The present attitude toward safety held by the utilities, by the sup­pliers, and by the Atomic Energy Commission (aec) is disciplined and based on a proper concern for the true safety of atomic power reactors. It is fully appreciated by those associated with the design, construction, and operation of power reactors that the primary safety objective for power reactors is to minimize the release of radioactive materials. Very early in the design of power reactors this motivation led to what is known as the multiple-barrier concept. As pointed out earlier, the technologies required to generate power by nuclear reactors are well established. The additional and very important design requirement of providing multiple barriers to fission product release receives a considerable percentage of the design ef­fort associated with power reactors. Briefly, this multiple-barrier design concept consists of the recognition that the radioactive material, which is principally the nuclear fission products, must be retained within the nu­clear system to avoid exposing the public to radiation. This is achieved by keeping the fission products within the fuel pellets, within the fuel rod clad, within the reactor primary system, within the primary containment, which in some designs is within a secondary containment. This is a very effective multiple barrier.

Obviously, a considerable amount of the design effort that goes into the specification and construction of the five barriers does not result from requirements with respect to power generation but only with respect to safety. The fact that so many barriers can be found in today’s nuclear power reactor is a demonstration that an extremely conservative attitude does exist with respect to safety and an assurance that the nuclear designs have public health and safety considerations as their primary objective.

Safety is an important consideration, not only with respect to normal operation of a power reactor, but also with respect to potential accidents.

In the nuclear industry a demanding approach has evolved for evaluating potential accidents. A spectrum of particular accidents are selected for de­tailed analyses in order to determine all of the requirements with respect to safety systems. These accidents covering the spectrum of potential ab­normal events which might occur to a nuclear power reactor are associ­ated with such hypothetical considerations as possible excess power in­creases owing to disturbances in the fission process in the reactor; me­chanical failure, such as the dropping of a fuel bundle during refueling; and loss of coolant, such as might result if one of the recirculation loops on a power reactor were broken arbitrarily. Engineered safeguards are provided to assure complete protection against such potential accidents. Therefore, we consider all types of accidents as well as the big and the lit­tle accident possibilities — the day-to-day deviations from normal opera­tion and the end-of-spectrum accident that requires a ridiculously improb­able combination of calamities.

This protection is offered for events down through very low proba­bility situations. For instance, we consider a loss-of-coolant accident in which a major pipeline, 24 to 28 inches in diameter with a wall thickness of stainless steel in excess of 1 inch, is assumed to break off completely and instantaneously. To any designer in the power industry, this is known to be an incredibly remote possibility, and yet it serves as the end-of-spec — trum accident for the provision of safeguards. This again demonstrates the properly conservative attitude toward safety that the nuclear industry has today.

Another important aspect in the design of the safeguards associated with these theoretical accidents is the demanding manner in which de­tailed failure mode studies are done on all of the equipment provided. Evaluations are made to see whether any adverse situation could cause the safeguards to fail. Detailed design criteria existing within the supplier or­ganizations as well as within the aec itself specify just what these equip­ment requirements and considerations must be.

With respect to normal operation of a nuclear power plant, a parallel design effort just as diligent as the design effort directed toward accident considerations is carried out. In the design of any large power plant there are waste products. A fossil-fired power plant burning coal or oil must be designed to dispose properly of such wastes as smoke, fly ash, and various chemicals which are released as part of the burning process in the boilers. The design of nuclear power stations ensures that the total waste release — whether gaseous or liquid — is always well within the specified regulations of the aec. In fact, as one would certainly expect, every feasible effort is made to minimize wastes which might include radioactive materials, in or­der to make radioactive waste discharge as small as practically feasible. Thus, the radioactive wastes of the nuclear power station are insignificant with respect to other radioactive considerations had the plant not been there at all.

Another important part of the industry’s attitude toward safety is the detailed emphasis placed on design review, construction review, and op­eration review of power reactors. Not only does a nuclear steam system supplier such as General Electric have various audit organizations to en­sure that its product is well designed and safe, but also the supplier and the applicant (the utility) subject each nuclear power plant to a detailed technical review at every phase of its design, construction, and operation. The aec’s regulatory staff performs a detailed review of the power plant applicant. Many meetings are held; detailed questions are answered and placed in the public record; experimental and analytical work is per­formed. At the completion of the aec review, the project is again re­viewed, by the congressionally established Advisory Committee on Re­actor Safeguards, (acrs). Then it moves to a third technical review con­ducted by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board; at a public hearing the Board permits anyone to raise any safety question and sees that the aec and acrs have covered all of the safety considerations satisfactorily. This entire program of review demonstrates the considerable effort put forth by the suppliers, utilities, and the aec and is certainly a further demon­stration of a proper attitude toward the safety of nuclear power reactors. No other industry receives this degree of governmental attention to its safety.

At the outset I commented on the need to consider the relative validity of standards set for other aspects of our environment in com­parison to radiation standards. There are formidable difficulties in doing this but I shall attempt it nevertheless. Chauncey Starr (1969) has ana­lyzed social benefit versus technological risk in terms of individual or soci­etal benefits versus the cost. Looking at risk of a fatal event per hour of ex­posure it is interesting to note that we voluntarily accept fourth-order risks (i. e., one chance in 104), in general sixth-order risks in hunting, skiing, smoking, or being in the Vietnam war. Note these are risks of fatality per hour. To compare these with the risks discussed above, the figures must be multiplied by the number of hours of exposure and corrected in various ways. The benefits are placed on a cost basis or, for some items, on an arbitrary scale of “benefits awareness.” This latter is determined by considering the percentage of the population involved in the activity and its relative usefulness or importance to the individual. The automobile is at the top of the list with 104 risk of a fatality per hour of exposure and a benefit awareness of about 50 (with 100 as the maximum). Nuclear power is at the bottom with a risk factor of 109 (i. e., one chance of a fatality per billion hours of exposure) with a benefit awareness of about 0.0005 — five orders of magnitude below the automobile! These exact numbers have little quantitative significance, but the implication is clear. Such analyses must be considered in any comprehensive evaluation of our technology.

I shall turn now to an area more comparable to the radiation field and one with which I am more directly familiar — namely, toxicology. On the order of one in twenty hospital admissions may be related to an unrecognized or undiagnosed untoward side effect of a drug taken for therapy. The risk of an untoward drug reaction while in the hospital is correspondingly large. This is a major public health problem and bespeaks the need for far more sophistication in toxicology than we now have. In an editorial in Clinical Pharmacology and Therapeutics Gerhard Zbin — den (1964) wrote: “Drug-induced side effects have been called diseases of medical progress. They are part of the price we may have to pay for more effective and better medicaments. Since there are no active drugs without undesired side actions, no toxicological experiment will ever be able to assure complete safety for their use in humans. It should, however, enable the therapist to better judge the risk involved in any kind of phar­macotherapy, so that he may weigh the expected benefit of a drug against possible injuries.” (Italics mine.) Does this not sound somewhat familiar? And it is from a man directing research for a major pharmaceutical company.

Current practices in toxicological testing can be seen in this outline of animal toxicological tests (abbreviated from Loomis, 1968):

Single dose acute tests using two species and two routes of adminis­tration (24-hour test and survivors followed for 7 days)

Prolonged tests (daily doses) — 3 months, two species, three dose levels

Chronic tests (daily doses) — 1-2 years, two dose levels

Special tests — potentiation, effects on fertility, teratogenicity, car­cinogenicity.

Note that the “special tests” are done only in unusual cases — or were until recently. These last include some of the long-term effects of greatest importance to radiobiology. As a part-time toxicologist I can testify that carrying a test beyond 30 days was indeed unusual until recently. And who says 6 months should usually be enough unless carcinogenicity is suspected. The story is different in radiobiology, partly because society has been willing to give the needed support for long-term studies largely through the federal government and partly because dedicated scientists have been willing to wait patiently for long latent periods to pass in order to see these experiments through.

Why is the situation so different in toxicology? There are many rea­sons, of which financial support is only one. Familiarity with chemicals as toxic agents is an important one. We have had drugs and chemicals in our daily lives for generations. Perhaps even more important is the fact that there has been little evidence of long-term effects of the type character­istic of radiation exposure. This may be partly because we did not look. Also, the existence of an irreversible component has not been demonstrat­ed in those few cases where really long-term toxicological studies have been undertaken. Indeed, as stated earlier, it may be that radiation effects differ in this fundamental way from chemical effects, but this is by no means proved. Long-term toxicological studies comparable to those done with radiation are hardly available at all. Only very recently under the stimulus of the thalidomide and similar unfortunate incidents has the possible long-term effect of drugs been considered and tested seriously before some use is permitted. The now familiar story of the reckless use of insecticides and pesticides and the irresponsible dumping of chemical wastes points further to the issue before us.

Many chemical mutagens are known to exist. Many more probably exist. Toxicologists are far behind the radiation field in examining quan­titatively the potential effects of chemical mutagens, and routine screening is just being considered. And one seldom hears even speculation that there may be anything but a threshold dose-response relationship since its presence is a basic tenet of classical toxicology.

Obviously, the fact that things are worse in chemical toxicology is no reason to relax vigilance toward radiation hazards. But there seems to be or was until very recently, an unfortunate tendency of large segments of the public to accept familiar hazards while reacting violently to the possible presence of a radiation source. Science — indeed logical reason­ing itself — seems to play a minor role in these reactions. The way in which the nuclear age was bom and the relatively mysterious nature of radiation, of course, have played their roles. Perspective wifi not come to our evalu­ations until these two major types of potential environmental modifiers can be and are reduced to the same terms and examined on comparable bases. A very large effort in toxicology will be required to permit this.

There appears to be no doubt that in general we are willing to accept risks in other spheres of activity which we will not accept from exposure to radiation. The acceptability of exposure even depends to some degree on the source of radiation. The largest single source of radiation exposure to the population except for natural background, about which we can do nothing, is found in the medical uses of radiation, particularly diagnostic X rays. This is true because of the large segment of the population in Western cultures which may receive an X-ray exposure for medical or den­tal reasons, and reflects an assumption that the benefit is clearly worth the risk involved. The benefit is to the individual exposed, the risk is largely to the race. I must admit to being, to a degree, mystified that a rad de­livered to the population by a nuclear power program is of so much more concern than a rad delivered by such more familiar routes. Perhaps it is again the matter of its voluntary nature as well as its familiarity. Perhaps it is the lack of clear benefit and the fact that alternative routes to the same end are not clear or do not exist. Remember, too, that medical uses of ra­diation are specifically excepted in promulgation of any standard because they rest on the individual professional judgment made by the physician.

These are not biological factors and I prefer not to digress further in­to them. Instead, I shall present my conclusions from this rather rudimen­tary comparison.

The biological risk associated with primary radiation standards is, in general, lower than in most of the more familiar activities of man. I speak of the risk of a delivered dose, not of the secondary standards such as those for air and water.

Present standards incorporate safety factors — large ones in the case of occupational exposures, smaller ones for exposure of adults as a popu­lation, still smaller ones for exposure of the fetus.

The information on long-term effects of radiation far outweighs simi­lar knowledge for drugs, chemical toxic agents in the environment, and so forth. A major effort is needed to put these on a comparable basis.

Although there may be some unique ways in which radiation affects living cells and tissue, only further work can establish whether or not these are truly unique.

Most radiation standards have been set largely on the assumption of linearity of the dose-effect relationship and the assumption that any in­crease above background may be harmful. Toxicological standards have been based largely on the concept of a threshold. Only a major scientific effort can establish whether or not there is a real difference. In fact, for radiation probably only major exposure incidents with thousands or mil­lions exposed would provide the needed data — and we do not countenance these.

Meanwhile I see no reason to reduce primary radiation standards without new and compelling evidence.* Some derived standards may need much adjustment to account for the events between release of a potential dose and its actual delivery to living tissue, and for the possible multipli­cation of sources impinging on the same population. But these are matters requiring new information and careful dispassionate study. Let us proceed about this as responsible citizens and scientists interested only in the truth.

*This paper was prepared and presented before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy hearings and other current writings which state that there is compelling evidence even though it is not new data. Comment on this would not be appropriate here since these matters require careful study, as emphasized above.

REFERENCES

International Commission on Radiological Protection. The evaluation of risks from radiation, icrp Publication 8. London: Pergamon Press, 1966.

Loomis, Ted A. Essentials of toxicology, Table 12-1, p. 142. Philadelphia: Lea & Febiger, 1968

Starr, Chauncey. Social benefit versus technological risk. Science, 1969, 165, 1232— 1238.

Zbinden, Gerhard. The problem of the toxicologic examination of drugs in animals and their safety in man. Clinical Pharmacology and Therapeutics, 1964, 5, 537­545.

Since controlled fusion has not yet been achieved, and may never be, only a brief mention of this potential source of energy will here be made. Initially, the most promising fusion reaction is one involving both D and eLi. However, the total known and inferred supply of ®Li in areas outside the Communist countries amounts to only about 7 x 10s4 eLi atoms, whereas the deuterium in the oceans amounts to about 1.5 x 1048 atoms, or about 109 times the eLi supply.

The energy obtainable from the lithium-deuterium reaction based on the total supply of 6Li would be about 2.4 x 1023 joules, which is approxi­mately equal to that of the world’s supply of the fossil fuels. The energy obtainable from a deuterium-deuterium fusion would be of the order of a billion times larger.

For a more tangible figure, 1 cubic meter of seawater contains 1.03 x 1025 atoms of deuterium having a mass of 34.4 grams, and a potential fu­sion energy of 8.16 X 1012 joules. This is equivalent to the heat of com­bustion of 269 metric tons of coal or of 1,360 barrels of crude oil. The deuterium in 28 cubic kilometers of seawater would have an energy equiv­alent to the world’s coal supply.

Conclusion

From this brief review, it is evident that the fossil fuels will be suffi­cient to supply the major part of the world’s power requirements for only about three centuries. Water power is potentially of a comparable order of magnitude but possibly also short-lived because of the silting of reservoirs. Geothermal and tidal power are useful, but of small magnitudes. This leaves only nuclear energy as a source of sufficient magnitude to supply the world’s power requirement for a period of a few additional centuries.

Against this must be considered the world’s finite area and its finite supplies of other mineral resources, particularly the ores of industrial metals. On a long-term basis, provided the world’s human population can be reduced to, and stabilized at, some optimum number, and provided that its industrial activity also can be stabilized at some nonexponentially expanding level commensurate with the earth’s resources, it should be physically and biologically possible to achieve and sustain a state of well being for the earth’s human population for at least a few centuries into the future.

REFERENCES

Averitt, Paul. Coal resources of the United States January 1, 1967. Washington: U. S. Geological Survey Bulletin 1275,1969.

Bemshtein, L. B. Tidal energy for electric power plants. Jerusalem: Israel Program for Scientific Translations, 1961 (Russian); 1965 (English translation). Committee on Geologic Aspects of Radioactive Waste Disposal. Report to the U. S. Atomic Energy Commission. Washington: Division of Earth Sciences, National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council, May 1966. 92 pp. Also pub­lished in Hearings before the Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution of the Committee on Public Works, U. S. Senate, 91st Congress, November 18, 19, and 20,1969, pp. 462-512.

Daniels, Farrington. Direct use of the sun’s energy. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Uni­versity Press, 1964.

Duncan, D. С., & V. E. Swanson. Organic-rich shales of the United States and world land areas. Washington: United States Geological Survey Circular 523, 1965.

Faulkner, Rafford L. Remarks at Conference on Nuclear Fuel Exploration for Power Reactors, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. Washington: United States Atomic En­ergy Commission, May 23,1968.

Hubbert, M. King. 1956. Nuclear energy and the fossil fuels. In American Petroleum Institute, Drilling and production practice (1956), 1957, pp. 7-25.

——- . Energy resources: A report to the Committee on Natural Resources. Wash­ington, D. C.: National Academy of Sciences Publication 1000-D, 1962.

——- . Degree of advancement of petroleum exploration in the United States.

American Association of Petroleum Geology Bulletin, 1967, 51, 2207-2227.

-. Energy resources. In Resources and man. Washington: National Academy

A discussion of the effect of heated water on aquatic life needs little introduction. During the past several years there has been much interest in this subject within the scientific community and also more recently by the public itself. Federal and state water quality legislation has increased this interest, especially with regard to timetables of progress.

In almost any field of endeavor, an awareness of a need usually evolves before adequate data have been accumulated for making im­portant decisions. Biologists in general and those of the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration in particular now know what answers are needed and how they might be determined. In the interim between the present and some future time when sufficient data are available for making highly accurate and predictive statements, we must speak to some extent in generalities rather than of precise temperature levels. In addi­tion, we must recognize that the effects of heated water on aquatic life are the same whether the source is a nuclear power plant, a fossil fuel plant, or some other process in which water is used as a coolant.

There are two major categories of heated water effects on aquatic life. Direct effects are usually unrelated to another parameter of the aquatic environment. Indirect effects involve a stepwise procedure where­by some other condition, changed by the addition of heat, becomes dele­terious to aquatic life. This distinction will become clear as specific cases are discussed.

The most obvious direct effect is lethality. The lethal temperatures for several species of fish native to and important in Minnesota, for ex­ample, are: walleye, 86° F; yellow perch, 84-88° F; white sucker, 84-85° F; and the fathead minnow, 93° F. No salmon or trout are listed

because there are few cold water environments suitable for these species that are large enough to satisfy the cooling water requirements for any kind of power plant — especially a nuclear plant, which is less efficient than other kinds. Also, there is usually little temperature rise required to replace trout and salmon with walleye, smallmouth bass, and other fish. For perspective, it may be stated that the Columbia River, one of the largest single cold water environments in the country, is only a few degrees from this conversion of fish populations.

A consideration of lethal conditions must include the fact that fish exposed to a lethal temperature do not die immediately. Several horns or several days may be required before stress becomes evident. This situation results in statements that fish were found at a temperature that should have caused mortality on the basis of published data. The presence of fish in heated discharges is often interpreted to mean that these effluents provide desirable or optimum conditions for that species. A little thought would suggest that many organisms, including man, are at times and under cer­tain conditions attracted to environments that are clearly not optimal. This example is one of many that have resulted in confusion and the drawing of conclusions from apparently contradictory events and ob­servations.

The blocking of spawning migrations of fish is another example of direct effects of heat on aquatic life. In this connection, mixing zones as well as larger heated areas must be considered. If a thermal barrier is pro­duced that will prevent one or several fish species from reaching spawning grounds, the eventual result will be the same as if the effect were directly lethal. This adverse effect can be aggravated when the thermal discharge is quickly mixed with cooler stream water, instead of permitting some heat dissipation to the atmosphere before complete mixing occurs. With imme­diate mixing, the temperature of the entire cross-section of the stream becomes higher than if complete mixing occurred more slowly and some distance downstream.

Related to this potential effect on reproduction is a direct effect on the spawning process itself. As mentioned earlier, the temperature that kills 50 per cent of fathead minnows in 96 hours is 93° F. However, it has been shown under laboratory conditions that a lower temperature (86° F) almost completely prevented spawning by this important minnow. More recent research with other aquatic species at the National Water Quality Laboratory has given comparable results, indicating that there are adverse thermal effects on reproduction several degrees below a lethal tempera­ture.

The most important ecological considerations, as always, are the

53

most difficult to investigate since they can rarely be studied under satis­factory conditions. These are the potential alterations in species compo­sition and food relationships. If we consider the geographic distribution of important fish species, it is apparent that when an environment is at the southern boundary of a particular geographic distribution, any increase in water temperature would probably result in removal of that species. Con­versely, a species at its northern limit would probably benefit from a rise in temperature. It would be simple to consider desirable species and their distribution if fish were the only factor. However, fish must feed to survive, and if the principal food, or an irreplaceable item in the food chain of fish fry, is removed, the fish species would also be removed even though other­wise thermally adapted. This consideration of the total effects of a change in temperature cannot be completed quickly.

Some investigators have found dense populations of fish near or in power plant effluents and have somewhat illogically concluded that heated water is therefore beneficial. A critical evaluation of such data frequently shows that these dense populations are not of desirable game species but are less desirable, rough fish species. These same data, in addition to in­dicating an abundance of rough fish, also indicate a scarcity or absence of desirable game or commercial fish. This kind of study rarely considers sublethal deleterious conditions such as reduced spawning.

The point in the environment at which the temperature is recorded, although frequently considered a minor problem, may be important. Many times when biological collections are being made, a hand-held thermom­eter is used and records a surface temperature that is actually higher than that in deeper water where fish or other biological forms were collected. This difference could be very significant; the resultant conclusion would have fish existing or thriving at a higher temperature than actually existed where they are found.

The food chain interrelationships of aquatic environments are not static. Everyone knows that at different times of each year there are differ­ent sizes of fish and that feeding habits vary with size, especially with newly hatched fry. Not everyone knows that there are great seasonal variations in the types and abundance of food organisms for these fish. The fry stage of fish is the most critical period because the necessary food for most fry is limited to organisms as small or smaller than immature copepods and cladocerans. Any significant increase in the thermal regime of an aquatic environment could result in the absence of this food when fish fry are totally dependent on them. This absence could be caused by removal of the food species from the system or merely by a change in the time of their availability. Either permanent removal or seasonal displace­ment would place great stress on the fry.

Research at the National Water Quality Laboratory with inverte­brates involving emergence from an aquatic larval form to a flying adult has shown that elevated water temperature causes earlier than normal emergence; this might not be critical except for the fact that these adults thus are ready to enter the aerial environment when air temperatures are still below normal. Under such a condition, many newly emerged adults are unable to leave the water’s surface and complete their life cycle.

It has been stated also that fish grow faster in heated waters. This, like many similar conclusions, is true, within certain limits. At some upper levels of temperature, which are still below lethal temperature, growth is reduced below normal. Even under the conditions which fostered more rapid growth under experimental conditions, we cannot be sure that the increased food required will be available in the aquatic environment. Such results emphasize the need for total environmental considerations and indicate also that subtle changes, many as yet unknown, can have im­portant implications.

One potentially important factor that could be the most critical of all has yet to go much beyond the discussion stage between biologists and engineers. In many plants the cooling water requirements may require up to the total stream flow. Certainly then, the microscopic and slightly larger food organisms would pass through the plant and any associated cooling processes and would be subjected to maximum temperatures which will exceed those of the stream. Even though the obviously desir­able species such as fish are not subjected to this exposure, they are still dependent upon their food chain. The direct, adverse thermal effect on this very important microscopic part of the food chain is measurable; the few times it has been investigated, contradictory results were obtained — ranging from no effect to 95 per cent mortality of the plankton.

The last of the direct effects of heated water on aquatic life is actually a summation of several that are best discussed together. Although up to a certain level, increased temperature can result in increased fish growth, it may also cause proliferation of algal growths that have a deleterious effect on justifiable uses of water other than that for aquatic life. Conse­quently, when excessive algal growth, caused by thermal pollution alone or in combination with municipal or agricultural fertilization of surface waters, results in windrows of rotting algae on shorelines or beaches, the use of these areas for recreational purposes is certainly limited. Not only are swimming and pleasure boating opportunities reduced, but any fisher­man who consistently catches string of algae on hook and line would be upset. This consideration is not marginal —and in fact can be carried further, because decaying algae would create problems of air pollution control.

Another justifiable use of water is for the industrial requirements of nonmunicipal water. Almost any pretreatment of this water for industrial use would have to be increased when heated water causes increased growth of slimes and algae.

A final effect of excessive algal growth is felt by municipal water supplies. Most inhabitants of larger cities are aware of the unpleasantness of drinking highly chlorinated water. The need for chlorination to control bacteria and other undesirable materials in drinking water will increase with increasing temperature, since the need for chlorination is accentuated when the temperature is raised.

The indirect effects of heated water may be considered incidental or secondary in nature, but nonetheless can have a significant impact on aquatic environments. Adverse effects attributed to other factors may be aggravated by heat, or the factor itself may be a result of increased tem­perature. Disease is probably one of the better examples. In relatively unconfined environments, fish diseases rarely reach catastrophic propor­tions, killing large numbers of fish rapidly. Disease organisms in the water and a nominal incidence of infected fish commonly occur. Disease organ­isms multiply more rapidly at elevated temperatures, just as the rates of most biological processes increase with increasing temperature. When temperatures are higher, the virulence of the disease increases, and the resistance of the fish decreases. Together, these may result in a significant loss of fish from disease — but in effect, the mortality is caused by a tem­perature that permits a normally low incidence of disease to become an epidemic. Such situations have occurred “naturally” in the confined en­vironments of hatchery ponds and small farm ponds. Only recently has this condition been shown to be a potential hazard in unconfined, artificially heated waters such as the Columbia River.

Everyone is aware of fish kills which occur from the addition of toxic materials to the aquatic environment. In a few instances the cause is found, and remedial action taken. Again, the addition of toxic materials may seem unrelated to thermal discharge, but further scrutiny uncovers a sig­nificant relationship. The toxicity of most materials — whether pesticides, solvents, heavy metals, or others — increases at higher temperatures. The important point is that water quality criteria can be determined for mate­rials toxic to aquatic life under desirable temperatures, but when tempera­tures are elevated above optimum, toxicity is increased and following these criteria may no longer protect aquatic life.

Again, even though the immediate cause of the damage is a toxic material, the addition of heat to the environment may have been the factor which brought about the undesirable effect. With regard to toxicity, the addition of anti-fouling chemicals in cooling towers and other industrial processes must be considered. The periodic addition of biocides or fungi­cides to the cooling water of power plants and industrial facilities is intend­ed to control and destroy slimes, algae, or scales composed of living cells. Besides the target organisms, these chemicals also, to some extent, affect the food chain organisms. Unfortunately, the frequency of use of these chemicals is directly related to need; since the growth of these target or­ganisms would be greater in warmer weather, the frequency of this addi­tional stress would increase when summer thermal stress is at a maximum. The use of copper sulfate for the control of algae in domestic water supply reservoirs will certainly be increased when raised temperatures increase algal growth. More frequent use of copper could also cause deleterious effects on aquatic environments.

As mentioned earlier, increased temperature causes an increase in physiological activity, which, in turn, increases the oxygen demand of aquatic organisms. This fact is true not only for higher living cells but also for decaying organic matter. Most power plants or other processes requiring cooling water are located near centers of population, where the greatest amounts of organic matter in water also accrue. The effect of these two conditions is at least additive. Either condition alone might be endured by the aquatic fauna, but when both are present, as they fre­quently are, a problem is created.

An example of a computed situation on the White River below Indianapolis can provide a solution to this problem. A sewage treatment plant operates at 92 per cent efficiency at 81° F in order to maintain a minimum dissolved oxygen concentration of 5.0 mg/1. A temperature rise to 86° F will require the treatment to be improved to nearly 95 per cent. This slight increase in required efficiency may seem negligible, but those who are knowledgeable state that this solution would be expensive.

It is not at all uncommon to have significant stretches of streams or rivers below municipalities nearly devoid of oxygen. These undesirable conditions are certainly enhanced by the discharge of heated water in the same general area. Federal and state legislation is resulting in the im­provement of treatment plant efficiencies and an increase in the percentage of the population served by sewer systems. It would be inappropriate to require improved treatment to the point of correcting not only the prob­lem of domestic sewage but that of the power industry as well. The cost would probably be prohibitive, and the treatment would require further improvement every time a heat source is added.

A slight digression here to consider the implications of combined stresses in general would be appropriate. Several specific examples have been mentioned; the list of others would be limited only by one’s imagina­tion. Dr. Auerbach has discussed radiological considerations with regard to the environment. To the stresses he mentioned would have to be added the stresses of elevated temperature as discussed above. The stresses of any other adverse conditions — whether related to toxicants, domestic sewage, or other factors — must be considered and added to the subtotal of artificial stresses. Too often, specialists do not view the environment through wide-angle lenses. They can no longer refuse to accept the just responsibility of providing sound recommendations that will protect the aquatic environment. Continued narrow-mindedness can result only in slower steps toward an ultimate goal that in some instances may no longer exist by the time we have completed the first halting progress.

A single temperature criterion for aquatic life would be simple and efficient. But the complexity and variety of environments in this country and in nearly every state do not permit a single number. Even if all the basic data needed were available, there would have to be a consideration of existing environmental quality. A stretch of river already borderline for the existence of desirable aquatic life (itself a difficult state to agree upon) certainly cannot accept another stress. The “natural” water temperature associated with latitude would also be an important factor.

Economics and public preference about the intended uses of the aquatic environment must be evaluated. Certainly, it is inadequate to consider only the need for electrical power, physical location and cost, and whether or not there is sufficient cooling water available. Existing stresses — low dissolved oxygen, toxic materials, disease, and so forth — must be acknowledged and must influence decision-making. Too often we have been unable to define environmental problems adequately because experts attempt too fine a dissection that does not consider all phases of a problem. There will be redundancy of effort and delays in solution of major pollution problems if experts adhere to narrow-minded problem­solving. The full impact of a pollution source can be determined only by adding up the total effects on many qualities and uses of the aquatic environment. Perhaps no other environmental condition demonstrates such a wide range of effects as does temperature.

For years biologists have been accused of being idealists willing to accept only pristine, unaltered conditions. In most of this country one sees many examples of changed environment caused by impoundments,

fish management, and many other activities. Demands for pristine condi­tions will not result in progressive pollution control. In most instances, a compromise between the optimum and the unacceptable is the only fea­sible means for progress. Recent recommendations for the Ohio River by the Ohio Basin Region of the Federal Water Pollution Control Adminis­tration provide an excellent example of current thought.

Those recommendations designated several specific classes of warm water fishes that required several different temperature criteria. The most restrictive temperature criteria would permit the continued existence of all present fish species. The next set of temperature criteria in terms of quality would not protect the most sensitive species, in this case, the sauger. A third step would eliminate such fish as the smallmouth bass, emerald shiner, and white sucker. Comparable sets of criteria were estab­lished for the cold water fisheries in the Ohio River watershed. Each set of criteria is different and gives different degrees of protection. The final resolution of water quality standards will involve much cooperation with representatives of all directly and indirectly involved parties.

The need for power production is urgent and obvious. Planning or construction delays are unfortunate. An awareness and understanding of each party’s problems and considerations are essential to constructive efforts to provide the necessary electrical power without usurping a basic public right to desirable aquatic life and recreation. Both masters may be served, but not without careful, mutual cooperation.

With these radiological safety guides and their purposes in mind, I shall now look at the aec’s reactor licensing and regulation procedures. Everything aec does in this area is necessarily based strictly upon the guides which, as a federal agency, it must follow. If one is unhappy with the guides imposed upon aec, the proper place to complain about them and make suggestions is to the frc, not the aec. There are procedures for doing just that if one takes the time and has the ingenuity to discover them.

The aec is not a nuclear Mafia conspiring to cram unsafe and un­needed nuclear plants down the throat of an unwilling but helpless nation. The predicted population of 300 million people in this country by the year 2000 will create tremendous demands for electricity, two-thirds of which goes to fuel the industries that will provide them their livings. Fur­thermore, the aec’s licensing process is not a device to boost the sale of nuclear power plants without regard for adequate protection of the public health and safety. I wish to emphasize that I am aware of some responsible scientists, having expertise in certain areas, who have raised questions which may have been only partly answered by the presently available in­formation. Their comments, well intended, should be considered. This should be done in a technical meeting where scientists can discuss these matters with their fellow scientists. The public rally, the cardboard pla­card, and the licensing board hearing are inefficient vehicles for technical communication and should not be used for that purpose.

aec’s first step has been to analyze frc’s guides and to translate them into general regulations covering all the activities involving ionizing radia­tion over which it has licensing jurisdiction; these regulations are available in a document entitled “Standards for Protection against Radiation” (10 CFR Pt. 20), which deals with definitions, permissible doses, levels and concentrations, precautionary procedures, waste disposal, records, re­ports, notifications, and so on. These are the general rules to be observed. The standards are more specific than Chairman Mao’s Thoughts, but not specific enough to assure absence of undue risk at a particular reactor at a particular site.

When somebody actually wants to build a reactor, then the aec ap­plies procedures calculated to assure that a particular plant at a particular place complies with each and every one of the frc’s guides. These proce­dures are contained in its regulations, “Licensing of Production and Uti­lization Facilities” (lOCFRPt. 36). These procedures are set forth in de­tail in Part A of Appendix В (p. 161).

In summary, although potential exposure of persons to the minute amounts of radiation legally and intentionally released from nuclear gen­erating stations is the focus of concern by many people at the present time, it has been a constant concern to the United States government ever since the discovery of atomic fission.

This concern has been expressed by a cumulative expenditure on the subject over a period of almost 30 years by the Manhattan District and its successor, the aec, of billions of dollars and millions of scientific man­hours. It is a concern which is interwoven into every procedure of the aec’s regulatory and licensing process and which attaches to each event in the history of any reactor (from conception of the idea, to design, to con­struction, to operation, and finally to retirement) and to every link in the nuclear fuel chain (raw materials, mining and milling, conversion of yel­low cake to UFe, enrichment, fuel fabrication, reactors, transportation, and reprocessing of spent fuel).

Protection of persons from radiation exposure is a component of mil­lions of design calculations and of each and every of the thousands of parts and pieces of a nuclear reactor which must work in unison the first time and for so long as the facility exists. The same protection attaches to each of the thousands of fabrication steps required to fashion these sep­arate components into a whole reactor, to the construction of an entire nuclear electric generating facility, and to the intricacies of its operation thereafter. This protection afforded by the aec’s licensing and regulatory activities continues not only for the IV2 years necessary for a construction permit and the 6-8 years of construction, but also for up to 40 years after an operating license has been issued.

Nowhere in the world today or at any previous time has there been a more meticulous, detailed, and scrupulously unbiased machinery for as­suring public protection against any hazard than that in the aec’s licenses and regulations protecting against radiation hazards. In executing this re­sponsibility the aec can and constantly does call upon the vast technical resources of other federal agencies for assistance and advice in their area of competence. For instance, under a 1964 agreement with the Depart­ment of the Interior, the aec uses the technical capabilities of the Geo­logical Survey with respect to the geological aspects of a particular reactor site, particularly those relating to seismology. On the radiological effects of a facility on aquatic and other wildlife, the aec brings in the consider­able talents of the Fish and Wildlife Service. The Weather Bureau and the Coast and Geodetic Survey provide assistance in obtaining and analyzing meteorological data. The Federal Water Pollution Control Administration and the Public Health Service also make valuable contributions to the re­actor licensing process in their fields.

This vast machinery and extensive effort is dedicated to one pur­pose: assuring that a nuclear power plant is designed and constructed and will operate without exposing individuals and the public to radiation lev­els above which not the aec but the nation’s and the world’s foremost ex­perts have calculated to be without undue risk.

Objective versus Subjective Regulation. At no point does the aec’s judgment of what is or what is not an acceptable level enter the picture. Its only judgment is that a particular reactor at a particular place does or does not meet the standards. By this means, tampering with the standards themselves is ruled out. This is the objective standards approach to reac­tor regulation. It is to be contrasted to any approach which would allow the regulators to jimmy standards up or down, for example to levels “as low as possible”; in the latter case, what may be “as low as possible” be­comes a subjective matter primarily depending on the daily condition of the regulator’s liver or stomach or other vital organs. This is the so-called visceral approach to reactor regulation.

Nuclear Incident Safety. Nuclear plant accident hazards have not loomed large in the current controversy over nuclear power stations, per­haps by reason of the outstanding safety record achieved because persons who deal with atomic energy respect its potential hazards and exercise great care to negate them. If for no other reason than that the magnitude of a reactor accident which could damage the public would also wipe out a utility company’s multi-hundred million dollar investment, unparalleled effort is made to design, construct, and operate nuclear plants so as to re­duce the risk of nuclear incidents to near zero.* * It has been argued by some that nuclear plant “unsafety” is proved because the Price-Anderson Act (PL 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 [1957]) limits liability from a nuclear

Chauncey Starr, dean of the engineering school at ucla, has esti­mated that for these reasons the operation of a nuclear plant to produce electricity is at least one hundred times safer than the operation of a fossil fuel plant for the same purpose.*

Radiation Release Safety. The current controversy does, however, focus on the proposition of turning over to the states some degree of con­trol over radiation releases from nuclear power plants. I doubt that many people seriously want to give states the primary or exclusive responsibility for regulating the nation’s nuclear activities. In fact, the idea is so horrify­ing I refuse to discuss it.

The genesis of the aec is probably too well known to bother repeat­ing here, but recalling it serves a purpose. Because of its beginnings as the developer of nuclear weapons, the aec started the peaceful atomic busi­ness with two strikes against it. The Commissioners themselves as well as every employee of the aec realized at the beginning that just being safe would not be enough. The public was basically frightened of atomic ener­gy and radiation. They knew that achieving the goal set out for them by the Congress and the President would require a level of public safety never before achieved in American industry. In the 23 years since it was organ­ized, the aec has assembled the most brilliant team of scientists and engi­neers ever assembled — within the aec itself, in its multi-disciplinary na­tional laboratories, in our greatest scientific universities, and in indus­try. The whole nation marveled at the precision and accuracy of the Apol­lo 11 program, and the men who put it together. The men who are devel­oping the nuclear power program are equally competent and probably more concerned with safety. Today, more than 50 per cent of the aec’s annual budget is devoted to the peaceful applications of atomic energy.

accident to $560 million and provides that the federal government shall act as in­surer to the extent that private insurance to that amount cannot be obtained. This is an erroneous inference; insuring nuclear power plant operation is not analogous to the risky business of flood insurance which private insurers decline to write owing to large losses and frequent occurrence, and for which a federal government insurance program has been enacted. Price-Anderson indemnity is analogous to the federal home mortgage insurance program established at a time when private insurers were reluctant to enter the field because no loss experience had been gained with the in­stallment sale of homes, just as no loss experience has been accumulated even to this date with respect to nuclear power plants. Further, because of the lack of nu­clear power plant accident loss experience at the time of the Price-Anderson Act, the rather large $560 million liability limit cannot reasonably be regarded as any meas­ure of the possible magnitude of any accident. Rather, it is a figure arbitrarily legis­lated in an abundance of caution and nothing more. To that I am my own footnote — I was there.

* “Social Benefit vs. Technological Risk,” Science, September 19, 1969, 165, 1232. Hear also “Current Nuclear Affairs,” Audio Tape No. 5, October 1969 (Instruc­tional Dynamics, Inc., 166 E. Superior Street, Chicago, Illinois 60611).

These include not only power reactors but programs like the development of a small, inexpensive artificial kidney, a radioisotope-powered heart pacemaker, and the use of radiation in the treatment of cancer. In fact, with the exception of the National Institutes of Health, the AEC probably has more to offer in the areas of biological and medical research than any other organization. The use of atomic energy to generate electricity was identified as a high-priority national objective with the passage of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. It has been supported by every President since, and it has a particularly enthusiastic friend in President Nixon. But always the primary concern has been protection of the public, both under routine operating conditions and in the event of a malfunction. To this day, no member of the public nor any employee of an AEC-licensed nu­clear power plant has ever been killed or injured because of the operation of a civilian reactor. Also, no worker or member of the public has ever been exposed to radiation levels above the permissible annual limits by a licensed reactor, and no release of radiation above the federally estab­lished quantities has ever occurred.

What the hue and cry from some quarters seems to be is for dual or concurrent regulation by aec and the states, principally on the grounds that states should have a privilege to impose more restrictive limitations on radiation releases than those imposed by aec reactor licenses. Being basically a states’ righter myself, the idea is attractive to me in principle. Thus, to me the issue is whether it would be workable. As a practical mat­ter, is multiple regulation necessary or wise or even safe?

Although some people say so, we are not dealing here with a situa­tion analogous to allowing a state to impose restrictions on emissions from automobiles more strict than those imposed federally. The automobile is a $4,000 item, its emissions are local, and its working principles are sim­ple and well understood. The nuclear plant is a $200 to $400 million in­vestment, its emissions may not be confined locally or even within state boundaries, and its working principles are exceedingly complex matters within the comprehension of only a relatively few experts.

If we accept the contention that the federal standards are too low, say, for Minnesota, then it logically follows that they are too low for Cali­fornia, where the President of the United States owns a house 2.0 miles from a 430-megawatt nuclear power station, and they are too low for all the other states with nuclear power projects. If that be the case, our con­cern properly should be with revision of the federal standards by which the aec must regulate rather than a state-by-state imposition of different standards.

The important issue here is not whether, for example, the Minnesota

Pollution Control Agency or the Federal Radiation Council should estab­lish standards for the release of radiation from the Monticello nuclear plant. Although Minnesotans may think that life and lakes and streams and milk are more precious in Minnesota than anyplace else, that just isn’t so. The important question is whether the federal standards are adequate for all Americans. In other words, has the federal government been negli­gent in its responsibility for protecting the health and safety of the public?

Over the past 25 years, the federal mechanism set up in this country to control nuclear radiation has become the most precise and effective public health program ever created anywhere by anybody. For this reason the task of proving a charge of negligence is very difficult. To avoid this dif­ficulty, the opponents of nuclear power are attempting to shift the burden of proof, saying the aec must stand guilty until proven innocent. They de­mand a list of ten accidents that did not happen because of the aec’s regu­lations and a list of twenty people who did not get leukemia because the aec has insisted that radiation releases be held to and below permissible levels. They call upon the aec to prove the negative. When the aec comes up with a refutation of something like the theories of Dr. Ernest J. Sternglass (radiation physicist at the University of Pittsburgh), the op­ponents just answer that the aec is not to be believed because it is fraught with internal conflict of interest between promotion and regulation (this canard is dealt with in Appendix B, second part, p. 164). And when someone like me suggests that they are aiming at the wrong target — the aec instead of the frc — they just get sore and say “he’s got to go!”

Arguments for Exclusive Federal Control. Specifically, arguments against dual federal/state regulation and for exclusive federal control in­clude, but are not limited to, the following:

a. Dual regulation is unnecessary because: The unprecedented safety record compiled by the federal regulatory mechanism is the best example of the effectiveness of the present system for protecting public health and safety. The aec has both the financial resources and the technical compe­tence to administer an effective program. It is inconceivable that any sin­gle state could develop either the financial resources or the technical com­petence to provide the same level of regulatory protection to the public. If the federal radiation release standards can be shown to be inadequate, the federal standards should be amended rather than authorizing states unilaterally to impose their own standards. Machinery already exists — namely, the frc— by which any necessary improvements in radiation standards may be initiated. It would prove futile inasmuch as dispersion of radionuclides in air, water, and food is not impeded by political boun­daries of states; a reactor in State A may have more environmental effect in State В than it does in State A. It has yet to be shown that the health and safety of the public are not fully protected by the federal standards. It has yet to be shown that the public would be better protected under state regulation than it is under federal regulation.

b. Dual regulation is unwise because: The public is best protected by the organization with the most competence and experience in dealing with radiation. Dispersion of regulatory authority diffuses regulatory responsi­bility and thereby weakens responsibility. Duality of regulation represents an inefficient use of the limited number of scientific and engineering per­sonnel who have both educational and practical credentials in the field. The many scientific disciplines and technical skills required for nuclear regulation are beyond the resources of the states. The drain on state budg­ets of developing and operating an effective regulatory program repre­sents a dissipation of state resources badly needed for other public pro­grams. Nuclear technology is still evolving, making it mandatory for the regulator to maintain a constant awareness of progress and problems in reactor development; this is best achieved within a single unit such as the aec. It will introduce confusion into licensing and will surely extend the already long process, further consuming time which engineers should be spending on advancing the state of reactor design. It would add another regulatory burden on power producers, further complicating efforts to provide adequate quantities of low-cost electricity to consumers. Should dual regulation unduly hamper the construction and operation of generat­ing facilities, the results could range from impeded industrial growth to actual power outages, the latter case resulting in dangers to public health and safety.

Dual regulation is unsafe because: Preoccupation with one aspect of reactor safety (i. e., radiation releases) at the expense of reactor design, construction techniques, and operating procedures could unwittingly in­duce hazards in other areas. Varying standards of multiple regulatory agencies may necessitate design features imposed to meet a multitude of requirements which could yield a less safe final product, might actually weaken the basic design integrity, and might create new hazards. Variety in state standards would impede the development of uniform manufactur­ing and construction codes, which are considered essential to improving the reliability of nuclear power plants.

There is another reason why bringing states into the regulatory pic­ture is unnecessary, unwise, and unsafe, and that is politics. Politics have never been injected into radiation safety by the frc or the aec. But at the state level — or anywhere there is a handful of lobbyists — politicians in­stantly become reactor regulation experts. Rationality is stripped from regulation like bark from a tree and the whole business sawed into plat­form planks.

State Regulation “Horror Case”

The arguments I have presented against dual regulation aren’t par­ticularly academic. Many of them are illustrated in the Monticello case in Minnesota. Plans for this $92 million plant were announced in 1966, and an aec construction permit was issued in 1967. The state of Minnesota essentially ignored the plant at Monticello until 1969, when the mpca at­tempted to license it and to set limitations on radioactive waste discharge and radiation monitoring requirements based on a consultant’s report, “Radioactive Pollution Control in Minnesota.” A copy of the report, by Dr. E. C. Tsivoglou of the Georgia Institute of Technology, was sent to the International Commission on Radiation Protection. It was studied by H. J. Dunster, who heads icrp’s task group on environmental radiation monitoring. In a letter to Tsivoglou dated August 20, 1969 (reproduced in Appendix A, p. 157), Dunster severely criticized the report; so severe was the criticism that Dunster wrote the aec that it was aimed solely at the

MPCA.

Dunster’s letter reveals how an unbiased world authority looks at the mpca’s understaffed, underexperienced attempt at regulation. Here are typical quotations from Dunster’s assessment:

On the tone of the report: “I came to the conclusion that there are some special political difficulties associated with pollution control or the introduction of nuclear power into Minnesota, which would make a logi­cal programme limited to genuine needs unlikely to be acceptable to the legislator.”

On the proposed regulations: “Your proposals seem somewhat ex­treme and could certainly not be related to the recommendations of icrp.”

On the generalizations about regulatory principles: “It did not seem to me, however, that the recommendations of the report were based on these excellent principles.”

On radioactivity monitoring requirements: “A programme of envi­ronmental measurements based on the recommendations of icrp Publica­tion 7 would require less routine effort and expense than the programme you have suggested and would give a genuine assurance of safety.”

On whether the report follows icrp recommendations: “I can say categorically that the radioactivity standards you have recommended are not based on icrp recommendations.”

On the requirement for limiting radioactivity at point of discharge to that permissible further away where contact with humans finally may be made: “I must take exception on behalf of icrp… It is a travesty to use these as a basis for limiting the concentration in an effluent, unless the effluent is directly consumed or directly breathed. . .”

On the assertion that off-site environmental monitoring and surveil­lance is necessary at Monticello or “any other potential waste source”: “The first sentence… is not convincing to me in regard to the pro­posed reactor and is demonstrably false in respect of the final few words.” On the off-site monitoring requirements for Monticello: “The rec­ommended programme is not consistent with icrp recommendations. If it is adopted, it will involve the citizens of Minnesota in higher taxes and higher charges for nuclear electricity than necessary… I am not con­vinced that they will be getting value for money and am certain that the expense cannot be laid at the door of icrp.”

For the reasons given and because of these demonstrated shortcom­ings of dual regulation in practice, I suggest that responsibility for regula­tion of nuclear power be left solely with the federal government.

Environmental factors like those we have been discussing are but some of the considerations involved in the siting and operation of steam electric power plants. That brings me back to the fact that what we are really facing is not only an environmental crisis but also an energy crisis, and that we must achieve a balance between meeting energy needs and protecting the environment. In order to do this, we need to develop some new or improved planning approaches.

In this connection, two years ago I suggested establishing a broadly based federal interdepartmental committee on electric power plant siting to develop a coordinated approach to the problems involved. The agen­cies in the federal government most deeply concerned cooperated with the Energy Policy Staff of the President’s Office of Science and Technology in acting on this suggestion. The initial result of this cooperative effort was a report which assembled in summary form the present knowledge of the public interest considerations that should play a role in planning to meet power needs (President’s Office of Science and Technology, 1969). The National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners and the state utility commissions throughout the nation contributed importantly by co­operating in a survey of the work of the states on this problem. The group which prepared the siting report is continuing its efforts under the aegis of the recently formed President’s Environmental Quality Council. Meetings are being held with representatives of organizations interested in siting problems. These include the Citizens Advisory Committee on Environ­mental Quality, certain state and local governments with experience in such problems, and utility-industry organizations. Proposed legislation is being carefully examined, and recommendations on legislative action will be made as appropriate. Finally, a study is in progress which will identify pertinent ideas for research and development that are not currently in­cluded in the plans of involved governmental agencies, the utilities, and industry.

At the regional, state, and local level, probably the best planning mechanisms that can be provided in the near future are the regional power supply councils established voluntarily in cooperation with the Federal Power Commission. These councils should be expanded and upgraded to include consideration of environmental matters, and include consultations with conservationists and other groups concerned with environmental matters. The councils should also provide for public members and be open to representatives of the small and publicly owned utilities. There is also a continuing need for an interaction between the planning mechanism and research and development efforts related to environmental problems.

On its part, the aec is developing an environmental safety research program plan in cooperation with industry, the university community, and our national laboratories. Such a plan will facilitate improved coordin­ation of our work on environmental problems with efforts of industry and others working on them. In addition to these efforts, members of the Com­mission have been speaking out to provide the facts on the environmental effects of producing electric power (Seaborg, May 5 and September 11, 1969; Ramey, June 2, July 28, and September 11,1969).

Conclusion

We of the aec believe the story of nuclear power is a good one. The program is sound; it is positive; and it will stand up under the most search­ing review. Nuclear power has two great potentials: providing a virtually inexhaustible resource of energy for many applications in succeeding gen­erations, and providing large quantities of pure water from the sea at reasonable cost for domestic and industrial use, and ultimately for agri­cultural purposes.

We recognize that the achievement of these benefits will involve some risks. Although our experience provides us with a measure of sat­isfaction and confidence that the risks are now being minimized, we do not intend to lessen the emphasis on safety. Our responsibility is to con­tinue to foster the development of nuclear power in a manner consistent with public health and safety.

I believe that with proper planning our power needs and the environ­mental considerations associated with power production can be harmo­nized with minimum adverse effects. We can have both additional power and a healthy and desirable environment, and the public will benefit from such an achievement. In any consideration of environmental factors, I believe nuclear power should come out quite well, since it has substan­tially less effect on the overall environment than other sources of energy, especially in regard to smoke pollution.

The public also has a responsibility — a responsibility to study the facts and then to make judgments based on them. This is sometimes diffi­cult, because the concepts of nuclear energy are complex. The scientific community — in the universities, the laboratories, and industry — can and should play a larger and more responsible role in assisting the public in this regard.

Summary

After decades of apathy this nation is becoming properly concerned with the environmental crisis which it faces. However, in our new-found concern for the environment, we should not overlook another crisis which is almost upon us — that of meeting this nation’s accelerating need for en­ergy.

The consumption of electricity alone is expected to increase three­fold in the next 20 years and sixfold by the end of the century. More gen­erating plants must be built, and we have no choice but to rely almost en­tirely on steam electric plants. Yet, the construction of additional power plants, fossil and nuclear, is encountering increasing opposition on en­vironmental grounds in many areas of the country.

I believe we can have both the additional electrical energy needed and a healthy and desirable environment. To do so we must consider both the benefits and risks involved; and we must do this in an orderly way, early in the planning process, to avoid conflicts and crises at the later stages.

The benefits of nuclear power are great in terms of low cost, preser­vation of the environment, and conservation of resources; but their achievement, as in all new or existing technologies, involves accepting certain risks. These risks are small, since the development of the nuclear industry has been one of the first deliberate attempts by government and industry to understand and control the risks of an emerging large-scale technology. Through use of nationally and internationally recognized ra­diation protection standards, and a “defense-in-depth” concept of reactor safety, the United States atomic energy program has a record as one of the safest of industries, from the standpoint of radiation hazards as well as of ordinary industrial risks. For example, radioactive effluents from nuclear power plants are so minimal as to constitute an almost unmeas­urable fraction of the level of radioactivity permitted by established radia­tion standards.

Although experience with the many power plants now in operation provides the aec with a measure of satisfaction and confidence that the risks are now being minimized, we do not intend to lessen the emphasis on safety. Our responsibility is to continue to foster the development of nuclear power in a manner consistent with public health and safety.

It will be helpful to review what is known about the radioactivity of the natural environment (Eisenbud, 1963), since this provides a yard­stick with which to compare the aec standards. An appreciation of the kinds and amounts of ionizing radiation exposure from natural sources will be relevant to my subsequent discussion of the significance of reactor produced radiation.

Radioactive substances are naturally present in the air we breathe and the food we eat. They become incorporated into our tissues in such amounts that on the average our bodies are literally disintegrating at a rate of about 500,000 times per minute due to radioactive decay.

The total body irradiation received by man from natural sources in most parts of the world is about 0.1 rad per year. This figure varies some­what from place to place, with an addition of about.028 rad per year for each 1,500 meters of altitude above sea level. Further deviations from the norm occur in places where the thorium or uranium content of the rocks and soils is above normal —in one village in Brazil, some people are exposed to as much as 12 rad/yr.

The lung and skeleton are selectively exposed over and above the dose received by the body as a whole. A large component of the dose to lung is due to the presence of atmospheric radon, the concentration of which varies from about 10"u uc/ml to about 2 X Ю’10 uc/ml in different parts of the world. A concentration of 1010 uc/ml will deliver a dose of about 1.3 rem/yr to the basal cells of the bronchial epithelium (the tissue of the lung, which is known to be particularly radiosensitive). Doses as high as ten times this value are possible indoors, particularly when the building is made of materials with a high radium content, such as the granites, radium-bearing shales, or concrete.

Radon, which has a half-life of 3.8 days, decays progressively through several shorter-lived progeny to 210Pb, which has a half-life of 22 years and which ultimately deposits on the earth’s surface. Only in the last few years have we begun to appreciate that mankind has always been subject to this form of natural fallout and that broad-leafed plants in particular have relatively high concentration of this isotope because of foliar deposition of 210Pb. According to one investigator, this phenomenon alone contributes an additional 41 mrem/yr to the lungs of individuals smoking one pack of cigarettes per day (Rajewsky & Stahlhofen, 1966).

Two naturally occurring nuclides, 226Ra and 228Ra, which are chemi­cally similar to calcium, enter our bodies through the foods we eat and are deposited with calcium in our skeletons. The daily radium ingestion of individuals in the United States is about 5 pCi/day, approximately equally divided between the two nuclides. Studies of food and water in various parts of the world have shown that there are wide variations from these mean values. In certain parts of the Middle West the radium intake is elevated by the presence of abnormally high amounts of radium in the drinking water, and the dose to the skeleton is increased by about 0.06 rem/yr. Considerably higher doses have been reported from Brazil and India, where there are radioactive anomalies of the type mentioned earlier (Penna Franca, 1965).

Thus, we can conclude that the whole body dose from natural radio­activity in most parts of the world is about 0.1 rem/yr. The lung receives a greater dose, owing to the superimposed radiation from atmospheric radon, and so does the skeleton in certain geographical areas where the radium content of food and water is elevated above normal.

So-called tar or heavy oil sands are those hydrocarbon deposits which are too viscous to permit recovery by natural flowage into wells. The best known of such deposits are the Athabasca tar sands near Fort McMurray in northeastern Alberta, Canada, and two smaller deposits, al­so in northern Alberta. The Athabasca deposit has an area of about 9,000 square miles and represents about 88 per cent of the total (Pow, Fair­banks, & Zamora, 1963). These occur at depths ranging from 0 at surface outcrops to 2,000 feet. The total producible oil reserves represented by these three deposits amounts to about 300 billion barrels.

Unsuccessful small-scale attempts to extract these deposits have been made repeatedly during the last half century. Large-scale develop­ment work was begun by major oil companies about 15 years ago, and the first successful operation was begun by a combination of oil companies about 1966. Further development will undoubtedly occur as soon as a prospective shortage of oil from conventional sources becomes evident. When the magnitude of these deposits is compared with the figures for the United States, their significance as a major source of liquid fuels becomes evident.

Taking advantage of the laws of nature is the fundamental method of achieving nuclear reactor safety. The prime objective of nuclear safety is to keep the large quantity of fission products in their proper place in the fuel. A number of separate inherent safety features are employed toward this general objective.

Use of Uranium Dioxide Fuel. The ceramic form of uranium dioxide in the form of sintered pellets is the nuclear fuel in today’s nuclear power reactors. It has an inherent safety advantage in that this material has the property of retaining most fission products, even when overheated. This property has become particularly evident during routine power reactor operation. For example, large water power reactors have operated with a number of experimental fuel assemblies. Failure of the metallic fuel clad­ding was expected and in a number of cases did occur. However, opera­tion continued with coolant contamination essentially at normal levels for

a number of months before shutdown for a scheduled refueling operation. The ability of the uranium dioxide to retain fission products, even in the presence of completely severed cladding tubes, is even more effective than originally had been expected and thus provides substantial natural safety for reactors using this fuel material.

Use of Low Enrichment Fuel. The uranium dioxide used for fuel in today’s power reactors is enriched in the easily fissionable isotope 235U, a factor of only three or four times its natural level. Thus, it is possible to use a natural safety factor, owing to the uranium composition, technically called the Doppler effect. This effect operates to reduce immediately the rate at which fissions occur in the fuel whenever the fuel temperature rises significantly. This inherent safety feature is the basic reason why a power reactor in no way resembles or could even act as a bomb which would con­tinue to release energy with no inherent “shutoff mechanism.” Since dur­ing normal reactor operation the average temperature of uranium dioxide is thousands of degrees less than its melting temperature of about 5,000° F, considerable elbow room is available for this effect to operate before significant melting of the fuel would occur in any accident.

Safety by Water Moderator. The use of ordinary water as both cool­ant and neutron moderator in today’s water-cooled power reactors pro­vides additional natural safety. If the reactor core should increase in power for any reason, the temperature of the moderator water would also tend to rise. In fact, in a boiling water reactor the amount of steam generated within the reactor would tend to rise also. In turn, the density of the water would decrease, and the efficiency of the water to moderate the neutrons would be decreased. Therefore, an inherent reactor shutdown mechanism would come into play. This is also an inherent reason why our reactors are so easily controlled and why they always operate stably. This major safety precaution results from the selection of water as the coolant and modera­tor of large power reactors.

The above three examples identify strong inherent safety features of today’s large water-cooled power reactors. They were major considera­tions during the period that the suppliers were evolving their product line in the nuclear power reactor business. The more inherent safety that the product itself possesses, the safer the overall product must be.

audience. Do the current radiation standards need revision and, if so, in what direction?

eisenbud. Standards, of course, are always in need of revision, par­ticularly when the spectrum of standards is as complex as those we are dis­cussing here. Leo Marinelli of Argonne has just published a paper which gives good evidence, on the basis of recent studies of the relative toxicity of radium and 90Sr, that the present 90Sr figure in bone could possibly be increased by a factor of three or four. In the normal course of events, if this were done (and I’m not saying that it will), it could easily take the ncrp three to five years to arrive at a consensus. There may be other situa­tions in which changes should be in the other direction. Thus, I would say, yes, there are needs for changes, but I don’t see the need for any revolu­tionary changes. Rather, I see the need for evolutionary changes of the type we’ve always had.

stannard. I have stated that I do not feel that the risks involved in the present basic standards are unacceptable to me as a biologist. On the other hand, I think many of the details—particularly those involved in setting levels for exposure in air or mpc’s in air or water, and those related to the peculiarities of behavior of a given radioisotope or of a given com­pound of that isotope — are going to need revision in the foreseeable fu­ture. Also, any risk must have its compensating benefit. To some these do not compensate for risk. But I speak of the ability of our species to tolerate the risk as a problem in biology. Many radiobiologists feel that they may be coming to the point of diminishing returns in the current expensive long-term experiments; they may not have the patience or money, particu­larly under present conditions of reduced budgets, to see through even some of the long-term animal experiments that are under way let alone mount new ones. I believe there is enough need for the additional infor­mation that anyone concerned with standards should support and advo­cate the continuation of needed experimental work.

tamplin. My only comment, in respect to standards, is that they should reflect the biological processes that intervene between the intro­duction of radioactivity into the environment and its subsequent deposi­tion in and effect, if any, upon the tissues of man. In the code of regula­tions, the standards should be so spelled out that they represent meaning­ful numbers in terms of the concentration of radioactivity in the diet that man will consume.

auerbach. Speaking from an ecological context, I do not believe that the basic standards we have now are justifiably in need of revision of the basis of ecological data. We perhaps have much research and informa­tion gathering to do before we are able to state that a particular standard for a particular isotope is still too low. The standards we have today are still a good basis for nuclear operations. However, we should continue re­search to test their long-term validity.

lieberman. Certainly the experience to date does indicate that the public’s health and safety have been protected in the peaceful uses of nu­clear energy. However, I do think that continual review of the effective­ness of control and the safety of current levels of protection in view of ex­panding operations is essential; changes must be made as required and as permitted by continuing experience.

commoner. Every standard which is in operation today is directly related to one’s moral attitude toward the value of human life and to the value of the operation. In other words, in my view, there is no objective, scientific way to establish a standard. Therefore, if people of the United States want, by reason of their moral views, to propose more stringent standards, then, the standards ought to be more stringent. I do want to re­mark, though, on that part of the standard related to the evaluation of the biological risk because that’s what morality considers. It is perfectly clear that all of the standards are now at fault for failing to take into account multiple effects. They deal with the effects isotope by isotope; they do not take into account the influence of other toxic substances or different tem­perature changes on radiation effects. Hence, I must disagree with Dr. Auerbach. In my view, the present standards are ecologically unaccepta­ble because they do not take into account the complexity of the ecosystem which, as Dr. Tamplin pointed out, is the vehicle through which the insult is delivered to the human body. So, I recommend an ecologically based revision of all standards relative to risk.

hosmer. Standards, of course, are not static things. They must be dynamic, and change with new data, with new circumstances, and, possi­bly, with changing political attitudes or even mutating psychological con­siderations. Sometimes, people need a Linus blanket, and just possibly some changes in radiation standards might furnish it. But, in any event, values continually change, not overnight, but over the months and over the years; some things become more valuable tomorrow than they are to­day. Some risks become more acceptable or less acceptable. And, if we approach regulation from a philosophy of balancing risk against benefits, then, as the scale changes, we have to revise our standards.

green. I don’t know whether or not the radiation protection stand­ards require any changes, but I am fairly certain that the procedures for setting the standards and reviewing the standards do need changes. I think the problem of setting and reviewing radiation protection standards is far too important to entrust to the experts.

abrahamson. I should like to direct a question to Dr. Eisenbud. It has been suggested that fossil fuel plants discharge relatively more biologi­cally significant radioisotopes than do at least some nuclear plants. Would Dr. Eisenbud care to comment one way or the other?

eisenbud. This refers to a paper which Petrow and I published in Sci­ence in 1964 which shows that, in round numbers, the fossil fuels in coal contained on the order of 1 to 3 parts per million of uranium and thorium along with the various degradation isotopes and that, when the coal is burned, the fly ash contains radioactivity. In the case of oil, there is less uranium and thorium, but the petroleum underground has the character­istic, well known to chemists, of absorbing the noble gases from the ground. The noble gases have a high solubility in fats and oils so that the radon tends to migrate into the oil underground and decays to 210Pb, which has a 22-year half-life. Then 210Pb appears in the effluent of oil­burning plants. Also, natural gas contains some residues of radon and 2l0Pb. Allowing for the fact that both 226Ra and 228Ra, emitted by fossil fuel plants, are among the most toxic of the radionuclides in terms of the ratio of the mpc, the two isotopes 226Ra and 228Ra are far more toxic than 181I or 85Kr, which are emitted by nuclear reactors (at least by pressurized water reactors, the only kind for which data were available in those days). Thus, a few laboratory analyses demonstrated the fossil fuel plants, curi­ously enough, put out more radioactivity than the reactors. Our work has been repeated by others and confirmed.

audience. I don’t think this panel quite balances, and I’d like to ask two questions. Is it true that Lauriston Taylor said that the standards were established mainly to achieve practical capability within the going facts related to the cost of safety? Second, is it true that the standards are only a paper crutch that the industry uses to justify their practical working level? I recall that when 80Sr in milk from animals from North Dakota ap­proached the standards, a committee met and doubled the standards.

abrahamson. The question, in essence, seems to be, Were the stand­ards not determined on the basis of what the industry needed rather than in the interest of public safety?

ramey. Dr. Taylor testified in the Joint Committee Hearings on Ra­diation Standards that were held in 1959, 1960, and 1962, where he out­lined the philosophy of the National Committee on Radiation Protection. As I recall, he made the point that in establishing standards, there were judgment factors involved. There was a fair amount of discussion of the costs to the industry and to the various users involved in setting standards.

brungs. The standards for temperature levels are derived in a much different manner. In our agency, in the Department of the Interior, the Water Quality Act of 1965 set up a program for states to develop stand­ards which would be approved, disapproved, or worked out with the De­partment of the Interior. Basically, states need federal approval of their standards. The Act was written so that standards are not to be fixed in time or in place; any data coming up that would warrant a change in standards in either direction would be well considered. In fact, some stand­ards that we approved as recently as two years ago are undergoing change at the present time to be compatible with more recent knowledge. abrahamson. More stringent or less stringent? brungs. More realistic.

audience. When the experts enter a public sector, I feel that I am also an expert. The democratic process of this country places decision-making powers in as large a group as possible. I was reminded of that again to­night when Congressman Hosmer said, “values continually change. . . if we approach regulation from a philosophy of balancing risks against benefits, then, as the scale changes, we are going to have to revise our standards.” In the case of atomic energy and genetic damage, then those values bear on human life. I don’t think our values have changed there. I want to know how Congressman Hosmer feels about that. Further, if there are deficits, who do those deficits fall upon?

hosmer. I think that Dr. Stannard was right when he said that these standards were set over half a century not only by experts, but by govern­ment leaders of the world; because the public cannot actually vote on ra­diation standards, it takes its part in the decision through its leaders. Ac­tually, in standards-setting groups, there are opportunities for the public to put its ideas across in hearings. And there are opportunities for experts who disagree with the standards to go to the frc which sets them, instead of to the newspapers, so that their ideas can be evaluated by their peers in scientific expertise.

I spoke of benefits in terms of risks, and what society does by way of imposing risk. Society must balance risk against potential benefits to the people; the ultimate decision should be that which is the greatest good for the greatest number.

ramey. A further part to that question was, How can the public par­ticipate in standard making? The aec’s standards for the siting of reactors, for effluents, and so on are adopted through the established federal meth­od of publishing them as proposed regulations in the Federal Register.

Thereafter, 45 or more days are allowed for comment. The public may also participate through Congress and the established committees of Con­gress in the atomic field. The most signicant of these is the Joint Commit­tee on Atomic Energy. The public is invited to come before that commit­tee and to comment on the standards and the activities of the aec. As a matter of fact, you may be aware that, at the end of this month and into November, the Joint Committee is going to have extensive hearings on en­vironmental matters, including standards. (For an expanded discussion of this subject, see remarks by James T. Ramey made at Madison, Wiscon­sin, on April 4,1970.)

commoner. Congressman Hosmer, are you ready to accept that the new Minnesota standards are valid in Minnesota since they reflect clearly the opinion of the people of Minnesota?

hosmer. I have been in Minnesota almost 24 hours. People have told me that these standards are a political football here, and I know they are in Washington among the Minnesota delegation. So, I’m not willing to accept them for that reason, and, secondly, because the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, clearly preempted the regulation of effluents from nuclear power plants, just as the legislation on commercial aircraft preempted the regulation of airlines and commercial airline pilots. These preemptions were taken on the same good basis — that these are national problems and therefore in the federal domain.

abrahamson. I have a written question directed to Dr. Zabel: It has been stated that additional complexity can result in a net negative gain in nuclear plant safety. The weighting of this is not a trivial matter. How is the weighting accomplished? Or, what methods of evaluation are at your disposal?

zabel. I should say first that I’m expressing my own opinions; they may or may not represent the aec’s or anyone else’s opinion. As far as evaluation by the Advisory Committee on Reactors’ Safeguard is con­cerned, 15 people have to search their souls. Some questions can be analyzed numerically, but some cannot. I’ve seen committee members really sweat a decision. These things cannot be put up for a vote by 200 million people. I don’t know if the size of group we happen to have in the acrs is adequate. The members are a cross-section of people, some of them not even in the nuclear business, and I believe they try hard to rep­resent the public. No matter who serves, no matter how large or small a group, if the members are making a decision in thrashing with these prob­lems, they become the experts, like it or not.

audience. I would like to ask Dr. Eisenbud about his and H. G. Petrow’s paper, “Radioactivity in the Atmospheric Effluents of Power

Plants That Use Fossil Fuels” (Science, 1964, 144, 288-289). Is it a fact that a fossil fuel plant would discharge more biologically significant radio­isotopes into the atmosphere than a nuclear plant of comparable size? What plant were those conclusions based on? Would you agree with them today?

eisenbud. The only nuclear plants in operation for which data were available to me then were Dusquene, Yankee, and Indian Point. Dresden was operating, but I hadn’t seen any data from it at that time. I don’t think there is anything in that report about which I would equivocate.

audience. The purpose of the question was, frankly, to determine whether you still believe the conclusions of the paper. Have they been borne out? If so, then many of our worries are fruitless.

eisenbud. The statement is correct. I am embarrassed that many people, in discussing that paper, have attempted to construe it as saying the radioactivity from these fossil fuel plants was a health hazard. We never said that. All we said was that the amount of effluent from a fossil fuel plant is not significant from a public health point of view, and that which comes from a pwr is even less significant.

audience. But nobody participating here would dispute those facts? commoner. Dr. Eisenbud, if modem fly ash precipitators were applied to the coal plant question, would the situation change?

eisenbud. My recollection is that we had a 97 per cent efficient pre­cipitator in that calculation.

audience. Dr. Eisenbud, you stated that your study compared pres­surized water reactors with fossil fuel plants. If boiling water reactors turn out approximately a 100,000 times greater gaseous discharge than do pressurized water reactors, the dose equivalent basis is about 10,000 times greater. It would seem that discharges from boiling water reactors are not comparable with those from fossil fuel plants.

eisenbud. I would prefer to refer that question to the members of the Bureau of Radiological Health. I haven’t done anything on this since 1962, but I think the Bureau of Radiological Health has some recent data. In particular, the amount of sulphur dioxide emission is relevant.

lieberman. I can only refer to the actual measured results that the Bureau of Radiological Health got from the Dresden plant (pp. 65-66). abrahamson. So you cannot make the comparison? lieberman. The calculation could be made. But in terms of the comparison, none of the emissions are at environmental levels of signifi­cance to public health.

abrahamson. Do you have the numbers at your disposal? lieberman. No, I don’t have any comparative numbers here.

Ill

eisenbud. I do recall, though, that the amount of air required to dilute the emissions from a fossil fuel plant (a coal burner), diluted to the mpc for the chemical constituents, is 30 times greater than the amount of air necessary to dilute the effluent from the boiling water reactor to the MPC.

abrahamson. Dr. Stannard, in the discussion on the levels of maxi­mum permissible dose of radiation, it was implied that there are many ways in which we receive radiation and other pollution from the air and water and that there are potential health hazards in various aspects of these things. When the mpd’s are set up, has it been taken into account that our health is also being adversely affected by other pollution and by radiation from natural causes?

stannard. The answer is no, in terms of the basic radiation standards vis-a-vis other potential pollutants. However, safety factors are introduced regularly which have that effect. These safety factors enter because the basic standard is always set somewhere below the acceptable risk and much below the level of known overt damage. Also, in the operations of icrp, ncrp, and, for that matter, the frc there is always the admonition to hold to the lowest practicable levels.

The point is a good one, however. For a total evaluation of the im­pact of all factors in our environment on the future of mankind or on our own individual welfare, we should try to do what the question implies. Someone mentioned earlier that radiation standard review was too com­plex for the experts. If a review of radiation alone is too complex, where are we going to get the people and data to evaluate the total environment without a very large effort? Dr. Commoner feels that this is the crux of our situation. It is indeed much more the crux than radiation standards per se.

Regarding the last part of the question, on damage from natural back­ground radiation, let me remind you that the standards are above back­ground but do not ignore it. Proof of damage from background radiation is, of course, not available.

commoner. The whole question of synergistic effects of various environmental stressors is very important. I agree with Dr. Stannard that more work has to be done. It is a huge undertaking, but such factors need to be better identified.

audience. Mr. Bray, can you comment on the radioactive releases from a boiling water reactor being 105 times the releases from a pres­surized water reactor?

bray. No, we haven’t done any relative studies either on other re­actor systems (our company manufactures only bwr’s) except that we’ve done considerable studies relative to the regulations.

abrahamson. These numbers last appeared in one place in the United Nations conference held during this last year in a paper by Morton Goldman on airborne wastes from nuclear power plants. He is with the N. U.S. Corporation, Washington, D. C.

audience. There have been numerous comments on the need for more ecologically oriented research. Does the aec, in fact, have a staff of ecologists?

ramey. The aec, in this current fiscal year (July 1, 1969-June 30, 1970), is spending around $89,000,000 for biological and medical re­search, of which a fairly large portion has environmental significance. I am sure that Dr. Auerbach would like to spend more money in this area. The aec does its work not directly through government employees, but through contracts at government-owned installations that are operated by universities or other organizations. The research is carried on by such organizations as the Oak Ridge National Laboratory and the Argonne National Laboratory as well as under a great number of smaller contracts with universities. Around $9 or $10 million a year goes for work that would be classified as ecological research and development related to land and fresh water. An additional $9 million is expended each year on ocean and atmosphere work having ecological significance.

abrahamson. What proportion is this of the total aec non-weapon budget?

ramey. The biological and medical budget is about 10 per cent of the total non-weapon budget (and the amounts appropriated for such research have been going up each year). We have been fortunate in getting, through the support of Congress, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, and the appropriations committees, what is called reasonable growth. Again, not so much as we would like and especially not so much as our laboratories would like.

auerbach. I am an employee of the Union Carbide Corporation, and, as such, a contract employee supported by the aec through the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. As Mr. Ramey says, the budget for terrestrial and fresh water ecological research has been between $9 and $10 million a year. To place that figure in context, I should say that the aec’s budget for ecological research covers a vast array of different kinds of studies, all concerned broadly with the understanding of natural systems, aec has put more money into basic ecological research than any other federal agency —far more over the past ten years than the National Science Foundation. Most of the original work in the study of ecosystems has been supported by aec.

In the country today, there really are two kinds of ecology being

bandied about, and both are quite legitimate. But, we should keep them in proper perspective. There is the traditional ecology, which is the study of organisms, populations, and so forth in response to their environment; it is the science of interactions. There is also a new ecology, which is con­cerned, in part, with human values in relation to the environment. It is not appropriate yet to mix these two — at least I, as a scientist, am not capable of mixing these two. I can talk only in terms of ecology as a science which, in this instance, is concerned with the effects of ionizing radiations. When one talks about the effects on human values, it is quite another matter.

commoner. Let me disagree with Dr. Auerbach in the following way. There are, indeed, two kinds of ecology abroad right now, and he described one of them very accurately: the study of the interaction be­tween an organism and its environment. The second kind of ecology he referred to does not exist, in my opinion; I know of no ecology which, as a science, takes into account, in an objective, scientific way, human values. However, there is an orthodox ecology, which often limits itself to arti­ficially defined systems —such as a pond. More recently, ecology has begun to include in its scope the properties of systems in which people live, such as the state of Minnesota. This kind of ecology, the kind that deals with the air that we breathe and with what is actually happening in the Mississippi River to the water that we drink, elicits a human response.

ramey. Certainly, some of the ecological studies that are projected, and some which are under way, do deal with whole river and lake systems. For example, the Argonne Laboratory is undertaking a study of the ecology of Lake Michigan and the role of nuclear power plants and fossil power plants in that whole lake system. At Hanford, Washington, for more than 20 years, we have been conducting ecology studies of the Columbia River as a system. Various computer techniques and other means of trying to relate some of the factors involved in those systems have been developed. We have not been able to do everything, by any means, but from a scientific standpoint, we are not just looking at proto­zoa in some pond. I agree that it makes a significant difference whether one is studying a pond or a total drainage basin composed of a whole composite of ecosystems, but the aec is looking at systems and certainly hasn’t ruled out expanding the research to cover drainage basins in other areas. The investment in ecology made by the aec has been singularly impressive, and the number of workers in this field has been limited only by the $18 million allotted for research which covers oceanography as well as freshwater, terrestrial, and atmospheric aspects.

eisenbud. We are getting to the point now in social development where we can no longer think of ecology as the kind of thing that ecol­ogists do. There are many things touching on the interaction of man and his environment which are done by non-ecologists who have an ecological point of view. For example, I would describe in ecological terms all of the toxicological work supported by the aec, all the radiobiological work, all of the extensive studies of inhalation physiology to determine what hap­pens when a person inhales a dust particle. The work we did some years ago at New York University, in which we related the amount of iodine in the environment to what turns up in kids’ thyroids and determined its progress through the food chain mechanisms, was ecology; it was done not by ecologists but by people with an ecological point of view. If you describe ecology in this way, I think that the budget of the aec is very much larger than $9 or $ 10 million a year.

audience. Dr. Lieberman, my understanding is that the drinking wa­ter standards of the U. S. Health Service haven’t allowed for gross activity of 1,000 pCi per liter. My understanding is that the aec standards for emission is at 100 pCi per liter, or ten times more restrictive than water standards. What is the Public Health Service doing to upgrade their stand­ards?

lieberman. The explanation of the difference between the phs drink­ing water standards and 10CFR20 is the condition that must be applied to the sample being analyzed based on the knowledge of the absence of certain radionuclides. The phs limit of 1,000 pCi/І is used when it is known that 90Sr and alpha emitters are absent. In the applications of 10CFR20 (100 pCi/І) for gross beta it is known that 129I, 226Ra, and 228Ra are not present. People in the Bureau of Radiological Health and Bureau of Water Hygiene are presently reviewing the whole question of drinking water standards.

audience. One of the reasons I am here is to see how the participants approach the problems that they work with as men. I wanted to see what the depth of their information was and how they regarded the problems they face. When Mr. Bray, who is the Manager of Systems Engineering for the Atomic Power and Equipment Department of General Electric and who is responsible for the basic design details and the evaluation of all ge boiling water reactors, says he does not know what the ratio is between the gaseous effluents of boiling water reactors and pressurized water re­actors, I would like to ask him why, in his position, he does not know what these ratios are.

bray. It’s not important that I know the differences between the ef­fluent release rates of pwr’s and bwr’s, but rather that I know what the effluents are from the boiling water reactor. As for the releases in pres­surized water reactors, although I worked with them in the naval pro­gram, in the last ten years I have had no need to know exactly what these effluents are. I do know, however, that although the liquid waste discharge from pwr’s is greater than from bwr’s, the gaseous waste is less. That is due to specific differences in the two designs. Therefore, the use of simple ratios in a particular discharge is not too meaningful. My primary respon­sibility as a designer is to check my design against appropriate regulations.

audience. Are the doses from other power plants that might exist taken into account when release limits, licensing, and so forth are deter­mined for a particular plant?

eisenbud. Although I cannot speak for the aec on this, certainly the ncrp believes that the total exposure to the public should be limited to.17 rad/yr. It would be up to the people who are administering the pro­gram, in this case the aec, to decide how this dose should be apportioned. In situations where two or more plants stand on a single site, for all prac­tical purposes these will be treated as a single plant. In other words, the emissions to the stream or to the atmosphere will be controlled as though they were just one plant.

bray. It is my understanding that whenever there is more than one plant on a particular site, the site is treated, with respect to the limits and the limitations both with gaseous waste off-site or liquid waste, on a plant site basis. So, the plants would be treated collectively if there together, and the integrated effect would be taken into consideration when looking at them separately.

audience. What would be the cost for the cooling towers necessary to affect the heat discharges to the water environment from a typical re­actor of, say, 500 megawatts?

brungs. In terms of construction dollars, the towers would run to millions of dollars. I prefer to look at cost to the consumer, via increased utility rates. There the cost varies with the situation, but it is around a 4 per cent increase in rates for complete cooling before discharge versus no cooling whatsoever.

hosmer. The question of dumping heat into water should not be considered in isolation. A cooling tower sends the heat into the air. Water cooling sends the heat into water first, then the air. The heat has to go someplace. Since modem conventional steam plants are 40 per cent effi­cient, 60 per cent of every 100 btu’s does not make electricity, but goes into the environment. Modem atomic plants are about 35 per cent effi­cient, so 65 per cent goes into the environment. Now, in the case of the conventional plants, some of the heat goes up the stack and elsewhere, and about 75 per cent of the wasted btu’s goes into the water unless air cooling is used. In the case of nuclear plants, all unused btu’s go into the water — 65 per cent. Cooling towers don’t automatically solve the prob­lem. The moisture they add to the atmosphere may cause considerable climatic changes, on a local basis. So there are many subproblems to be considered.

abrahamson. Would you care to elaborate on the climatic effects?

hosmer. In many cases, in the wintertime, water particulates lead to an increasing incidence of fog or sleet. The results depend upon the local climatology and meteorology. Before erecting a cooling tower, engineers should calculate the climatological effect of the additional moisture bur­den in the air.

brungs. It comes down to balancing aerological and ecological changes against aquatic and ecological changes. If a plant is in the Ohio River Valley where the summer humidity is quite high at night, fog would easily be created. But, in other, less humid areas, this would occur rarely using cooling towers or some other cooling facility.

Someone asked earlier if there is an advantage to putting the heat into the atmosphere rather than into water. It seems to me that in many cases the effect would be the same because the water, in turn, heats he air. The power industry has done many studies which indicate that heat can be lost quickly, in a matter of a mile or two downstream; thus, the heat is basically lost to the atmosphere. This does not allow for the hu­midity increase attributable to cooling towers. Does it really make much difference whether the heat goes directly to the atmosphere or through the stream and then into the atmosphere?

hubbert. The last annual report of the aec (Fundamental Nuclear Energy Research, 1968, January 1969, p. 41) stated the temperature in­crease in the Columbia River persists for a hundred miles or more down­stream in contrast to the mile or two. However, the heat eventually goes to the atmosphere because there’s nowhere else it can go. Before deciding to distribute it to the atmosphere in concentrated form at the plant or to feed it to the atmosphere over a wider area, one should know what at­mospheric thermo pollution amounts to at the plant. Intuitively, I suspect immediate release at the plant would be far less objectionable than heat­ing the river.

audience. Rivers cool themselves by evaporation of moisture into the air. Whether heat is passed into a tower or into a river, it eventually moves in the form of water vapor to the air. Incidentally, a cornfield 9 miles square would evaporate moisture dining the day at a rate equal to a million-kilowatt plant.

abrahamson. These considerations with regard to cooling towers are reflected, I believe, in the cost estimates that were previously given?

bray. Yes, they appear as capital costs and operating costs. Also, any pumps or fans associated with the cooling towers would increase costs. I’m not familiar with the design of cooling towers, since it falls out­side any scope General Electric has as a supplier. I believe that was in the Federal Power Commission report (see Hosmer’s paper, p. 139ff).

hubbert. What temperature in the summertime can be obtained in a condenser by using evaporative cooling towers as compared with using the Mississippi River at this latitude? The thermodynamic efficiency of a steam engine depends only upon temperatures of the boiler and of the condenser.

bray. The rise in temperature through main condensers is on the order of 10-15° F. Thus, the temperature of the incoming coolant, which is generally river water, is increased 10-15°. A greater rise might come from a cooling tower, depending upon how effective the cooling tower is.

audience. I have reviewed approximately 90 per cent of the cooling towers of reactors in the eastern United States and have found no record­ing of any fogging problems. I would like to ask Congressman Hosmer if he knows of specific incidents where fogging has been a problem?

hosmer. An environmentalist from New York told me about this at South Dakota State University in Brookings one night.

ramey. I cannot provide any references on the problem of fogging, but I understand that this question was raised in connection with some of the New England reactors. By the way, if salt water were to be used in cooling towers, agriculture might be affected. In Florida, for example, the question of building cooling towers for plants has been thought to be a rather touchy one because of the possibility that the salty fog might ad­versely affect the valuable truck crops raised in some areas.

freeman. Waste heat in the quantities discharged by large power plants into rivers is definitely a problem. The Federal Water Pollution Control Administration, in cooperation with the states, has established standards for all rivers to limit the increase in the temperature rise in the rivers. The problem occurs most acutely in the summertime, when the rivers have low flow and are naturally hot. The quantities of heat injected by either a fossil fuel or a nuclear plant of the size being built today, pre­sent a severe local problem and, in many cases, cooling towers are re­quired to meet the present standards of the Water Quality Act. There are a number of questions surrounding this problem, a major one of which is what size of mixing zone is permissible at particular locations. It is gen­erally accepted by the people who deal with water quality that ejecting

the heat into the atmosphere is definitely preferable to ejecting it into the rivers.

The ultimate answer to this problem is neither cooling towers nor ejecting heat into the river. We badly need to improve the efficiency of generating electricity. Electricity is, at present, an inefficient method of converting our energy resources into a usable form. The most efficient methods now barely reach 40 per cent. The aec’s research program to perfect a breeder reactor that will operate at higher temperatures and pressures is an important part of the search for greater efficiency. We should be devoting funds to researching magnetohydronamics which promises to give us a method of converting energy into electricity at near 60 per cent efficiency rather than 40 per cent efficiency; this effort has been badly neglected. Heat can be beneficial when nuclear plants can be located in cities; it can be used directly for heating and cooling. Heat is not inherently something bad, but a by-product that could be useful. How­ever, the idea that it can be dumped into waterways without risk is er­roneous.

abrahamson. I have a written question in two parts: First, given the current state of the art and any imminent developments, to what extent is it possible to remove radioactive contaminants from both gaseous and liquid wastes? Secondly, what would be the cost rates of doing both to the maximum extent?

bray. In my paper (pp. 3-26) I have identified some techniques that have already been used to bring radioactive release below standards. Gaseous wastes can simply be kept in the plant longer. This technique takes advantage of the half-life of the material, and can be improved just by keeping the gas still longer. Although the technique is effective to a certain degree, the half-lives of some gases are months or years. A second technique for reducing off-site effects of gaseous wastes is the use of ele­vated releases. For liquids, there is the technique of using filtration, ion exchange, or evaporation to take out the radioactive components from the liquid; the amount removed depends on how far the processes are taken. Equipment worth some $3-5 million is used to attain the levels currently being released; costs of lowering the levels further are on the order of $ 1-2 million per factor of ten or so. Solid wastes are stored in radioactively shielded containers or tanks and shipped off-site.

audience. If society were to change its values, and decided that the increased treatment of wastes was desirable, to what extent does current technology enable us to actually do so?

bray. Again, you can do more of the same — hold gases longer, filter or otherwise treat liquids more. The stopping point depends on how min­119

uscule this release should be relative to background radioactivity. Other techniques are being explored, such as recombiners; since much of the nonradioactive gaseous waste can be recombined, doing so early would make the hundreds of feet of piping now on-site more effective because the radioactive gas can then be kept longer.

audience. As I understood Dr. Tamplin’s calculation of doses re­lated to maximum permissible exposure, higher exposures to human be­ings come about because of various ecological considerations. Yet Dr. Auerbach pointed out that in spite of many studies, it appeared that the ecological build-up from discharges of radioactivity was very low. There appears to be a discrepancy there.

tamplin. I don’t think there was really any discrepancy between Dr. Auerbach’s and my points. If I understood him correctly, he was talking about the effects of effluents on the ecological system, exclusive of man. The studies which he had conducted and which people at the University of Washington and at Hanford had conducted, were looking at the effects of effluent on the ecology, exclusive of man. These studies detected no noticeable changes in ecology. Now, I wanted expressly to show that one can start with the quantities of individual radionuclides released to the en­vironment and rigorously calculate the dosage that would end up in the tissues of man. From there, you can determine the effect of that dosage. In the example that I used, I simply picked a release rate. From what I’ve heard from the reactor experts in this discussion, the release rate that I picked was a factor of a million higher than what is actually released from the reactors. If, indeed, the lower figure is the present release rate, then the dosages that the reactor experts were quoting would be identical with what I would calculate. The numbers which I presented in my paper would be the upper limits, because I made a number of conservative as­sumptions about unknowns in the biological data. I am still left with some uneasiness. If the law of the land were something different than the mpc values in Title 10 —if it specified a definite quantity of, say, cesium re­lease as the absolute maximum — I could have based my calculations on that quantity. I had to pick a hypothetical release rate because I didn’t have precise information on the quantities of the individual radionuclides.

auerbach. Dr. Tamplin is quite correct. I did not address myself at all today to the problem of ecological concentration. This is an entirely different area, in which there is a great deal of misinterpretation of the facts available. Ecological concentration cannot be generalized to a par­ticular group of organisms or individual species in a particular habitat; it must be evaluated on the basis of particular isotopes. One cannot general­ize that there will be ecological concentrations of 105 or 10e in the en­

vironment. There are certain unusual situations in which one may find high ecological concentrations — a typical example of such unusual con­centration is found with phosphorus, an element which is needed by all organisms. The more peculiar and unusual elements — such as cesium, cerium, ruthenium, and promethium — tend to have much lower ecologi­cal concentration factors. Consequently, any calculations made on the basis of human hazard have to be made carefully. In many of the rivers that have been examined, the extent of human hazard can be ascertained on analysis of the water, both for its radioisotope content and its specific activity. In many cases, one can predict the concentration on the basis of the ratio of the specific activity in the water and in the food organisms.

tamplin. It is true, as Dr. Auerbach says, that there are a great many uncertainties as one proceeds from the release of particular radio­nuclides to determining what concentration will end up in man. The ap­proach I reported produces the numbers that are upper-limit estimates of the dosage. I can say in a scientifically defendable way that the dosage will not exceed this number, and, indeed, it should be less. Faced with un­certainties in trying to give a scientific number, the only valid scientific number that we have is an upper-limit number; the actual hazard or the actual concentration will be expected to be less than this number.

lieberman. Dr. Tamplin’s conceptual approach involving the as­sessment of exposure to man from specific radionuclides is in order, and I would not argue with the arithmetic of his calculations, but I agree that his assumptions with respect to the quantity of radioactive material released to the rivers is off by a large factor. He used a hypothetical quantity of fis­sion products generated in one hour of operation of a 500-megawatt plant, but the actual amount released from operating reactors is 10e less than that. The data from our study at the Dresden Nuclear Power Station in­dicates that for 137Cs, where the ratio for release in liquid waste in the ac­cumulation of the fuel was the highest, the estimated release for a year’s operation was 0.17 Ci and the calculated accumulation for 600 mega­watts for one year with a 64 per cent use factor was 4.6 x 105 Ci, giving a ratio of 3.7 x 10~7. Similar ratios for all other radionuclides were ap­preciably lower. In general, the actual ratio based on operating experience of commercial nuclear power stations is only about 1 part in 100,000,000, considering the longer-lived fission products. Accordingly, the results of the dosage calculations Dr. Tamplin indicated would be off by an ex­tremely large factor. Dr. Berad Kahn, who is responsible for the study summarized in my paper and who measured release values from the Dres­den plant on a specific radionuclide basis, used an approach consistent with Dr. Tamplin’s, assessing each individual radionuclide released to the environment.

One other point on which there might be some confusion relates to the federal regulations. Besides addressing themselves to concentrations of radioactive material at the point of discharge, there are provisions in the regulations which require taking into account the effects of possible concentrations of radionuclides in the environment — for example, in the food chain — when evaluating man’s exposure.

tamplin. That provision does exist within Title 20, but the law or the wording should be more specific. It would be possible to set limits on the amount of cesium that is going to be released from a reactor and, if there were 15 or 20 reactors within an ecological region, to set the ulti­mate criterion before a single reactor is built. Then, if the releases the re­actor puts out meet the law, they will not exceed the frc guidelines.

eisenbud. I could get more excited about Dr. Tamplin’s calculation if it weren’t for that factor of a million, which is a substantial factor. In actual circumstances, we are dealing with very small amounts of radio­activity. The question is, How hard should one look, or how hard should one work in terms of effort, money, and manpower to define human doses when they are below a certain value? For example, in New York there’s about a 15 per cent difference in the annual dose rate, equivalent to 10 to 12 mrad/yr, between the sandy shores of Brooklyn and the igneous rock of upper Manhattan. This being the case, it’s hard to get a health depart­ment excited about defining the dose from rivers with any degree of pre­cision when, by the roughest approximation, you can establish beyond any doubt that the dose is less than 1 mrad/yr.

audience. Dr. Tamplin, can you show us how you arrived at your assumptions?

tamplin. I came at them in a rather straightforward way, consider­ing the background of my introduction into the nuclear energy area. In the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, much of my work has been asso­ciated with the Plowshare Program. There, we talk about kilotons and megatons, so I originally based my example on a kiloton; then I was ad­vised that no one would understand what a kiloton was. So I recalculated it, to find that it was the same amount of activity that was produced in 1 hour of operation of a 500-megawatt thermal plant, the assumption I stated on pages 45^46. After giving the example, I said that no one should take it at face value, that it was not intended to be a scare tactic. I wanted to come up with a scientifically defensible estimate of the effects of a nu­clear reactor on the basis of the quantities of each radionuclide released to the environment. I assumed a hypothetical river and plant; if I had had the individual radionuclides that were to be released, I would have used them, or, if the law were specific, I would have used the legal limit. I couldn’t use the vague statement in Title 10 or the table of mpc values. So, I picked a number, which I hope is high by a factor of 10е. If it is, I don’t know what this discussion is all about.

audience. What is the present practice and what are the plans for storage of high-level wastes?

auerbach. The aec has announced a long-term program to develop various techniques for the storage of high-level wastes with long half-lives. It is my understanding that high-level wastes are currently stored under­ground in tanks at two or three of the main aec installations. The tanks are large 800,000-gallon refrigerated gunnite, concrete, or steel. The long­term plans for high-level wastes include a number of possibilities, one of which is converting the radioactive high-level liquid to a solid and per­haps storing it in such places as abandoned salt mines. Salt mines appear to offer a unique capability for high-level waste storage for the following reasons: There is an enormous number of salt mines throughout the United States. They are deep underground and, in some cases, thousands of feet thick. They have some favorable characteristics, such as dryness and plasticity. If a cell were created in the salt for these materials, it would tend to be self-sealing. For the past 7 or 8 years, a number of aec labor­atories, mine included, have proceeded cautiously on the testing of the salt mines for the ultimate storage of high-level wastes. A salt mine in western Kansas has been used, and the results look favorable. In fact, at the present time, one fuel element is being tested in storage in these cham­bers 2,000 feet below ground.

ramey. The aec announced in June 1969 a policy of requiring all high-level wastes to be solidified and stored at a federally owned repos­itory, which would probably be a salt mine.