1. Reactor full and abbreviated name

2. Brief description of the design and safety design concept with reference to previous publications

3. Description of inherent (by-design) and passive safety features, passive and active systems

• Inherent and passive safety features (Category A in IAEA-TECDOC-626)

• Passive systems (Categories B, C, D in IAEA-TECDOC-626)

• Active systems

IMPORTANT: For each passive and active system, please, indicate whether it is safety grade or a backup system

4. Role of inherent and passive safety features and passive and active systems in defence in depth (NS-R-1, with a reference to questionnaire Q4)

Level 1: Prevention of abnormal operation and failure Level 2: Control of abnormal operation and detection of failure Level 3: Control of accidents within the design basis

Level 4: Control of severe plant conditions, including prevention of accident progression and mitigation of consequences of severe accidents

Level 5: Mitigation of radiological consequences of significant release of radioactive materials

Note: Please try to follow this IAEA-supported DID structure, even if in your domestic practice the concept of DID is different.

5. Acceptance criteria for design basis accidents (DBA) and beyond design basis accidents (BDBA)

• List of DBA and BDBA (NS-R-1)

• Acceptance criteria for DBA and BDBA (deterministic and probabilistic, if applicable)

• Protection against the impacts of external events, and combinations of events considered in the design (NS-G-3.3, and NS-G-1.5)

• Probability of unacceptable radioactivity release beyond the plant boundaries

• Measures planned in response to severe accidents

6. Questionnaires

Q1. List of safety design features considered for/incorporated into a SMR design

Q2. List of internal hazards

Q3. List of initiating events for safety analysis

Q4. Safety design features attributed to defence in depth levels

Q5. Positive/negative effects of passive safety design features in areas other that safety (if any)