered in the industry, to build and sustain the habits of management and job execution that are known to support safe operation of the system.

Current radiation protection approaches acknowledge the importance of protecting not only humans but also the environment. Previously the concern focused on mankind’s environment only with regard to the transfer of radionuclides through it, mainly in the context of planned exposure situ­ations. In such situations, the standards of environmental control needed to protect the general public would ensure that other species are not placed at risk. To provide a sound framework for environmental protection in all exposure situations, there has been proposed the use of ‘reference animals

Bands or constraints and reference levels (mSv) Characteristics of the exposure situation Radiological protection requirements Examples Greater than 20 Individuals are exposed by sources Consideration should be given to reducing Reference level set to 100bc that are not controllable, or where actions to reduce doses would be disproportionately disruptive. Exposures are usually controlled by action on the exposure pathways. doses. Increasing efforts should be made to reduce doses as they approach 100 mSv. Individuals should receive information on radiation risk and on the actions to reduce doses. Assessment of individual doses should be undertaken. for the highest planned residual dose from a radiological emergency. Greater than 1 Individuals will usually receive benefit Where possible, general information Constraints set for to 20 from the exposure situation but not necessarily from the exposure itself. Exposures may be controlled at source or, alternatively, by action in the exposure pathways. should be made available to enable individuals to reduce their doses. For planned situations, individual assessment of exposure and training should take place. occupational exposure in planned situations. 1 or less Individuals arc exposed to a source that gives them little or no individual benefit but benefits to society in general. Exposures are usually controlled by action taken directly on the source for which radiological protection requirements can be planned in advance. General information on the level of exposure should be made available. Periodic checks should be made on the exposure pathways as to the level of exposure. Constraints set for public exposure in planned situations.

and plants’. In order to establish a basis for acceptability, additional doses calculated to these reference organisms could be compared with doses known to have specific biological effects and with dose rates normally experienced in the natural environment. Nobody, however, is proposing to set any form of ‘dose limits’ for environmental protection.

It should be recognized that until recently the word environment itself was absent in normal parlance and, unsurprisingly, concerns for environ­mental protection are a relatively new phenomenon. The term ‘environ­ment’ derives from the old French environ, ‘surroundings’, from en ‘in’ + viron ‘circuit’, strictly referring to the surroundings of an object. More recently it has evolved to mean the surroundings or conditions in which a person, animal or plant lives or operates and, even more recently, it has become equated to the natural world, especially as affected by human activ­ity. It will certainly take time to develop comprehensive protection doc­trines for such a relatively contemporary concept, one that encompasses this relatively new human apprehension. Over the last years, two fundamen­tal environmental protection approaches (rather than ethics) are being constructed: the so-termed biocentrism and ecocentrism.

In spite of this apparent vacuum of an environmental protection ethics, some basic principles are being developed for protecting not only humans but also the environment in itself from the detrimental effects of radiation exposure. The aim is to ensure that the development and application of approaches to environmental protection are compatible with those for radiological protection of humans, and with those for protection of the environment from other potential hazards (IAEA, 2005b).

As indicated heretofore, within the context of planned exposure situa­tions, the standards of environmental control needed to protect the general public should ensure that other species in the human habitat are not placed at risk. However, the situation could be different in emergency and existing situations and in the environment at large. Thus, the radiation protection community is adhering to some international basic environmental protec­tion objectives such as:

• to maintain biological diversity

• to ensure the conservation of species

• to protect the health and status of natural habitats, communities and ecosystems.

Under these premises, a framework for assessing the impact of ionizing radiation on non-human species (ICRP, 2003) and the techniques for imple­mentation (ICRP, 2008) have been recommended by ICRP.

Ultimately, the protection of the environment from radiation exposure will be achieved through international efforts for restricting discharges of radioactive substances (Gonzalez, 2005).

360 Infrastructure and methodologies for justification of NPPs

M. S. PELLECHI, International Atomic Energy Agency

(IAEA), Austria

Abstract: This chapter explores non-proliferation from the point of view of international safeguards and recommends what ‘newcomers’ should be familiar with if they are to successfully assess, manage or participate in the expanded use of nuclear energy. It provides a basic understanding of the safeguards requirements to be addressed by stakeholders, and offers some technical guidance and advice on safeguards-relevant operational measures that may be taken. The subject matter is presented in simplified terms, such that it may be of particular benefit to stakeholders with limited or no nuclear energy experience.

Key words: International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT, safeguards, non-proliferation, safeguards agreement, additional protocol, state system of accounting for and control of nuclear material, SSAC.

13.1 Introduction

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (otherwise known as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or NPT) was brought into force in part out of a desire to contain the spread of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons technology, while legitimizing the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The text of the NPT can be found in INFCIRC/140 (IAEA, 1970). From a global perspective, an increasing number of countries are today assessing, or plan to include, the use of nuclear power as part of the mix of sustainable energy sources. According to Amano (2010), the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in excess of 20 countries

This chapter is the copyright of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and is reproduced by the Publisher with the IAEA’s permission. Any further use or reproduction of the chapter, in whole or in part, requires the permission of the IAEA. The chapter has been written by a staff member of the IAEA in his personal capacity and not on behalf of the IAEA or the Director General of the IAEA. The views expressed in the chapter are not necessarily those of the IAEA and that the IAEA disclaims all liability in connection with the chapter and any use made thereof.

might very well bring their first nuclear power plant online within the next 20 years. Towards that end, the IAEA, one of the specialized agencies1 of the United Nations (UN), has established a website dedicated to helping Member States develop a nuclear power infrastructure. Readers of this chapter may want to familiarize themselves with some of the authoritative publications, specifically IAEA (2007a) and IAEA (2008a), as the informa­tion contained in them will assist in gaining an understanding of where safeguards fits into the development of a State’s nuclear power infrastruc­ture. An overview of the IAEA Safeguards System can be found in footnote.[10] [11]

If, as projected, any manner of a nuclear renaissance is realized, it is expected that some of these States will be developing countries. And therein arises a necessity for the safeguarding of nuclear material and facilities in countries that previously had very limited or no experience with the nuclear fuel cycle and international safeguards. As indicated in the IAEA (2007a) ‘Milestones’ publication, it is essential for all concerned stakeholders to understand the safeguards requirements and obligations, in addition to the other 18 topical areas requiring commitment and resources.

This chapter’s objective is to provide guidance to stakeholders with an understanding of what is needed for the effective implementation of safe­guards, when it is needed, and how, through the transparent application of safeguards, they may advance their interests in the peaceful use of nuclear energy nationally and internationally. It begins with a discussion on the underlying safeguards requirements as they derive from the NPT. The chapter examines, in general terms, the international non-proliferation obli­gations of countries/stakeholders within the context of a comprehensive safeguards agreement (IAEA, 1972) and additional protocol (IAEA, 1997a). Together with examples of the application of safeguards measures, the chapter explores the establishment of an effective state system of accounting for and control of nuclear material, and offers some technical perspective on the NPT and the IAEA. It also provides a brief discussion on transparency and the future of safeguards.

Each subsection of the chapter is self-contained which, while building on the previous subsection(s), can be read in a stand-alone fashion for quick reference. Nevertheless, an underlying theme throughout the subsections is that stated intentions alone are not enough to assure the global community that any new pursuit or expansion of a civilian nuclear option is entirely for peaceful purposes. The chapter is written with the presumption that it is primarily through demonstrable, transparent actions by prospective govern­ments and nuclear facility operators that a country convinces its stakehold­ers that their efforts represent a positive, peaceful use of nuclear material and technology.

A short glossary of frequently used terms is provided below (IAEA, 2001, and IAEA Statute, Article XX: Definitions):

• Additional Protocol (AP): A protocol additional to a safeguards agree­ment (or agreements) concluded between the IAEA and a State, or group of States, following the provisions of the Model Additional Protocol. The Model Additional Protocol provides for those measures for strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of IAEA safeguards which could not be implemented under the legal authority of safeguards agreements.

• Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA): An agreement that applies safeguards on all nuclear material in all nuclear activities in a State.

• Facility: A reactor, a critical facility, a conversion plant, a fabrication plant, a reprocessing plant, an isotope separation plant or a separate storage installation; or any location where nuclear material in amounts greater than one effective kilogram is customarily used.

• Location Outside Facilities (LOF): Any installation or location, which is not a facility, where nuclear material is customarily used in amounts of one effective kilogram or less.

• Nuclear material: Any source material or special fissionable material as defined in Article XX of IAEA Statute.

• Source material: Uranium containing the mixture of isotopes occurring in nature; uranium depleted in the isotope 235; thorium; any of the foregoing in the form of metal, alloy, chemical compound, or concen­trate; any other material containing one or more of the foregoing in such concentration as the Board of Governors shall from time to time deter­mine; and such other material as the Board of Governors shall from time to time determine.

• Special fissionable material: Plutonium-239; uranium-233; uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233; any material containing one or more of the foregoing; and such other fissionable material as the Board of Governors shall from time to time determine; but the term ‘special fis­sionable material’ does not include source material.

• Uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233: Uranium containing the isotopes 235 or 233 or both in an amount such that the abundance ratio

of the sum of these isotopes to the isotope 238 is greater than the ratio

of the isotope 235 to the isotope 238 occurring in nature.

A closed reactor can in its entirety be seen as waste, and the decommission­ing and dismantling process can be seen as waste management. A key component in the management process is to segregate non-radioactive waste from radioactive waste. The larger part of the reactor, e. g. buildings and systems that have not been in contact with process waters or gases, can be regarded as non-radioactive waste and be taken care of like normal industrial waste. The remaining radioactive waste covers a wide spectrum of types and activity concentrations, ranging from core components with a very high radiation level to very low-level waste, similar to the maintenance waste.

A key component for successful decommissioning and dismantling is an effective and well-planned waste management system including choosing the right size of the waste packages and the right level of decontamination. The optimal levels will differ between countries depending on their entire waste management system, in particular the transport system and disposal facility and the possibilities of recycling decontaminated material. Ideally, recycled material should be used without restrictions, but also some mate­rial with a radioactivity concentration above the release limit could be recycled in the nuclear industry for waste packages or some reactor components.

While currently not included in standard electricity cost accounting schemes, decision makers should be aware of cost factors imposed on the public by the production and use of electricity. These costs are real and a fair share have directly and indirectly been compensated by the public purse (or resulted in reduced government revenue). Since investors normally do not consider externalities in investment decision making, it falls upon gov­ernment policy to ‘internalize the external costs’ of the health and environ­mental damages resulting from power generation. In fact, in the past, internalization has been imposed on electricity generation[99] but insuffi-

Wave and tidal CSP PV South PV Central Wind offshore Biofuel steam turbine Nuclear

Natural gas (with carbon capture and storage)

Natural gas

Lignite

Lignite LGCC Lignite LGCC (with carbon capture and storage)

Hard coal Hard coal IGCC

Hard coal IGCC (with carbon capture and storage)

0 10 20 30 40 50 60

Euro per MWh

15.12 External costs of different generating options. Adapted from Preiss and Friedrich (2009).

ciently by far for a full internalization.14 The most recent studies addressing life-cycle externalities from electricity generation show nuclear power as one of the technologies with the lowest externalities (Preiss and Friedrich, 2009; NRC, 2009). One of the externalities of nuclear power is the cost of a severe nuclear accident (e. g., Chernobyl or Fukushima). These are calcu­lated on a probabilistic basis (low probability — high consequence) and given the large amount of kWhs produced by nuclear power plants are still small despite the enormous damage costs of an accident. Figure 15.12 sum­marizes the findings of the NEEDS study (Preiss and Friedrich, 2009). Clearly, factoring these externalities into the price of electricity would fun­damentally change the merit order of generating options in favour of nuclear power and renewables.

Protection Administration (SEPA) in China, Directive 2001/77/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 September 2001 on the Promotion of Electricity Produced from Renewable Energy Sources that mandates the integration of more expensive, non-dispatchable electricity from renewables, the European Emissions Trading Directive (2003/87/EC), the Price-Anderson Indemnity Act which governs liability-related issues for all non-military nuclear facilities in the United States, the EU Directive on Nuclear Safety (2009/71/EURATOM) and the Kyoto Protocol limiting greenhouse gas emissions in industrialized countries.

14 There is a host of issues yet to be resolved ranging from attribution of damages to their monetary valuation.

540 Infrastructure and methodologies for justification of NPPs

The requirement in the UK to site nuclear power stations in coastal loca­tions can have an environmental impact on marine processes. Paragraph 4.4.1 of the draft NPS recognises this and provides that ‘the development and construction of new coastal and fluvial defences and possible marine landing jetties/docks could affect coastal processes, hydrodynamics and sediment transport processes at coastal and estuarine sites. These impacts could lead to localised or more widespread coastal erosion or accretion. There could also be changes to offshore features such as submerged banks and ridges and marine ecology.’ Applicants will be expected to identify, and develop, appropriate mitigation measures to address the impacts on marine biodiversity and coastal geomorphology in their EIA.