Since its birth, the IAEA’s safeguards work has included[26]:

• Verifying that countries are not using nuclear material and nuclear technology for non-peaceful purposes

• Setting the standards and guidelines for safeguarding nuclear material and facilities

• Fulfilling its role as the guardian of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty

• Assisting the international community in nuclear disarmament efforts.

To fulfil its mandate, the Secretariat has assigned the Department of Safeguards with organizational responsibility for safeguards implementa­tion. In practical terms, the Department of Safeguards implements monitor­ing and verification activities worldwide in over 900 facilities and locations outside facilities (LOFs).[27] While covering the entirety of a State’s nuclear fuel cycle, its efforts consider the strategic value of those types of nuclear material and activities in a NNWS that are the most crucial and relevant to nuclear weapons manufacturing. It publishes the results of its activities annually in a Safeguards Implementation Report.[28]

Keeping in mind that there are three major infrastructure milestones[29] in the Milestones publication (IAEA, 2007a) for the development of a nuclear power programme, stakeholders involved with any of the milestones may find themselves better equipped and more effective in their assigned capac­ity when they consider the full scope and nature of the IAEA’s safeguards work. This subsection briefly discusses that work in the context of the Safeguards and Verification Pillar.[30]

Safeguards have evolved from their early focus on safeguarded nuclear material at the facility level, to today’s concept which reflects development and implementation of a safeguards approach at the State level.[31] In the evolution of the safeguards approach over the last several decades, includ­ing transitioning the application of safeguards from a facility level to the State level, there were external and internal IAEA factors driving the introduction of new tools and safeguards measures. For an authoritative account, two recommended sources of information on the IAEA’s historical transition in safeguards and how it was implemented and is being imple­mented today have been provided by Jennekens (1970) and by an IAEA Department of Safeguards document covering 1991-2005 (IAEA, 2005b, Section C).

For introductory purposes, the general sequence of developments in a State’s safeguards system will be described starting from the moment a

State decides to pursue a nuclear energy option for peaceful purposes. In terms of a chronology of events, what follows is a hypothetical sequence of safeguards-relevant events that a ‘newcomer’ State may come to experi­ence. Bear in mind that the sequence described below is for illustrative purposes only, and there may be many variations in an actual case.

In theoretical terms, assuming a State has not yet acceded to the NPT, it may take appropriate action domestically and internationally for consider­ing such an undertaking. Should the State be contemplating development of a nuclear power infrastructure, the State will very likely assess its priori­ties and presumably decide positively on the importance of the NPT rela­tive to its non-proliferation goals and objectives. Whether a State accedes to the NPT or not, their decision will inevitably impact the perception of many regional and international stakeholders regarding the State’s trans­parency and openness.

For a State without a safeguards agreement in force, the IAEA will work closely with the State’s representatives to draft and bring one into force. If the reference State is a Party to the NPT, the safeguards agreement will be comprehensive in nature and modelled on INFCIRC/153 (Corrected) (IAEA, 1972). Any State with a safeguards agreement may also conclude a protocol additional to its safeguards agreement with the IAEA (herein­after referred to as an ‘additional protocol’).[32] While it remains the sover­eign decision of the host State, if requested the IAEA will advise and provide available support to enable a State to conclude an additional pro­tocol (AP) to their safeguards agreement at the same time (or at a later date depending on the State’s circumstance). In respect of drafting the safeguards agreement (and AP), the State and the IAEA will conclude Subsidiary Arrangements[33] which specify how the measures included in the CSA (and AP) are to be implemented. Subsidiary Arrangements to

safeguards agreements consist of a General Part, applicable to all common nuclear activities of the State concerned, and a Facility Attachment, pre­pared for each facility in the State and describing the arrangements specific to that facility.

Once a CSA is in force, the State is obligated to establish a state system of accounting for and control of nuclear material (SSAC) if it has not already done so.[34] In this regard, there are two different contexts to the use of the term SSAC. One refers to the National Authority assigned responsi­bility as the formal technical interface for safeguards implementation with the Agency and facility operators. The second refers to the system of nuclear material accounting and control procedures required by the National Authority and implemented by facility operators. The concept is graphically presented in Fig. 13.1. With regard to the National Authority assigned as the SSAC, among its many initial responsibilities, the newly established SSAC will address the preparation and transmission of the State’s initial report (concerning the inventory of nuclear material and facilities) to the IAEA.[35] If an AP is in force at the time, the preparation and submission of initial AP declarations are also required.

Early consultation with the IAEA can facilitate this process to the benefit of both Parties. Experience shows that it is a good practice if the SSAC is involved early in the process, for example prior to or during the develop­ment of the Subsidiary Arrangements. In some NNWSs, it is an office in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or equivalent that is designated as the SSAC, negotiates the Subsidiary Arrangements, submits the initial report and undertakes to fulfil other SSAC responsibilities. In other countries, a depart­ment or section in the Ministry of Science and Technology or equivalent is the SSAC which seeks to fulfil the requisite obligations. There are any number of considerations that go into such a decision and each State is expected to factor in its own national interests and needs. Examples may include current or proposed national laws, policies and regulations relevant to safeguards implementation; relevant foreign policies; technical compe­tency of the ministry or department/section; and financial and other resource availability/constraints. The essential point here is that whether a State has no nuclear material and facilities, or they possess a more developed nuclear fuel cycle, having a technically capable and properly resourced SSAC is a requirement of fundamental importance. Regardless of which national authority is designated as the SSAC, the State’s point of contact for safe­guards will be identified in the relevant Subsidiary Arrangements and will benefit by being involved early in the process.

With regard to the system of nuclear material accounting and control procedures, if there are small quantities of existing nuclear material in the State, the State may already have an operational nuclear material account­ing and control system. If one is not in place, concurrent with the activities involving the preparation of the initial inventory declaration, the State and the relevant operators establish or implement a nuclear material accounting and control system.[36] In keeping with the IAEA’s mandate under its Statute, the IAEA takes account of all safeguarded nuclear material, including enriched uranium, plutonium and uranium-233 in countries with a CSA. Other types of nuclear material subject to safeguards verification include thorium, natural uranium, and depleted uranium, the latter of which is commonly used, for instance, as shielding of radiation sources in hospitals, industry and agriculture.[37]

Following the submission, if any nuclear material is declared, the SSAC works closely with relevant nuclear operators to prepare for the IAEA’s initial verification of the State’s nuclear material inventory. During this period, the IAEA is reviewing the State’s declarations and, as appropriate, assessing the correctness and completeness of the submittal (s). In some instances, the SSAC may receive one or more IAEA requests for clarifica­tion or further information. The more technically capable a SSAC is at this point, the more easily it will be able to respond accordingly. Good com­munication between the parties is always a recommended priority, but it is especially important during this stage of the process.

In respect of the State’s initial inventory declaration, the SSAC will then undertake to routinely submit accounting and operating reports to the IAEA as specified in the respective Facility Attachment (part of the Subsidiary Arrangements). The relevant accounting reports and operating records in the submittals usually originate from the facility operator’s system of accounting for and control of nuclear material. Nevertheless, as the CSA is a binding instrument between the IAEA and the State, it is the SSAC that is responsible for assuring the correctness and completeness of the submittals to the IAEA. This point is very important, and essentially serves as a reminder to those responsible in understanding and fully embrac­ing their SSAC role as the technical interface to the IAEA.

In the case of an existing or planned nuclear facility, the SSAC will typi­cally consult with the operator(s) for the preparation of a design informa­tion package that is to be submitted to the IAEA. The design information, in the form of a Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ) for each existing and planned nuclear facility, is used by the IAEA, together with the infor­mation provided in the State’s declaration of the initial inventory of nuclear material, to facilitate the development of the safeguards approach at the State level, including the safeguards measures to be implemented at the respective nuclear facility. Where applicable, the facility design information is also used in (1) development of the Facility Attachment, (2) technical discussions between the IAEA, the SSAC and the facility operator regard­ing the potential installation and service of IAEA containment and surveil­lance (C/S) systems, and (3) the IAEA’s ongoing assessment concerning the identification of indicators of misuse of declared facilities and/or diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful activities.

The application of C/S systems is complementary to the accounting meas­ures implemented in accordance with the State’s safeguards agreement. As

C/S devices make use of the local design features of the facility, equipment or item (e. g., nuclear material in a storage container or vault), their applica­tion is dependent on a number of factors. Such factors include defining the objective of applying such safeguards measures (e. g., whether it is an indica­tor of possible diversion of nuclear material, an indicator of possible misuse of sensitive equipment or process, or an indicator of possible tampering with IAEA safeguards equipment). Other factors include, but are not limited to, the type and form of nuclear material (to the extent applicable), design information on the containment equipment or facility, and alterna­tive safeguards measures to meet the same objective. As a practical matter, C/S systems are typically utilized in situations where they offer improved safeguards efficiencies or effectiveness, contribute to improvements in personnel safety, health and radiation protection, or are attached to IAEA equipment and other sensitive items (e. g., a sealable pouch contain­ing facility design information) to provide an indication of possible tampering.

For example, we hypothetically consider a large number of containers of nuclear material containing low-enriched uranium oxide powder in a sepa­rate storage area of a facility, where they are to be stored for many years before final disposition. The first time a physical inventory verification is conducted at the facility, the time-consuming task of performing detailed measurements and assays of the nuclear material in the containers will be conducted. During subsequent physical inventory verifications, some of the inspection activities might be reduced or eliminated by the application of an appropriate IAEA C/S measure(s). In the example provided, installation and use of the containment (or surveillance) system is based in part on the cost-effectiveness of the approach. When considering the application of such measures, the IAEA will consult the State in advance of any installa­tion, and they will jointly decide on the merits of any increased efficiencies to be achieved.

If an AP is also in force, normally the State could expect that the first time a complementary access is requested is after the State’s initial AP declarations are received and reviewed by the IAEA. In practice, after the initial AP declarations are submitted, AP update declarations are routinely sent by the State and the majority of complementary accesses conducted are to assure the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities at the selected location(s). From time to time, there may be ‘questions’ or ‘inconsistencies’ that arise. Experience shows that when the responsible national authority (e. g., SSAC if so designated) consults early and works closely with the IAEA, especially to resolve the questions or inconsistencies in a timely manner, then assurances that a State’s nuclear programme is entirely for peaceful purposes can be strengthened. In this regard, the State’s non-proliferation objectives are being achieved.

In time, the SSAC personnel could expect to include the following func­tional activities in their routine (i. e., day-to-day) safeguards-related activities:

• Periodic conduct of physical inventory takings of safeguarded nuclear material

• Provision of accounting reports and operating records to IAEA in accordance with the Safeguards Agreement and the relevant Subsidiary Arrangements

• Provision of IAEA inspector and technician access to relevant locations and strategic points

• Provision of support (e. g., availability of crane operator, refuelling bridge) during the conduct of on-site safeguards activities (e. g. inspec­tions, C/S installation and maintenance)

• Provision of information and close consultation with the IAEA as appropriate to resolving inconsistencies or open issues

• Conduct of follow-up actions associated with resolution of discrepancies and open anomalies

• Training to maintain or enhance technical skills and abilities of the SSAC and operator personnel

• Development and/or revision of organizational practices, standards, policies and procedures relevant to safeguards implementation

• Consultation in the drafting and updating of Subsidiary Arrangements

• Purchase and maintenance of SSAC-owned safeguards equipment.

With time and experience, the SSAC role becomes more familiar to the personnel involved, especially during the conduct of on-site safeguards activities (e. g., inspections, complementary accesses, design information verification visits).