I start this paper by stating a number of facts which I believe are axio­matic. First, although the atomic energy establishment is prone to dismiss those who are concerned about the health and safety implications of nu­clear power plants licensed by the aec as ignorant of the facts, overly fear­ful, or in cahoots with the coal interests, the fact of the matter is that there is a legitimate basis for apprehension. Normal operation of a nuclear power plant results in the discharge of radioactive effluents into the en­vironment. Although there is no basis for believing that such effluents, in­volving very low levels of radiation, are harmful to plant, animal, or hu­man life, there is also no assurance that they will not result in harm. (It is worth noting that only long after the electric power producing and auto­motive industries came to maturity did anyone begin to understand that discharges from fossil-fueled power plants and motor vehicles pollute the environment in a manner detrimental to life.) However small the result­ant radiation exposure may be, I doubt that anyone would seriously con­test the proposition that it would be better if the exposure were even smaller. As stated by the frc in 1960: “There are insufficient data to pro­vide a firm basis for evaluating radiation effects for all types and levels of irradiation. There is particular uncertainty with respect to the biological effects at very low doses and low-dose rates. It is not prudent therefore to assume that there is a level of radiation exposure below which there is ab­solute certainty that no effect may occur.” (Radiation Protection Guid­ance for Federal Agencies, Memorandum for the President, May 13, 1960).

Recommendation 1 in this memorandum states the basic principle underlying radiation protection standards as enunciated by the frc:

“There should not be any man-made radiation exposure without the ex­pectation of benefit resulting from such exposure.” True, the frc goes on to establish Radiation Protection Guides within which man-made radia­tion exposure may be authorized, but it cautions in Recommendation 2 that “every effort should be made to encourage the maintenance of ra­diation doses as far below this guide as practicable.”

The frc’s guides are essentially the same as the aec’s Radiation Pro­tection Standards — the famous Part 20 of aec’s regulations — and activi­ties licensed by the aec result in radiation exposures far below the limits set in the guides and standards. Nevertheless, as the frc stated, it is not prudent to assume that no harm will result. (Indeed, the numbers set forth in the frc radiation guides and in Part 20 themselves represent the strik­ing of a balance between risks and anticipated benefits.)

There is another and more frightening hazard of nuclear power plants, the possibility of a serious accident in the course of operation of the plant. In 1957, a Brookhaven National Laboratory study commis­sioned by the aec concluded, under quite pessimistic assumptions, that a single serious accident could result in 3,400 deaths at distances up to 15 miles; 43,000 injuries at distances up to 45 miles; land contamination at even greater distances; and $7 billion in property damage. Four years ago, the aec chairman told the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy that, because of advances in the technology, the consequences could now be even greater.* The potential destructive impact of a nuclear power plant catastrophe dwarfs by many orders of magnitude any other catastrophe which could be imagined as resulting from a man-made artifact. The Price-Anderson Act of 1957 explicitly recognizes the possibility that at least $560 million in damages might result from such an accident, since it establishes a requirement for insurance protection plus an aec indemnity agreement in that aggregate amount, f The probability of such an acci­dent is extremely low because of the great care taken by industry in de-

* Hearings before the Subcommittee on Legislation of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on Proposed Extension of AEC Indemnity Legislation, 89th Cong., IstSess. 347-348 (1965).

t The Price-Anderson Act requires every nuclear power plant operator to carry $82 million in liability insurance, the maximum available from the insurance industry. Over and above this, there is a government indemnity of $478 million which pro­tects anyone who may have liability. When these sums are exhausted at the level of $560 million of liability, the Act explicitly cuts off any further liability. For exam­ple, if a nuclear power plant accident were to result in public liability of a billion dollars, liability claims would be settled on the basis of somewhat more than fifty cents on the dollar. The effect of this is that there is zero possibility that anyone in the nuclear industry would have to pay one penny’s worth of liability claims out of his own pocket.

signing and building nuclear power plants, the stringency of aec safety regulations and requirements, and the multiple levels of safety review within the aec. Nevertheless, utilities would not buy and operate nuclear power plants and equipment manufacturers would not build and deliver such plants and their major components without the protection of the Price-Anderson Act, which relieves them of any possibility of liability out of their own pockets for the consequences of such an accident. However infinitesimally small may be the probability of a serious accident causing damage of enormously high proportions, industry will not assume the very same infinitesimally small risk which must be assumed by the public which lives in the shadow of nuclear power plants.

The second fact is that the aec regulatory program is more compre­hensive and stringent than any other in the history of this nation. It is, moreover, administered by a dedicated and competent group of public servants, and provides for thorough, multiple safety reviews. It is under­written by an equally dedicated and competent congressional committee, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

Third, whatever the risks of nuclear power may be, they could be reduced if more money were spent by the utilities. If greater costs were incurred, discharge of radioactive effluents could be reduced. At greater cost, nuclear power plants could be built in more isolated locations, put underground, or otherwise made safer. Of course, forcing such greater costs on nuclear power plant operators would make nuclear power less attractive from the economic standpoint.

Fourth, there has to date been a truly remarkable health and safety record in all phases of the atomic energy industry.

Finally, the fact that nuclear power plants involve hazards does not mean that we should not have nuclear power. Nuclear power brings with it benefits (aesthetics, freedom from sulfur-dioxide pollution, and per­haps cheaper power, among others) against which the risks must be weighed. If the benefits outweigh the costs and risks, obviously nuclear power plants should be built. My principal objective in this paper is to ex­plore the manner in which the aec nuclear power licensing procedures re­late to the balancing of benefits against risk.