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14 декабря, 2021
The issue of proliferation extends beyond the NPT and the corresponding NNWS’s obligation to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material and to undertake a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA. As this book is focused on infrastructure and methodologies for the justification of nuclear power programmes, the three milestones36 described in the Milestones publication (IAEA, 2007a) are the focus of the detailed discussion on non-proliferation in this subsection. The information is organized by the essential obligation/commitment undertaken by a NNWS Party to the NPT, with associated safeguards requirements linked to the relevant milestone(s) in IAEA (2007a).
In generic terms, prior to reaching Milestone 1, the State is normally working to acquire a comprehensive understanding of the requisite obligations and commitments involved. Once a decision to proceed with the infrastructure development is made, the State organizes the national means and plans needed to successfully implement the decision while progressing towards Milestones 2 and 3. As a State advances with its nuclear energy plans, it would be beneficial for the State to periodically perform a selfassessment, keeping in mind some example metrics presented in Table 13.1.
36 Milestone 1 is defined as when the State is ready to make a knowledgeable commitment to a nuclear power programme as it pertains to each of 19 issues, one of which is safeguards; Milestone 2 is defined as when a State is ready to invite bids for the first nuclear power plant; Milestone 3 is defined as when a State is ready to commission and operate its first nuclear power plant.
Milestone |
no. |
State-level metrics relevant to safeguards (to be achieved prior to reaching the identified milestone) |
3[40] |
||
X |
Understood the level of safeguards commitment required for the full life cycle of a nuclear power plant. |
|
X |
Established a plan or road map for safeguards implementation. |
|
X |
Committed to developing its nuclear power infrastructure transparently. |
|
X |
Acceded to, or completed a decision process/plan for joining, appropriate international and regional legal treaties and conventions (e. g., Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons). |
|
X |
Concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA conforming to INFCIRC/153 (Corrected), and where applicable, placing in force an additional protocol modelled on INFCIRC/540 (Corrected). |
|
X |
Established a National Authority as the technical interface to the IAEA (i. e., SSAC) with the necessary authority, resources, and technical capability. |
|
X |
Submitted, or in the process of submitting, requisite information to the IAEA in accordance with relevant safeguards obligations (e. g., initial report on inventory of nuclear materials and facilities, early provision of facility design information, AP-relevant declarations as applicable). |
|
X |
Developed, or progressing in a programme plan for developing, a comprehensive framework covering all aspects of non-proliferation (e. g., nuclear-related import/export controls, use/ownership of nuclear material) including safeguards. |
|
X |
Established a state system of accounting for and control of nuclear material which meets IAEA requirements. |
|
X |
Concluded, or progressing in the development of, Subsidiary Arrangements with the IAEA, including relevant Facility Attachment(s). |
|
X |
Established the organizational elements at the State and facility level with the responsibility to ensure the non-proliferation of nuclear materials and technologies in accordance with relevant legal instruments. |
|
X |
Established, or progressing in the implementation of, an outreach programne for maintaining transparency of the nuclear power programme. |