Kotaro Tonoike, Hiroki Sono, Miki Umeda, Yuichi Yamane, Teruhiko Kugo, and Kenya Suyama

Abstract In the Three Mile Island Unit 2 reactor accident, a large amount of fuel debris was formed whose criticality condition is unknown, except the possible highest 235U/U enrichment. The fuel debris had to be cooled and shielded by water in which the minimum critical mass is much smaller than the total mass of fuel debris. To overcome this uncertain situation, the coolant water was borated with sufficient concentration to secure the subcritical condition. The situation is more severe in the damaged reactors of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, where the coolant water flow is practically “once through.” Boron must be end­lessly added to the water to secure the subcritical condition of the fuel debris, which is not feasible. The water is not borated relying on the circumstantial evidence that the xenon gas monitoring in the containment vessels does not show a sign of criticality. The criticality condition of fuel debris may worsen with the gradual drop of its temperature, or the change of its geometry by aftershocks or the retrieval work, that may lead to criticality. To avoid criticality and its severe consequences, a certain principle of criticality control must be established. There may be options, such as prevention of criticality by coolant water boration or neutronic monitoring, prevention of the severe consequences by intervention measures against criticality, etc. Every option has merits and demerits that must be adequately evaluated toward selection of the best principle.

Keywords Criticality control • Fuel debris • Fukushima Daiichi

21.1 Introduction

In normal nuclear facilities, the goal of criticality control is to secure subcritical conditions of fissile materials, which is achieved by regulating the composition, geometry, or mass of the fissile materials [1]. In the accident of Three Mile Island

K. Tonoike (*) • H. Sono • M. Umeda • Y. Yamane • T. Kugo • K. Suyama Japan Atomic Energy Agency, 2-4 Shirakata Shirane, Tokai, Ibaraki, 319-1195, Japan e-mail: tonoike. kotaro@jaea. go. jp

© The Author(s) 2015

K. Nakajima (ed.), Nuclear Back-end and Transmutation Technology for Waste Disposal, DOI 10.1007/978-4-431-55111-9_21

Unit 2 reactor (TMI-2), heavily damaged and melted fuel assemblies formed a large amount of fuel debris whose composition was unknown except the possible highest 235U/U enrichment, 3 wt%, whose geometry is uncertain, and whose mass is larger than the minimum critical mass derived from the enrichment. Moreover, the fuel debris had to be cooled and shielded by water. To overcome this uncertain situation, the coolant water was borated with a concentration, >4,350 ppm, sufficient to secure the subcritical condition [2].

The situation of the damaged reactors in Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (1FNPS) is more severe than that of TMI-2 because of the water issue. The most major difference is that the coolant water flow is practically “once through.” Boron should be ceaselessly added in the water to maintain its lowest concentration necessary to secure the subcritical condition, which is not feasible. The water is not borated relying on the circumstantial evidence that the xenon gas monitoring in the containment vessels (CVs) does not show a sign of criticality. Although the fuel debris will not be touched for a while, its condition may change because of a gradual drop of its temperature or change of its geometry by aftershocks. The condition will be intentionally changed when the fuel debris is retrieved. Every such change may lead to the criticality of fuel debris [3].

To avoid criticality and its severe consequences, a certain principle of criticality control must be established. There may be options, such as prevention of criticality by coolant water boration or by neutronic monitoring, prevention of the severe consequences of criticality, etc. Each has merits and demerits.

It is necessary to understand the actual condition of the fuel debris regarding the selection of an appropriate principle from those options and the realization of certain criticality control following the selected principle. Adequate observation, sample taking, and analysis of the fuel debris must be conducted.