In 1971 and 1972, even prior to the first oil shock, utilities from France, Germany and Italy signed a number of agreements for joint construction of two commercial breeder reactors, one in France and one in Germany. In December 1972 the French Parliament passed a law that granted permission to create companies "that carry out an activity of European interest in the electricity sector".6 The legislation was tailor-made for the creation of a European fast-neutron reactor consortium (NERSA),7 which was established in 1974, shortly after the start-up of Phenix, with the purpose of building the first commercial-size plutonium-fueled fast breeder reactor in the world.8 The Superphenix Parliamentary Enquiry Committee later noted that the "public enquiry into the project was excessively short." It lasted only a month from 9 October to 8 November 1974.9

The project immediately attracted significant opposition. In November 1974, 80 physicists of the Lyon Physics Institute highlighted specific risks of breeder technology and, in February 1975, approximately 400 scientists initiated an appeal that detailed their concerns about France’s nuclear program in general and the fast breeder in particular. That same year, the German utility RWE transferred its NERSA shares to the European consortium, SBK, that planned to build the SNR-300 breeder reactor in Kalkar, Germany.10 Andre Giraud, then head of CEA, urged the rapid and massive introduction of breeders, since delays in their introduction would have "catastrophic consequences on the uranium savings that are expected."11 The public enquiry commission into the Superphenix project estimated that fast breeders would supply a quarter of France’s nuclear electricity by the year 2000.

In the middle of April 1976, the Restricted Energy Council chaired by President Valery Giscard d’Estaing made the political decision to build Superphenix. Site preparation work started immediately at Creys-Malville (45 km East of Lyon, 60 km from Grenoble and 70 km from Geneva). The Parliamentary Enquiry Committee noted 22 years later:

Once the decision to build was taken, the electricity utilities would not rest until they succeed. Convinced of the well founded decision, they did not allow local consultation to slow them down; the latter can be qualified as minimal.12

The official public decision to build Superphenix was only announced a year later. The Parliamentary Enquiry Committee wonders:

Finally, what to think of a governmental decision to authorize the creation of the plant dated 12 May 1977, thus taking place after the beginning of the preliminary infrastructure and site preparation work and after the beginning of the construction of the reactor?13

In the summer of 1976 some 20,000 people occupied the site to protest the construction of Superphenix. Around 50 municipalities in the region had come out in opposition to the project between 1974 and 1976 and, in November 1976, about 1300 scientists from the Geneva region issued an open letter to the Governments of France, Italy, Germany and Switzerland voicing their concerns over the project.

CEA Chairman and soon to be named Minister of Industry Andre Giraud was more optimistic than ever and, at the December 1976 meeting of the American Nuclear Society in Washington D. C., forecasted 540 commercial breeders in the world for the year 2000, of which 20 would be in France. By 2025, he projected the number of Superphenix-size fast breeder reactors units worldwide would reach exactly 2766.14 In fact, not a single Superphenix-size fast breeder reactor was in operation in the world in 2000.

On 31 July 1977, a large international demonstration close to the construction site in Creys-Malville, with some 50,000 participants, turned extremely violent. The riot police used grenades that led to the death of Vital Michalon, a local teacher. Another demonstrator lost a foot and a third had a hand amputated. The events were a profound trauma for the French anti-nuclear movement. The State did not alter its plans. Three days after the events, Rene Monory, then Minister, of Industry, declared: "The Government will continue the construction at Creys — Malville and Superphenix, because it is a matter of life and comfort of the French people."15 The construction proceeded.

The combination of the EURODIF uranium enrichment consortium that started up its plant at Tricastin in 1979 and the push for a European plutonium industry were attempts to acquire independence from what some decision makers and industry leaders perceived as U. S. nuclear supremacy. France’s President Giscard d’Estaing declared that "if uranium from French soil is used in fast breeder reactors, we in France will have potential energy reserves comparable to those of Saudi Arabia."16 U. S. President Jimmy Carter’s non-proliferation policy, highly critical of plutonium separation and use, was considered "totally absurd" by the CEA.17

In 1982, Jean-Louis Fensch, a CEA engineer, produced a 250 page report on fast breeders for the Superior Council on Nuclear Safety, a consultative body. Fensch concluded that "fast breeder reactors are the most complicated, the most polluting, the most inefficient and the most ambiguous means that man has invented to date to reduce the consumption of nuclear fuel".18

By the time Superphenix went critical in 1985, international enthusiasm for nuclear power had already peaked and the number of construction starts in the world had gone down from a peak of 40 units in 1975 to 13 in 1985 and 1 in 1986.19 The Chernobyl catastrophe in 1986 only accelerated the decline in nuclear projects. Superphenix, whose objective was to save uranium, was outdated by the time it began operating. Uranium prices had dropped from $40 to $15 per pound on the spot market, little more than the 1974 price. In comparison with the demand, uranium resources were abundant.

France’s nuclear decision makers did not alter their plans, however. The result was that the country built up both a large electric-power generating overcapacity (at least a dozen excess nuclear units by the middle of the 1980s) and a full-scale plutonium economy that had long lost its raison d’etre. Between 1987 and 1997 the rate of reprocessing of spent fuel at La Hague quadrupled to almost 1700 tons per year, of which approximately half was for foreign clients. With an approximate one percent content of plutonium, the La Hague facilities separated about 17 tons of plutonium in 1997. This was roughly the magnitude of the total cumulated quantity of plutonium that had been irradiated in French breeder reactors as of the end of 1996 when Superphenix was permanently shut down.20

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Figure 2.2 Superphenix annual electricity generation. Source: CEA, WISE-Paris.

Figure 2.3 Superphenix operational and administrative history. Source: IAEA, Fast Reactor Database 2006 Update.

The core of Superphenix contained 5780 kg of plutonium (4054 kg of plutonium-239). Operated at a nominal capacity with annual one-third core refueling, Superphenix would have absorbed over 1900 kg of plutonium per year. But during its 11 years of operations, the reactor did not even use the equivalent of one reactor core.

Superphenix had a rated power of 1200 MWe net (1240 MWe gross). On 7 September 1985 it went critical and was connected to the grid on 14 January 1986. It was plagued by a number of technical and administrative problems, however, and was shut down more than half of the time until 24 December 1996 when it produced its last kilowatt hour (kWh). Superphenix generated 8.2 terawatt hours (TWh) (gross) in total, almost half of which was generated during its last year of operation. Its lifetime load factor was less than 7 percent.

As figures 2.2 and 2.3 illustrate, Superphenix experienced a series of significant incidents and administrative hurdles. The reactor never operated more than 17 months in a row. Operations halted in May 1987 with the discovery of a major sodium leak in the fuel transfer tank or storage drum. The tank could not be repaired and it took 10 months to develop a new method to load and discharge fuel from the reactor core.

The incident also revealed major deficiencies in the French fast breeder reactor organization. Before the leak, at the end of 1985, FRAMATOME’s engineering subsidiary NOVATOME laid off more than half of its staff, 430 of 750 employees. NOVATOME was losing a lot of money because it could not invoice NERSA for work on Superphenix until it had gone into commercial operation.21 In the course of the relocation of its thinned-out engineering teams from Paris to Lyon, many experts took up attractive offers to leave NOVATOME. As a result, when the storage tank leak occurred, NERSA realized that the specialist who had managed the electronic database for the tank had left the organization and it took some time before the database could be accessed. The re-qualification and authorization of the new fuel transfer and storage method absorbed another 13 months before the reactor could restart in April 1989. Low-power operation lasted until July 1990 when a defective compressor led to major air leakage into the system and oxidation of the sodium. Sodium purification took another eight months. In December 1990, the roof of the turbine hall collapsed after a heavy snowfall (figures 2.4 and 2.5).

On 3 June 1991, NERSA requested permission to restart the reactor by July 1991. On 27 May 1991, however, the French Conseil d’Etat invalidated the 1989 restart license that had been legally challenged by Swiss and French opponents. The restart, unlike the original licensing procedure, became subject to a lengthy process of parliamentary hearings and debates on a national and regional level. In June 1992, the Government decided to commission expert reports and to request a new public enquiry that was carried out between 30 March and 14 June 1993. The public enquiry commission issued its report on 29 September 1993 and the safety authorities reported to the Government in January 1994. A new operating license was finally issued on 11 July 1994. The unit had been back on line for only seven months, however, when an argon leak in a heat exchanger forced a new outage. When the reactor restarted in September 1995, it was for the last time.

Figure 2.4 Superphenix turbine hall in foreground. Photo: Dissident-Media.

Figure 2.5 Superphenix collapsed turbine hall roof. Photo: Dissident-Media.

On Christmas 1996, Superphenix was shut down for maintenance, core reconfiguration and the launch of a research program into transmutation. On 28 February 1997, however, the Conseil d’Etat nullified the July 1994 operating permit and, on 19 June 1997, incoming Prime Minister Jospin told the National Assembly that "Superphenix will be abandoned." The political decision became official on 2 February 1998 when the communique of an inter-ministerial committee meeting stated that "the Government has decided that Superphenix will not restart, not even for a limited period of time".

A Green Party representative had entered a European National Government with a senior ministerial position for the first time. Dominique Voynet became Environment Minister, and thereby shared oversight over civil nuclear safety in France with the Industry Minister. Point number one on the Green Party electoral platform had been the closing of Superphenix. The issue had always been highly symbolic for France’s nuclear power opponents. It would have been difficult to imagine anything less than the end of the Superphenix project after the Green Party joined the Government. It is also perfectly clear, however, that at least part of EDF’s top management had long considered Superphenix and reprocessing a costly error.22

French diplomats were quick to downplay the strategic significance of the end of Superphenix. The French Embassy in the U. S. stated in its "Nuclear Notes from France":23

In the wake of recent decisions, made by the French Government, including the closure of the Superphenix fast breeder reactor, some may wonder if France is changing its nuclear policy. Basically, the answer is no. Both Prime Minister Lionel Jospin and Economic Minister Dominique Strauss-Kahn have made it clear France is satisfied with its nuclear "wise" commitment, stressing the large return on investment it provides in terms of economic competitiveness, self-sufficiency and environmental protection. France will stick to its policy of reprocessing and plutonium recycling, a good way to optimize waste management while producing more electricity. Is it surprising? Just remember what everybody in France has in mind: no oil, no gas, and no coal means no choice! It sometimes helps!

A decree dated 30 December 1998 formalized the decision to proceed with the final closure of Superphenix and the first decommissioning steps. As of 2008, the fuel has been discharged and transferred to the storage facility APEC on site. The turbine hall has been emptied. A permit for full decommissioning was issued on 20 March 2006.

Military plutonium from Phenix

The CEA’s military department had a keen interest in fast breeders because of the fact that, as a by-product, they generate super-grade plutonium in the breeder blankets.24 Even if the utilities involved in the Superphenix project always categorically rejected the idea of a military link, it is clear that Phenix was used for the generation of plutonium for France’s nuclear-weapon program. The potential militarization of Superphenix raised considerable concern, especially in Germany, and was discussed in the context of the possibility that France might develop and deploy neutron bombs in Europe.25

In the case of Phenix, the fuel design allowed not only for the use of the radial blanket but also part of the axial blanket to produce plutonium for weapons. Usually the axial blanket is integrated with the core fuel in the same fuel pins but it seems that in the case of Phenix the upper axial blanket was separate. Phenix blanket material was reprocessed at the military UP1 plant in Marcoule, while core material, diluted with gas-graphite reactor fuel, was reprocessed at La Hague and at a dedicated pilot plant at Marcoule (APM with the head end SAP-TOP, later SAP-TOR).

In unusually blunt statement, General Jean Thiry, former director of the French nuclear test sites in the Sahara and in the Pacific, who prior to these positions had been responsible for eight years for plutonium "counting" at the CEA, told the daily Le Monde in 1978: "France is able to make nuclear weapons of all kinds and all yields. It will be able to fabricate them in large numbers as soon as the fast breeder reactors provide it with abundant quantities of the necessary plutonium."26 In 1987 General Thiry confirmed his statement and declared: "One can always get plutonium, especially if one develops… This is apparently an idea that one should not say (openly) because it is not moral,27 but I defend Creys-Malville (Superphenix) and the fast breeder reactor type, because there you have plutonium of extraordinary military quality."28 Dominique Finon states that Phenix was used for military purposes starting in 1978 but that the idea to use Superphenix for defense needs was abandoned in 1986.29

Research and development, construction, operation and decommissioning costs

France’s fast breeder reactor program was costly to the French taxpayer. A comprehensive historical economic assessment is not available. An extensive analysis to the middle of the 1980s was carried out and the national Court of Auditors provided a cost estimate in 1996.30 In addition a number of assessments have looked at specific aspects (R&D, decommissioning, etc.). Figure 2.6 provides an overview of Phenix operating costs between 1972 and 2003.

Between 1973 and 1996 the CEA alone spent an undiscounted FRF 15.8 billion ($2008 3.8 billion) on breeder R&D, 50 percent more than on light-water reactors (including the EPR development).31

According to an agreement signed in 1969, the CEA provided 80 percent and EDF 20 percent of the construction and operational costs of Phenix. Construction costs totaled FRF1974 800 million ($2008 880 million). Approximately €600 million ($2008 950 million) were spent on Phenix upgrades between 1997 and 2003.

The French state spent some FRF1985 44 billion ($2008 17.4 billion) on the fast breeder program between 1960 and 1986. The Superphenix construction costs increased by 80 percent to reach FRF1985 26 billion ($2008 9.5 billion) by the time the reactor went on line in 1986.32 At that time, the investment cost ratio per installed kilowatt (KW) between breeder and PWR was evaluated by the CEA at 2.58.33

Figure 2.6 Phenix operating costs, 1972-2003 (FRF2000 million). Source: Sauvage, 2004.

The Court of Auditors, in its 1996 annual report, provided an evaluation of the cost of Superphenix, assuming that it would operate until the end of 2001. It estimated that the unit had cost FRF 34.4 billion by the end of 1994 and that financial, spent fuel management, decommissioning and waste management costs would reach an additional FRF 27.4 billion. Operating costs were given at FRF 1.7 billion per year. Considering the fact that the unit shut down at the end of 1996, adding two years of operating costs but also of power generation (approximately 3.65 TWh), the total estimated cost would be somewhere around FRF 64 billion, minus approximately a FRF one billion electricity generation credit.34 Jacques Chauvin, president of the directorate of NERSA stated that "in total, cumulating investment and operating costs and taking into account all future costs, Superphenix will have cost FRF 65 billion of which EDF will have paid 38 billion."35

The NERSA and Auditor Court figures are closer than the level of uncertainty attached. In particular, the decommissioning costs contain a substantial potential margin of error. They have been raised several times. As of 2003, the Court of Auditors estimated Superphenix decommissioning and waste management alone would cost €2.081 billion.