Safeguards are an essential part of international confidence-building mea­sures, and serve to help demonstrate a country’s commitment to non-pro­liferation. But today’s safeguards will likely need to adapt to tomorrow’s challenges and with those challenges will come new incentives for countries to become more transparent. In preparing for tomorrow’s challenges, the IAEA has considered the future environment, and reported its internal assessment in February 2008, in ‘20/20 Vision for the Future, Background Report by the Director General for the Commission of Eminent Persons’.[76] This report presents the results of a review by the IAEA regarding the role of the IAEA through the year 2020 and beyond. While the publication will benefit a ‘newcomer’ on the potential future direction of the IAEA and safeguards, its ‘foresight’ analysis and forward-looking review may be of particular interest to those stakeholders who wish to consider the longer term in terms of transparency and the non-proliferation regime. For example, in the Executive Summary, it says:

Although a revival in nuclear power would require additional verification (‘safeguards’) activities, the IAEA’s workload is not likely to increase propor­tionally if States accept greater transparency measures under a new verification standard. The need for IAEA inspectors in the field is likely to decrease due to the use of new technology and a change in the way States are evaluated. Verification activities will increasingly become information driven, with more evaluation work at the Agency’s headquarters. Meeting future challenges will require a robust IAEA ‘toolbox’ containing the necessary legal authority to gather information and carry out inspections, state-of-the-art technology, a high calibre workforce and sufficient resources.

For stakeholders, one pertinent question raised by the above statement is: what will States accept as greater transparency measures under a new veri­fication standard?

Demands for greater transparency about another State’s nuclear activi­ties arise for a variety of reasons, including the desire of States to under­stand the nuclear capabilities and policies of other States. Berkhout and Walker (1999) have considered this question. In terms of transparency mechanisms applied during the development of a nuclear power infrastruc­ture, one should keep in mind that there are the expressed and implied needs of stakeholders at the international, regional, national, sub-national and local levels which should be considered as part of the decision process (i. e., prior to making the decision to develop a nuclear power infrastruc­ture). At the same time, while implementation of transparency mechanisms (and other confidence-building measures) clearly will have benefits at each of these levels, the potential for negative impacts must also be explicitly addressed as reported by Harmon et al. (2000) from the Sandia National Laboratories in a report for the US Department of Energy. This is particu­larly important in view of the fact that a major reason justifying secrecy is non-proliferation. The outcome of such an analysis (whether formal or informal, whether part of a broader analysis of national security objectives, or narrowly defined at the facility level), will enable a State to better align its national interests with its non-proliferation objectives.

And what is the appropriate level of nuclear transparency? That is a question for which each stakeholder forms his or her own opinion. Some suggest that one example of the appropriate level of transparency is illus­trated by the transparency mechanism applied to the exclusively peaceful uses of nuclear energy between two States, namely Argentina and Brazil, as discussed by Fernandez-Moreno and D’Amato (2002) in the 24th Annual Meeting of the European Safeguards Research and Development Association, ESARDA. Johnston et al. (2008) consider that ‘the point and the measure of transparency is full and open truthfulness while being mindful that complete transparency is an abstraction that will never be fully achieved in any society’. Others may differ. Fortunately, transparency in the nuclear field and its contribution to non-proliferation continue to be dis­cussed in several international forums, more recently in the context of the 2010 NPT Review Process that was referred to in Section 13.2.1, Birth of a landmark treaty.

Noting that IAEA safeguards agreements are in force in every State thought to have nuclear activities, but recalling that some States have yet to conclude a safeguards agreement[77] with the IAEA as required by the NPT, transparency remains a subject of global interest (and one that is open to differing points of view). As recognized by the IAEA, an expansion of nuclear power will call for ever greater transparency.[78] A State’s ability to fully embrace and adhere to its international obligations arising from the NPT can well serve as a foundation for building transparency in an age of nuclear renaissance. Besides concluding a safeguards agreement with the IAEA (if none is in force), an example of how a State may increase trans­parency is found in the statement of the IAEA Director General Yukiya

Amano in March 2010, concerning international cooperation being vital to the nuclear renaissance:[79]

Responsibility means countries must abide by the highest safety and security standards and implement IAEA safeguards so the Agency can verify that nuclear materials are being used exclusively for peaceful purposes. All coun­tries with nuclear power should adhere to the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. All countries are encouraged to implement a so-called Additional Protocol to their safeguards agreement with the IAEA, which boosts transparency by giving the Agency’s inspectors more authority.

These views are just some of the many ideas and concepts involving trans­parency, and they should be factored in as part of a State’s progression in the development of its nuclear power infrastructure. In doing so, the con­cerned State may be better positioned to advance its national interest and achieve its non-proliferation goals and objectives.

13.4 Sources of further information and advice

Regarding further information on non-proliferation and safeguards, a true list of web sources would be exhaustive, and in today’s rapidly changing web environment that list might very well be out of date the moment it is published. To be of service to the ‘newcomer’, the sources listed below are essentially limited to UN and IAEA web pages, which many people would consider to be authoritative. Nevertheless, there are many other sites avail­able, and as the ‘newcomer’ progresses in their search, he or she will undoubtedly uncover a host of these other websites, many of which are associated with both NGOs and governmental organizations involved with and/or responsible for non-proliferation and safeguards.

13.6.1 Web-based general sources related to the NPT

Information related to the NPT, with links to associated international safe­guards, is provided at the IAEA’s web pages located at:

• http://www. iaea. org/Publications/Documents/Treaties/npt. html

• http://www. iaea. org/Publications/Documents/Treaties/index. html

• http://www. iaea. org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/legal. html

• http://www. iaea. org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/sv. html

For those readers who may want to become more familiar with the develop­ments of the NPT (both historical and present day), a recommended start­ing point is the ‘NPT Briefing Book (MCIS/CNS) 2010’, available from http://cns. miis. edu/treaty_npt/npt_briefing_book_2010/index. htm.

13.6.2 Web-based general sources on non-proliferation and disarmament

• http://www. iaea. org/Publications

• http://unhq-appspub-01.un. org/UNODA/TreatyStatus. nsf

• http ://www. opanal. org/NWFZ/nwfz. htm

• http://www. un. org/disarmament

• http://www. unidir. org/

• http://www. unog. ch/disarmament

13.6.3 Web-based safeguards-relevant sources and publications

• http://www. iaea. org/Publications/Magazines/Bulletin/Bull5H/ 51103570609.html

• http://www. iaea. org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/safeg_system. pdf

• http://www. iaea. org/Publications/Booklets/Safeguards3/safeguards0408. pdf

• http://www. iaea. org/Publications/Booklets/Safeguards3/safeguards0707. pdf

• http://www. iaea. org/Publications/Booklets/Safeguards3/safeguards0806. pdf

• http://www-pub. iaea. org/MTCD/publications/PDF/NVS1-2003_web. pdf