isbin. A number of written questions have been submitted to me by members of the audience; I shall draw them randomly.

audience. Would you like to estimate how much the nuclear in­dustry should pay for public safety, knowing that very few other industries pay anything at all?

bray. Well, I can attempt a partial response from my experience, taking as an example a power reactor. There are millions of dollars in­vested in the construction of a power plant. In addition, the amount paid for safety is definitely in the millions of dollars per plant. Many millions are spent providing accident preventatives such as selection of inherent safeguards; selection of applied safety, preventative systems; provision of safeguards; and provision of containment.

The second category in which payment for safety is quite large is, of course, in the normal release area. Again, millions of dollars have been spent on systems not only to meet regulations, but to bring the releases below regulations in the interest of safety. Just how that cost converts to rates, of course, depends upon the finances of a particular utility.

audience. What are the additional costs for more stringent control devices to reduce radioactivity in the water emission and for complete radiator cooling power systems in nuclear plants, both in additional capital investment and kilowatt-hour costs to the consumers? Are these additional capital inputs sufficient to make nuclear power more costly than fossil fuel power?

bray. There are techniques for more stringent control, similar to those used today to bring the liquid and gaseous releases below limits. For instance, in the holdup system the long pipes might be made longer — increasing the cost of the initial system. The main question one asks is, What is the goal? Every one of us is receiving anywhere from 200 to 500 or more mrem per year (see list on p. 20). From a nuclear power plant there would be some 5 mrem per year in gaseous wastes. Does it make sense to concentrate on bringing 410 mrem per year down to 400? Might it not be a more fruitful and more effective use of the national economy to attempt to diminish some of the other contributory sources of radiation—such as the 45 mrem in newly constructed houses, the amount and strength of medical X rays, or some other areas? Large sums might be spent in those areas to better effect. At this point in the nuclear industry, large sums and much effort are directed at the last minor radia­tion released; the effectiveness of such expenditures becomes questionable. For instance, when an engineer sizes a holdup system for protection from radiation, he makes the duration long enough to allow some of the active isotopes to die; doubling the length of time for holdup of the gaseous release doubles the cost.

The use of radiator cooling calls for towers or other such devices. These certainly would increase the cost of a power plant — any of these large structures always ends up in the millions column of a cost sheet. Whether this makes nuclear power more expensive than fossil power depends on many other factors. Across the country today, there are areas where fossil fuel plants are less, equally, or more expensive than nuclear plants. When the cost of a nuclear power plant is increased in the millions columns, it could easily become more expensive than fossil fuel plants in certain areas and still be less expensive in others.

audience. You did not deal at all with the question of ultimate dis­posal of high activity wastes — what happens to them in, say, 100 years. Also, how can you justify the problem of multiple consecutive reuse of the same water for numerous plants on a particular river?

bray. I mentioned briefly in my paper that the solid wastes are drawn out of the liquid gaseous wastes and stored on site in barrels and then, under very strict regulations, are transported to aec disposal facilities. These facilities, of course, meet stringent requirements, as do the power reactors. With respect to multiple reuse, the important point is that any power plant, independent of where it is and what its water sources are, must meet the same stringent requirements as any other power plant, be it upstream, downstream, or on another river. Again, our attitude toward it is one of proper concern about safety.

isbin. Would this mean that multiple reactors at stations nearby would have no effect on a particular plant?

bray. No. If there were an effect at all, the system would have to be designed to comply with all the appropriate existing regulations, whether there were one plant or two plants or many plants nearby, whether they were 200-megawatt plants or 800-megawatt plants.

audience. How are aec long-range standards actually determined? zabel. It is always difficult to answer a question about standards because there are standards and codes; sometimes these two are mixed up, so I’m not sure which you are talking about. A standard is often referred to as an element for maintaining conformity or compatibility; it sets some­thing that is interchangeable. A code is that which is designed, something to be acceptable. I don’t know which one you mean here. If it’s a code, the code is determined primarily by a “codes group,” which represents the nuclear industry in the aec and standard code groups within the country. The group works at the aec, sometimes with the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, in an attempt to take a rational approach to a code. If you’re speaking of a standard — a radiation standard, for instance — there are international groups that deliberate the problem and make a judgment. They collect data accumulated over many years, evaluate it, and set what they believe to be a standard of radioactive material con­centration. The decision is followed up over the years to determine its validity. Setting standards is a lifetime work and a professional occupation.

audience. What specific attention is given to the possibility that a senior operator or supervisor might become mentally unbalanced and use his knowledge and accessibility to vital components to bypass engineered safety features and create an accident endangering public safety?

bray. Utilities have an excellent screening system for the selection of operators, especially in nuclear power plants. Secondly, no operator is alone. He works with senior operators, shift superintendents, or whatever the particular utility would call them. Also, the continuity of the design of these systems makes it unlikely that any operator could make all these automatic safety systems not work at the same time. There are so many automatic systems set to shut the reactor down that an operator generally finds himself busy keeping the reactor going.