In many regulatory organizations the commissioning phase just described is only one part of the operating license. In any case, the licensee has to submit an FSAR, together with a series of additional documents relevant for the operational phase, as described in Table 20.3. The FSAR is a refine­ment of the PSAR, describing the NPP as it has been built and introducing changes in equipment capabilities and operational limits as determined by the results from the pre-nuclear and nuclear tests undertaken. Apart from organizational documents, one of the most significant documents for opera­tion is the Operational Limits and Conditions, also called the Technical Specifications for Operation.

These documents are reviewed by the RB and form the basis of the operating license. By this time, even for new entrant countries, the RB staff will already have accumulated a great deal of experience and expertise; nevertheless, when confronted for the first time with handling the operating license, outside help will be needed. As in previous cases, it is recommended that advice be sought from the RB in the country of origin of the project, from the IAEA, or from TSOs experienced in operating research reactors. In the longer term, the RB will become more independent from external help, except in cases regarding anomalous situations and accidents. In any case, the RB will need to convene a competent body of experts, including those who have been involved in the construction and commissioning phases. Once again, the SER constitutes the basis for the operating license and its limits and conditions.

The operating license covers a great variety of different issues in some detail. Among other things, the license stipulates the procedures according to which an activity is to be carried out, the conditions to be respected, the documentation the operator has to produce, what they have to report to the RB, and whether the participation of a representative of the authority is required.

The license therefore quotes the document on personnel organization which describes the functions, responsibilities and tasks of persons and organizational units. It states the requirements for training for important positions. Operating activities are undertaken according to a number of internal regulations. Those with safety relevance are licensed. Important among these internal regulations are manuals on in-service testing, main­tenance, radiological testing, shift and control room organization, access and security, alarms, physical protection, and quality assurance.

Operation of the plant is guided by procedures for normal operation and for incidents and accidents. Limits and conditions for operation have to be respected. There are also guidelines and procedures for severe accidents, and these documents also form part of the license. There are requirements on the information the authority needs for fuel outages, on the justification of the safety of the new core, and the conditions for restart. The procedure for how plant modifications are to be processed is also fixed at this stage. Additionally, there are requirements on quality assurance for components to be exchanged, with special regard to core internals.

The license stipulates that the operator has to follow and analyze inci­dents in other plants, and justify their conclusions regarding their own plant. It also states how the operator should proceed with reportable events in the plant itself. The license deals with the proof of waste disposal, and the handling of fuel and radioactive waste. Of course, it sets limits for tolerable effluents in air and water. The license is also a basis for the surveillance which the authority will perform during operation. Therefore, it regulates the documentation which the operator has to maintain and the reports they must submit to the authority on a regular basis.

Regular inspections, either announced or not, are conducted by the RB. Some RBs have resident inspectors assigned to each NPP who oversee day-to-day operations and report to the RB headquarters. In case of anom­alous situations, a so-called reactive inspection is put into effect to analyze the situation and oversee the actions taken. Some RBs have established permanent oversight systems, based on selected safety pillars; non­compliance with the defined pillars generates a colour code which measures the importance of the non-compliance, which is maintained until the non­compliance is addressed and corrected.