In recent years, particularly in western countries, there has been an increas­ingly marked distinction between giving information, which is a ‘top-down’ process, and stakeholder involvement, which tends to involve groups and citizens who declare an interest in nuclear choice in the decision process. The degree of citizen involvement in the decision process is variable, ranging from compulsory involvement or (as is more often the case) simply con­sultative advice. Whichever, stakeholder involvement requires giving suffi­cient information to stakeholders, and so requires real transparency and access to expertise. However, other information processes may have differ­ent purposes: they may have an educational goal, which requires ‘objective’ information on the advantages and drawbacks of all energy sources, and an explanation of geopolitical and economic constraints which limit and struc­ture energy choices. Conversely, they can tend to involve or influence citi­zens’ opinions, for instance through advertising campaigns, where the goal is less to supply knowledge than to obtain support.

There are many kinds of ‘stakeholder involvement processes’: national or local public debates; Local Information Councils (CLI), in France, in the neighbourhood of nuclear plants; a Dialogue Forum in the Russian Federation; COWAM in the EU; and numerous other initiatives. These processes don’t have the same impact on public decision everywhere: in France, national debates under the aegis of CNDP (‘National Commission of Public Debate’) have a legal status and are compulsory for some deci­sions about the building of large energy facilities; again in France, CLIs are compulsory near nuclear sites but they have no decision mandate; in the UK, the 2006 consultation on nuclear policy had no compulsory value; the Swedish process of local consultation to select a disposal site has had a decisive impact on the final choice, etc. The political impact of consultative or participative processes in public decisions to launch a nuclear programme depends strongly on local laws and on national political culture. For instance, in 2005-2006, in France, the government referred to the CNDP to organize a national public debate before passing a new Act on waste management. This public debate was implemented by organizing 13 meetings, some in Paris and in other larger cities (Lyon, Marseille, Nancy) and others in the vicinity of possible waste storage or disposal sites. The schedule was very strict, with the participation of nuclear sector professionals, government representatives, NGOs and independent experts. Some anti-nuclear NGOs refused to participate. Public participation was weak in Paris and in the large cities far from the sites but it was significant near the potential disposal sites. The meetings and an Internet consultation allowed a long list of ques­tions and fears about radioactive waste management to be collected, and for answers to be given to those questions. This also made it possible to take these fears into account when proposing the Act, by including clauses, for example, to ensure the reversibility of nuclear waste disposal for a period of 100 years. This whole process probably increased people’s knowledge and understanding of waste management issues in France, but it did not increase the wider public interest in them. Some years later, the question of radioactive waste management remains, for the public at large, a problem with ‘no solution’.

The following lessons can be learned from the experience of public debates in France:

• Be transparent about the process and about the role of debate in elabo­rating a decision; it is important to explain the impact of public debate on the decision (whether about an Act or selection of a site for a nuclear facility). In this regard, several qualitative and quantitative studies con­ducted in France (IRSN, The French Perception of Risks and Security, Barometer, 2010), and quantitative studies implemented in the EU show that a majority of citizens delegate technological decision to experts, provided the experts report their arguments and possible doubts or disagreements, and provided information is shared with the public. Moreover, the Eurobarometer on Nuclear Safety (2010) showed that ‘only around one in four Europeans would like to be directly consulted in the decision-making process regarding the development and updating of energy strategies’.

• Give complete information about all energy sources and allow people to be able to build their own understanding of realistic choices: is there an alternative to nuclear power and, if so, what are the advantages and drawbacks of each alternative solution?

• Clearly define the process and the different steps from opportunity study to decision, and the rules, limits and schedule of public consultation.

• Listen to all the fears and questions raised about a nuclear project and provide answers to all of them.

16.4 Conclusion

A gap remains between the social impact of nuclear power and people’s perception of its impact. This gap is more acute in non-nuclear countries, and the more nuclear power is experienced, the better it is accepted. But contradictory phenomena influence the evolution of public perceptions. A better understanding of energy questions and of environmental and eco­nomic issues will probably contribute to a better acceptance of nuclear power, and the growing interest in developed and (more and more) devel­oping countries for nuclear power as part of a low-carbon energy strategy may have a driving effect. In the same way, continuous improvements in safety may have a positive effect; conversely, however, a severe accident like Fukushima will have an adverse effect everywhere in the world, even if the needs of nuclear power in an energy mix remain exactly the same as before the accident. There is a growing need for stakeholder involvement in the decision process, which has ambivalent consequences: it can favour objective discussion among different parties about the advantages and drawbacks of the nuclear choice; however, many people in the public at large who have no definite opinion on nuclear power may in fact be con­vinced by nuclear opponents, of whom there are many giving their views in public debates. As a result, nuclear decisions must be based soundly on a technical and economic opportunity study, and any such decision must be supported by a majority of political decision-makers and by the business community. The most difficult decision to make is the decision for the first plant or the first units, because infrastructure costs and possible public reluctance are the same for one plant or for a whole programme. Such a decision may have a very positive impact on economic, technological, indus­trial and educational development in a country but requires sufficient politi­cal stability to guarantee safe, secure and sustainable practice.