M. S. PELLECHI, International Atomic Energy Agency

(IAEA), Austria

Abstract: This chapter explores non-proliferation from the point of view of international safeguards and recommends what ‘newcomers’ should be familiar with if they are to successfully assess, manage or participate in the expanded use of nuclear energy. It provides a basic understanding of the safeguards requirements to be addressed by stakeholders, and offers some technical guidance and advice on safeguards-relevant operational measures that may be taken. The subject matter is presented in simplified terms, such that it may be of particular benefit to stakeholders with limited or no nuclear energy experience.

Key words: International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT, safeguards, non-proliferation, safeguards agreement, additional protocol, state system of accounting for and control of nuclear material, SSAC.

13.1 Introduction

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (otherwise known as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or NPT) was brought into force in part out of a desire to contain the spread of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons technology, while legitimizing the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The text of the NPT can be found in INFCIRC/140 (IAEA, 1970). From a global perspective, an increasing number of countries are today assessing, or plan to include, the use of nuclear power as part of the mix of sustainable energy sources. According to Amano (2010), the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in excess of 20 countries

This chapter is the copyright of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and is reproduced by the Publisher with the IAEA’s permission. Any further use or reproduction of the chapter, in whole or in part, requires the permission of the IAEA. The chapter has been written by a staff member of the IAEA in his personal capacity and not on behalf of the IAEA or the Director General of the IAEA. The views expressed in the chapter are not necessarily those of the IAEA and that the IAEA disclaims all liability in connection with the chapter and any use made thereof.

might very well bring their first nuclear power plant online within the next 20 years. Towards that end, the IAEA, one of the specialized agencies1 of the United Nations (UN), has established a website dedicated to helping Member States develop a nuclear power infrastructure. Readers of this chapter may want to familiarize themselves with some of the authoritative publications, specifically IAEA (2007a) and IAEA (2008a), as the informa­tion contained in them will assist in gaining an understanding of where safeguards fits into the development of a State’s nuclear power infrastruc­ture. An overview of the IAEA Safeguards System can be found in footnote.[10] [11]

If, as projected, any manner of a nuclear renaissance is realized, it is expected that some of these States will be developing countries. And therein arises a necessity for the safeguarding of nuclear material and facilities in countries that previously had very limited or no experience with the nuclear fuel cycle and international safeguards. As indicated in the IAEA (2007a) ‘Milestones’ publication, it is essential for all concerned stakeholders to understand the safeguards requirements and obligations, in addition to the other 18 topical areas requiring commitment and resources.

This chapter’s objective is to provide guidance to stakeholders with an understanding of what is needed for the effective implementation of safe­guards, when it is needed, and how, through the transparent application of safeguards, they may advance their interests in the peaceful use of nuclear energy nationally and internationally. It begins with a discussion on the underlying safeguards requirements as they derive from the NPT. The chapter examines, in general terms, the international non-proliferation obli­gations of countries/stakeholders within the context of a comprehensive safeguards agreement (IAEA, 1972) and additional protocol (IAEA, 1997a). Together with examples of the application of safeguards measures, the chapter explores the establishment of an effective state system of accounting for and control of nuclear material, and offers some technical perspective on the NPT and the IAEA. It also provides a brief discussion on transparency and the future of safeguards.

Each subsection of the chapter is self-contained which, while building on the previous subsection(s), can be read in a stand-alone fashion for quick reference. Nevertheless, an underlying theme throughout the subsections is that stated intentions alone are not enough to assure the global community that any new pursuit or expansion of a civilian nuclear option is entirely for peaceful purposes. The chapter is written with the presumption that it is primarily through demonstrable, transparent actions by prospective govern­ments and nuclear facility operators that a country convinces its stakehold­ers that their efforts represent a positive, peaceful use of nuclear material and technology.

A short glossary of frequently used terms is provided below (IAEA, 2001, and IAEA Statute, Article XX: Definitions):

• Additional Protocol (AP): A protocol additional to a safeguards agree­ment (or agreements) concluded between the IAEA and a State, or group of States, following the provisions of the Model Additional Protocol. The Model Additional Protocol provides for those measures for strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of IAEA safeguards which could not be implemented under the legal authority of safeguards agreements.

• Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA): An agreement that applies safeguards on all nuclear material in all nuclear activities in a State.

• Facility: A reactor, a critical facility, a conversion plant, a fabrication plant, a reprocessing plant, an isotope separation plant or a separate storage installation; or any location where nuclear material in amounts greater than one effective kilogram is customarily used.

• Location Outside Facilities (LOF): Any installation or location, which is not a facility, where nuclear material is customarily used in amounts of one effective kilogram or less.

• Nuclear material: Any source material or special fissionable material as defined in Article XX of IAEA Statute.

• Source material: Uranium containing the mixture of isotopes occurring in nature; uranium depleted in the isotope 235; thorium; any of the foregoing in the form of metal, alloy, chemical compound, or concen­trate; any other material containing one or more of the foregoing in such concentration as the Board of Governors shall from time to time deter­mine; and such other material as the Board of Governors shall from time to time determine.

• Special fissionable material: Plutonium-239; uranium-233; uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233; any material containing one or more of the foregoing; and such other fissionable material as the Board of Governors shall from time to time determine; but the term ‘special fis­sionable material’ does not include source material.

• Uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233: Uranium containing the isotopes 235 or 233 or both in an amount such that the abundance ratio

of the sum of these isotopes to the isotope 238 is greater than the ratio

of the isotope 235 to the isotope 238 occurring in nature.