Milestone 1

In response to developments in the 1990s (e. g., Iraq’s clandestine nuclear weapons programme, South Africa’s nuclear weapons programme), the IAEA developed and implemented additional, strengthened safeguards

47 Paragraph 84 of INFCIRC/153 (Corrected) provides the IAEA with the right to conduct a portion of the routine inspections without advance notice. Under such a safeguards agreement, unannounced inspections are carried out in accordance with the principle of random sampling.

measures. Part of the strengthening measures approved by the IAEA Board of Governors and complementary to the safeguards agreement with a State is the ‘Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards’ (INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)) (IAEA, 1997a). Following the IAEA Board of Governors approval in May 1997, the IAEA began con­cluding with those States that already had a safeguards agreement an addi­tional protocol based on the provisions of a standard reproduced in INFCIRC/540 (Corrected).

When an AP is in force in a NNWS, the relevant articles of the AP oblige the State to provide additional information to the IAEA beyond that required under a CSA. The State’s submissions are referred to as AP dec­larations. In very general terms, the AP declarations articulate all nuclear fuel cycle-related activities and facilities in the State (e. g., nuclear research and development not involving nuclear material, mining and milling), thereby going beyond the information required by the CSA (which is essen­tially focused on nuclear facilities and nuclear material). Beside the avail­ability of broader information concerning a State’s nuclear fuel cycle, the implementation of an AP in a State also permits the IAEA to access loca­tions in the State or under its control (i. e., beyond declared nuclear facilities and LOFs) for any of the following purposes:

1. On a selective basis in order to assure the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities

2. To resolve a question relating to the correctness and completeness of the information provided pursuant to the AP or to resolve an inconsis­tency relating to that information

3. For the Agency to confirm, for safeguards purposes, the decommis­sioned status of a facility or of a LOF where nuclear material was cus­tomarily used.

Due recognition should be given to the fact that it is a State’s sovereign decision whether to place an AP in force, and as such, there are many important domestic and international considerations a State may have to address before it is willing to accept the relevant AP obligations. To date, over 100 States have an AP in force. These States have elected to do so in order to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards applied in the State and/or such action represents a continuing contribution to their international and national non-proliferation goals.