The demand for training is underestimated as is the profit of training programs for electrification projects. The following two examples demonstrate that successful energy projects with renewable energies require more knowledge and skills than common apprenticeship of local technicians and end users — realised in few hours of "learning during installation” — can provide. These examples also illustrate that the expenses for training courses in view of the existing risks constitute an effective investment.

In line with the Chinese Brightness Programme two employees of Fraunhofer ISE and Centre for Solar Energy — and Hydrogen-Research (ZSW) conducted a two weeks lasting training course for technical instructors of different provinces of China (Gabler et. al., 2003) in March 2003. Within the scope of the course both trainers realised, that the trainees already possessed of extensive theoretical knowledge, but practical application like installation, maintenance, fault analysis, and repairs were much than important for henceforth instructors. Thus half of the training course was used for practical exercises. It became additionally evident, that beside pure technical knowledge there was high demand for skills to manage institutional tasks like the creation of service standards, the development of energy service companies (Rural Electrification Service Company RESCO), the clearance of responsibilities and ownership structures. There was also a lack of approaches to handle basic problems like energy distribution, payment schemes, incentives for the usage of energy saving devices and system monitoring. The Brightness Programme defined the political and technical frame of the electrification project but economic tasks were not considered in-depth. Only few days of training about off-grid energy supply would have increased the awareness of the Chinese decision makers of the Brightness Programme anticipating many problems that occur now after the implementation. Instead there is need for amendment in various fields. For example the

systems operate without maintenance and payment schedules and user must to get used to varying fees for energy services. The implementation of payment schemes for off-grid energy supply is therefore much more time consuming and expensive, but absolutely necessary. Only with fees regularly and reliably collected it is possible that the PV systems are operated and maintained by private RESCOs. Due to the large number of plants, the patchy situation and conceptual gaps in the program devour great sums of money for which the Chinese government has as yet to pay for every year.

Experiences from South Africa with rural electrification by solar home systems demonstrate that PV (and other renewable energies) is in principle suitable for off-grid energy supply. However, several South African companies failed to accomplish many of their primary objectives. These projects often shipwrecked because of the disregard of the special circumstances in rural and remote areas. Thus the companies neither considered the inaccessible and scattered settlement structure nor did they take the social and cultural background of their possible customers into account. For instance „fee for service" paying schemes failed in some regions due to the distinctive perception of property. User sometimes sold their systems (though they were not the proprietor) or „modified" their SHS technically without authorisation of the real owner. Because of insufficient knowledge about the customers, the companies promoted systems with undersized batteries and power output that didn’t cover the energy demand of the users. Moreover the concessionaire companies underestimated the requirements for personnel and neglected reliable selection methods and training programs. There was a lack of competent personnel on site so users did not know their SHS well and the condition of the solar power systems constantly degraded due to inappropriate handling. The situation changed dramatically as displeased customers refused to pay fees or instalments any longer. The financial losses of the operating companies were not published but one can easily calculate if in 1000 households the batteries became prematurely defective due to overloading and deep discharge. The replacement cost of 100,000 Euro (100 Euro per household) could have been deferred if the project managers had been schooled to hold appropriate user training courses (costing around 10,000 Euro, or 10 Euro per household).

Other expensive experiences can be avoided if decision maker and project designer learn how to survey and integrate non technical factors of rural electrification into their programs.