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Tables IV-4 to IV-8 below provide the designer’s response to questionnaires developed at the IAEA technical meeting “Review of passive safety design options for SMRs” held in Vienna on 13-17 June 2005. These questionnaires were developed to summarize passive safety design options for different SMRs according to a common format, based on the provisions of IAEA Safety Standards [IV-5] and other IAEA publications [IV-6, IV-8]. The information presented in Tables IV-4 to IV-8 provided a basis for the conclusions and recommendations of the main part of this report.
TABLE IV-4. QUESTIONNAIRE 1 — LIST OF SAFETY DESIGN FEATURES CONSIDERED FOR/ INCORPORATED INTO THE SCOR DESIGN
# |
Safety design features |
What is targeted? |
1 |
Integral primary circuit |
Elimination of large break LOCA |
2 |
Integral primary circuit |
Increased coolant inventory/larger thermal inertia |
3 |
Internal CRDMs |
Elimination of rod ejection |
4 |
Internal CRDMs |
Elimination of vessel head penetrations or reduction of their size |
5 |
Soluble boron free core |
Elimination of boron dilution |
6 |
Increased level of natural circulation |
Passive decay heat removal in LOFA |
7 |
Pressure suppression containment |
Fission product retention increase |
8 |
Inerted containment |
Prevention of hydrogen explosion |
9 |
Reduced core power density |
Slower progression of accidents |
10 |
Soluble boron free core and reduced core power density |
Mitigation of ATWS |
TABLE IV-5. QUESTIONNAIRE 2 — LIST OF INTERNAL HAZARDS |
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# |
Specific hazards that are of concern for a reactor line |
Explain how these hazards are addressed in an SMR |
1 |
Prevent unacceptable reactivity transients |
Internal CRDMs (no control rod ejection); boron-free core (no boron dilution); (limited) negative moderator reactivity coefficient |
2 |
Avoid loss of coolant |
-Integral design of the primary circuit (no large break LOCA, minimized vessel penetrations due to internal CRDMs) -Grace period increased due to large coolant inventory and reduced core power density |
3 |
Avoid loss of heat removal |
— Diverse and redundant passive decay heat removal systems with heat exchanges integrated in the primary coolant system -Diverse ultimate heat sinks with the air cooling tower having infinite autonomy -In-vessel retention achieved via RPV cooling by natural convection of water in the reactor cavity -Large heat capacity of the primary circuit |
4 |
Avoid loss of flow |
-Increased level of natural circulation in the primary coolant system; reduced power density in the core |
5 |
Avoid exothermic chemical reactions |
-Inerted containment -Reduced core power density, providing an increased margin to Zr-steam reaction |
TABLE IV-6. QUESTIONNAIRE 3 — LIST OF INITIATING EVENTS FOR ABNORMAL OPERATION OCCURRENCES (AOO)/DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENTS (DBA)/BEYOND DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENTS (BDBA)
# |
List of initiating events for AOO/DBA/BDBA typical for a reactor line (PWRs) |
Design features of SCOR used to prevent progression of the initiating events to AOO/DBA/BDBA, to control DBA, to mitigate BDBA consequences, etc. |
Initiating events specific to this particular SMR |
1 |
LOCA |
-Integral primary circuit eliminates large break LOCA — Increased coolant inventory extends grace period — Containment with high design pressure — Pressure suppression system |
Nothing specified here |
2 |
Steam generator tube rupture |
-Steam generator designed for full system pressure |
|
3 |
Steam line rupture |
-Steam is discharged to a dedicated water pool |
|
4 |
Control rod ejection |
Internal CRDMs eliminate an option of control rod ejection |
|
5 |
Boron dilution by the ingress of boron free water from the secondary circuit |
-Soluble boron free core design |
|
6 |
LOFA |
-Increased level of natural circulation — Reduced core power density |
TABLE IV-7. QUESTIONNAIRE 4 — SAFETY DESIGN FEATURES ATTRIBUTED TO DEFENCE IN DEPTH LEVELS
Category: A-D
(for passive systems only),
according to
IAEA-TECDOC-626 [IV-8]
Relevant DID level,
according to NS-R-1 [IV-5]
and INSAG-10 [IV-6]
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Hydrogen combustion — A
TABLE IV-8. QUESTIONNAIRE 5 — POSITIVE/NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF PASSIVE SAFETY DESIGN FEATURES IN AREAS OTHER THAN SAFETY
Passive safety design features |
Positive effects on economics, physical protection, etc. |
Negative effects on economics, physical protection, etc. |
Integrated primary circuit |
Allows for a reduction in containment volume (see below) |
Increased RPV cost per unit of energy produced; unit power limited by 2000 MW(th) for the original SCOR steam generator concept |
Increased reliance on natural circulation |
Simplifies design and maintenance, contributing to reduced costs |
RPV cost increased due to larger vessel size; may increase complexity of reactor operation (startup phase, etc.) |
Compact primary circuit |
Containment volume could be reduced with a positive effect on plant economy |
|
Soluble boron free core |
Relaxes concerns related to human actions of malevolent character |
[IV-1] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Status of Innovative Small and Medium Sized Reactor Designs 2005: Reactors with Conventional Refuelling Schemes, IAEA-TECDOC-1485, IAEA, Vienna (2006).
[IV-2] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Status of Advanced Light Water Reactor Designs 2004, IAEA-TECDOC-1391, IAEA, Vienna (2004).
[IV-3] EMIN, M. MP98, New passive control rod system for a full and extended reactivity control on LWR, paper 3163, ICAPP’03, Cordoba (2003).
[IV-4] PAPIN, B., QUELLIEN P., The operational complexity index: A new method for the global assessment of the human factor impact on the safety of advanced reactors concepts, Nucl. Eng. Des. 236 (2006) 1113-1121.
[IV-5] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. NS-R-1, IAEA, Vienna (2000).
[IV-6] INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR SAFETY ADVISORY GROUP, Defence in Depth in Nuclear Safety, INSAG-10, IAEA, Vienna (1996).
[IV-7] Technical Guidelines for the Design and Construction of the Next Generation of Nuclear Power Plants with Pressurized Water Reactors, GPR/German experts, (19th and 26th October, 2000), Germany (2000).
[IV-8] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Safety Related Terms for Advanced Nuclear Plants, IAEA-TECDOC-626, IAEA, Vienna (1991).