Milestone 1

As reflected by the IAEA, no safeguards system, no matter how extensive the measures put in place, can provide absolute assurance that there has been no diversion of nuclear materials or that there are no undeclared nuclear material or activities in a State. The safeguards system for imple­menting comprehensive safeguards agreements, including additional proto­cols, is designed to provide for verification by the IAEA of the correctness and completeness of States’ declarations, so that there is credible assurance of both the non-diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful activi­ties and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.

Further to a State’s undertakings, Article III of the NPT also stipulates specific obligations of each State party to the NPT ‘not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material espe­cially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful pur­poses, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this article.’ After the entry into force of the NPT, multilateral consultations on nuclear export controls led to the estab­lishment of two separate forums for dealing with nuclear exports: the

Zangger Committee in 1971 and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in 1975.[70]

The Zangger Committee[71] was set up to consider procedures for exports of nuclear material and equipment related to NPT commitments. In August 1974, the committee produced a trigger list of items which would require the application of IAEA safeguards and, if the items were to be exported directly or indirectly to a NNWS which was not party to the NPT, the appli­cation of export procedures by the supplier. The trigger list and associated guidelines were communicated to and published by the IAEA as INFCIRC/209 (IAEA, 1974), which has been updated several times.

The Nuclear Suppliers Group, also known as the London Group or London Suppliers Group, was set up in 1974 after India exploded its first nuclear device, and included both non-members and members of the Zangger Committee. An authoritative document on the history, role and activities of the NSG has been published by the IAEA as INFCIRC/539 as amended (IAEA, 1997c, 2000, 2003, 2005c, 2009). The group sought to ensure that transfers of nuclear material or equipment would not be diverted to unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive activities. Therefore, among the other conditions of supply in the NSG guidelines, formal govern­ment assurances to this effect were required from recipients. The guidelines were originally communicated to the IAEA in 1978 and published as INFCIRC/254 (IAEA, 1978); the guidelines have been periodically amended, including the addition of Part 1 (IAEA 1992a) and Part 2 (IAEA, 1992b).

Milestones 2 and 3

In a practical sense, the NSG guidelines (INFCIRC/254, Parts 1 and 2) are essentially a set of export rules which govern the export of items and tech­nologies especially designed or prepared for nuclear use (Part 1) and the export of nuclear-related dual-use items and technologies (Part 2).[72] Whereas States party to the NPT have already forsworn the acquisition of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, and agreed to accept comprehensive safeguards on the entirety of their nuclear fuel cycle, States not signatory to the NPT will need to consider the nuclear suppliers’ requirements for export of sensitive facilities, equipment, material and tech­nologies used for peaceful nuclear purposes, prior to deciding whether to construct a nuclear facility.

To control the non-proliferation of nuclear material and technologies, the international community has focused on both States and non-State actors. Some requirements and measures extend beyond nuclear non-proliferation to non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and are included in several legally binding instruments by the UN Security Council (UNSC). Of primary importance is United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (UNSCR 1540),[73] adopted in April 2004. UNSCR 1540 (2004) requires that all States adopt and enforce appropriate laws that prohibit any non-State actor to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons (otherwise known as weapons of mass destruction or WMD) and their means of delivery. Among its provi­sions is the call upon all States to fulfil their commitment to multilateral cooperation, including those within the framework of the IAEA.

A ‘newcomer’ will inevitably benefit from understanding the scope of UNSCR 1540 (2004)[74] and related resolutions (e. g., UNSCR 1673 (2006) and UNSCR 1810 (2008))[75] regarding their implications at the State level, to establish national control over WMD-related material in the areas of accounting/securing, physical protection, border and law enforcement, export and transshipment, for example. However, as the objectives of these resolutions go well beyond safeguards, they are outside the scope of this chapter. Nevertheless, these UNSC resolutions, and other resolutions with their relevant measures to be implemented accordingly, are part of the legally binding instruments and commitments every State is obligated to undertake. They should be factored into the information acquisition process inherent to the IAEA’s Milestones 1-3 as discussed in the Milestones pub­lication (IAEA, 2007a).