To deal with requirements for new nuclear power plants, two main docu­ments should be referred to: IAEA (2007b), Milestones in the Development of a National Infrastructure for Nuclear Power, NG-G-3.1, and IAEA (2008a), Nuclear Safety Infrastructure for a National Nuclear Power Programme Supported by the IAEA Fundamental Safety Principles, INSAG-22.

2.4.1 Preliminary phase

At the level of a country and upon the decision of the government, the first preliminary phase is to prepare the manpower necessary for carrying the programme, a phase that will evolve with time over periods as long as 10 years, and to ratify all international conventions necessary to meet the necessary levels of safety, security and safeguards.

Manpower development, in addition to nuclear engineering achieved through education, theoretical training and on-the-job training, if necessary in foreign countries, should follow a very long schedule to be able to man the required structure to be put in place. Such a structure is composed of the energy producer, the regulatory body, research laboratories and techni­cal support organizations. It is recommended to man the top levels of the structure with nationals having the power of decision and well-established responsibilities. One should not forget to prepare the manpower necessary for the maintenance of the installations.

A national structure should be set for managing the whole programme. This includes the government support ministries with a clear definition of roles and responsibilities, and the availability of financial and human resources.

The international legal framework comprises the international legal framework for nuclear safety, the international legal framework for nuclear security, and the international nuclear security initiatives.

For safety there are the Convention on Nuclear Safety (IAEA, 1994), the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management (IAEA, 1997), the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (IAEA, 1986a, 1986b) complemented by bilateral agreements between neighbouring countries, Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials (IAEA, 2009c), the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources (IAEA, 2004) and the Code of Conduct on the Safety of Research Reactors (IAEA, 2006a). The references for developing and implementing nuclear laws are IAEA (2003c), Nuclear Law Handbook, and the newer IAEA (2010a), Nuclear Law Handbook — Implementing Legislation.

It is necessary to implement at all stages of the life of the installation the 10 fundamental principles that sustain safety as developed in IAEA (2006b), Safety Standards Series, Fundamental Safety Principles, SF-1:

Principle 1: Responsibility for safety.

Principle 2: Role of government.

Principle 3: Leadership and management of safety.

Principle 4: Justification of facilities and activites.

Principle 5: Optimization of protection.

Principle 6: Limitation of risk to individuals.

Principle 7: Protection of present and future generations.

Principle 8: Prevention of accidents.

Principle 9: Emergency preparedness and response.

Principle 10: Protective actions to reduce existing or unregulated radiation.

These principles constitute the starting point of the review and revision of all safety standards series of the IAEA.

For security there are the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (IAEA, 1979), the Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (IAEA, 2005), the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (IMO, 1988) and UN Security Council Resolution 1540 which asks ‘States to prohibit non­State actors from acquiring such weapons through adoption of laws, enforce­ment measures, domestic controls’. In addition a certain number of initiatives need also to be implemented: the Nuclear Threat Initiative, the IAEA security plan, and the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.

The IAEA (2003c) Nuclear Law Handbook and the newer IAEA (2010a) Nuclear Law Handbook — Implementing Legislation cover all these inter­national aspects and give all necessary details for implementation.

For safeguards, the Non-Proliferation Treaty engages all state parties to implement export controls (not to transfer nuclear material and single-use equipment and material to non-nuclear weapons States except subject to Agency safeguards (Art. III.2)), technology transfers (to facilitate fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for peaceful uses of nuclear energy (Art. IV.2)) and disarma­ment (to pursue negotiations on measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament, and on treaty on general and complete disarmament under international control (Art. VI)); the veri­fication process is in the hands of the IAEA via Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements. The structure and content of Agreements between the Agency and States, in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons INFCIRC/153 (Corr.), requires from countries the estab­lishment of a State system of accounting and control (SSAC), an informa­tion system for record keeping by operators, reporting inventories, imports, exports and production of nuclear materials, providing information on design of nuclear facilities and other locations where nuclear material is used, and giving access to facilities and other locations, involving facility design information verifications, inspections and cooperation with the Agency. Chapter 13 of the present book deals in more detail with the safe­guards regime.

Finally, the country should also sign one of the Conventions on Civil Liability for nuclear damage. Special arrangements have been adopted under both national laws and international legal instruments to deal with the problem of how to compensate persons for injuries and other damage that could result from nuclear incidents. Reference IAEA (2010a), Nuclear Law Handbook — Implementing Legislation, lists the following principles:

‘(a) A defined scope for the liability regime based on specific concepts, namely “nuclear installation”, “operator”, “nuclear incident” and “nuclear damage”

(b) Strict (no fault) liability imposed on the operator of a nuclear installation (also referred to as “absolute” liability)

(c) Exclusive liability of the operator (so-called legal channelling of liability onto one person — namely, the operator — to the exclusion of other persons)

(d) Exonerations of the operator from liability only in certain exhaustively enumerated circumstances (e. g. nuclear incidents directly due to warlike events, grave natural disasters of an exceptional character, conduct on the part of the person suffering the damage which amounts to gross negli­gence or intent to cause damage)

(e) Possibility of limiting the liability in amount

(f) Mandatory financial security of the operator to meet liability

(g) Limitation of liability in time

(h) Non-discrimination and equal treatment of victims

(i) Exclusive jurisdiction of a single competent court

(j) Obligation to recognize and enforce final judgements entered by the competent court in other contracting States without re-examination of the merits.’

These Conventions will also determine the responsibilities with the vendor and constructor of the plant.

The development of the national legal framework comes next. Again the reference IAEA (2010a), Nuclear Law Handbook — Implementing Legislation guides countries in developing their national nuclear legal framework.

The national nuclear law needs to be established and should meet all the obligations induced by the ratification process underlined above. It should also meet the constraints of the legislative system of the country. The defini­tion of the national nuclear law is the following: ‘Nuclear law is the body of special legal norms created to regulate the conduct of legal or natural persons engaged in activities related to fissionable materials and ionizing radiation’ (IAEA, 2010a).

The government should include public participation in the preliminary steps: the support of opinion support is essential for carrying out a nuclear programme. Regular information meetings could be envisaged, especially at the various steps described in the next paragraphs.