The safety analysis presentation is the purpose of the PSAR document. It requires a core and primary circuit analysis and a standby safeguards analysis with emphasis in each section on abnormalities considered, identi­fication of causes, and a complete analysis with methods and results.

Table 6.2 is an outline of a safety analysis section, as an example of exact­ly what might be covered in such an analysis, in this case for a three-loop LMFBR.

This document would be prepared by the design and safety groups of the industrial vendor for their utility customer and the utility would submit it to the AEC in support of their application. The vendor acts as an expert witness for the utility if any questions on the work arise.

Section XIV
SAFETY ANALYSIS

1. INTRODUCTION

2. REACTOR PLANT PROTECTION AND FAULT CONDITIONS

2.1 System Design Safety Features

2.1.1 Core Design

2.1.2 Heat Transport System Design

2.1.3 Reactivity Design

2.1.4 Protective System Design

2.2 Reactor Stability

2.3 Plant Protective Trip Levels

2.4 Classification of Events Considered

2.4.1 Fault Tree Analyses

3. REACTOR PLANT PROTECTION ANALYSIS

3.1 Primary Flow Failures

3.1.1 Loss of Electrical Supply to All Pumps

3.1.2 Loss of Electrical Supply to Two Primary Pumps

3.1.3 Loss of Electrical Supply to a Single Primary Pump

3.1.4 Mechanical Failure of One Primary Pump

3.2 Secondary Flow Failures

3.2.1 Loss of Electrical Supply to the Secondary Pumps

3.2.2 Mechanical Failure of One Secondary Pump

3.3 Steam System Failures

3.3.1 Turbine Stop-Valve Closure

3.3.2 Loss of Feedwater Supply

3.4 Reactivity Faults

3.4.1 Power Range Reactivity Addition

3.4.1.1 Continuous Rod Withdrawal

3.4.1.2 Loss of Control Material from a Single Rod

3.4.1.3 Loss of Control Rod Hold-Down Features

3.4.1.4 Loss of Operation of a Single Control Rod

3.4.2 Start-Up Reactivity Addition

3.4.3 Seismic Effects

3.4.4 Cold Sodium Insertion

3.4.5 Core Distortion

3.4.6 Sodium Voiding

3.4.7 Local Assembly Faults

3.5 Local Faults

3.5.1 Heat Transfer Impedance

3.5.1.1 Cladding Crud Deposition

3.5.1.2 Fuel Pin Swelling

3.5.1.3 Gas Bubbles

3.5.2 Flow Blockage to Subassemblies

3.5.2.1 Total Blockage

3.5.2.2 Partial Blockage

3.5.2.3 Defective Fuel Failure

3.5.3 Continuous Local Overpower

3.5.4 Fuel Failure Propagation

3.5.4.1 Fission Gas Release

3.5.4.2 Fuel and Gas Release

3.6 Primary System Ruptures

3.6.1 Small Leaks

3.6.2 Large Ruptures

3.7 Secondary System Ruptures

4. CONTAINMENT DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENTS

4.1 Philosophy

4.2 Possible Initiating Conditions

4.2.1 Flow Blockage to a Subassembly

4.2.2 Local Failure Propagation

4.2.3 Primary System Ruptures

4.2.4 Loss of Reactor Scram

4.2.5 Voids Introduced into the Core from External Sources

4.3 Energy Release Mechanisms

4.4 DBA Consequences

4.4.1 Vessel Damage

4.4.2 Head Damage

4.4.3 Radioactivity Release

4.4.4 Compliance with 10 CFR 100

5. REFUELING AND FUEL HANDLING ACCIDENTS

5.1 Loss of Cooling

5.1.1 Fuel-Handling Machine Cooling

5.1.2 Decay Storage Cooling

5.2 Loss of Power

5.3 Dropped Fuel Assembly

5.4 Sodium Leakage

5.5 Misloading

6. SUMMARY AND SAFETY POSITION

6.4 Other Siting Considerations

The regulatory process includes a public hearing and public groups and individuals are allowed to make comment on the proposed power plant and the applicants’ submissions. The attitude of the public is influenced by the safety of the plant and radiological limitations which are set by possible normal and off-normal emissions which would not be expected.

However the public are also influenced by aesthetic and ecological con­siderations as well as by possible radiological consequences. It is therefore pertinent to make some reference to these considerations before leaving the subject of license application. To put these effects into context, the fast breeder will be compared to thermal reactors and fossil-fueled plants.