Established by the nuclear power industry in December 1979, following the recommendations made by the Kemeny Commission (set up by President Jimmy Carter to investigate the accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant), the Institute of Nuclear Power Operation is a not-for-profit organization headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia, USA. The mission at the INPO is to promote the highest levels of safety and reliability — to promote excellence — in the operation of nuclear electric generating plants. This mission is accomplished through the programmes of plant evaluations, training and accreditation, events analysis and information exchange and missions of technical assistance.

In 1985 was founded the National Academy for Nuclear Training (NANT), which provides training and support for nuclear power professionals. NANT evaluates individual plant and utility training programmes to identify strengths and weaknesses and recommend improvements. Selected opera­tor and technical training programmes are accredited through the inde­pendent National Nuclear Accrediting Board.

INPO offers, through its International Program, technical assistance to its members and access to its website including important references and very detailed descriptions of specific training programmes for different job positions.

Commissioning of the individual components followed by integrated com­missioning of the reactor systems is done to confirm that they are able to perform their design-intended functions. While the main reactor systems are taken up for commissioning on completion of construction, service systems such as the compressed air system, electrical power supply system and water demineralization plant are commissioned in parallel with con­struction. Commissioning provides a unique opportunity to obtain deeper insights into the working of the reactor systems that is so essential to augment the knowledge acquired from study of documents such as design and operating manuals and PSAR. For this reason the operating staff should be intensely involved in the commissioning work. Results of commissioning should be formally reviewed in a senior-level commissioning review com­mittee. Based on these reviews, necessary modifications in the plant and in the operating procedures should be made and additional surveillance and in-service inspection requirements should be identified. Operating staff must be involved in the commissioning review as it will help them acquire intimate understanding of the plant and the interaction of reactor systems with each other.

Ionizing radiation has shaped life on earth since it appeared and exposure to ionizing radiation will continue unabated. It comes from the earth and from the sky and there is no reason to avoid it, although protection from extended exposure to ultraviolet rays coming from the sun is recommended. Ionizing radiation is used widely and increasingly in medicine for both diagnosis and treatment; high levels of exposure are frequently delivered and there is no reason to avoid such uses, although valid efforts are made to reduce the doses and the risks of radiation accidents without reducing the benefits. Ionizing radiation also comes from nuclear power plants, in small amounts during normal operation and potentially in larger quantities in case of accidents; there is no reason to ban these plants, while increasing safety is a primary objective. Nevertheless, natural and medical radiation are socially acceptable, while radiation from nuclear power plants is grossly rejected. This rejection is supported by the precautionary principle ‘when in doubt, keep it out’.

Protection against ionizing radiation is based on the principles of justifi­cation of practices, optimization of protection and limitation of individual dose and risks, which have been developed over time by the ICRP. These principles were introduced in international and national regulations, and are developed in Chapter 11 of this book.

Radiation protection principles are now included in the IAEA Safety Fundamentals (IAEA, 2006) and their meaning and application go beyond the intended ICRP thinking. The justification principle was initially intended for radiation use, though this chapter analyses its application to justify nuclear power. The optimization principle aims to provide ‘the highest level of safety that can reasonably be achieved throughout the lifetime of the facility or activity, without unduly limiting its utilization’. When applied to a nuclear power plant and related fuel cycle installations and activities, this requirement should be applied to all modes of opera­tion, from normal to accident conditions, and during the whole life of the installation.

The limitation principle establishes that ‘Measures for controlling radia­tion risks must ensure that no individual bears an unacceptable risk of harm’. In practice, this requirement translates to defining dose limits that should not be surpassed, and which are the upper legal bounds of accept­ability, but which do not assure the best protection possible. When the limi­tation and optimization principles apply to any given installation or activity, the desired level of protection should be achieved without impairing the benefits that can be obtained from the installation or the activity in question.

Legal radiation dose limits have been suggested by the ICRP and accepted globally for a variety of circumstances and human organs. The limits for public exposures have been reduced to one millisievert/year, and in many countries lowered to one-tenth of a millisievert/year after applying the optimization principle. In practice, the dose received by the most exposed individual in the public population from a nuclear power plant is even less than that. These values should be compared with the average of 2.4 mil- lisieverts/year that is received from natural radiation.

Although these values are well supported by scientific evidence, an intense ‘radio phobia’ has grown in developed countries. One of the reasons for such a situation is the so-called linear non-threshold approximation (LNT) which assumes that any radiation dose may produce harm. Other proposed approximations are included in Fig. 8.2.

The ICRP included the LNT hypothesis very early in its recommenda­tions. CRP Publication 9 (ICRP, 1966) stated: ‘Because of the lack of knowl­edge of the nature of the dose-effect relationship in man, the Commission sees no practical alternative, for the purpose of radiological protection, to assuming a linear relationship between dose and effect’. The Commission understands that the assumption of no threshold may be incorrect, but it is satisfied that application of LNT will probably not underestimate radiation risks.

Although much has been learned about carcinogenesis, the fact is that the LNT hypothesis has continued to be used since that time. The situation has been reviewed in subsequent ICRP reports, mainly in ICRP Publication 26 (ICRP, 1977) and ICRP Publication 60 (ICRP, 1990), although without change. In fact, the dose limits have been reduced because the risk coeffi-

cients in the LNT hypothesis have been increased. In ICRP Publication 103 (ICRP, 2007) a certain concern has been expressed when recognizing that the LNT hypothesis makes it ‘impossible to derive a clear distinction between safe and dangerous’. Moreover, it advises that the LNT hypothesis should only be used for the optimization process and not for epidemiologi­cal studies, as it frequently is.

The ICRP recommendations have been accepted by international organi­zations, mainly the IAEA, World Health Organization (WHO) and others, and have been introduced in national, supranational (EU) and international regulations and standards, not always concurrent with the understandings defined by the Commission. As such, they are the main source of social and political concerns. Over time, what started as a working assumption has come to be considered as a scientifically documented fact by the public and mass media, and even by some regulatory bodies and many pro-LNT scientists.

‘Radio phobia’ against nuclear power started in the early 1970s, gaining impetus in the late 1970s, and started to produce serious consequences during the 1980s after the TMI-2 (1979) and Chernobyl-4 (1986) accidents, the consequences of which were grossly amplified by the media, some politi­cal parties and non-governmental organizations. The Fukushima large earthquake and tsunami-driven events have again increased public radio phobia, and increased serious concerns within international institutions and national authorities about the safety of currently operating nuclear power plants, which are now being reviewed.

The application of the LNT model to estimate the stochastic conse­quences of small doses and small dose rates received by a large number of people as a consequence of the Chernobyl accident have not so far been proven by direct observation. The existence of a hormetic, i. e. beneficial, relationship between low doses and consequences has not yet been scientifi­cally proven for all cases and circumstances, despite the intense research on the matter which has been conducted (DOE, 1998).

It has to be recognized that the LNT hypothesis may have provided a reasonably conservative approach to radiation risk assessment, but its introduction into the national and international regulatory system has prob­ably gone too far. It has contributed to create an intense social and political radio phobia which has clearly limited the beneficial application of nuclear energy.

In conclusion, neighbourhood populations may be exposed to tiny radia­tion doses, smaller than the ones received from natural radiation, from gaseous and liquid releases, which are limited and well controlled in the origin of the release and in the surroundings through an extensive monitor­ing programme. Moreover, epidemiological studies have not revealed any harm from such radiation. The concerns raised by these doses are not founded.

8.6.2 Security as a subject of increasing relevance

Nuclear installations and relevant activities may be the objects of terrorist attacks bacause of the potentially large social distortion they could produce. The design and operation of nuclear installations include very strict access control, sophisticated intruder detectors, entrance delay technologies and armed police forces. Operation now also involves intelligence and external help. Nuclear installations are generally very robust for safety reasons and there is a synergy between safety and security, which has recently been analysed by the INSAG (INSAG, 2010) and by the IAEA AdSec Group (IAEA, 2007). A justification document should include references to national and international regulation use in the design and organization of the security system, though it will be necesary to reserve details (for security reasons).

D. A. MENELEY, Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd, Canada

Abstract: Nuclear safety includes all aspects of protection of humans and the environment from the harmful effects of ionizing radiation existing or produced during operation. This chapter outlines all aspects of the safety of nuclear-electric generating stations with the exception of conventional industrial safety. Due to the very broad scope of this subject, extensive reference is made to open literature on the subject. The objective of the chapter is to assist those persons interested in starting a new energy venture to reach a basic understanding of this technology and its application to satisfy human needs for energy.

Key words: protection of the public, international standards and guides, national regulatory body, operational safety, safety management systems.

10.1 Introduction

Close attention to nuclear safety is easily justified on each of three factors: protection of the public, protection of the operating staff, and protection of the plant. As identified in governing regulations (IAEA, 2006), safety is the full responsibility of the plant licensee (INSAG, 1999a, p. 15). From first principles, any delegated responsibility still remains in full force with the delegator. Each regulatory agency acts in the role of safety auditor during operation in order to ensure that the plant is operated within the scope of the licensee’s authority and in accordance with national standards and regu­lations. The operating organization holds, at all times, authority to operate the plant only within the provisions of the operating licence, and commen­surate with its stated responsibility. This authority normally is delegated by the regulatory agency on behalf of the government of the country. Since delegated responsibility always remains in full force with the delegator, the government and regulatory agency remain ultimately responsible for safe performance of the nuclear energy enterprise.

The INSAG report Probabilistic Safety Assessment (75-INSAG-6, 1992) presents a sound description of the probabilistic method. It is a systematic risk-based analytical method that combines fault trees and event sequence diagrams of potential success and successive failure pathways, and finally a consequence analysis of each pathway which, when multiplied by the derived frequency of occurrence of the event sequence, delivers an esti­mated risk (frequency x consequence) contributed by each particular acci­dent sequence. Two additional reports, INSAG-8 (1995a) and INSAG-9 (1995b), provide further details and expansion of the concepts important to probabilistic analysis. The present INSAG group has now published an important extension of this concept as report INSAG-25 (INSAG, 2010).

A PSA analysis may be used to improve a system design by modification to improve the success branch of one or more fault trees. For example, if the result shows that the reliability of heat rejection to the final heat sink is insufficient, added component or system redundancy may be chosen to improve the situation. Applied rigorously and comprehensively across the whole scope of the power plant, a PSA offers yet another dimension through which any given design can be reviewed and tested. This process is a valu­able addition to the normal methodologies of engineering design review, commissioning tests, and operational review. PSA adds knowledge about the degree to which the plant is robust against a wide range of component and system failures.

On the other hand, it has been widely postulated that any radiation expo­sure, at any level, however small, may cause a risk for future increases in the natural incidence of some malignancies and hereditable effects. On the basis of available radio-epidemiological studies in humans exposed to rela­tively high radiation doses, UNSCEAR has assessed that the excess lifetime risk of mortality (averaged over both sexes) is:

• for all solid cancers combined, 3.6-7.7% per Sv for an acute dose of 0.1 Sv, and 4.3-7.2% per Sv for an acute dose of 1 Sv

• for leukaemia, 0.3-0.5% per Sv for an acute dose of 0.1 Sv, and 0.6-1.0% per Sv for an acute dose of 1 Sv.

Taking into account available radio-biological information and epidemio­logical studies in animals, UNSCEAR has also made estimates of risk of

a ICRP (1984). b UNSCEAR (1988). c Edwards and Lloyd (1996). d Scott and Hahn (1989), Scott (1993).

e Most values rounded to the nearest gray; ranges indicate area dependence for skin and differing medical support for bone marrow.

heritable diseases in one generation due to low-dose exposure and con­cluded that the risks in the first generation (per unit low-LET dose) are:

• for dominant effects (including X-linked diseases), ~750-1500 per million per gray vis-a-vis a baseline frequency of 16,500 per million

• for chronic multifactorial diseases, ~250-1200 per million per gray vis­a-vis a baseline frequency of 650,000 per million

• for congenital abnormalities, ~2000 per million per gray vis-a-vis a base­line frequency of 60,000 per million (chromosomal effects were assumed to be subsumed in part under the risk of autosomal dominant and X-linked diseases and in part under that of congenital abnormalities).

In sum, as far as radiation-induced heritable diseases is concerned, UNSCEAR concluded that for a population exposed to radiation in one generation only, the risks to the progeny of the first post-radiation genera­tion are estimated to be 3000 to 4700 cases per gray per one million progeny, which constitutes 0.4-0.6% of the baseline frequency of those disorders in the human population.

It should be noted, however, that these estimates are associated with unavoidable uncertainties. The processes occurring from the ionization of living matter by radiation exposure up to the expression of the attributable detrimental health effects are extremely complicated and can only be assessed with considerable uncertainties. For stochastic effects they extend over different time periods: the physical interaction taking place in mil­lionths of microseconds, the physicochemical interactions occurring in thou­sandths of microseconds up to milliseconds, the biological response arising in seconds up to days, and the stochastic medical effects expressed after years, decades and — in the case of hereditary effects — probably centuries.

National authorities assume overall responsibility for implementing ade­quate nuclear emergency plans to protect people, the economy and the environment from radiation hazard in case of nuclear accidents. In this regard, they are responsible for adopting social, political, economic and technical measures dealing with major nuclear emergencies. In discharging these responsibilities, national authorities usually assume the following basic and strategic functions:

• Issuing appropriate legislation and regulations for nuclear emergency planning, preparedness and response

• Approving nuclear emergency plans ensuring clear allocation of respon­sibilities among organizations involved and establishing appropriate procedures for making decisions and their implementation, consistent with other national emergency response plans

• Providing funds, means and resources necessary to ensure effective implementation of nuclear emergency plans; provisions have to include extraordinary resources to respond to large-scale nuclear emergencies derived from extreme severity accidents, including adequate facilities for medical treatment of large numbers of victims

• Establishing training strategies and programmes applicable to all levels of responsibility within the organizations that have been assigned a role in nuclear emergency plans

• Activating nuclear emergency plans as necessary, as well as directing the response operations until people and areas affected by the accident have recovered normal conditions as far as possible

• Adopting necessary measures to limit long-term radiological conse­quences resulting from contamination caused by nuclear accidents, such as control of trade and consumption of contaminated products; limita­tion of the use of land, water, areas, facilities and property affected by a nuclear accident; and implementation of hard countermeasures to revert to normal conditions

• Coordination of all activities related to public information concerning the preparation of emergency plans and response in case of emergency, paying special attention to putting into practice specific information programmes to ensure that people who could be affected by a nuclear emergency are aware of their potential risk and know how to behave in an emergency

• Establishing adequate mechanisms to ensure monetary compensation derived from civil liability of parties involved in the origin and following up of a nuclear emergency

• Establishing adequate arrangements for prompt notification to interna­tional organizations and the authorities of other countries potentially affected by a nuclear accident occurring in its own territory, as well as for providing or receiving assistance in nuclear emergencies.

Safeguards are an essential part of international confidence-building mea­sures, and serve to help demonstrate a country’s commitment to non-pro­liferation. But today’s safeguards will likely need to adapt to tomorrow’s challenges and with those challenges will come new incentives for countries to become more transparent. In preparing for tomorrow’s challenges, the IAEA has considered the future environment, and reported its internal assessment in February 2008, in ‘20/20 Vision for the Future, Background Report by the Director General for the Commission of Eminent Persons’.[76] This report presents the results of a review by the IAEA regarding the role of the IAEA through the year 2020 and beyond. While the publication will benefit a ‘newcomer’ on the potential future direction of the IAEA and safeguards, its ‘foresight’ analysis and forward-looking review may be of particular interest to those stakeholders who wish to consider the longer term in terms of transparency and the non-proliferation regime. For example, in the Executive Summary, it says:

Although a revival in nuclear power would require additional verification (‘safeguards’) activities, the IAEA’s workload is not likely to increase propor­tionally if States accept greater transparency measures under a new verification standard. The need for IAEA inspectors in the field is likely to decrease due to the use of new technology and a change in the way States are evaluated. Verification activities will increasingly become information driven, with more evaluation work at the Agency’s headquarters. Meeting future challenges will require a robust IAEA ‘toolbox’ containing the necessary legal authority to gather information and carry out inspections, state-of-the-art technology, a high calibre workforce and sufficient resources.

For stakeholders, one pertinent question raised by the above statement is: what will States accept as greater transparency measures under a new veri­fication standard?

Demands for greater transparency about another State’s nuclear activi­ties arise for a variety of reasons, including the desire of States to under­stand the nuclear capabilities and policies of other States. Berkhout and Walker (1999) have considered this question. In terms of transparency mechanisms applied during the development of a nuclear power infrastruc­ture, one should keep in mind that there are the expressed and implied needs of stakeholders at the international, regional, national, sub-national and local levels which should be considered as part of the decision process (i. e., prior to making the decision to develop a nuclear power infrastruc­ture). At the same time, while implementation of transparency mechanisms (and other confidence-building measures) clearly will have benefits at each of these levels, the potential for negative impacts must also be explicitly addressed as reported by Harmon et al. (2000) from the Sandia National Laboratories in a report for the US Department of Energy. This is particu­larly important in view of the fact that a major reason justifying secrecy is non-proliferation. The outcome of such an analysis (whether formal or informal, whether part of a broader analysis of national security objectives, or narrowly defined at the facility level), will enable a State to better align its national interests with its non-proliferation objectives.

And what is the appropriate level of nuclear transparency? That is a question for which each stakeholder forms his or her own opinion. Some suggest that one example of the appropriate level of transparency is illus­trated by the transparency mechanism applied to the exclusively peaceful uses of nuclear energy between two States, namely Argentina and Brazil, as discussed by Fernandez-Moreno and D’Amato (2002) in the 24th Annual Meeting of the European Safeguards Research and Development Association, ESARDA. Johnston et al. (2008) consider that ‘the point and the measure of transparency is full and open truthfulness while being mindful that complete transparency is an abstraction that will never be fully achieved in any society’. Others may differ. Fortunately, transparency in the nuclear field and its contribution to non-proliferation continue to be dis­cussed in several international forums, more recently in the context of the 2010 NPT Review Process that was referred to in Section 13.2.1, Birth of a landmark treaty.

Noting that IAEA safeguards agreements are in force in every State thought to have nuclear activities, but recalling that some States have yet to conclude a safeguards agreement[77] with the IAEA as required by the NPT, transparency remains a subject of global interest (and one that is open to differing points of view). As recognized by the IAEA, an expansion of nuclear power will call for ever greater transparency.[78] A State’s ability to fully embrace and adhere to its international obligations arising from the NPT can well serve as a foundation for building transparency in an age of nuclear renaissance. Besides concluding a safeguards agreement with the IAEA (if none is in force), an example of how a State may increase trans­parency is found in the statement of the IAEA Director General Yukiya

Amano in March 2010, concerning international cooperation being vital to the nuclear renaissance:[79]

Responsibility means countries must abide by the highest safety and security standards and implement IAEA safeguards so the Agency can verify that nuclear materials are being used exclusively for peaceful purposes. All coun­tries with nuclear power should adhere to the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. All countries are encouraged to implement a so-called Additional Protocol to their safeguards agreement with the IAEA, which boosts transparency by giving the Agency’s inspectors more authority.

These views are just some of the many ideas and concepts involving trans­parency, and they should be factored in as part of a State’s progression in the development of its nuclear power infrastructure. In doing so, the con­cerned State may be better positioned to advance its national interest and achieve its non-proliferation goals and objectives.

13.4 Sources of further information and advice

Regarding further information on non-proliferation and safeguards, a true list of web sources would be exhaustive, and in today’s rapidly changing web environment that list might very well be out of date the moment it is published. To be of service to the ‘newcomer’, the sources listed below are essentially limited to UN and IAEA web pages, which many people would consider to be authoritative. Nevertheless, there are many other sites avail­able, and as the ‘newcomer’ progresses in their search, he or she will undoubtedly uncover a host of these other websites, many of which are associated with both NGOs and governmental organizations involved with and/or responsible for non-proliferation and safeguards.

13.6.1 Web-based general sources related to the NPT

Information related to the NPT, with links to associated international safe­guards, is provided at the IAEA’s web pages located at:

• http://www. iaea. org/Publications/Documents/Treaties/npt. html

• http://www. iaea. org/Publications/Documents/Treaties/index. html

• http://www. iaea. org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/legal. html

• http://www. iaea. org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/sv. html

For those readers who may want to become more familiar with the develop­ments of the NPT (both historical and present day), a recommended start­ing point is the ‘NPT Briefing Book (MCIS/CNS) 2010’, available from http://cns. miis. edu/treaty_npt/npt_briefing_book_2010/index. htm.

13.6.2 Web-based general sources on non-proliferation and disarmament

• http://www. iaea. org/Publications

• http://unhq-appspub-01.un. org/UNODA/TreatyStatus. nsf

• http ://www. opanal. org/NWFZ/nwfz. htm

• http://www. un. org/disarmament

• http://www. unidir. org/

• http://www. unog. ch/disarmament

13.6.3 Web-based safeguards-relevant sources and publications

• http://www. iaea. org/Publications/Magazines/Bulletin/Bull5H/ 51103570609.html

• http://www. iaea. org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/safeg_system. pdf

• http://www. iaea. org/Publications/Booklets/Safeguards3/safeguards0408. pdf

• http://www. iaea. org/Publications/Booklets/Safeguards3/safeguards0707. pdf

• http://www. iaea. org/Publications/Booklets/Safeguards3/safeguards0806. pdf

• http://www-pub. iaea. org/MTCD/publications/PDF/NVS1-2003_web. pdf

The generating cost structure of nuclear power is dominated by its capital costs which roughly account for 60% to 75% of total generating costs. This compares with about 25% to 40% for coal power plants without carbon capture and storage (CCS) and 12% to 18% for combine cycle gas technol­ogy (NEA/IEA, 2010). Figure 15.6 summarizes the relative shares of gen­erating cost components for different generating options. Nuclear fuel costs assume a low share of 10% to less than 20% while the actual uranium share accounts for approximately 20% of fuel costs (or between 2% and 4% of total nuclear of generating costs). The small share of uranium in the gener­ating cost structure makes total generating costs very predictable and stable in the long run. Even a 10-fold uranium price increase would increase nuclear’s total costs by 18% to 32% depending on interest rates and

100%

90%

80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

15.5 Generating cost structure of different electricity generating options (NEA and IEA, 2010).

amortization periods. In contrast, for CCGT technology with a fuel cost share of about 70%, a mere doubling of natural gas prices translates into cost escalation of 73% to 80%. For CCGT, high fuel cost shares mean smaller margins over which the plant can make profits.

High capital cost is the single most important economic factor affecting the prospects for new nuclear build. Inherent uncertainty about electricity sales prices and the question whether revenues will be sufficient to cover full costs have become characteristics of liberalized electricity markets. Figure 15.7 depicts the revenue-cost positions typically found in competi­tive markets. Clearly, as long as revenues exceed total generating costs, plant operation is profitable. If prices drop below generating costs, high capital cost and low fuel cost technologies can still be competitive in the short run as long as revenues cover marginal operating costs and still allow for some contribution to debt service. But in the long run revenues must cover capital costs so that the operator can fully meet debt services and provide share­holders the expected return on investment. Once fully depreciated, its low fuel costs give nuclear a decisive edge over its competition. In contrast to nuclear power, CCGT has excellent load-following capability and thus can respond by reducing output during periods when the sales prices drop below short-run marginal costs. Or in cases where natural gas-fired CCGT is the lowest-cost provider and thus the price setter, utilities can pass higher gas fuel costs through to consumers, effectively allowing them to preserve their profit margins.[91]

The economics of nuclear power are not just an issue of competitive generating costs but also a matter of the wider economic and policy frame­
work. This is particularly the case when the well-being of the public at large is at risk due to inadequate provision by markets — so-called externalities. Externalities relate to costs and benefits that are traditionally omitted from private sector evaluations of the economics of different generating options. Including these ‘externalities’ increases the likelihood of developing the most economical and sustainable power resource from a societal perspec­tive (Roth and Ambs, 2004). Typical externalities are health and environ­mental damages caused by pollution from fossil fuel combustion, and energy security of limited liabilities of nuclear operators in case of accidents with off-site consequences. The associated damage costs are not borne by producers but by the public at large. Most importantly, the full costs of producing and using energy are underestimated by the markets and, there­fore, not reflected in the market mechanisms determining the price of electricity. As a consequence, producers and consumers base their respec­tive investment and purchase decisions on incorrect price signals (Bohi and Toman, 1996).

In the absence of government intervention, in each of the externality examples above, liberalized markets would fail to deliver an efficient or optimal resource allocation, resulting in loss of economic and social welfare.

For example, high fossil fuel import dependence, the prospects of price volatility, and technical or geopolitically motivated supply disruptions may adversely affect a country’s energy security and any such incidence may result in a loss of social welfare. The external costs of the US oil import dependence have been estimated at $3/gallon (Copulos, 2007). Consumers do not pay (or even know about) such costs, which, since they are not reflected in the market price, results in overconsumption. In essence, ‘markets have no way of incorporating the energy security cost into the market transaction’ (Tyner, 2007). Basic economic theory suggests a correc­tion of such externalities through taxes, subsidies (for alternatives to oil), standards or some kind of regulation. Energy security considerations may prompt government policy to provide support for diversification of the country’s energy mix. This could come in the form of either disincentives on the fuel/technology with high externalities, or attractive incentives for investment in lower externality options. For example, governments may support nuclear power projects (loan guarantees, power purchase agree­ments, direct involvement in the finance of the plant), despite it not being the least-cost supply option under standard direct cost accounting. The extra costs incurred by the policy can be interpreted as an insurance premium against the occurrence of the externality.

Similarly, policies targeted at mitigating climate change improve the eco­nomics of the low-carbon technology nuclear power. Even small cost adders (e. g., taxes or carbon prices under a cap-and-trade scheme) on CO2 emis­sions can tilt the balance in favour of nuclear power (Rothwell, 2010;

KPMG, 2010). In many markets nuclear power could reduce CO2 emissions at negative costs[92] (IPCC, 2007), especially those with a high dependence on imported coal or where nuclear power is excluded for political reasons.

This raises the interesting question of how EIA should be carried out where environmental consequences of a proposed nuclear installation may straddle political boundaries. Of particular relevance here is the concept of transboundary EIA, the process whereby States ‘take all appropriate and effective measures to prevent, reduce and control significant adverse trans­boundary environmental impact from proposed activities’ (United Nations, 1991, Article 2(1)). This is an express requirement of the EIA Directive, but is also an established principle of international law. The Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (the Transboundary EIA Convention) (United Nations, 1991) is the primary international agreement on the matter, and provided the basis upon which the EIA Directive was amended in 1997. The Transboundary EIA Convention has as its core the objective of enhancing international coop­eration in assessing and mitigating environmental impacts in a transbound­ary context, and addresses the situation where an activity proposed in a territory in one jurisdiction causes the risk of significant adverse environ­mental impacts in the jurisdiction of another State. The definition of ‘impact’ is drafted widely and includes ‘any effect on the environment. . . historical monuments or other physical structures’ and any resulting ‘effects on cul­tural heritage or socioeconomic conditions’ (United Nations, 1991, Article 1(vii)). Clearly, this threshold is deliberately set at a very low level so as to encourage active dialogue between States when the potential for trans­boundary environmental issues arises.

The process affords the affected State the right to participate in and, to a limited extent, influence the decision-making process in the State where the activity is proposed, principally by giving the affected State the right to be notified of the proposed activity and to receive certain documentation as regards environmental assessment. As with EIA at a national level, however, the transboundary EIA process does not give affected States(s) the right to ‘veto’ a proposed activity on the basis of transboundary envi­ronmental impacts.

Adopting an approach similar to that of the EIA Directive, Appendix 1 of the Transboundary EIA Convention identifies types of projects for which a transboundary EIA should always be carried out. This includes proposed development of installations for the ‘production or enrichment of nuclear fuels, for the reprocessing of irradiated nuclear fuels or for the storage, disposal and processing of radioactive waste’ (United Nations, 1991, Appendix 1, paragraph 3). In the early to mid-1990s, the British government listened closely to representations made by the Irish government when it was considering how to proceed with determining a licence application for a proposed nuclear waste disposal site at Sellafield in England. The Irish government produced strong scientific evidence that the storage of radioac­tive substances at the proposed disposal site could have significant adverse environmental impacts in Ireland, primarily as a result of Sellafield’s geo­graphical location on the Irish Sea coastline. This evidence ultimately played a significant part in the British government’s decision to not grant the licence.