According to international standards, the initial and on-going training pro­grammes for the personnel involved in the operation of the nuclear facility must be designed and implemented following a Systematic Approach to Training (SAT) methodology. Establishing SAT at an early stage in the project will help to ensure that an effective training system is set up within the project and that those areas where training services and support can be appropriately outsourced to vendors and/or national education and training organizations are correctly specified.

A training programme must have been developed according to the fol­lowing phases, if it is to fit within the SAT concept:

• Analysis

• Design

• Development

• Implementation

• Evaluation.

For all jobs that have a potential impact on the safe and reliable operation of nuclear facilities, the training needs associated with both technical com­petence and soft skills should be considered and analysed as part of the SAT process.

An important activity of the SAT analysis phase is job analysis. Job analy­sis is a method used to obtain a detailed listing of the duties and tasks of a specific job. The results of job analysis are an important input to the SAT design phase. Job analysis results are also important for other HR-related purposes, such as recruitment and selection, HR planning, training, qualifi­cation and authorization, employee development, succession planning and career development.

Once a training programme is running, new information or events can trigger training needs analysis, for example changes in regulatory require­ments, plant modifications, new procedures, feedback from job incumbents, supervisors, trainees or instructors, operating experience, and weaknesses in training processes or performance deficiencies, amongst others.

The most important outcome of the design phase is the training objec­tives. Clear training objectives which are measurable and based on job requirements constitute the basis for designing training programmes, devel­oping training materials and performing post-training assessments of competencies.

During this phase the different training settings (classroom, simulator, workshop, laboratory, plant for on-the-job training) and training tools, suit­able for achieving the training objectives, should be identified. Training tools that are particularly important in the nuclear industry include simula­tors, equipment for workshops and laboratories, mock-ups, computer-based and web-based training systems, e-learning platforms, and video and audio training aids.

Finally, the standards and associated assessment methods are determined during the design phase.

The outcomes from the development phase are the suitable training materials which support the training tools, such as lesson plans, student handouts, simulator scenarios, workshop and laboratory practices and on-the-job training guides. Particularly important activities within the development phase are the training of instructors and validating training materials during a pilot course to ensure the required quality of training delivery.

It is during the implementation phase when training is conducted in the different training settings. If the analysis phase has been well done, only relevant training will be delivered. The implementation phase also includes an assessment of whether students have achieved the standards identified in the training objectives. The assessment of competencies should lead to a formal process of qualification and authorization of personnel to work in an efficient and safe manner without direct supervision.

Training evaluation is one of the most important phases to guarantee the effectiveness of training programmes and improve performance. According to Kirkpatrick (2011) four levels of evaluation can be used to determine the impact of training:

• Level 1: Participants’ reactions to the training

• Level 2: Participants’ achievement of training objectives

• Level 3: Transfer of competencies acquired through training to job per­formance or behaviour

• Level 4: Impact of training on organizational performance.

The conclusions from the evaluation are used as feedback for the rest of the SAT phases for training improvement.

The basic elements for safety in operation of a NPP are the ability to control the reactor power, ensuring adequate core cooling at all times and contain­ment of radioactivity. Towards this aim the NPPs are designed using proven engineering practices and following the principles of defence in depth and adequate redundancy and diversity in safety-related components. However, in spite of the best design, situations can arise during NPP operation that were not envisaged in the design. Experience has shown that timely actions by competent operators may be able to ensure safety even during such unforeseen circumstances. A high level of technical competence in well — trained operators is therefore an absolute necessity. This can be achieved to a large extent by learning from operational safety reviews and operating experience feedback. It should be borne in mind that the primary respon­sibility for safety rests with the operator.

A formal mechanism for review of operational reports and operational incidents on a regular basis should be established by the operating organiza­tion. In addition the regulatory body should lay down criteria for reporting of safety-related operational occurrences. These reports should be reviewed to identify the causes, including the root causes, of the incidents and neces­sary corrective actions should then be implemented. While some of the actions can be implemented immediately, there will be other actions for which detailed analysis, experimental work or development of designs and procurement of materials or components may be required. For implement­ing such actions, a time schedule should be agreed upon between the oper­ating organization and the regulatory body.

In addition to the operational safety reviews mentioned above, compre­hensive and detailed periodic safety reviews should be conducted at inter­vals of about 10 years. For such reviews, a detailed report by the operating organization Is prepared and reviewed internally before its review by the regulatory body. The purpose of periodic safety reviews is to confirm that the NPP meets the current safety requirements and is also expected to continue to meet them till the next such review. The periodic safety reviews should also take into account the feedback from international operating experience, new knowledge available from research and the updated proba­bilistic safety analysis of the plant.

Another useful method for improving operational safety is through peer review by teams of international experts. Similarly the work of the regula­tory body can also be subjected to international peer review. Such peer reviews bring in the benefit of experience from across the globe and the information on good practices followed by the operators and the regulatory bodies of other countries.

The Advanced CANDU Reactor-1000 (ACR-1000) design is a 1200 MWe pressure tube reactor that retains many essential features of a typical CANDU plant design, including horizontal fuel channel core, a low-tem­perature heavy water moderator, a water-filled reactor vault, two indepen­dent safety shutdown systems, a highly automated control system, on-power fueling and a reactor building that is accessible for on-power maintenance and testing. The key differences from the traditional CANDU design incor­porated into the ACR-1000 are the use of low-enriched uranium fuel (as opposed to natural uranium), the use of light water instead of heavy water as the reactor coolant, and a lower moderator volume to fuel ratio. These features together with a number of other evolutionary changes lead to the many benefits for the ACR-1000 design: a more compact core design, an increased burn-up as a result of the fuel enrichment, increased safety margins, improved overall turbine cycle efficiency through the use of higher pressures and higher temperatures in the coolant and steam supply systems, reduced emissions through the elimination of tritium production in the coolant and other environmental protection improvements, enhanced severe accident management by providing backup heat sinks, improved performance through the use of advanced operational and maintenance information systems, and improved separation of redundant structures, systems and components (SSCs) important to safety through the use of a four-quadrant plant layout. The ACR-1000 design has been reviewed by the Canadian regulatory body and has been given a positive regulatory opinion about its licensability. The generic preliminary safety analysis report for the ACR-1000 design was completed in September 2009. The final stage of the ACR-1000 design is currently underway including documentation and addi­tional confirmatory analysis, and the basic engineering is expected to be completed in 2010.

AP1000

The Westinghouse Advanced Passive PWR (AP1000) is a two-loop 1117 MWe PWR scaled up from that already certified in the USA AP600 design, which was originally compliant with the EPRI URD (EPRI, 1995, 1999). In the AP1000, designers have made an effort to simplify all systems, and to reduce the number of systems and components for easier construc­tion, operation and maintenance. As in other evolutionary concepts, the AP1000 uses prefabrication and modular construction as a way to reduce construction schedule uncertainties. One of the signature characteristics of the AP1000 is the use of passive safety systems, i. e., those that rely on natural driving forces such as pressurized gas, gravity flow, natural circula­tion flow, and convection, for core cooling, containment isolation, residual heat removal and containment cooling. On the other hand, the plant design utilizes proven technology and capitalizes on more than 40 years of PWR operating experience. The AP1000 also incorporates severe accident mitiga­tion features, such as in-vessel retention of core debris following a core melt event, and no reactor vessel penetrations below the top of the core level. Two AP1000 projects are currently under construction in China (Haiyang and Sanmen) and substantial construction and operating experience is expected from these. In the USA, final design certification by the US NRC for the AP1000 is expected by 2011 and there are several applications for its construction starting 2011.

At the beginning of the nuclear energy era, several countries developed more or less independent standards in the attempt to define the acceptable level of risk, in terms of risk to the general public. The methods varied from simple dose limits within a specified frequency range (Hurst and Boyd, 1972) down to detailed listings of specific equipment that must be installed (Murley et al., 1991). These criteria have been refined over past decades; the present-day international standards for achieving a satisfactory level of power reactor safety can be found in IAEA publications (NS-R-1,2000 and 13 associated guides). These documents are not, in general, specific enough to serve as national standards for reactor licensing. Generally, each national regulatory group establishes a unique set of specific documents for licensing purposes. Most of these national regulations make reference to the higher — level IAEA documents. Within the community of large reactor owners there has been a major cooperative effort to establish inter-plant commu­nication as well as codes of ‘best practice’ to disseminate detailed plant operational and safety information to new owners. It is strongly recom­mended that a prospective new plant owner should join the appropriate group and to seek information and training from them. This in recognition of the large financial benefits that can be gained by doing this, as well as the fact that nuclear plant owners know that a serious accident anywhere in the world has immediate deleterious effects on all operating plants.

298 Infrastructure and methodologies for justification of NPPs Small power reactors and research reactors

Recently, IAEA has produced a separate Safety Requirements document (NS-R-4 and six associated guides) for small reactors. The Agency is prepar­ing one further guide entitled The Graded Approach. This guide will describe the unique acceptance criteria for this category of fission reactors. In the meantime, at least one national regulatory agency (Canada) has already produced such a guide showing details of the different levels of require­ments that may be applied in licensing of small reactors, as well as giving a definition of this reactor classification.

This aspect of learning is not very different from the exchange of informa­tion on normal operation as discussed in the previous section. Normal operation also includes a host of small equipment malfunctions and human errors — all of which are examined to find out if they might be precursors of larger malfunctions that could occur in the future.

We must carefully define the usage of the word ‘accident’ in this context, beyond the conventional usage. We are dealing here with a complex tech­nology for which all contingencies are presumed to be subject to careful engineering analysis and design. It is reasonable, therefore, to take the posi­tion that all unfortunate consequences arise from human error at some stage of the process. This classification is somewhat at odds with usual prac­tice; however, taking the example of an equipment failure, one can quickly identify different causes — design error, manufacturing error, installation error, and maintenance error. All of these failures are caused by human failure. Even so-called natural events are expected to be protected against by design (through either prevention or mitigation).

An example

Given the fact that accidents are, at the very least, caused mostly by human error, it is very useful (Duffey and Saull, 2008) to look at serious accidents that occur in other industries and human activities in general. The reason for this is to ‘normalize’ the accident rate in nuclear plants to the usual patterns of human existence. Indeed, Reason (1990) points out that ‘active’ human errors are very rare in the world nuclear industry when compared with the frequency of correct action.

Table 10.1 outlines a ‘typical’ accident sequence. (Note that the specific technology is of secondary importance in this type of analysis.) In this case a sudden tire failure led to failure of one engine during takeoff. The pilot was 1.5 seconds late in applying the takeoff abort procedure, and so the immediate cause of the accident was said to be pilot error. During subse­quent review and analysis it was found that a number of other factors actu­ally had a powerful negative effect on the accident — most especially the continued use of tires that were already beyond their service life. In the end, it became apparent that airline management was strongly implicated through unsafe practices.

The basic principles developed by ICRP over the years continue to be regarded as the fundamental basis for a system of radiological protection (ICRP, 2007a). They can be simplistically formulated as follows: [6]

• Principle of optimization (of radiation protection): The likelihood of incurring exposures, the number of people exposed, and the magnitude of their individual doses and risks should all be kept as low as reason­ably achievable, taking into account economic and societal factors. For NPPs this can be formulated as follows: the level of radiation protection designed for the NPP and the level of radiation protection during its operation should be the best under the prevailing circumstances, maximizing the margin of benefit over harm.

• Principle of individual protection: Inequitable individual protection out­comes of justification and optimization should be prevented by restrict­ing individual doses, by applying individual-related dose limits and source-related dose constraints and reference levels. For NPPs, plant — related dose constraints and reference levels should be established respecting individual-related dose limits.

These principles contain embedded values of prudence encompassing the

protection of future generations and their habitat. These values can be

formulated as a de facto principle:

• Principle of intergenerational prudence, which extends the radiological protection principles to all humanity, regardless of where and when they live, and implies that all humans, present and future, and their habitat shall be afforded a level of protection that is not weaker than the level provided to the populations of the society causing the protection needs. In practice, this means that the dose from NPPs to be controlled is the committed dose rather than the incurred dose.

The adequacy of emergency response arrangements can be evaluated through the audit and review of plans, procedures and infrastructure (pre­paredness). The ability to carry out the required emergency actions (response) can be assessed through audits and reviews of past performance, but it is most commonly evaluated through exercises.

Emergency response exercises are a key component of a good emergency preparedness programme. They can provide a unique insight into the state of preparedness of emergency response organizations. They can also be the basis for continued improvement programmes for the emergency response infrastructure. However, to be most useful, emergency response exercises need to be well organized, professionally conducted and focused on the potential for constructive improvement. Nuclear emergency response exer­cises are a powerful tool for verifying and improving the quality of emer­gency response arrangements. Each exercise represents a significant investment of effort, financial resources and people. It is therefore impor­tant for each exercise to yield the maximum benefit. That benefit depends primarily on the quality of the preparation, conduct and evaluation of the exercise.

An emergency response exercise is not an isolated event, but rather a part of an overall exercise programme that is normally implemented over a cycle of several years. This cycle includes several types of emergency exercise. The programme is conducted to validate emergency plans and procedures and to test performance, to train intervention personnel in a realistic situation, and to explore and test new concepts and ideas for emer­gency arrangements. Emergency preparedness programmes should also include considerations and arrangements for international liaison, notifica­tion, exchange of information and assistance. According to the IAEA rec­ommendations (IAEA, 2007) a cycle of emergency exercises includes several types of drills and exercises. The most common are as follows.

• Drills normally involve small groups of persons in a learning process designed to ensure that essential skills and knowledge are available for the accomplishment of non-routine tasks such as emergency radiation measurements or the use of emergency communication procedures. A drill can also be used to assess the adequacy of personnel training and is usually supervised and evaluated by qualified instructors. It normally covers a particular component, or a group of related components, associ­ated with the implementation of the emergency plan and is conducted several times per year.

• Tabletop exercises are discussion-type workouts conducted around a table. All the participants are in the same room or building and no com­munication link with any outside body is necessary. They are not usually conducted in real time and their main focus is on decision-making, assessment, public and media communication policy definition, and implementation.

• Partial and full-scale exercises are simulations used to allow a number of groups and organizations to act and interact in a coordinated fashion. The focus of partial and full-scale exercises is on coordination and cooperation. Exercises can be partially or fully integrated. The inte­grated full-scale exercise involves the full participation by all on-site and off-site response organizations. Its major objective is to verify that the overall coordination, control, interaction and performance of the response organizations are effective and that they make the best use of available resources. Combined on-site/off-site exercises are usually per­formed to test both the on-site and off-site responses and the interface mechanisms in place, which are so important to a proper overall response. In fact, the interface aspects are often the weak link in the emergency response system and need to be tested and updated frequently. When appropriate, partial and full-scale exercises should be organized to train intervention organizations to respond simultaneously to a nuclear acci­dent and a natural or anthropogenic disaster affecting the same areas.

• Field exercises focus on the tasks and coordination of resources that must be operated at or around the site of an emergency. Those include means used by survey teams, police, medical first-aid and fire-fighting teams. Field exercises are conducted on their own or combined with a partial or full-scale exercise. Figure 12.2 shows first responders prepar­ing to intervene in a nuclear emergency field exercise carried out by the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Defence and the Nuclear Safety Council in Madrid (Spain) in 2010.

The frequency of integrated exercises is a matter to be determined by the regulatory authorities. Usually an integrated exercise is conducted in every nuclear facility every year. After every emergency exercise, a per­formance evaluation is conducted to identify areas of emergency plans and preparedness that may need to be improved or enhanced. As a result of an exercise evaluation, there may also be recommendations on ways to correct the identified deficiencies, problems or weaknesses.

Several international organizations conduct nuclear emergency exercises at different scales. Significant examples of these international exercises are ConvEx exercises organized by the IAEA (Martincic and Obrentz, 2008), INEX exercises organized by the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA, 2007) and ECURIE exercises organized by the European Commission (EU, 1987a).

Similar exercises are conducted by other international organizations at regional level in America and Eastern Asia. In addition, some international organizations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO, the World Meteorological Organization, WMO and the World Health Organization, WHO, organize nuclear or radiological emergency exercises focused on topics under their specific responsibilities. Figure 12.3 show the follow-up of an international nuclear emergency exercise at the IAEA Incident and Emergency Centre.

14.3.1 Overview

During nuclear power production radioactive substances are generated as fission products, activation products and transuranic elements (which are also strictly speaking activation products). Most of the radioactivity, 99%, will be found in the spent fuel and in the structural components in the reactor core. The remaining 1% will be found in the process and technologi­cal waste, which is normally low-level waste.

The waste from nuclear power production can thus be classified as follows:

• Spent fuel elements, consisting of the fuel material (uranium oxide, plutonium oxide, fission products and transuranic elements), the fuel cladding and the structural components in the fuel element. As has been noted above, the spent fuel can also be considered a resource, as it con­tains components that can be further used as nuclear fuel.

• Core components, i. e. components that hold the core together and that direct the flow of water (or gas) through the core. Examples are the core grid and core barrel. Also control rods are included among the core components.

• Process waste, i. e. waste from systems used during reactor operation to clean the process water or gas or to limit the releases of radioactive substances during operation.

• Technological and maintenance waste, consisting of secondary waste generated during maintenance work and components from the reactor systems that have been replaced due to failure or wear or to renewal of the particular system.

• Decommissioning waste, with similar content to the technological and maintenance waste. It also includes the reactor pressure vessel and its internal components, which are similar to the core components.

Annually about 20-25 tonnes of spent nuclear fuel,[83] counted as uranium or uranium and plutonium (heavy metal (HM)), or 10-15 m3, is removed

from a 1000 MWe light water reactor, and about 100-200 m3 (after condi­tioning) of LLW is generated. The volume of ILW, mainly core components, varies depending on actions undertaken and is on average at least an order of magnitude less than the LLW.

During decommissioning a few thousand cubic metres of radioactive waste is generated. Most of this waste is VLLW and LLW, while some of the internal components are ILW.

Equity and debt are the basic elements of capital finance. Equity finance means taking ownership, i. e., raising capital by selling shares of ownership in a venture. Sponsors may buy shares themselves (internal equity) or sell shares (external equity). Equity owners are attracted by the potential for profit (from electricity sales) compared to other investment opportunities. Equity is completely at risk should the venture fail. Higher risk exposure and different income tax implications than loans make equity more expen­sive than debt to attract. Equity thus raises the WACC and hence the project cost, but is needed to establish project credibility, especially if the sponsors have poor records at cost control or low credit ratings, or the plant is the first of a kind or first in a country. Hence utilities are usually expected to channel significant equity into nuclear power plant investments.

Debt is borrowed money. Creditors are attracted by the creditworthiness of the project (potential for repayment) and the price (the cost of the loan and the risk-return ratio of the interest income offered to the creditor). The price or interest rate is commensurate with the perceived risk of the loan as well as with the presence of, and potential recourse to, collateral assets of the utility. If a creditworthy government or other entity guarantees the debt, the risk of non-payment and hence the cost of debt both fall signifi­cantly. Creditors by law have priority over owners in case of project failure. The fact that most loans involve contractually agreed interest rates and repayment schedules which are independent of plant performance further reduces the risks to lenders (NEA, 2009).

Proper conditions and incentives for attracting these elements would include assurances that the project is viable. This means that revenues will cover costs (which presumes careful market analysis); that profitable return of and on investment is assured (i. e., no cost overruns that reduce returns over the life of the project, and a regulatory and fiscal climate that is rea­sonably stable and not expropriative); that profits can be repatriated, if this is applicable; that debt repayment is guaranteed; and that risks are properly allocated and managed. Any viable financing scheme must include an effi-

cient and proper allocation of costs, risks, rights and responsibilities among the responsible parties. A project structure that imposes serious discipline in cost and risk management is a sine qua non of successful financing, what­ever arrangements are made with regard to debt and equity.

For any sizable project, some combination of debt and equity is generally required; for multi-billion dollar projects like nuclear power plants, 100% equity or internal financing is highly unlikely. Debt will be preferred by project sponsors: the financing costs of attracting debt are lower than the costs of attracting equity, and debt puts someone else’s money at risk. Lenders to the project will prefer a high equity component, to reduce their own exposure, and as a measure of credibility and project sponsor confi­dence or good faith. The split between equity and debt in the structure of any financing scheme will depend inter alia on the nature and financial position of the project sponsors, on local conditions where the plant is to be built, and on the viability, structure and evolution of the electricity sector in which the plant will operate. Many financing considerations are the same regardless of whether a plant’s sponsors are state-owned companies or governments or private sector companies. However, the risks can be quite different.

Financing a nuclear power plant requires the commitment of large amounts of capital over extended periods of time. Payback periods of 30 years or more are substantially longer than those of most other generation technologies. Expenditures commence up to 10 years and more before the first revenue is obtained. Only a few private sector utilities or large institu­tional investors are willing and able to deal with the inherent uncertainties associated with such long payback periods (demand, market structures, prices, regulatory changes or policy interventions).

The examination process is not intended to take more than six months, and Section 88 of the PA 2008 requires the examining authority of the IPC/ MPIU, after an initial assessment of the issues, to meet with the applicant and each other interested party to allow them to make representations about how the application should be examined. Written representations will be the norm, and this marks a big change from the previous regime under Section 36 of the Electricity Act 1989 (or its predecessors) which was char­acterised by potentially long and expensive public inquiries (e. g. the Sizewell B inquiry which lasted for 340 days). Cross-examination under the new system will play a more limited role, although interested parties do have the opportunity to make representations in open-floor hearings. The IPC does, however, have considerable powers to control the content and proce­dure of these hearings.

Unless extended by the Chair of the IPC/MPIU or the Secretary of State, the decision must be made within three months of the completion of the examination stage. The application must be decided in accordance with the nuclear-specific NPS, unless one of five exemptions applies, including where the panel is satisfied that the adverse impact of the proposed development would outweigh its benefits. Decisions must be supported by a statement of reasons and, if granted, the IPC/MPIU can impose conditions in the order granting development consent.