Как выбрать гостиницу для кошек
14 декабря, 2021
See Table II-3.
II-7. MEASURES PLANNED IN RESPONSE TO SEVERE ACCIDENTS
The passive safety design features of the IRIS aimed at prevention of core damage (decrease of core damage probability) are described in section II-2; those aimed at mitigation of severe accident consequences are listed in section II-3 (DID Level 5).
Regarding measures for population evacuation/relocation in the vicinity of a plant, the designers are considering an option to license IRIS with the off-site emergency planning zone being drastically reduced in area or even essentially eliminated by reducing it to the site boundary.
II-8. SUMMARY OF PASSIVE SAFETY DESIGN FEATURES FOR IRIS
Tables II-4 to II-8 below provide the designer’s response to questionnaires developed at an IAEA technical meeting, “Review of passive safety design options for SMRs”, held in Vienna on 13-17 June 2005. These questionnaires were developed to summarize passive safety design options for different SMRs according to a common format, based on provisions of IAEA Safety Standards [II-6] and other IAEA publications [II-7, II-9]. The information presented in Tables II-4 to II-8 provided a basis for the conclusions and recommendations of the main part of this report.
TABLE II-4. QUESTIONNAIRE 1 — LIST OF SAFETY DESIGN FEATURES CONSIDERED FOR/ INCORPORATED INTO THE IRIS DESIGN
# |
Safety design features |
What is targeted? |
1 |
Integral primary circuit |
Elimination of large break LOCA |
2 |
Integral primary circuit |
Increased coolant inventory/thermal inertia |
3 |
Internal CRDMs |
Elimination of rod ejection |
4 |
Internal CRDMs |
Elimination of vessel head penetrations |
5 |
Increased natural circulation |
Downgraded LOFA |
6 |
Reduced size, high design pressure containment |
Small break LOCA mitigation |
7 |
Pressure suppression containment |
Fission product retention improvement |
8 |
Inerted containment |
Prevention of hydrogen explosion |
9 |
Reduced core power density |
Slower progression of accidents |
10 |
Integral steam generators, designed for full system pressure and with tubes in compression |
Prevention or downgrading of: — SG tube rupture — Steam line break — Feed line break Elimination of tensile stress induced cracking |
11 |
Internal (fully immersed) axial design pumps |
Elimination of: — Shaft seizure — Locked rotor |
12 |
Thick downcomer acting as internal neutron shield |
No vessel embrittlement, and no need for surveillance resulting from a reduction of fast neutron fluence on the reactor vessel |
13 |
Large volume integral pressurizer |
Prevention of overheating events, elimination of sprays |
TABLE II-5. QUESTIONNAIRE 2 — LIST OF INTERNAL HAZARDS
j. Specific hazards that are of concern
# Explanation of how these hazards are addressed in an SMR
for a reactor line [41]
TABLE II-6. QUESTIONNAIRE 3 — LIST OF INITIATING EVENTS FOR ABNORMAL OPERATION OCCURRENCES (AOO)/DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENTS (DBA)/BEYOND DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENTS (BDBA)
List of initiating events for AOO/ DBA/BDBA typical for a reactor line (PWRs) |
Design features of IRIS used to prevent progression of initiating events to AOO/DBA/BDBA, to control DBA, to mitigate BDBA consequences, etc. |
Initiating events specific to this particular SMR |
Large break LOCA |
-Integral primary circuit eliminates large break LOCA |
|
Small break LOCA |
Coupled response of reactor vessel and containment to small break LOCA limits loss of coolant and prevents |
|
core uncovery |
||
LOCA Steam generator tube rupture |
-Integral primary system — High design pressure containment — Increased coolant inventory extends grace period — Pressure suppression system -Because the primary coolant is on the shell side of the steam generators, the tubes are compressed and the possibility of a steam generator tube rupture (e. g., by stress corrosion cracking) is greatly reduced — SG designed for full primary system pressure, up to main isolation valves (MIV) |
Nothing in particular specified here |
Rod ejection |
Internal CRDMs |
|
LOFA |
-Multiple (8) main circulating pumps (MCPs) — Increased natural circulation fraction because of a large, tall vessel |
# 1 2 |
3 |
4 |
5 6 |
TABLE II-7. QUESTIONNAIRE 4 — SAFETY DESIGN FEATURES ATTRIBUTED TO DEFENCE IN DEPTH LEVELS
TABLE II-8. QUESTIONNAIRE 5 — POSITIVE/NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF PASSIVE SAFETY DESIGN FEATURES IN AREAS OTHER THAN SAFETY.
Passive safety design features |
Positive effects on economics, physical protection, etc. |
Negative effects on economics, physical protection, etc. |
Integral primary circuit with safety-by-design™ |
-Core damage frequency (CDF) and large early release frequency (LERF) are reduced, allowing for twin unit or multiunit power plants; potential economic benefits from reduced or eliminated emergency planning — Allows use of a compact steel containment, minimizing the siting area and improving protection from external events, such as aircraft crash — Safety-by-design™ results in a reduced complexity of the plant and its safety systems, contributing to reduced costs — Intrinsic security (‘security by design’) contributes to reduced costs |
-Limits power of a single module (counteracted by modular construction of multiple units at site) — Increases reactor pressure vessel size (however, containment and overall footprint are decreased) |
All safety grade systems are passive |
-Results in reduced complexity and improved reliability of the plant, contributing to reduced capital and maintenance costs -Added resilience to sabotage and other malevolent acts |
None identified |
[II-1] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Status of Advanced Light Water Reactor Designs 2004, IAEA-TECDOC-1391, IAEA, Vienna (2004).
[II—2] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Status of Innovative Small and Medium Sized Reactor
Designs 2005: Reactors with Conventional Refuelling Schemes, IAEA-TECDOC-1485, IAEA, Vienna (2006).
[II-3] CARELLI, M. D., et al., The design and safety features of the IRIS reactor, Nucl. Eng. Des. 230 (2004) 151-167.
[II-4] FINNICUM, D., et al., “IRIS preliminary PRA analysis”, GLOBAL 2003, paper 2069 (Proc. Int. Mtg., New Orleans, LA, 2003), American Nuclear Society/European Nuclear Society (2003).
[II—5] MAIOLI, A., FINNICUM, D. J., KUMAGAI, Y., “IRIS simplified LERF model”, ANES 2004 (Proc. Int. Conf., Miami, FL, 2004).
[II-6] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design, IAEA, Safety Standards Series No. NS-R-1, IAEA, Vienna (2000).
[II—7] INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR SAFETY ADVISORY GROUP, Defence in Depth in Nuclear Safety, INSAG-10, IAEA, Vienna (1996).
[II—8] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Advanced Nuclear Power Plant Design Options to Cope with External Events, IAEA-TECDOC-1487, IAEA, Vienna (2006).
[II—9] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Safety Related Terms for Advanced Nuclear Plants, IAEA- TECDOC-626, IAEA, Vienna (1991).