hubbert. A question that is uppermost in my mind with regard to long-range policy pertains to the present rash of light-water reactors. Ac­cording to aec sources, there is a promise of an acute shortage of 235U in about 25 years as a result of the consumption by the light-water reactors now being built. Yet, the breeder program has been extremely slow getting started. According to the latest time schedule that I have seen, full-scale industrial breeders will not be in operation until the middle 1980’s. It seems to me a very shortsighted policy to authorize the installation of the current rash of large-size light-water reactors under such a situation. Could someone comment on this?

ramey. It is true there was a large surge of reactor orders in the years 1965-1967, averaging 20 plants a year. One year nuclear plants com­posed almost 50 per cent of total capacity ordered. However, in 1968 and 1969, the ordering has gone down some. The power industry has always been cyclical in orders, and the government does not have any control over the ordering of power plants whether they are nuclear or coal fired. This is a part of the private enterprise system. It has been projected that by 1980, there would be around 150,000 megawatts of power produced by nuclear plants, which would amount to, perhaps, 25 per cent of ca­pacity at that time, and that the raw material reserve could begin to get tight in the 1980’s and 1990’s. On the other hand, there has been a tre­mendous exploration program going on for uranium. The current uranium areas are being expanded, and I don’t believe that anyone in the industry or in the aec believes we are in trouble in plans for phasing from a light — water industry to a breeder economy. On the other hand, we all would like to move as fast as possible on the breeder program. The aec is seeking proposals now on the first phase of building the 200 to 500 megawatt demonstration plants that will provide the basis for going into the liquid metal fast-breeder program.

commoner. I am struck by Mr. Ramey’s plea that the aec has no control over free enterprise and the nuclear power industry. That’s an in­consistent position. If that’s the case, why did the Price-Anderson Act ever get enacted? The nuclear power industry, when in need of federal help and regulation on the insurance problem, got it and I don’t see why, if Dr. Hubbert is right and the aec does have the responsibility over our nuclear future, the aec couldn’t make stringent requirements for the kinds of re­actors that are built. I would like to ask, too, whether the Fermi reactor situation has any bearing on this?

hosmer. As to the raw material situation, the energy division of the Chase Manhattan Bank has just completed a study of raw materials through the period 1980 which concludes that, at $10 or less per pound, there is plenty of uranium; the study stops at 1980. But, if you talk with the various material suppliers in this country, they seem to be worried more about oversupply than undersupply and, to back up the supply of uranium by 1980, there is plenty of plutonium coming out of existing light-water reactors to re-cycle, if it is necessary. As a matter of fact, it will be necessary to do so, unless breeders come along very fast, in order to keep the economics of light-water reactors in line. In addition to that, the aec has indicated that by 1973 it will be lowering the barriers on the importation of uranium which may be enriched in United States diffusion plants. So, again there is an extra source. I don’t think, Dr. Hubbert, there is any cause for concern about the supply of raw materials.

ramey. On his first point, Professor Commoner is glib regarding the things that he thinks government agencies can do or ought to do. In this case, it would be regulating the marketing of the largest capital-intensive industry in this country. Just speaking in the context of the possible, the aec does have a number of responsibilities, one of which has been to pro­vide research and development assistance in this emerging technology, but, in its regulatory authority, the aec has been limited to the safety of atomic power plants. If rather extreme regulations were undertaken, it could be handled, presumably, by the agency of government which regu­lates the economic aspects of electric power production — the Federal Power Commission. However, the new chairman of the fpc has indicated that even in environmental matters, he didn’t think that the fpc would be moving very fast or very far in regulating the power industry.

I assume that the second question refers to the impact of the suc­cesses and the problems of the Fermi reactor on the breeder program. The Fermi reactor was authorized and its design and construction began in the 1950’s. It had a whole series of problems in its design, construction, and operation. There was a fuel element failure a couple of years ago, and the reactor is now being re-worked, as far as the utility group that is sponsor­ing it is concerned, as a kind of a testing facility as a part of the fast-breed­er program. The mishap that they had did slow up, to some extent, the de­velopment of liquid metal fast-breeder reactors. A lot of time has been spent determining how the accident occurred and how it could have been prevented. The new designs for demonstration plants are rather different from the Fermi reactor, and the industry and the aec staff are satisfied that engineering means are available in the technology for building safe reactors of this general type.

borchert. A question from the audience is addressed to Dr. Auer­bach: There has been some publicity about a proposed Union Carbide breeder reactor for the Minnesota shore of Lake Superior. Can you tell us anything of these plans? Do you know of any ecological or limnological studies of the lake that could help in evaluating the wisdom of such an es­tablishment?

auerbach. I do not know of any Union Carbide plant on Lake Su­perior.

hosmer. That question may be traceable to speculation about the possibility of building the fourth enrichment plant. Some figures have been developed to compare the cost of putting it on Lake Superior and using a nuclear power plant to power it with the cost of enlarging some of the ex­isting enrichment plants. It was a speculative cost-study based on hy­pothesis; no intention to put in a plant existed.

freeman. I might add that a fourth enrichment plant would not be needed, at the earliest, before 1980 or later, and the possibility that it might be built on Lake Superior is quite remote at this time.

commoner. If I recall correctly, Mr. Hosmer said that the aec is simply given standards by the frc and the other agencies — that it doesn’t set the standards, it simply applies them. If any standard involves a moral judgment between risks and benefits, where is the moral judgment with respect to a reactor made? Is it made in the frc or in the aec?

hosmer. It is made at least in three different places: first, at the In­ternational Council on Radiation Protection, the common fountain that produces all of these standards; second, the National Council on Radia­tion Protection, which has some additional inputs; and third, the Federal Radiation Council itself. These are where the so-called moral judgments are made. Incidentally, Dr. Commoner, apparently you have made the moral judgment that you, at least, don’t like nuclear power. You didn’t put the problem in the context of electrical energy for the United States, the

requirements for which double in less than every 10 years. We cannot con­sider nuclear power plants in a vacuum. They are part of the electrical energy supply problem. If there are risks and benefits in nuclear power, there are risks and benefits in conventionally generated power, and the same for going without power. There may even be a fourth alternative in cutting down the population somehow. But this total sweep has to be analyzed — the nuclear power question is only one segment of the total problem.

commoner. By historical accident, the nuclear power industry has become the arena in which these questions are being discussed. Of course, the risk-benefit evaluation must also be applied to other power plants, ul­timately on the level that Dr. Hubbert talked about. My own position is that it has become quite clear that we cannot operate this country very long on the principle of continuous intensified growth. Now, if the nuclear power industry is already worried about the economic consequences of the kinds of issues that are raised, just start thinking about the economic im­pact of restrictive growth. The country has got to be prepared to take moral stands on that issue, too.

But Mr. Hosmer hasn’t answered my earlier question. How can the icrp, meeting in Europe, understand the value of a reactor in Minnesota? If there is to be a moral judgment regarding the value of the activity that puts out the radioactivity, there is no way of reaching that judgment with­out knowing what that activity is and what its benefits are. There is no such thing as a standard achieved in the halls of the icrp or in the frc, in the abstract. The standard exists only in application to the specific activity that is under consideration and what I am concerned about is who applies it?

hosmer. The state political boundaries are totally arbitrary. Why shouldn’t you leave it up to the people of south Minnesota or east Minne­sota or west Minnesota? It’s got to be some reasonably sized area of com­munity interest in which you make these decisions, and the communities affected don’t always fall entirely within the bounds of one state.

ramey. These risk-benefit judgments should probably be made at the regional level, in relation to the regional need for power and how it can best be met by nuclear, fossil, or other plants. At that level and at the plan­ning stage, conservation groups, utilities, politicians, and the public can take these things into account before a specific license application is made. By the time a license is applied for, matters may have polarized to the point that the proper overall risk-benefit ratios sometimes can’t be made.

borchert. If the aec begins to move seriously toward the encour­agement of regional environmental councils, it might find models in Min­242

nesota, because the last session of the state legislature enabled the creation of regional planning councils.

The next question, directed to Dr. Green, regards the Price-Ander- son Act. Isn’t it true that utilities carry a considerable amount of insurance in addition to Price-Anderson? Have there been many claims requiring settlement using Price-Anderson coverage?

green. It’s true that utility companies carry various kinds of insur­ance. Under the Price-Anderson Act itself, utilities are required to carry $82 million in private insurance, which is the maximum available from the insurance industry. Probably the utilities also carry property insurance, boiler insurance, workman’s compensation insurance, health and accident insurance, life insurance on the lives of their executives, and so on. There have not been any claims under the Price-Anderson Act, to the best of my knowledge — the safety record in the nuclear industry is truly remarkable.

The point that Mr. Ramey and Mr. Hosmer make about our desper­ate need of nuclear power in order to make sure that 20 to 30 years from now when we flick the switch on the bathroom wall an electric light, razor, and toothbrush will go on is an impressive argument, but we should look at it in perspective. The fact that we are talking about nuclear power in it­self involves an accident of history —the accident of World War II, in which the atomic bomb was developed — the historical fact that Congress created an aec, and, even more important than that, the fact that Congress created a Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. There is no doubt in my mind that if, in 1946, we had created some other kind of commission or some other kind of joint committee — for example, a commission to maxi­mize the productivity of power produced from fossil fuel without polluting the environment and a companion joint committee — we wouldn’t have to be concerned about using nuclear power today to meet the threat of a dwindling fossil fuel supply.

eisenbud. I find myself in sympathy with much of what has been said about the need for cost-benefit analysis and, having been in the nu­clear field for many years, I think this is a good arena in which to try it out. We have relatively more information about radioactivity than we do about other environmental hazards, and it is unquestionably the focus for greater attention. We can agree on principle, we can disagree on detail. But if a community is going to make a cost-benefit decision, it must have facts. I’m worried about some of the facts in this volume. For example, Dr. Commoner, I don’t know the exact context of what you quoted from the 1953 aec report about 9CSr and splinters of the bone (p. 226 above), but I can assure you that by 1953, we in aec had already developed tech­niques for measuring 90Sr in milk and were already monitoring the milk of at least one city on a regular basis. We were also making 80Sr measure­ments in samples of human bone. You also referred to the traces of 131I in the thyroids of cattle. I have tried to work backwards, by two meth­ods, to see what 10 pCi per thyroid would mean in terms of total deposi­tion of iodine in the United States. By one method of calculation, I esti­mate the deposition at any given time to 5 Ci, by the other, 50. This is a working range in which we can discuss the matter. The total amount of radioiodine discharged to the atmosphere from all of the power reactors in this country is very, very much less than that. However, there are hun­dreds of curies of radioiodine shipped to the hospitals in this country for treatment of hypothyroidism and thyroid cancer, and much of this does find its way into the atmosphere — but not in sufficient quantities to ac­count for the 1962 report that you referred to, which was curious. It was learned as a result of that report and some work Van Middlesworth did at the University of Tennessee, that the thyroid gland accumulates ra­dium; during that period there were traces of radium reported in thyroids at about the levels you were discussing.

auerbach. I would like to clarify Dr. Eisenbud’s comment about the pervasive contamination of the environment implied by Dr. Commoner’s remarks when he spoke of the 1 pCi/g of radioiodine found in the cattle thyroids at the Nevada test site in the period 1959-1961. At that time, there were, as he says, no weapons tests going on on a worldwide basis. There were three small, or relatively small, nuclear power reactors oper­ating in the eastern part of the United States. If they were to contribute to Nevada radioiodine, that iodine would have to travel several thousand miles to get there. The most likely source of radioiodine in those cattle around the Nevada test site was some nuclear rockets being tested at that time. But a more important consideration, which Dr. Eisenbud has men­tioned, is that the method of measuring radioiodine in thyroid at low levels is a very tricky one, and that up to 50 per cent of the quantity reported as 131I could be radium, which is in the soil as radon and evolves 24 hours a day from the soil. Radium and radon are also among the by-products of fossil fuels.

Dr. Commoner also mentioned the higher radioiodine activities in March 1968 reported by the Public Health Service. Of these values, the Public Health Service analyzes in detail only thyroids which have an amount greater than 50 pCi/g; below that, the figure was obtained simply by multiplying numbers which lack confidence limits. It is interesting, though, that these higher values, above 50 pCi/g, were measured a couple of months or less after the Chinese weapons tests began — these are still going on and are sending radioactive materials across the ocean. Another factor about radioiodine that should be kept in mind is that the quantity of radioiodine found in cattle is much greater than that found in humans. Lastly, the actual quantity currently reported by Dr. Van Middlesworth at the University of Tennessee Medical School at Memphis is somewhere around.3 pCi/g of thyroid, which is an essentially negligible quantity in the environment.

commoner. I said that recent results reported by the Public Health Service in the period January to March 1968 are much more striking than the early ones. In this period of time, there were no nuclear explosions capable of nationwide dispersal of radioactive iodine; there were no Chi­nese explosions. In that period, values as high as 68 pCi/g of iodine were observed in the thyroid gland. The earlier values of 1 pCi do involve the radium problem, and if this discussion had taken place in 1963, the re­marks made by Dr. Eisenbud and Dr. Auerbach regarding the obscurity of the significance of the 131I data because of the radium question would be pertinent. Now that we know, from the Rad Health data, that values as high as 68 pCi/g have been found in the absence of any nuclear tests, we ought to look for a continuous source. The very small amounts of 131I that are used in medical treatments cannot possibly account for such levels in cattle thyroids. Finally, in my calculation I of course took into account the fact that 131I levels are lower in humans than cattle. I would like to know why the aec staff has not been tracking down the origins of the 131I appearing in cattle thyroids in the expectation that they might learn some­thing useful about nuclear reactors and processing plants.

eisenbud. The total amount of iodine released by all of the reactors that we are talking about is a very small fraction of the iodine used in medical practice. The ratio is probably 100 to 1.

ramey. I would just like to comment again that Dr. Commoner is being awfully moral in relation to the Atomic Energy Commission. I should point out, though, that he is out on a limb on 131I. His data are wrong, and he is making false assumptions and interpretations which would be easy to check. He put this in an article some time ago, I believe. I should think he would want to spend some time working this over, and we should be glad to check these data over with him.

audience. What would be the average per-capita dose to the popu­lation of the Minneapolis-St. Paul area from discharges of the Monticello plant at the aec maximum permissible level?

eisenbud. This area contains 1.6 million people. The regulations specify quite clearly that the most-exposed individual in the population cannot receive more than.5 roentgen. When these regulations are followed with a boiling water reactor, the per-capita dose for a population of 10 million people would be.04 mrem.

borchert. Another question from the audience: What is the cost of concentrating, handling, and disposing of high-level radioactive wastes and who pays the cost? The question is asked in the context of the general economic framework in which we are often asked to consider growth with the nuclear power industry.

ramey. The utility that owns the reactor and the fuel is responsible and pays the cost for getting it reprocessed. Under the present system, the high-level wastes will be stored, temporarily, at the site of the reprocessing plant for a period of up to five years. During this time, they will become concentrated and put into solid form and then transported to a federal repository. So, the utility wifi be paying a chemical company or whoever runs the reprocessing plant for the reprocessing, handling, and storing of the wastes for this intermediate period. Then, the utility will pay the gov­ernment for storing the wastes permanently at the federal repository.

borchert. Mr. Ramey, could you refer to some source of data on this which gives the cost and relates it in some way to the economic structure of the industry?

ramey. There is one private organization in business, Nuclear Fuel Services, which has a schedule of charges for reprocessing and for stor­age. There have been a number of economic studies on how much it costs to reprocess and store high-level wastes and how much that adds to the cost of producing power. It is a relatively small amount. The aec has a section in its Reactor Development Division which would be the best source for economic studies and the general picture. Nuclear Fuel Services would be the best source for specific charges and rates. At this time, the General Electric Company is also building a reprocessing facility near Morris, Illinois, and will be in business, I believe, in 1971. An interested person could also get specific costs and charges from them.

audience. Are there any other payments that have been made under the Price-Anderson Act that need to be mentioned to augment the answer that Dr. Green gave to an earlier question?

ramey. I would hesitate to try to give any specifics or even any ranges. In Burlington, Vermont, someone at the press conference on September 11, 1969, asked me what amount of indemnity was required under the Price-Anderson indemnity provisions and I stated that it was in the range of $70 to $75 million. I was immediately jumped by someone saying it was a terrible thing that a Commissioner did not know the pre­cise amount. Of course, I have now done my homework on this and now know that the amount is $82 million. These figures are all in the accept­

able range. Among scientists, of course, even a factor of 2 doesn’t make any difference — it has to be a factor of 10 before anybody gets interested. On the property side, there were some small payments made in connection with an accident at Waltz Mill, but the figure was small.

audience. How did California obtain the right to control emission of C02 from automobile exhaust pipes? Was that unilateral?

hosmer. The automobile is a $4,000 mass-produced item, and California is an automobile market of 20 million people. Since the emis­sions were local and not national or interstate, this issue could be handled locally, and Congress permitted California to introduce higher standards because they don’t interfere with the rest of the country. By contrast, nuclear power plants are multi-million dollar investments and affect the whole region in which they exist — possibly the whole country. The situa­tion is simply not comparable.

commoner. This is an interesting question about the automobile and the nuclear power industry. The federal government has dropped an antitrust action against the auto industry designed to force the introduc­tion of pollution controls. The state of California is thinking of carrying out that suit.

hosmer. Dr. Commoner, the federal government did not drop any suit against the automobile industry. It agreed to a consent judgment against the automobile industry.

commoner. The legal proceedings under the antitrust act were halt­ed, and judgment entered against the industry. The reason this came under the antitrust act was that the technological development of auto­mobiles, even though they are sold in small economic units, represents a huge industry-wide operation. The federal government felt originally, although it has changed its mind, that this national issue required national action. So, I’m not impressed with Mr. Hosmer’s argument that the auto­mobile, because it is small and operates locally, can be regulated state by state whereas the nuclear power plant can be regulated only nationally. Anti-pollution devices in cars pose some technical problems similar to those in the design of a nuclear power reactor.

freeman. I do think it important to understand that the Attorney General and his assistant for antitrust did not drop the lawsuit against the automobile industry short of a complete victory. The consent judgment contains an agreement by the companies which admits each and every allegation made in the complaint and, for that reason, the Justice Depart­ment agreed to the consent judgment. It was a complete victory, effective immediately, rather than a lawsuit that might have taken a couple of years. audience. As all seem to agree that releases from reactors in Minne­sota will be far below what would be permitted by aec regulations. Why are the proposed Minnesota regulations not acceptable to either industry or the AEC?

ramey. This enters the area of preemption discussed earlier. Many of us thought that we were states’ righters, and wanted to cooperate with the states in getting nuclear energy and other things going in a new tech­nology sense. In the 1950’s, when I was staff director of the Joint Com­mittee and Mr. Hosmer was a member, we prepared a report on the possible roles of the states in atomic energy. Then the aec submitted a couple of different bills proposing a role for the states. Finally, in 1959, Congress passed what are called the federal-state amendments, setting forth an interim method, for the next 10 to 20 years, for delegating to the states the authority to regulate radioisotopes. The biggest source of radia­tion for most people is medical radiation from X ray machines, radium, and so on, which traditionally has been regulated by the states. It was thought that by delegating the authority to regulate radioisotopes pro­duced in reactors under aec authority, and by providing for the aec’s assistance to the states, the states’ activities in controlling an important part of radiation could be improved. In the last 10 years, under this authoriza­tion, aec has entered into agreements with twenty-one states providing for this type of program. Interestingly enough, Minnesota is not one of the agreement states. Frankly, it would be desirable for Minnesota to con­sider such an agreement because, even though the state has some good radiation people in its health group, with the aec’s help it could perhaps train and upgrade still more people in this very important field. And the medical field actually involves far more radiation than do effluents of power plants.

The second area that the states could participate in to a greater extent right now, and the aec is embarking on this program with the Public Health Service, is in the monitoring of the effluents from nuclear power plants. Experimental or demonstration programs are under way at several of the nuclear power plants such as Dresden (Illinois). If states are truly concerned about the monitoring of effluents, they could, in cooperation with the aec and the Public Health Service, have a positive role in getting themselves equipped. The 1959 federal-state amendment to the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 indicated that there could be later changes. In this country, the proper process would be to make a case before Congress whether or not the law ought to be amended to permit the states to par­ticipate in the regulation of the nuclear power plants. The various pro­posals and motivations involved would then be aired in the normal con­gressional process.

borchert. Mr. Ramey, do I summarize correctly, then, that the concern is not with the level of releases that are suggested in Minnesota as compared with the aec standards, but rather with the legal fact that the aec feels that Congress has preempted the field and with the concern that you expressed that other areas of radioactive risk are more urgent and more practical for the states to concern themselves with? Is this what you are saying?

ramey. No. But your second point has some basis; these other areas are more important in terms of the priorities of what the states ought to be concerning themselves with. However, there are problems with the specific regulation that’s involved in the order of the permit issued by the Minne­sota Pollution Control Agency. As I understand it, the mpca’s regulation is based on an average, and sets the average as a limit — even though every­body knows that sometimes you go over the average and sometimes you go under it. Similarly, as I understand it, mpca has provisions which would require frequent start-up and shutdown of the plant, perhaps monthly, to investigate whether or not there are any leaky fuel elements that might give off very minor amounts of fission products. From a safety standpoint, one normally prefers to have a plant stay in operation. The start-ups and shutdowns pose more problems than the benefits to be derived from seek­ing answers to questions of whether or not there are any minute leaks in fuel elements. This example shows the intimate relation between the per­mit that is regulating effluents and the actual design and operating mode of the reactor. It requires a terrific amount of technical knowledge and review in order to come up with the right kind of a design and the right kind of operating mode.

audience. Is the aec looking into the question of lowering its Part 20 standard on radioactive effluents?

ramey. The aec has looked at it from time to time, and we are doing so even more carefully now. There is a general admonition in the FRC Guide to keep radiation as low as practicable. One method would be to interpret what is as low as practicable. This matter is not so urgent as some of the other things that we are working on, but we are going to reach some decision, again not looking at just one state and not necessarily at just one type of radioactivity. [On March 28, 1970, the aec issued for public comment proposed revisions to regulations 10CFR20 and 50 which would provide further assurance that radioactive releases from nuclear plants remain “as low as practicable” below the established standard. See aec Press Release No. N-48 dated March 28, 1970.]

zabel. When I was on the icrs, the question came up in connection with one of the plants that was operating, Why should the limit be so high?

The records of that particular plant showed that levels in operating ex­perience had been low, and it would have been possible to lower the rates. During an extended discussion of that particular reactor, the icrs finally concluded that the higher levels should be maintained as limits for the time being. I still feel that they could have been lowered, and eventually they will be. However, if an ironclad limit is set, action must be taken when the limit is exceeded even temporarily. Because of operational problems and because of such hazards as shutdowns’ putting stress on parts of the plant, immediate action in the case of a temporary excess may not be the most desirable thing to do. It depends upon the particular situation, icrs encourages the plants to keep it very, very low, but leaves the limit high enough to permit freedom of judgment on the safest action under specific circumstances. If the limits are too low, the effect on flexibility might be a more critical condition than if the limits are higher and emissions are low on the average.

borchert. Why are means or averages used instead of absolutes in the statement of standards?

brungs. In terms of temperature standards, in most cases we are talking about a maximum temperature over a given period of time rather than averages, because averages can vary quite a bit, depending upon the season.

stannard. One reason for using averages in population standards is that we are dealing, not with a situation where a given event, such as a blow on the head, is certain to give damage, but with overall effects of radiation on a population at levels where somatic changes are much less significant than genetic. Also because the figure for average exposure has already incorporated several safety factors, it is considered possible to allow certain individuals, or small segments of the population, somewhat more exposure than the average because we are dealing only with a low probability of something happening and that something carries a wide range of biological significance. Finally the measurement of individual doses in a large population is a large undertaking and we would be dealing with an average anyway.

ramey. My reference was to setting an absolute limit at about 2 per cent of the mpc level, based on the average experience predicted by the utility in terms of how it is expected to operate the nuclear power plant. Everybody knows that the effluent discharged wifi fall above and below an average — one day or one week it might be 1 per cent and another week 4 per cent. So an absolute limit at that very low level is impractical.

audience. In building reactors, is a safety factor included in the same way it is in building a bridge?

stannard. The safety factor is included in every calculation and every decision on standards, physical, biological, and engineering. Prob­ably the largest safety factor of all is the assumption that the biological effects of radiation that we are interested in actually follow a linear rela­tionship to dose with no threshold. That is a very large assumption, and it introduces a safety factor of considerable importance. Yet, even with that safety factor, others on the order of 10 or more are put into standards because those with responsibility for setting standards feel it is necessary to be conservative. One of the reasons that many who participate in standard-setting want a good reason for further tightening these standards is that already many safety factors have been included. Several papers in this volume have pointed out an important reason for using such factors — namely, that there are other factors in the environment that may impinge on the health of man. This is where we need to place our efforts and our money.

audience. If we know there’s danger of risk in these systems, why don’t we modify the system?

commoner. A brief, and understandable, reply is that what you propose will cost a lot of money.

audience. If there is any possibility of hazard from the wastes from nuclear power plants, why do we build them?

hosmer. It is a matter of having to accommodate to the world in which we live. We need to produce electricity. The chances of damage to any individual in society from any of the effluents of a nuclear plant are so low that there would be fewer people hurt by them than there would be if the same amount of electricity was being produced by a coal plant powering pollutants into the air. But society has forced upon us many, many risks. Crossing the street is a risk. You cannot live in our society without moving around.

tamplin. The fact that the reactors may not come anywhere near delivering the dosage that is allowable under the radiation protection guideline is a wonderful thing, because the radiation protection guideline is not necessarily safe. The guideline is inappropriately too high. Dr. Stan­nard presented a figure on the number of genetic deaths for 1 roentgen of radiation, the figure in icrp Publication No. 8. The genetic deaths in the first generation have built into them an imagined elimination rate of 2.5 per cent, a rate which is not necessarily established for human popula­tions. If something like the radiation protection guideline is the law, then the population could eventually be exposed to that rate generation after generation. Then this 2.5 per cent imagined elimination rate, which may be an actual rate of 50 per cent per year for the population, is meaning­less. The number of mutations in the population might increase at the 2.5 per cent elimination rates, taking something like 50 generations for it to build up its maximum. But, at that time, the number of genetic deaths will be the number that Dr. Stannard had recorded for infinity. Also, that number was four times the existing death rate at 1 roentgen per genera­tion, not 5 roentgens per generation.

audience. How much more, in mills per kilowatt hour, would it cost to generate power under mpca standards than it would under aec standards?

commoner. This is the key question in most massive pollution prob­lems, Why not simply accept the lower risk and have the public or society accept the added cost of reducing the risk? An answer is to let the price of electricity go up; if people are willing to pay more for electricity in order to avoid certain dangers, that is a perfectly feasible thing to do in our society. It hasn’t been approached this way because all the costs and bene­fits are not yet out in the open. In many cases, pollution problems will be solved simply by people’s expressing their willingness to pay more for the product in order to avoid pollution.

audience. Dr. Auerbach, have you been satisfied with existing en­vironmental monitoring programs?

auerbach. I would not be at all surprised if they are inadequate, but I have not commented on that. The responsibility for developing an ade­quate monitoring procedure is a responsibility of the utility. The utility has the responsibility of assuring the public that its nuclear power plant will meet all of the present safety requirements. I don’t think that the present safety requirements need to be changed or that there is any tech­nical justification for changing the standards. But, I do think that the pri­mary responsibility of informing the public about a particular plant lies with the utility company, and not necessarily with the federal government.

As for the costs for pollution, I think that Dr. Commoner has a valid point. However, if society wants to pay for increased pollution control, it has yet to demonstrate this on a local level. For example, society does not want to vote bond issues for local sewage treatment plants. The challenge is to come up with the necessary funds at the local level if we are indeed interested in a clean environment.

audience. Mr. Ramey remarked that atomic power plants are aesthetically pleasing. Who says they are and is it so?

ramey. Relatively speaking, nuclear plants are aesthetically pleasing when compared with fossil-fueled plants. Anyone who has visited or ob­served a coal plant is not exactly impressed with its aesthetic appearance,

whereas I think many of the nuclear plants have a modern, rather striking, architecture. Of course, aesthetics are quite a personal thing.

commoner. Then, too, there are people who find a blemished dis­ease-marked apple more aesthetically pleasing than a nice smooth one because it gives them a feeling that there haven’t been so many insecticides on it. It depends on who you are.

I have been asked whether the mpca standards represent the conse­quences of an informed public opinion or, rather, the opinions of some small group. I have the general impression that there has been a greater public input into the considerations of the mpca than there has been in almost any other reactor problem that I know about. The influence of public views is probably better represented by the mpca judgment than it has been anywhere else, and I think that is a very good direction in which to go.

audience. Dr. Hubbert indicated that the United States has only a 25-year supply of 2S5U. Is it his opinion that the present program of rapid installation of reactors that principally consume 28 5U may have been ill — advised?

hubbert. Yes, that is substantially my opinion. My statement was based on two recent reports of the aec. On page 14 of the aec report of February, 1967, entitled Civilian Nuclear Power, the 1967 Supplement to the 1962 Report to the President, the following statement was made on page 14: “With reactors of current technology, the known and estimated domesic resources of uranium at prices less than $ 10 per pound of uranium oxide (U308) are adequate to meet the requirements of the projected growth of nuclear electric plant capacity in the U. S. for about the next 25 years.” Since that statement was made, the projected growth has been increased from 95,000 to 145,000 megawatts of nuclear power capacity by 1980.

Evidence for a shortage of uranium before 1980 was also presented by Rafford L. Faulkner, Director, Division of Raw Materials of the aec, in an address before the Conference on Nuclear Fuel — Exploration to Power Reactors, held in Oklahoma City on May 23, 1968. More recently, however, as a result of the realization of this impending shortage, an accelerated program of uranium exploration has been begun and, accord­ing to the aec Annual Report for 1968, has met with some success.

In view of this limited supply of 235U, the present program of rapid installation of 235U-consuming, light-water reactors, impresses me as hav­ing been ill-advised. If fission nuclear power is not to be short-lived, breeder reactors are imperative. In the 1962 report on Energy Resources of the National Academy of Sciences Committee on Natural Resources, advisory to President Kennedy, top priority was given to the development of breeder reactors. However, according to Milton Shaw, Director, Divi­sion of Reactor Development and Technology of the aec, in his paper “The Fast Breeder Reactor Program” (given before the American Power Conference in Chicago on April 23, 1968), the breeder-reactor program before 1967 had been carried out at a leisurely pace, and in an atmosphere of complacency. “There was much less substance than image to the in­dustrial breeder program,” stated Shaw, “for there appeared to be ample time.” Subsequently, something approaching a crash program on industrial breeder reactors has been launched but, according to the published time schedule, these are not expected to be in operation before about 1985.

ramey. Dr. Hubbert is entitled to his views. He has been trained in geology and knows a great deal about natural resources, but he is not an expert in nuclear power. In 1962, the aec, in a response to a request from President Kennedy prepared a report called “Civilian Nuclear Power, A Report to the President, 1962.” This report discussed what the future of atomic power should be and stated that the fast breeder program, particu­larly the liquid metal fast breeder, should be the top priority program. It has been a growing program, and it is now the program on which we are expending our greatest effort. Of course, there are back-up programs in the breeder field, in case, for some unanticipated reason, we do not make it with the prime candidate. The current commercial development of light — water reactors will not waste our natural resources, in that the plutonium that the reactors produce will be useful either as a recycle fuel or as a fuel in the fast breeders, when they come in in the late 1970’s and in the 1980’s. Secondly, a good part of the uranium that isn’t burned up in commercial light-water reactors is reusable. So, I don’t think the criticism that Dr. Hubbert is leveling is quite so strong as he makes out. I would point out, however, that after an analysis of the resources available, he made it very clear that we are going to need nuclear power, certainly in the next cen­tury and the centuries to come.

audience. Wouldn’t the artificial release rates of thousands of curies of tritium and xenon per annum from the stack of the Monticello plant be detrimental to the public? I understand that the maximum release there would be 41,400 curies of radioactivity a day.

bray. I’m not familiar with the number you are quoting, but it ap­pears to me to be higher than the anticipated stack release rate from the Monticello plant. To give a dose of 500 mrem/year to a person who stands all year at a fence on the boundary of the property, the release rate would have to be.48 curies, or 480,000 /лСі/sec. The anticipated release rate of the Monticello plant is expected to be less than that. Its emissions are consistent with the regulations, and it is on that basis that the project was reviewed by the aec.

ramey. I would like to refer this question to Mr. Lester Rogers, director of the Division of Radiation Protection Standards, one of my aides.

Rogers. With respect to number of curies, you really have to speak also in terms of particular nuclides in the gaseous release from boiling water reactors. Many short half-lived noble gas radionuclides are released. While the total number of curies released may be high, their signficance, so far as exposures of people goes, is very small. The regulations provide that the maximum permissible release rate shall not result in an exposure rate anywhere on the boundary of the site of more than 5 rem/yr (integrated exposure outdoors over a period of 365 days a year, 24 hours a day). Actual exposures to members of the public would be substantially less. The farther away from the reactor they are, the less the exposure, as Dr. Eisenbud has calculated and presented in his paper.

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