As explained in Section 20.5.6, the primary aim of the PSR is to assess the health of the SSCs of the NPP from an ageing viewpoint, to help ensure that there are no significant degradations that can impair safety. The RB should carry out an in-depth analysis of the PSR report submitted by the licensee to determine whether the NPP is meeting the current safety requirements and is also likely to continue to meet them till the next PSR. In addition to the information from plant data, including a revised proba­bilistic safety analysis, the analysis by the RB should also take into account any revision of safety standards that might have taken place, relevant new knowledge acquired from research, international operating experience and any obsolescence of NPP components. Based on this analysis a revision of licensing conditions and operating procedures should be made, as appropri­ate. Also the requirements for any system modification, replacement of components and other retrofitting needs should be identified and the time frame for their implementation should be decided.

The personnel in any organisation have to be integrated into a cohesive unit in which roles and responsibilities are clearly understood. Typically these are described in the form of policies, processes and procedures in quality assurance (QA) programmes. Such programmes will include poli­cies in respect of health, safety and welfare and environmental protection.

The great danger with quality assurance programmes is that they can become over-prescriptive; this in turn can result in them becoming impracti­cal to use and maintain. Pragmatism in the development of the associated procedures is advisable. The degree of detail in such procedures can be determined by the nuclear safety significance of the issue to be covered and the need for detail.

Over time, quality assurance programmes have evolved from prescriptive programmes that are imposed to the more inclusive concept of Total Quality Management (TQM) programmes.

The concept of integrated management systems attempts to go further by taking into consideration cultural factors, such as safety culture, that influence and are important to the way in which an organisation operates (IAEA 2006b).

The Management System for Facilities and Activities Safety Requirements Series No. GS-R-3.

This refers to those skilled workers who, by a combination of training and experience (usually through an apprenticeship), are well qualified to perform specific types of tasks, operate specific classes of equipment or perform specific operations.

Craftsmen are mainly required for plant construction and for the manu­facture of equipment and components. It should be noted that qualified pipe fitters and welders each represent approximately 15-20% of the total craftsmen workforce during the construction stages.

Examples of this type of worker would include boilermakers, carpenters, concrete workers, electricians, insulators, iron workers, millwrights, opera­tors of heavy equipment, painters, pipe fitters, sheet-metal workers and welders.

A research reactor with a thermal power rating of a few megawatts has all the systems of a power reactor except those that are related to raising steam and operating the turbine generator for producing electricity. Therefore a research reactor would serve well for personnel to obtain a good under­standing of the intricacies and complexities of controlling the fission chain reaction and the overall operational management of a nuclear reactor.

Training in the conventional engineering part of a NPP can be imparted in large-sized fossil-fuelled electricity generating plants in the country. A research reactor also forms a nucleus around which several scientific and engineering laboratories get established to create a multidisciplinary research centre. Such a centre would then serve as the nodal technical organization to support the nuclear power programme in the long run.

The experience gained in design, construction and operation of a research reactor is extremely helpful in developing a sound foundation for the nuclear power programme. The personnel trained in a research reactor are able to quickly assimilate the knowledge required for operating a NPP and thus a good cadre of well-trained personnel can be created in a reasonably short time for managing the nuclear power programme in the country. Operating a research reactor also gives a boost for establishing the safety culture that is so essential for the success of the future nuclear power pro­gramme. It is perhaps for this reason that all countries operating nuclear power plants today started their nuclear activities by first establishing a research reactor.

A research reactor facilitates production of radioisotopes that are exten­sively used in medical, industrial and other applications. This provides a good opportunity for establishing facilities for preparing targets for irradia­tion in the reactor, processing of the irradiated materials for producing sealed sources and radiopharmaceuticals, transportation of radioisotopes and their various medical and industrial applications for societal benefit. In a way this beneficial aspect of nuclear energy helps in conditioning the public mind towards acceptance of nuclear power subsequently.

Personnel with experience in operation and management of a research reactor can be readily inducted in the regulatory functions and this helps in early establishment of the regulatory body with competent staff.

The benefits of nuclear energy are related to its potential to replace fossil fuels, reduce carbon emissions and hence control climate change, and the potential increase of scientific and industrial progress deriving from an intellectually and technologically intense activity, together with the social and economic development of the societies affected.

As discussed in the previous section, the whole world benefits from the substitution of oil and gas by nuclear power for the generation of electricity, as a result of the corresponding decrease in the emission of greenhouse gases, and by the increase in commercial activities and technology inter­changes between nations. Similarly, the whole of a country benefits from the increased reliability and potential lower costs of electricity, and local and regional populations benefit from taxes and subsidies, and from the direct and indirect economic and developmental effects of nuclear activities. All these benefits are closely related to particular characteristics of nuclear power, which will now be considered in the following sections.

ATMEA1 brings together field-proven technology that is already incorpo­rated into AREVA’s EPR and MHI’s APWR. It is a three-loop PWR that relies primarily on active safety systems, and incorporates severe accident mitigation features. Fuel cycle lengths can be set to be from 12 to 24 months. Fuel management variations in ATMEA1 can go from a full uranium oxide core to a mixed core with MOX fuel up to one-third of the core for the standard design, and up to 100% without any major design modification. The core design includes a radial neutron reflector that improves neutron utilization, thus reducing the fuel consumption, and reduces the irradiation to the vessel.

CAREM

CAREM (in Spanish, Central Argentina de Elementos Modulares) is an Argentinian nuclear reactor that has an indirect-cycle reactor with some distinctive and characteristic features that greatly simplify the design, such as an integrated primary cooling system, self-pressurized primary system and safety systems relying on passive features. The first step of this project is the construction of a 27 MWe (CAREM-25) prototype in Argentina. CAREM has been recognized as an International Near Term Deployment (INTD) reactor by the Generation IV International Forum (GIF).

In the Canadian political system, as well as in many other nations, the public ultimately decides what is to be done and what is to be stopped. In this sense the whole of the nuclear enterprise reports to them. Officially, this reporting is done through government agencies and elected officials. In recent years, however, the public has become much more directly involved — the system has become more participatory and less representative. We all can recall cases in which public discussion has directly influenced the deci­sions made by both the operating company and the safety standards author­ity. The safety management system has become a political system rather than a purely technical one. This subject is discussed in some detail in a recent report by INSAG (INSAG, 2006).

In the present-day climate, consider the position of the operating company when faced with a regulatory staff proposal with which they disagree, either on the basis of potential negative effect on safety or due to unfavourable cost-effectiveness. They can appeal this proposal to the safety standards authority in hopes that reason will prevail. The safety standards authority may rule against the operating company at least partly because of their heavy reliance on the regulatory staff for technical advice. Several means have been devised to ensure that regulatory decisions (which may have far-reaching consequences) are balanced. The first is to establish a senior advisory committee reporting to the head of the regulatory agency, whose duty is to advise the authority from a detached, third-party point of view. In some countries, formal appeals can be made to separate and unbiased bodies established for this purpose.

Obviously, special safety systems may require support services such as status monitoring, control signals, power supplies, water supplies, pump and valve operating power so that they can carry out their designated function. This is especially true of post-accident fuel and containment cooling that may be required to operate for months in some accident situations. Regular reporting of operational testing and maintenance to the regulatory author­ity is an integral part of the test program — essential for the staff to carry out their central auditing function.

Among the international intergovernmental organizations involved in radi­ation safety, the IAEA is the only one specifically authorized under the terms of its Statute to establish radiation safety standards. Unsurprisingly the first endeavour to establish international radiation protection require­ments was made at the IAEA, and has become the main international radiation safety requirement for all activities involving radiation exposure, including NPPs. Over time it has come to be known as ‘basic safety stan­dards’, or BSS.

The IAEA’s Board of Governors first approved radiation protection and safety ‘measures’ in March 1960 (IAEA, 1960, 1976), when it was stated that ‘the IAEA’s basic safety standards. . . will be based, to the extent possible, on the recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP).’ The IAEA’s Board of Governors first approved basic safety standards in June 1962, and these were published as Safety Series No. 9 (IAEA, 1962), a revised version being published in 1967 (IAEA, 1967). At the beginning of the 1980s a further — comprehensive — revision was carried out. This was jointly sponsored by the IAEA and two other organizations of the UN family, ILO and WHO, and also by the Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD/NEA). The resulting text was published by the IAEA as the 1982 edition of Safety Series No. 9 (IAEA, 1982). At the end of the 1980s, the ICRP revised its standing advice and issued its 1990 recom­mendations (ICRP, 1991) in the light of which relevant organizations of the UN family and other multinational agencies promptly started to review their own radiation safety standards. Thus, taking account of the new devel­opments, the IAEA, FAO, ILO, OECD/NEA, PAHO and WHO established a Joint Secretariat for the preparation of new International Basic Safety Standards for Protection Against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources, which came to be commonly referred to as the Basic Safety Standards (or BSS) (IAEA, 1996a; Gonzalez, 1994, 2001a). At the moment of preparation of this book the BSS are freshly revised (IAEA, 2011) to take account of the new ICRP recommendations (ICRP, 2007a).

For the particular case of NPPs, the BSS are supported by requirements on safe siting (IAEA, 2003a), design (IAEA, 2000c) and operation (IAEA, 2000d), which, mutatis mutandi, include radiation protection requirements. They are also sustained by a plethora of safety guides, including those on radiation protection aspects of design for nuclear power plants (IAEA, 2005c), on radiation protection and radioactive waste management in the operation of nuclear power plants (IAEA, 2002a) and on dispersion of radioactive material in air and water and consideration of population dis­tribution in site evaluation (IAEA, 2002b).

Today, the IAEA has safeguards agreements in force with over 170 coun­tries around the world. Almost all of these agreements are formulated based on INFCIRC/153 (Corrected) (IAEA, 1972) in respect of a State’s obligation for a CSA as a Party to the NPT.[21]