Over the last year there has been a difference of opinion in Minnesota about who has the authority to regulate radiological discharges from nu­clear power plants, in this case the Monticello nuclear generating plant. The matter is now in the courts for a determination based on the legalities involved. Briefly, the two points of view in the case are that, first, the state of Minnesota, through the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, avers that it has the power to regulate the minute radioactive waste discharges which will emanate from the Monticello plant as well as those discharges which it traditionally regulates, such as waste heat. Second, the electric utility, Northern States Power Company, contends that the Atomic Ener­gy Act “preempted” to the federal government the authority to regulate such radiological hazards, and that therefore a state may not lawfully act in this area.

In lay terms, the doctrine of preemption is a legal concept which arose after the colonies adopted the Constitution and became the United States of America. Under the Constitution certain powers were granted to the national government and provision was made that the national law be supreme. Thus, where there is a federal statute and policy, a conflicting state law and policy normally must yield. Similarly, where the federal law regulating a particular field is so pervasive as to evidence a congressional intent to “occupy the field” to the exclusion of state regulation, the courts will strike down state action attempting to regulate within that field.

The question, then, is largely one of congressional intent. In this pa­per I shall show that there is ample evidence that Congress meant to have

the important field of atomic energy regulated not by each individual state, but by the national government, except only to the limited extent that the Atomic Energy Commission might, under federal-state agree­ments, relinquish certain of its exclusive regulatory authority to interested and qualified states.

Another environmental consideration in the question of nuclear power reactors is the management of the radioactive wastes or effluents which are generated. These wastes fall into two general categories — high and low level — and it is important to distinguish between them. High — level wastes are produced during the reprocessing of spent fuel elements from nuclear reactors. They are not processed or disposed of at the reactor site. The spent reactor fuel is removed from the reactor, securely pack­aged, and shipped to a reprocessing plant. Only during reprocessing are high-level wastes removed from the fuel elements and concentrated in liquid form for permanent storage. Such storage has been safe and effec­tive, but we have long had research and development efforts to convert liquid wastes to solid form, aec Press Release M-132 (June 2, 1969) an­nounced a proposed policy for handling the high-level wastes from nuclear power plant fuels. Under this policy the liquid wastes will be further con­centrated, changed into solids, and stored at a federal repository, possibly in salt formations deep underground.

The other category, low level, refers to the very low levels of radio­activity such as those which occur in air, water, and solids outside the fuel elements in the routine operation of nuclear reactors. The regulations on the radioactive content of effluent air and water control the maximum amount of radioactivity permitted to be discharged to the environment. It is these wastes and their control which are at issue in Minnesota.

The limits on concentrations of radioactivity permitted in any power reactor liquid effluents leaving the plant area, before dilution in a body of water, are sufficiently low that a member of the public could drink this water throughout his lifetime without exceeding the radiation protection guide. Concentrations in the effluents, of course, are further reduced by dilution in the body of water into which they are discharged.

Limits on rates of release of radioactive gases are based on a con­servative calculation which — at the point of highest radiation level aver­aged over a year, on or near the site boundary — would result in an ex­posure to an individual equal to the frc radiation protection guide, if he remains on or near the site boundary for the entire year. Of course, at greater distances, radiation levels decrease owing to diffusion, dispersion, and decay of the radioactive material.

We have now had about 10 years’ experience in the operation of li­censed nuclear power reactors. This experience has shown that low-level wastes released during operation have been generally less than a few per cent of authorized limits. Monitoring programs are carried out by licen­sees, some states, the Public Health Service, and the aec. The quantities of radioactivity released are so small that it has been difficult to measure any increase in radioactivity above natural background levels in rivers and streams.

There are those who believe present limits on releases are too liberal when viewed in comparison with the even lower levels that reactors are capable of achieving as shown by operating experience. We fully agree that, within radiation protection guides, exposures to the public should be kept “as low as practicable.” However, the point at which “as low as prac­ticable” has been achieved is always a matter of degree and involves judg­ment. From a regulatory standpoint, we believe that this concept can be implemented in a fair and effective manner only by the development of definitive criteria and standards which will provide guidance as to what constitutes “as low as practicable.” A major consideration in developing such criteria and standards is whether the degree of reduction in risk to the public by a regulatory requirement justifies the measures that may be required by both the regulatory agency and the licensee to implement the requirement. A point is reached where the extent of the measures required to achieve a small incremental reduction in the amount of radioactivity released from a facility is disproportionate to the very small reduction in risk to the public. Thus, the question of what is “as low as practicable” is a difficult one — but it is a valid question, and one to which we have de­voted much attention. It is something we shall continue to explore.

The Atomic Energy Commission has relied from the beginning of its ex­istence on the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measure­ments (ncrp) and the International Commission on Radiation Protection (icrp) to recommend the basic numerical values of permissible radiation exposure. The aec has assumed for its part the role of translating the rec­ommendations of the поп-aec independent groups of experts into admin­istrative language that lends itself to use by regulatory authorities.

The ncrp was founded about forty years ago and until recently was headquartered in the Bureau of Standards. In 1964, ncrp was granted a congressional charter and now operates as an independent organization financed by voluntary contributions from government, scientific societies, and manufacturing associations. There are 65 members on this council, and about 175 members on the eighteen scientific committees that are re­sponsible for developing the technical reports of the organization.

In 1928, one year before ncrp was formed, the International Society of Radiology sponsored formation of the International Commission on Radiation Protection. This group has operated in close cooperation with ncrp, and receives support from the World Health Organization.

In 1955, following a proposal made by the United States before the General Assembly of the United Nations, there was established a fifteen — nation Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation. This committee of scientists, aided by a permanent scientific secretariat at the United Nations, has examined the world literature on the effects of ioniz­ing radiation on a continuing basis, and has published a number of reports on the state of knowledge in this field. It is not the function of this com­mittee to propose standards of permissible exposure, but rather to gather

and evaluate the basic scientific information on which these standards are based. The reports of this committee are classics in international scien­tific collaboration.

It is essential that this discussion of the standards of permissible ra­diation exposure start with the understanding that the aec standards orig­inate in the work of these national and international bodies among whom there is total harmony, with not the least doubt that their recommendations are based on an objective evaluation of existing information, motivated by a common interest in the health of the public.

The most significant question with regard to the fossil fuels is that of how much larger their rates of consumption may become, and about how

long these sources of energy can be depended upon to supply a major frac­tion of the world’s industrial energy needs. Since the present supplies of coal and oil represent the remains of organic debris of the geologic past, and about 600 million years were required for this accumulation, it should be evident that any additional accumulation likely to occur during the next thousand years will be negligible. Hence, our present consumption amounts to a progressive depletion of an initial stockpile of fixed and finite magnitude. When this is gone, there will be no further accumula­tions of fossil fuels within a time span of interest to man.

The manner in which the consumption of fossil fuels has increased with time can best be shown by means of graphs of annual rates of produc­tion. Statistical data for world production of coal and oil are available since 1860, for coal production in the United States since its beginning around 1820, and for oil production in the world since 1860. For the world, the production of coal since 1860 is shown in Figure 1, and the production of crude oil since 1880 in Figure 2. In Figure 3, the world pro­duction of both coal and lignite and world production of crude oil are

shown where the production rates are expressed in a common unit of ener­gy, the kilowatt-year.

Corresponding data for the United States are given in Figures 4-7. The production of coal in the United States is shown in Figure 4, produc­tion of crude oil in Figure 5, and that of natural gas in Figure 6. Finally, the total annual production of energy in the United States from the com­bined sources of coal, oil, gas, water power, and nuclear energy, expressed in British thermal units, is shown in Figure 7.

Among all of these curves there is a strong family resemblance. In each case the production rate either started from zero during the nine­teenth century, or, as in the case of the world production of coal, had only an insignificant magnitude at the beginning of the century. In each case, the rate of production for roughly a century exhibited an exponential, or compound-interest, growth, before eventually showing signs of a slow­down.

The world production of coal, for example, increased during most of the nineteenth century and up to the beginning of World War I at an an­nual rate of 4.4 per cent per year, or at a rate that would double the pro­duction rate every 16 years. Then after a slowdown until the end of World War II, exponential growth resumed at a rate of 3.6 per cent per year. Coal production in the United States until World War I increased at about 6.6 per cent per year, with a doubling period of about 10.5 years. Subse­quently, owing principally to the replacement of coal by oil and gas, the production of coal in the United States has fluctuated about a mean rate of about 475 million short tons per year.

For the case of petroleum, world production of crude oil up to the present has grown at an average rate of about 6.9 per cent per year, with a doubling period of 10 years. In the United States, from 1875 to 1929, crude-oil production increased at an average rate of 8.3 per cent per year with a doubling period of 8.4 years. Since 1929 the rate of increase of the production rate has progressively declined to a present figure of near zero.

The production of natural gas in the United States since 1900 has in­creased at an average rate of about 6.6 per cent per year. Finally, the pro­duction of total energy in the United States, as shown in Figure 7, has in­creased from 1850 to 1965 at an average rate of 6.9 per cent per year, with a doubling period of 10 years. In about 1950 this rate dropped to an average of 1.8 per cent per year with a doubling period of 39 years, which has prevailed to the present.

Another result obtainable from the study of these curves is an appre­ciation of the extreme brevity of the time during which most of this pro­duction has taken place. Coal, for example, has been mined continuously for about 800 years, and by the end of 1969 the cumulative production will amount to approximately 135 million metric tons. To produce the first half of this production required the 800 years up to 1938; the second half has required only the subsequent 31 years. The second half of the world’s cumulative production of crude oil has required only the 12-year period since 1957. Similarly, for the United States, the second half of the cumulative production of coal has occurred during the 38-year period since 1931, and the second half of the crude oil production during the 16- year period since 1953. In brief, most of the world’s production and con­sumption of energy during its entire history has occurred during the last 20 years.

As far as the power generation activity is concerned, the use of a boiling water reactor in a power generation station in this country today is actually not too different from using the conventional fossil fired boiler. The simplified flow path (Fig. 1) shows the usual steam turbine, electric generator, and main condenser. However, in the nuclear case the steam supply is from a nuclear reactor vessel containing nuclear fuel bundles rather than from a conventional boiler burning coal, oil, or natural gas. The structural aspects of the two plants are different, but that is principal­ly due to safety considerations.

In general, then, the boiling water reactor in a nuclear power plant accepts feedwater from a conventional “balance of plant” involving a con-

denser, feed pumps, and regenerative heaters; converts this feedwater into steam within the reactor vessel; and supplies the steam to a conventional steam turbine. Therefore, as far as power generation is concerned, the major difference in the nuclear power process is within the boiler.

Figure 2 shows the flow path within the current bwr design and dem­onstrates how the feedwater is converted into steam within the nuclear re­actor vessel. The feedwater enters the vessel by means of a flow header for equal distribution; it then mixes with recirculated water from the reactor core. The mixed flow passes through jet pumps within the reactor vessel in order to develop enough additional pressure to pass through the reactor core. The flow then enters the core, which consists of many (300 to 600) fuel bundles. The flow passes along fuel rods within the bundles, cooling the fuel rods which are being heated by the fission process. Thus, the flow passing through the core is heated and partly evaporated as steam is formed. This water and steam flow from all of the fuel bundles mixes in the area just above the core and then enters a bank of steam separators. The separators direct the steam toward steam dryers and then out of the vessel to the turbine. The water fraction is returned from the separators to be recirculated with the feedwater flow. Thus, there is a rather simple hy­draulic path within the reactor vessel. The considerations of radioactivity in the reactor system will be discussed later in this paper.

With respect to the nuclear process itself, the reactor core consists of

a well-defined array of fuel assemblies each containing a specified number of fuel rods. These fuel rods are metal tubes sealed at both ends by weld­ing and containing uranium dioxide pellets (Fig. 3). The fuel assemblies are separated by control rods containing boron. Thus by a controlled with­drawal of various control rods from the core area, and depending on the water temperature and steam void content, the reactor reaches the critical stages — that is, the reactor is made to sustain a controlled chain reaction at defined power levels. The generated power is in the form of heat within the fuel rods, which are in turn cooled by the flowing water and steam through the core. These fuel rods are like the electric heating elements on an electric range, except that the fuel rods operate at a much lower tem­perature.

The design concept is simple and does not involve any technologies other than those with which we have considerable experience. Steam sep­arators have been used in many applications, including many operating nuclear reactors; the jet pumps have also been used in many other appli­cations. The hydraulic aspects of coolant flow through redded fuel bun­dles is also a well-known technology, both by experience in various fields of heat exchange and by experimentation of various power situations. The nuclear considerations of the fission process and power distribution among and within the fuel assemblies is also now well known by experience with various operating reactors. In fact, there is not a single element — be it a separator, a fuel assembly, a jet pump, or any other component — that has not been tested fully at the temperatures, pressures, and other important

environmental conditions which exist in a nuclear power plant. Further­more, the boiler is very similar to a fossil-fired one. Instead of heating the water with burning coal, we heat it with hot fuel rods. All of the conven­tional design procedures for boilers are used to design this boiler also. Therefore, nothing in the design of nuclear power plants involves signifi­cant technological unknowns. If anything, we find ourselves designing re­actors at 1,000 psi pressure, compared with fossil units over 3,000 psi, and using vessels at less than 600° F compared with fossil units at 1,000° F. In essence, we know what we are doing in the nuclear industry. This is an important fact and one upon which to base the rest of our considera­tions.

I have taken up the most likely risks to the individual exposed and related them to levels of exposure and “routine” releases from operations of nuclear power reactors. The brush has had to be very broad. The biological changes which could occur range from uniformly serious to acceptance of a statistical chance almost in inverse relation to the likeli­hood of the event. As a biologist, I view the somatic risks from delivered doses below present population exposure standards (i. e., 0.17 rem/yr) as acceptable in comparison with other activities in our daily lives. True, if you are the individual to have one of the extra cases of leukemia in 15 million exposees receiving 0.17 rad/yr you would find it unacceptable. But this is true of any individual incidence of any ailment. But there are many unanswered questions, particularly in the area of carcinogenesis. I am confining my remarks to the delivered doses to the individual. De­rived figures such as permissible concentrations in air and water involve many additional considerations. There are probably those who will dis­agree, but I believe the risk of somatic injury to an exposed individual is not the controlling parameter in routine reactor operations. Rather, that parameter is the hazard to the race — genetic factors which control popu­lation exposure. Only for the very young or in the event of major releases does risk from somatic effects approach that from genetic effects unless the exposed group is quite small.

Of critical concern for the future of nuclear-fission power are the magnitude of the supplies of uranium and the state of technological devel­opment toward the achievement of breeder reactors. The reactors now in operation and under construction, or on order, are almost exclusively light-water reactors having so small a conversion factor that they are es­sentially burners, consuming only about 1 per cent of whole uranium.

Rafford L. Faulkner (1968), director of the Division of Raw Ma­terials, aec, has estimated that by 1980 the requirements for nuclear fuel in the United States (allowing for an 8-year advance supply) would amount to 650,000 tons of U3Os. Against this figure, his maximum esti­mate of reserves was 660,000 tons. His requirements estimate, however, was based on an earlier estimate of a 1980 power capacity of 95,000 megawatts, instead of the revised higher estimate of 145,000. The corre­sponding estimate of uranium supplies for the world outside the Commu­nist bloc was 1,575,000 tons of U308. Most of this will doubtless be re­quired by the nuclear power developments outside the United States.

From such data, it appears that with the types of reactors already in operation, or being built, or on order, an acute shortage of uranium sup­plies is likely to occur within the next 25 years.

Offsetting this is the breeder reactor program. Initially, this was pur­sued at a leisurely pace, but within the last 5 years a sense of alarm has arisen so that now something approaching a crash program is under way. Even so, the earliest prototype large-scale breeders are not expected to go into operation until about 1985.

It appears, therefore, that nuclear power from the fission reaction, were it to continue to be based principally on 2S5U, would be relatively short-lived—probably less than a century. However, if a transition to breeder reactors can be made before it is too late, the supplies of uranium and of thorium in rocks having contents of 50 grams or more per metric ton are of a magnitude hundreds of times larger than the total supply of

fossil fuels. Hence, with breeder reactors, there is promise of an adequate industrial energy supply for a much longer period than would be the case for other exhaustible energy sources.

The rapidly expanding interest in the utilization of nuclear energy as a power source has started to focus public attention on the benefits and risks associated with the peaceful uses of the atom. The context of the current concern differs markedly from the last period of major public interest in atomic matters, which occurred during the period of weapon testing with its associated worldwide radioactive fallout. The current phase happens to be concomitant with a more general concern about environmental quality and with the impact of technology on the environment. Thus, today the nuclear reactor, in terms of its potential as a cheap energy source, repre­sents a very important element among the several alternative technologies available to provide needed electrical energy. Each of these alternative technologies has a potential impact on the local environment. Each, there­fore, must be considered in terms of its long-term costs versus short — and long-term benefits. Nuclear power stations represent one of several alter­native possibilities. Any judgment of the risks and benefits associated with a nuclear power station must include, as part of the complex of facts and variables that enter into the formulation of such a judgment, the risks and benefits associated with fossil fuel power stations because fossil fuel is presently the first alternative.

Each kind of power station has risk associated with it that is more or less unique. For nuclear power stations, this risk is generally recognized as that associated with radioactivity. However, there is evidence that fossil note: The research in this paper was sponsored by the U. S. Atomic Energy Com­mission under contract with the Union Carbide Corporation.

fuel power stations also may release radioactivity from their stacks (Eisenbud & Petrow, 1964;Fish, 1969),so that differences between pow­er stations in terms of their impact on the environment may, in part, be quantitative, as in the case of radioactivity, or distinctly qualitative, as in the case of S02. The radioecological impact of power stations must be evaluated in the light of these considerations.

The public concerned about environmental radioactivity has wit­nessed a gradually increasing growth in the atomic energy program. Dur­ing the earliest years environmental studies and related surveillance were primarily centered on the major government-owned nuclear facilities, such as the Hanford works and the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, where radionuclides were being produced and released to the environment in accordance wtih prevailing standards. The Hanford works was of particu­lar concern because radioactive waste resulting from irradiation of the cooling water used in the large production reactors was discharged rou­tinely to the Columbia River, which had important fisheries. An ecologi­cal analysis and surveillance program was established and now has docu­mentation extending over twenty years on the behavior and effects of the quantities of radionuclides released to the Columbia River.

By the mid-1950’s, the potential of nuclear energy with its associated problems of radioactive wastes and the concern over weapons fallout resulted in an intensification and broadening of effort in radioecology. The problems of movement of radionuclides through food chains and the effects of radiation on the environment were quickly perceived as being the two major facets of the radiation problem. Likewise, the effect of chronic, low-level ionizing radiation was early recognized as one of the most difficult, if not intractable challenges facing radiation ecologists — much as it has been for radiation biologists concerned with the effects of low-level ionizing radiation upon man. In this paper, I shall examine some of the evidence which bears on the long-term, low-level effects of chronic ionizing radiation upon organisms within the natural environment. Movement and trophic level or food chain transfers and accumulation of radionuclides is the subject of another paper in this volume.

To evaluate the facts and related information on the environmental impact of radioactivity properly, some perspective on the known effects of ionizing radiation is necessary. Likewise, it is necessary to judge these data in the context of the quantities of radiation likely to be encountered in the vicinity of a nuclear power station. The quantity of artificial radionuclides which can be released to the environment is legally limited on the basis of hazard to man. The maximum permissible doses of radiation to man and the permissible levels of radionuclides derived from these doses are eval­uated continuously by regulating agencies and certain scientific bodies which were established for the express purpose of establishing standards of permissible radiation exposure for human beings. These scientific bodies include the U. S. National Committee on Radiation Protection and Meas­urements (ncrp); the Committees on the Biological Effects of Atomic Radiation, under auspices of the National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council; the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation; and the Federal (U. S.) Radiation Council (frc), which was established to provide protection policy on exposures of radia­tion workers and members of the public.

Other nations also have governmental agencies with functions similar to the frc and the ncrp. All of these groups and agencies were established because of the concern with ionizing radiation and the need to protect human beings from overexposure to radiation. The problems in determin­ing what quantity of radiation constitutes overexposure are manifold and complex. Nevertheless, it is to the credit of these agencies, and to the hundreds of scientists who have conducted the many kinds of radio­biological research which provided the necessary data, that a body of acceptable standards has been developed. Although the standards them­selves are complex in both interpretation and application, they reflect an effort in research and standards development that is unique and out­standing.

We have no comparable standards for the environment. Research in radioecology during the past fifteen years or so has been directed toward ascertaining the effects of radiation on natural populations as a function of dose. As this research matures, a body of doctrine will emerge to pro­vide the basis for development of any further standards that are shown to be necessary. Meanwhile, the present standards provide both guide­lines and a set of baseline levels which are useful now in comparing the known effects of chronic, low doses of radiation on organisms against the legally permissible levels of radionuclide release.

My concern here is with the potential effects of ionizing radiation resulting from releases of radionuclides that are in accordance with cur­rent standards. The extant data on low-level effects should be evaluated in terms of the doses that are likely to be received by organisms in the environment as a result of releases at or below the maximum permissible concentration (mpc). The maximum permissible concentrations and doses established by the International Commission on Radiological Pro­tection (icrp) and the ncrp form the basis for the regulations set forth in 10CFR20 (Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Pt. 20) pertaining to the discharge of radioactive wastes by nuclear establishments. The stand­ards of radiation exposure and therefore the mpc’s differ for the popula­tion groups exposed, icrp Publication No. 9 has established two cate­gories of individuals for which the Commission now gives recommenda­tions: first, adults exposed in the course of their work (radiation workers), and second, members of the public. Under current practice, members of the public (including populations in the vicinity of nuclear power stations) are limited to an exposure no greater than 170 mrem/yr, excluding back­ground and medical exposures. The 170 mrem/yr refers to the somatic dose to the gonads, total body, and red bone marrow. No official guid­ance is presently available on how this 170 mrem/yr should be appor­tioned among exposures from nuclear power stations, Plowshare applica­tions, and industrial products producing ionizing radiation. Although Table 2 of Appendix В in 10CFR20 lists occupational mcp’s x 1/10, it is implied elsewhere (Regulation 20.106(e) of 10CFR20) that these 1/10 x (mpc) occ values should be multiplied by an additional factor of 1/3. Thus, continuous exposure at 1/3 X 1/10 X (mpc) (K.(. would result in a maximum dose rate of 170 mrem/yr to an average man.

It is important to bear in mind that the criteria for assessing exposures of the public are the radiation protection standards of 5 rems/30 years for genetically significant dose and 170 mrem/yr somatic dose. The mpc’s are only secondary standards derived from these primary standards.

A certain amount of experience already has been gained in operating nuclear power stations below the limits specified in 10CFR20. Blomeke and Harrington (1969) recently have reviewed the waste management experience obtained with six operational power reactors (Dresden-1; Big Rock Point, Humboldt Bay, Elk River, Indian Point-1; Yankee). For liquid wastes, the activity discharged per year as a percentage of limit (limit based on a continuous discharge [averaged over 12 consecutive months] of 10_e /лСі/сс [1 pCi/cc] of unidentified isotopes of plant origin) ranged from a low of 0.0002 per cent to a high of 9.9 per cent. The aver­age annual release rates of gaseous radioactive wastes ranged from .00013 to 28 per cent of the specified aec license limits.

Since all of the mpc’s are derived for internal exposure of man, an obvious question relating to exposure of biota arises. What is the dose to organisms of natural populations submerged in water maintained at the (mpc)w or some fraction of the (mpc)w for individual radionuclides? Would these dose rates be expected to result in detectable biological effects to aquatic organisms over a period of time? The accompanying tabulation shows the results of calculating the yearly dose rates at the surface of an organism submerged continuously in water containing va­rious radionuclides maintained at the (mpc)w for the general human population. This is an unrealistic exposure condition which results in incomplete dose estimates because, first, the (mpc)w ~ 30 relates to the critical organ dose to man for each nuclide and includes the important requirement that there is no other exposure to that critical organ, and second, the internal dose to the biota has not been computed for the radio­nuclides that might be present in the digestive tract or tissues of the “biota” organisms.

When a mixture of radionuclides is present, a weighted total mpc is computed so that the maximum permissible dose (mpd) to any organ is not exceeded. Consequently, the limit used in current nuclear power sta­tions of 10~6 р-СЇ/cc (1 pCi/cc) is one to several orders of magnitude lower than the mpc’s for the individual radionuclides used to derive this table.

How do these annual dose rates (and doses) compare with our current factual knowledge of the effects of ionizing radiation? The rest of my paper wifi be concerned with this question.

It is not my intention to review the developing literature on the ef­fects of large doses of radiation delivered in an acute or chronic mode. The interested reader can refer to several symposia on radioecology (Aberg & Hungate, 1967; Hungate, 1965; Nelson & Evans, 1969; Schultz & Klement, 1963) for facts and details. In the area of radiobiology the lit­erature on such things as effects, dose response, and survivorship is vast, and it would be presumptuous of me to attempt a review. There are, nevertheless, some generalizations which can be derived from this body of fact. An acute dose of 100 rad is the general lower limit that can be expected to produce mortality in a number of organisms, but not in all. Depending upon the biological endpoint, acute doses greater than 100 rad will produce an effect proportional to the dose. On the other hand, under conditions of chronic doses, generally speaking, the effect is much less marked than for an acute dose. Moreover, the lower the dose rate and the less the total dose, the more difficult it is to detect an effect. That is, more sophisticated means of detection must be used and more sensitive biological endpoints must be the basis for detection. When dose rates are lowered to 1 rad/day, the number of factors affecting the organism are sufficient to mask any effects that might be present. Such commonly used endpoints as survivorship, fecundity, growth, development, and suscep­tibility to infection have not as yet been shown to be unequivocally affected by such low dose rates.

This volume is concerned in part with the chronic effects of radiation on biota at levels lower than mpc levels. Therefore, for the remainder of this paper I shall review some of the findings made by a number of the workers in this difficult and at times frustrating field. Very few studies have been made on natural populations exposed to chronic radiation higher than background. The salivary chromosomes of the larvae of Chironomus tentans which inhabit the radioactively contaminated bottom sediments of the White Oak Creek and White Oak Lake at Oak Ridge National Laboratory were analyzed for 5 years for chromosomal aberra­tions (Blaylock, 1965, 1966a, 1966b). Calculations and measurements of the absorbed dose for the larvae living in the sediments gave values of

230-240 rad/yr or approximately twenty-five hundred times background for the area. Over 130 generations had been exposed to this or greater dose rates during the previous 22 years. The accompanying tabulation (from Blaylock, 1966a) summarizes the number of different chromosome aberrations observed in irradiated and nonirradiated populations; the data include the White Oak Creek (irradiated), the Ten Mile Creek (non­irradiated), and other populations. Column one shows a total of seven­teen different aberrations which were observed in the irradiated popula­tion. The second column shows that only six different inversions were ob­served in the nonirradiated populations and that all six of these inversions were also found in the irradiated population. These inversions were found in each population more than once, and three occurred at relatively high frequency. Eleven aberrations — ten inversions and one deletion — were observed only once, except for one inversion which was found five times in two collections from one site and was probably the result of one event (Blaylock, 1965). The frequencies of these unique aberrations, found only in the irradiated population, were very low when compared with the frequencies of the endemic inversions. Blaylock concluded that the occur­

rence of new aberrations in the contaminated area was increased by the high background radiation and that these new aberrations were rapidly eliminated by selection or genetic drift.

The presence of endemic inversions at high frequencies in both popu­lations provided Blaylock an opportunity to test the effect of ionizing radiation on the chromosomal polymorphism of these populations. Gen­eticists believe that polymorphic populations are superior in fitness to monomorphic populations. Therefore, a decrease in chromosomal poly­morphism could indicate a decrease in fitness of the population. Blaylock found there was no difference between the irradiated and control popula­tions with respect to their chromosomal polymorphism as evidenced in the endemic inversions. Therefore, he concluded that the chronic environ­mental radiation which was capable of producing a detectable increase of new chromosomal aberrations was not affecting the frequencies of the endemic inversions in the populations of White Oak Creek and White Oak Lake.

This radioactive habitat was also the site for another series of investi­gations by Blaylock (1969). In this case the natural population investi­gated was the hardy, highly adaptable mosquito fish, Gambusia affinis affinis. Approximately one hundred generations of fish have lived in this area since the first release of radioactive waste effluents. In this investi­gation, another parameter of population fitness, fecundity — or the num­ber of offspring per female — was considered, since laboratory studies have shown that it can be influenced by ionizing radiation. These fish lived in a shallow portion of the lake where the sediments contained appreciable quantities of 137Cs, 106Ru, 60Co, 90Sr, and eEZn. Based on measurements and calculations, these fish were exposed to approximately 11 rads/day of external gamma radiation and 1.75 rads/yr from internal beta radiation.

To obtain fecundity data female Gambusia were collected from White Oak Lake and the control area, measured to the nearest millimeter and dissected in order to make embryo counts. In 98 fish from White Oak Lake a total of 4,625 embryos were scored. The brood size ranged from 13 embryos in a 3.0-cm fish to 105 in a 4.0-cm fish. In 98 fish from the control pond, 3,257 embryos were scored; the brood size ranged from 11 embryos in a 3.3-cm fish to 63 embryos in a 4.4-cm fish. The frequency of dead embryos and abnormalities was greater in the irradiated population than in the nonirradiated population.

The most striking finding of this study, however, was the fact that the irradiated populations had a highly significant greater fecundity than the control population. In his paper Blaylock marshals evidence which sup­ports the idea that irradiation can increase the fitness of organisms. These data support the hypothesis that radiation-induced mutations, most of which would be deleterious in the homozygous condition, produce suffi­cient cumulative effects in the heterozygous condition to more than coun­terbalance induced dominant deleterious mutations. Apparently, under certain conditions, genetic variability resulting from radiation-induced mutations can improve the fitness of organisms. Natural selection operat­ing on a population with increased genetic variability results in an in­creased rate of evolution of the population and in its adaptation to environmental factors.

The increased fecundity of the female in the Gambusia population in White Oak Lake may be an adjustment to the chronic environmental radiation. An increased mortality of embryos that could be attributed to ionizing radiation was also found in this population. In this respect radia­tion would be analogous to an environmental factor that increases mor­tality. Another effect of radiation would be the increased genetic varia­bility resulting from radiation-induced mutations. This would increase the rate of evolution and speed up the adjustment of the population to the increased mortality. However, this would not occur without some ex­pense to the population. Many genetic combinations would be selected against, and the individuals eliminated. In populations with a relatively short life cycle, such as fish and insects, where overproduction of young is the rule and selection is severe, the population level could be main­tained in spite of the elimination of many individuals.

At the University of Washington, Loren Donaldson has had under way a long-term study of the effect of chronic low-level gamma radiation on the chinook salmon (Oncorhynchus tshawytscha) (Bonham & Don­aldson, 1966; Donaldson & Bonham, 1964; Donaldson et al., 1969). In these experiments eggs and alevins were exposed to rates of 0.5, 1.0, 2.5, or 5.0 r/day beginning immediately after fertilization until the yolk is absorbed and the young fish are completely formed, a period of 80-100 days, depending on water temperature. The fish from the exposed lots and a like number from the control group were fed for a period of about 90 days before being released to migrate to the sea. In the ocean the young fish must compete in a natural environment that presents many hazards. Upon return from the sea, the adult fish and their progeny are subjected to detailed study for all possible effects.

The results of this series of long-term experiments with large num­bers of fish (ranging from 96,000 to 256,000 fingerlings released per experiment) have given no indication that these high exposure rates are injurious to the fish. Irradiations at early life stages have not caused sig­nificant mortality or retardation of growth in either smolts or returning spawners, or in fecundity of the females. In fact, Donaldson and his co­workers report that at the lowest exposure rate of 0.5 r/day — an exposure rate which is 10,000 times greater than background (0.2 mr/hr) — the irradiation stock returned in greater numbers and produced a greater total of viable eggs than the controls.

Templeton, Nakatani, and Held (1970) provide some pertinent viewpoints on the genetic effects: “The genetic consequences of radiation exposure have been and are still being studied very extensively in connec­tion with the potential hazards to man. In general, the conclusion from these studies is that any significant increase in radiation levels is detri­mental from the genetic point of view. However, for man, this acceptance rests on ethical considerations, which take note of the individual, and the fact that genetic anomalies are not reparable in an individual. When con­sidering the marine environment, however, we are not concerned with in­dividual organisms, but with populations, and at the population level, ge­netic damage is reparable by natural selection.”

A similar viewpoint has been expressed by Purdom (1966), aBritish worker in this field: “It would seem likely that the genetic response of populations is relatively unimportant and that general mortality and in­fertility would be the limiting factors in the extent to which populations may overcome radiation exposure. This certainly seems true for animals which have been studied extensively — Drosophila, the mouse, and do­mesticated farm animals. Provided that marine organisms are not more sensitive genetically than these other organisms, genetic damage will prob­ably have negligible effects, even under the maximum radiation exposures that seem possible from present day practice.”

Additional insight on the probable ecological effects resulting from radionuclide release may be obtained from laboratory investigations. The number of investigations is too large to cover in this paper; moreover, they are treated more fully by Templeton, Nakatani, and Held (1970). Some that are illustrative of many of the findings are summarized briefly here.

Phytoplankton are important because they are one of the main bases of the ecological food chains of the ocean. Phytoplankton are known to accumulate a large number of elements, including radioisotopes, in con­centrations many times greater than their concentrations in the surround­ing media. Rice and his co-workers (personal communication) tested the effect of 1S7Cs on the division rate of a marine plankton Nitzschia closte- rium. The rate of cell division controls the population size and cell divi­sion rate is an easily followed parameter. In one experiment the popula­tions were started in a median containing 14.3 /*Ci 13TCs per liter (1.43 x 104 pCi/cc). After 26 weeks at this concentration the cultures were trans­ferred to media containing 10 times the previous concentration of 137Cs (1.43 X 105 pCi/cc) and followed for 30 more weeks. Rice and his group found no evidence of injury to the cells or to the population during this period of time.

The effects of 65Zn, 51Cr, and "Sr"Y on the development of oyster larvae were examined in a series of experiments by Nelson (1968). There is an important oyster fishery in Willapa Bay which is located near the mouth of the Columbia River and thus receives radionuclides originating from the Hanford Plant (Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratory). The concentrations of radionuclides used and the dose rates resulting there­from appear in Table 1. In addition, stable zinc and stable chromium were tested in conjunction with the nuclides for the effect of carrier upon the organisms. The biological endpoint was abnormal larvae — defined as those larvae which had incompletely developed shells 48 hours after fer­tilization. Nelson’s results are illustrated in Table 2. These results show that there were significant increases in abnormal larvae as follows: (a) in 85Zn (carrier-free), at a concentration of 108 pCi/1 and greater; (b) in 66Zn (with carrier), at a concentration of 107 pCi/1 and greater; (c) in 51Cr, at a concentration of 10s pCi/1 and greater (stable chromium had no effect at any of the levels tested); (d) in 90Sr90Y at a concentration of 109 pCi/1. On the basis of these experiments, Nelson concluded that the concentration of 90Sr"Y necessary to produce abnormal oyster larvae above control levels (10s pCi/1) is ten million times greater than the max­imum concentration of 90Sr in natural marine environments (10 pCi/1) as reported by Miyake and Sarakashi (1960). The concentration of carrier — free e5Zn necessary to produce an effect on oyster larvae in the first 48 hours after fertilization of the eggs is ten million times greater than the 65Zn concentration in Willapa Bay. Concentrations of 51Cr which caused

Table 2. Mean Percentage of Abnormal Pacific Oyster Larvae 48 Hours after Fertilization at Various Concentrations of !K, Sr+MY, KZn (Carrier-Free), "Zn (with Carrier), and MCr

Seawater

Concentrations "Sr + "Y Carrier-Free “Zn “Zn with Carrier B1Cr

pCi/1 pCi/cc Iа 2” 1“ 2” 1» 2Ь 1[1] [2] 2b

Control……………………… (15) 8.5 ±2.5 (9) 7.7 ± 2.2 (10) 8.6 ± 4.1 (12) 6.8 ± 1.4

109 1 03…………. (6 ) 8.3 ±1.6 (4) 9.0 ± 4.2 (6) 9.3 ± 2.6 (6) 7.5 ± 3.7

107 10‘………………….. (2)…….. 5.5 ±0.7 (3) 21.7 ±15.0 (2) 43.5 ± 6.4* (5) 9.2 ± 1.8

10" 10s………………….. (7)….. 11.0 ±2.7 (5) 28.0 ± 9.9* (4) 32.7 ± 10.7* (6) 16.3 ± 6.9

109 10e………………….. (4)….. 98.0 ±0.8* (2) 100.0 ± 0* (2) 100.0 ± 0* (6) 26.3 ± 3.1

10“ 107………………….. (4)….. 95.8 ±2.1* (1) 100.0 ± 0* (3) 100.0 ± 0* (3) 56.7 ± 35.7

demonstrable effects are 800,000 or more times greater than those re­ported in water collected between the mouth of the Columbia River and Willapa Bay in 1961, when all eight Hanford production reactors were stiff in operation. Since then five of these have been shut down.

The biological effects of the effluent from Hanford production reac­tors have been monitored for over twenty years by raising salmonid fish in the diluted effluent. The three main factors in the potential pollution ef­fects of Hanford reactor effluent on fish are thermal increment, radioac­tivity, and chemical toxicity, since hexavalent chromium was used as a corrosion inhibitor (Templeton, Nakatani, & Held, 1970). Freshly ferti­lized eggs of salmonids were incubated, and the fish were raised in various concentrations of effluents until they reached migrant-sized fingerlings. Table 3 shows the mortality, growth, and radionuclide concentration in Chinook salmon as raised under various effluent conditions.

No significant lethality occurred in 6 per cent effluent, a concentra­tion far above the existing levels in the Columbia River. The greater growth observed in fish maintained in effluent is due to the heat in the ef­fluent, which accelerates growth. The concentration of the three gamma emitters, 21Na, 51Cr, and 66Zn, in the fish were approximately proportional to the effluent concentration. The investigators point out that the body burdens at these levels produced no demonstrable damage in Chinook sal­mon.

No review of this nature can forego mention of Russian work in this field, especially since Russians report effects at much lower concen­trations of radionuclides than do other workers. Russian emphasis has been placed on marine fish eggs. Polikarpov (1966), who pioneered the

studies in this field, has reported on extensive studies with eggs of a large number of marine and freshwater species over the concentration range of 10~2 pCi/1 to 10s pCi/1. They reported reduced hatching of the larvae and early mortality at concentrations of 105 pCi/1 and above, and the number of abnormalities were increased significantly at concentrations of 102 pCi/1 and above with remarkable consistency.

British workers (Templeton, Nakatani, & Held, 1970) did similar experiments with eggs of two fish species maintained from immediately after fertilization until hatching, in water contaminated with 0OSr9OY over a concentration range of 102 to 10s pCi/1. They did not observe any sig­nificant increase in mortality or in the production of abnormal larvae.

Templeton, Nakatani, and Held (1970) point out that the particular significance of the work from the u. s.s. r. is the unique concentration effect response reported by Polikarpov in 1967. An increase in concen­tration over six orders of magnitude (from 200 to 200 million pCi/1) no more than triples the abnormality production rate and only increases mor­tality fivefold. This result is totally inconsistent with the linear hypothesis of dose response as well as with data from many radiobiological in­vestigations.

Preliminary experiments of the effect of tritium on fish eggs are under way at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ornl) and at the Univer­sity of Washington. At ornl, Blaylock (personal communication) has subjected fertilized carp (Cyprinus carpio) eggs to various concentrations of tritiated water. The biological endpoint was hatchability which nor­mally occurs at 72 hours when maintained at 26°C. Eggs either hatch or die. Since the embryonic stages are considered among the most sensitive stages of the life cycle to irradiation, this was considered a useful method for testing the effect of tritiated water. An additional advantage is that the eggs imbibe water and swell. Assuming no discrimination against tritium, the eggs would be exposed to both external and internal doses from trit­ium. The concentrations used ranged (Table 4) from 6.75 X 107 to 51.8 X 107 pCi/cc. These concentrations delivered a 72-hour dose to the eggs and developing embryos of from 57 to 436 rads. Although the percentage of eggs that hatched is less in three of the concentrations than in the con­trols, statistical tests showed no significant differences between any of the doses and the controls.

At the University of Washington (Held et al., 1969), hybrid trout eggs were exposed to tritiated water at concentrations ranging from 109 to 1011 pCi/1 of water. No significant differences between groups were observed. The investigators are repeating the experiments with a hundred­fold increase in the highest concentration (1018 pCi/1). These workers

Table 4. The Hatchability of Carp Eggs in Different
Concentrations of Tritiated Water

Concen — Accumulated

tration Dose (rads) Total No. Percentage

OtCi/cc) in 72 hr of Eggs of Hatch

0 ……………………………….. 0……………. 436 93.1

67.5 …………………………… 57……………. 285 85.6

127.0 ……………………….. 107……………. 293 86.6

274.0 ……………………….. 231……………. 474 85.9

375.0 ……………………….. 316……………. 408 93.4

518.0 ……………………….. 436……………. 257 92.6

source: Reprinted, with permission, from B. G. Blaylock, “Chromosomal Polymorphism in Irradiated Natural Popu­lations of Chironomus” (Genetics, 1966, 53 [No. 1], 131—

136).

also tested the effects of tritiated seawater on spore germination and sporling development of the algae Padina japoinia Yamada. Effects on germination and subsequent growth were observed only at the highest concentrations of tritium used (З x 1010 pCi/1!) Admittedly, these trit­ium experiments have not followed up on any effects which might show up after fresh eggs have hatched. Nevertheless, one should bear in mind that concentrations up to 100 million times greater than mpc levels showed no effects on fish eggs and that in algae effects showed at 10 million times greater than mpc levels.

What inferences may be drawn from these data? “Insufficient in­formation and more research is needed” is frequently the response of re­search workers in situations such as this. As a scientist I am not entirely immune to this special type of bias. To call for such research is easy; to attract first-rate scientists to devote years of their professional lives to experiments wherein the outcome may be the production of consistently negative results is not so easy. Journals are not interested in publishing such data. Moreover, one might question whether the investment required could not be put to better use in other needed research areas.

These data, as well as many others that I have not mentioned, with the possible exception of Russian work, show that the dose necessary to evoke an unequivocally detectable biological response is considerably above that resulting from mpc’s in the environment.

It is not unreasonable to infer also that low dose rates (at or around mpc levels) delivered to ecosystems under field conditions may present an intractable problem. At present, our best technologies and methods cannot demonstrate effects to these systems at these doses that are clearly and uniquely attributable to ionizing radiation. The possibility of develop­
ing sufficiently sensitive methods exists, but will undoubtedly require superbly controlled laboratory conditions. I doubt that these methods, if developed, could be used in complex field situations where manifold perturbing factors are interacting on and with organisms.

One might invoke special effects, or organisms with undefined or special roles in the ecosystem that make them uniquely sensitive (and therefore the ecosystem also) to the low dose rates that might occur in the vicinity of nuclear power stations. The possibility exists that the radio­sensitivity of organisms may be increased significantly as a result of en­vironmental interactions. Ecologists are always seeking some unusual effect, or a species with high sensitivity to ionizing radiation. So far they have not found any organisms which, within an environmental context, have a radiosensitivity at the levels of release permitted under current standards. Research is continuing to include as many different kinds of organisms as possible from a variety of environments (habitats) in order to demonstrate and differentiate the effects of radiation within an en­vironmental context.

All of the foregoing suggests essentially the same answer to a ques­tion posed at the recent Burlington, Vermont, public education meeting. Namely, if mpcw levels of radionuclides have an effect on the biota living in the vicinity of nuclear power stations, these effects will be essentially undetectable. The reason for this judgment lies in the fact that there un­doubtedly would be other factors changing in the environment, or other substances added to the aquatic environment that may, and undoubtedly will, have an effect on the constituent organisms. These substances — chemicals, nutrients, and so forth — may modify the habitat to the extent that it will be extremely difficult, using current methodologies, to demon­strate effects that might result from the low levels of radioactivity.

In examining the federal-state relations in the regulation of atomic energy, it is important to note the history of the various legislative enact­ments concerning atomic energy. It is also instructive to recall the history surrounding development of the atomic energy process itself.

The means by which the energy of the atom can be released evolved from extensive military research and development by the federal govern­ment during World War II. Because of its significant military implications, the process was shrouded in secrecy. All nuclear research activities were conducted by or, pursuant to contract, for the federal government. The states had no role, regulatory or otherwise, in the development and use of this new energy source.

The Atomic Energy Act of 1946. It was under these circumstances that Congress enacted the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (PL 585, 79th Cong., 60 Stat. 755-775; hereafter cited as the 1946 Act), the nation’s — in fact, the world’s — first such legislation. Under that Act atomic energy remained under an almost airtight government monopoly, but control was transferred from the military establishment to the newly created, civilian Atomic Energy Commission. The Act conferred on the aec pervasive reg­ulatory authority over the possession, use, transfer, import, or export by any person of any of the various atomic energy materials.

Moreover, except in certain enumerated and very limited circum­stances, facilities for the production of fissionable material (e. g., nuclear reactors) could not be owned by anyone, including agencies and depart­ments of the federal government, other than the aec. Under no circum­stances could there be ownership of fissionable materials by anyone other than the aec.

The Act wrought modifications of the patent system unprecedented in American history — certain inventions and discoveries pertaining to atomic energy were removed entirely from the regular patent system, and certain others, though patentable, were subject to compulsory licensing if found by the aec to be affected with the public interest and such licens­ing was “necessary to effectuate the policies and purposes of this Act.”

The Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Following eight years of experi­ence and atomic energy development under the 1946 Act there grew a realization that private enterprise could and should be afforded an oppor­tunity to assume a role in the development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. Accordingly, Congress enacted the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (PL 83-703, 68 Stat. 919 [1954], as amended, 42 USC 2011-2281; here­inafter referred to as the 1954 Act). Certain of the rigid controls pre­scribed by the 1946 Act were relaxed at the time of passage of the super­seding 1954 Act; even so, however, it still can be said that, with respect to the assigned areas of responsibility, few other statutes confer upon an ex­ecutive agency the broad powers with which the aec is endowed by the terms of the 1954 Act.

The 1954 Act not only provides for intensive federal regulation of all atomic energy activities, but utterly ignores any recognition of the states’ power to regulate such activities. For example, the patent provisions of the 1954 Act, although somewhat less far-reaching than those under the 1946 Act, represent marked departures from the normal patent system in terms of the controls which they vest in the aec over atomic energy in­ventions and discoveries. The 1946 Act’s virtual prohibition against pri­vate ownership of “utilization facilities” (e. g., nuclear power reactors) was removed wth passage of the 1954 Act.* Significantly, however, it was not until a congressional enactment as recent as 1964 that private owner­ship of the fuels for such facilities — such as special nuclear material— became permissible, t Congress left with the aec broad authority to impose a comprehensive and detailed regulatory control scheme upon the posses­sion, use, transfer, export, import, and so on of the various atomic energy materials (see 1954 Act, Secs. 53, 62, and 81). Notable too was conspic­uous silence on the role of the states in the regulation of these materials. Except for one limited provision (1954 Act, Sec. 271; amended by PL 89-135, 79 Stat. 551 [1965]), not relevant to radiological considerations, no notice was taken of a role for the states in the regulation of nuclear power reactors.

* The terms production facility and utilization facility are defined in Sec. 11 v. and cc. of the 1954 Act. Except for certain military activities involving the Department of Defense, no person within the United States may transfer or receive in interstate commerce, manufacture, produce, transfer, acquire, possess, use, import, or export any nuclear reactor, nuclear fuels reprocessing facility, fission product conversion and encapsulation plant, or other utilization or production facility except under and in accordance with a license issued by the aec pursuant to Sec. 103 or 104. (1954 Act, Sec. 101.)

t PL 88-487, 78 Stat. 604 (1964), the so-called Private Ownership of Special Nu­clear Materials Act. The term special nuclear material is defined in Sec. 11 aa. of the 1954 Act. Essentially, it refers to Pu, ““U, and mU.

1957 Proposal Rejected. As atomic industrial activity and the num­ber of trained personnel grew in the years following passage of the 1954 Act, and as classification restrictions on atomic information were lifted, some states began to develop an interest in applying their general health and safety powers to the atomic activities being carried on within their borders. It was in this context that the aec in 1957 forwarded to the Con­gress proposed legislation which, if enacted, would have authorized con­current radiation safety standards to be enforced by the states where such standards were not in conflict with those of the aec (see Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Selected Materials on Federal-State Cooperation in the Atomic Energy Field [March 1959], p. 18).

The proposed bill provided that the states might adopt, inspect against, and enforce radiation standards for the protection of health and safety in areas regulated by the aec. In other words, the bill proposed by the aec in 1957 would have permitted dual regulation by both federal and state governments of nuclear reactors, other utilization or production fa­cilities, and the potential radiation hazards associated with the various atomic energy materials.*

“Cooperation with States” —1959. After extensive hearings, during which witnesses of the various states and the Council of State Govern­ments played prominent roles, the approach to the federal-state question originally suggested by the aec was unanimously rejected by the 18-man Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. However, the Committee was per­suaded, and on the basis of its recommendation the Congress was per­suaded, of the advisability of legislation offering to the states a limited role and thereby clarifying the respective roles of the aec and the states under the Atomic Energy Act. For that primary purpose Congress added Sec­tion 274, “Cooperation with States,” to the Act in 1959 (PL 86-373, 73 Stat. 688 [1959]).

Under Section 274 the aec may relinquish to states, on a state-by­state basis, certain of its authority to regulate the use of reactor-produced isotopes, the source materials uranium and thorium, and small quantities

* Two related bills, one sponsored by Senator Clinton P. Anderson and the other by Congressman Carl T. Durham, were introduced at this time. Both proposed to amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 with respect to federal-state cooperation. S. 4298 (84th Cong., 2nd Sess.) would have authorized the aec to enter into compacts or agreements “delineating the separate responsibilities” of the aec and the states with respect to the health and safety aspects of activities licensed under the Act, and to transfer to states such regulatory authority as it finds them competent to assume. H. R. 8676 (84th Cong., 2nd Sess.) would have “authorized and directed” the aec to relinquish, within six months after receiving such certification, jurisdiction over health and safety in any or all atomic energy areas in which a governor certified that his state had an agency competent to assume such responsibility.

(quantities not sufficient to form a critical mass sufficient to initiate the fission process) of special nuclear materials. Collectively, such materials are referred to as agreement materials.

Before such an agreement may be entered into with any prospective agreement state that state’s governor must make certain certifications and the aec must make certain findings. Specifically, the governor must certify that the state has an adequate regulatory program for “materials within the state covered by the agreement” and that the state desires to assume such regulatory responsibilities (1954 Act, Sec. 274 d. [1]). The aec, in turn, must find that the state’s regulatory program is adequate to protect the public health and safety and is compatible with the aec’s regulatory program for such materials (1954 Act, Sec. 274 d. [2]).

Section 274 specifically reserves certain areas to the aec. It clearly provides that the aec may not enter into an agreement with any state un­der which such state would assume the regulation of the construction and operation of nuclear reactors, the export or import of nuclear materials or facilities, or the ocean disposal of radioactive wastes (1954 Act, Sec. 274 c.). Further, the legislative history of Section 274 makes it abundantly clear that the discharge of radioactive effluents from such nuclear facili­ties as reactors and reprocessing plants, and the transportation of nuclear fuel and irradiated fuel elements, are not to be included within the authori­ty transferred to a state by virtue of a Section 274 agreement (see Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings on Federal State Relationships in the Atomic Field, 86th Cong., IstSess. [1959], pp. 291, 297, 298).

Preemption Intended by Congress. Thus, if any shadow of a doubt existed before 1959 that Congress intended to preempt the regulation of atomic activities insofar as radiation protection is concerned, the addition of Section 274 to the Act should have dispelled that doubt.

The Joint Committee’s reports (H. Rep. 1125, S. Rep. 870, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. [1959]) which accompanied this legislation were unequiv­ocal. The Committee said that it was the intention of the proposed law to clarify the responsibilities of the federal government, on the one hand, and state and local governments, on the other, with respect to the regulation of by-product, source, and special nuclear materials in order to protect the public’s health and safety from radiation hazards. The Committee’s report added (Sec. 9): “It is not intended to leave any room for the exercise of dual or concurrent jurisdiction by States to control radiation hazards by regulating byproduct, source, or special nuclear materials. The intent is to have the material regulated and licensed either by the Commission [aec], or by the State and local governments, but not by both. The bill is in­tended to encourage States to increase their knowledge and capacities, and to enter into agreements to assume regulatory responsibilities over such materials.”

Based on the 1959 amendment and its legislative history, several points about the intent of Congress emerge as being virtually indisputable: (a) Under the Atomic Energy Act as it is presently constituted, there is no room for the exercise of dual or concurrent jurisdiction by states to control radiation hazards by regulating by-product, source, or special nu­clear materials, (b) Such materials are to be regulated and licensed either by the aec or by state and local governments, but not by both, (c) Cer­tain, but not all, of the aec’s regulatory responsibilities may be transferred to interested and qualified states whose regulatory programs are compati­ble with the aec’s and adequate to protect the public’s health and safety. And, (d) specifically included within the regulatory responsibilities that are at all times to be reserved to the aec, vis-a-vis the states, is the regula­tion of the construction and operation of nuclear reactors, including the discharge of radioactive effluents from such facilities.

Thus, to sum up, the comprehensive controls over the various nu­clear materials, devices (including weapons), and facilities which the 1954 Act and its 1946 precursor lodged in the aec; the paramount na­tional interest in this highly sensitive and important field; the significant implications of these materials, devices, and facilities to public health and safety and the common defense and security; and the utter silence of Con­gress in 1946 and 1954 on the role, if any, of the states in regulating the potential radiological hazards of source, by-product, and special nuclear materials — all of these quite clearly evidence a legislative intent to “oc­cupy the field” to the exclusion of state regulation. If any further evidence were required of congressional intention to preempt this field, the legisla­tive history of Section 274 provides it in abundance — indeed, fairly com­pels this conclusion.

Legal Authorities and Courts Support Preemption. This legal opin­ion is not merely my view, or that of the aec’s general counsel, or that of the Joint Committee’s staff counsel. Virtually every court, legal scholar, and state attorney general to consider the question of preemption in the context of atomic energy has concluded that Congress has preempted sub­stantially the whole field to the exclusion of the states, except only state regulation pursuant to an agreement as provided in Section 274. The list includes, but is not limited to, the Attorney General of Michigan, the At­torney General of South Dakota, the New York Bar Association’s Com­mittee on Atomic Energy, the Dean of the Harvard Law School — and even Richard A. Emerick, Special Assistant Attorney General of the State of Minnesota, who reached the same conclusion and so advised the

Minnesota Pollution Control Agency well before it took final action on the Northern States Power Company’s application for a waste disposal permit.*

The following quotation from the report of the Atomic Energy Com­mittee of the New York State Bar Association (pp. 4—5) is especially pertinent: “While the United States Supreme Court has never been re­quired to determine whether the Atomic Energy Act has pre-empted the regulation of atomic activities for radiation protection purposes it seems clear that Congress intended so to pre-empt, if not by the provisions of the 1954 Act, then, certainly by means of the federal-state amendment in 1959. In the latter amendment, Congress came perhaps as close as it has ever come to stating expressly that a regulatory area has been pre-empted.”

As noted, the Supreme Court of the United States has never specifi­cally ruled on the question of preemption under the Atomic Energy Act. However, the two state courts before which the question has been raised both agreed that such preemption had occurred.! In addition, the Na­tional Association of Attorneys General has reviewed the law and the proposed transfer of regulatory responsibilities from the aec to the states, and has endorsed the program. On April 25, 1962, the Association adopted a resolution favoring transfer of regulatory responsibilities, read­ing in part: “Be it resolved. . . that all states are urged to accelerate the adoption of such legislation and the development of such programs as will permit the states to enter into agreements with the Atomic Energy Commission pursuant to PL 86-373.”

I think it highly doubtful that any state’s attorney general would en­dorse such a program unless he were confident that the responsibility in — * The opinion of the aec’s General Counsel is on record in 34 Fed. Reg. 7273 (May 3, 1969) (and see 10 CFR Pt. 8, Sec. 8.4); Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Se­lected Materials on Environmental Effects of Producing Electric Power (August 1969), p. 36; Michigan Opinions of the Attorney General, No. 4073, October 31, 1962; South Dakota Attorney General, Official Opinion, July 23, 1964; Committee on Atomic Energy, New York State Bar Association, State Jurisdiction to Regulate Atomic Activities: Some Key Questions (July 12, 1963); David F. Cavers, “State Responsibility in the Regulation of Atomic Reactors,” Kentucky Law Journal, 1961, 50, 29; Richard A. Emerick, “Memorandum of Law on State-Federal Control over Nuclear Facilities; the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and Amendments” (January 31, 1969), set forth in Hearings on AEC Authorizing Legislation Fiscal Year 1970 be­fore the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), p. 936. t Boswell v. City of Long Beach, Commerce Clearing House Atomic Energy Law Reporter, 1960, 1, 4045 (California Superior Court, 1960); Northern California Association to Preserve Bodega Head and Harbor, Inc. v. Public Utilities Commis­sion (respondent, Pacific Gas and Electric Company, real party in interest, Supreme Court of California), California Reporter, 1964, 37, 432; Pacific Reporter (2nd ser.), 1964,390,200.

deed rested with the federal government and that it could be transferred to the states.

To the roll of nationally recognized groups and associations which have endorsed a program of limited state assumption of atomic energy regulatory responsibilities from the federal government might be added the American Bar Association, the National Governors’ Conference of 1962, the Council of State Governments, and the Chamber of Commerce of the United States. I am unaware that any of these groups expressed any reservations or concern that a constitutional issue exists in this connec­tion.

To the foregoing should be added the list of twenty-one states which have assumed the regulatory role contemplated for them under the 1954 Act, thereby recognizing both the principle and fact of federal preemption: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Kan­sas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Washington.

Argument has been made that federal preemption concerns only the high areas of emission releases and leaves the lower still to the states. This is erroneous. Preemption when it occurs in any area is total, and the courts have so ruled consistently in numerous cases arising since 1820.

Federal Water Pollution Control Act. There remains the question whether the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (PL 87-88, 70 Stat. 498 [1956], 33 USC 466 et seq.; hereafter referred to as fwpc Act) has the effect of vesting in the states any authority, by their participation in the setting of water quality standards, over the release of radioactive efflu­ents, which had been preempted to the federal government by the 1954 Act. The terms of the fwpc Act, of themselves, do not speak expressly to the preemption question, although Section 466 c. does provide that noth­ing in the Act “shall be construed as impairing or in any manner affecting any right or jurisdiction of the States with respect to the waters (including boundary waters) of such States.” But it appears quite clear that the fwpc Act does not affect the aec’s preempted jurisdiction over radioactive efflu­ents. Nowhere does the fwpc Act speak in terms of a grant of authority to the states to set water quality standards.

On the other hand, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 clearly reserves to the federal government the field of regulation of atomic energy, except as that jurisdiction has been relinquished to the states under agreements entered into pursuant to Section 274. By reason of the preemption to the aec of jurisdiction over regulation of by-product, source, and special nu­clear materials, states have no jurisdiction to adopt standards relative to such materials, including those contained in effluents, in the absence of an agreement with the aec. Those states which have entered into agreements are, by the terms of the agreements, obligated to use their best efforts to assure that their regulatory programs continue to be compatible with the aec’s program. It should be noted that Section 274 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 also establishes the Federal Radiation Council, and provides for its functions to include guidance for federal agencies in the formulation of radiation standards and in the establishment and execution of programs of cooperation with states (see pp. 148-149 below).

Finally, if, contrary to the view expressed above, the fwpc Act of 1965 could be construed as a grant of authority to the states, this together with the fact that such authority was granted subsequent to enactment of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and Section 274 thereof in 1959 would in no way disturb the foregoing conclusions.

It is a recognized principle of statutory construction that subsequent legislation is not presumed to effectuate an amendment of a law not under consideration, in the absence of an express amendment, unless the terms of the subsequent act are so inconsistent with the provisions of the prior law that they cannot stand together.* No such incompatibility or incon­sistency would appear to exist here as to require invocation of the excep­tion to this general rule of statutory construction.

The questions that have arisen with respect to limits on low-level re­leases have raised again the associated question of whether the states have or should have a right to establish standards different from those of the aec. Congress has already recognized the states’ interest in applying their general health and safety powers to atomic activities being carried on within their borders. To this end, Congress has carefully spelled out the areas in which the states may participate in regulating the use of reactor — produced isotopes, the source materials uranium and thorium, and small quantities of special nuclear materials. On the other hand, by law the aec may not relinquish to a state the authority to regulate the construction and operation of nuclear reactors. These federal-state relationships are gov­erned by the 1959 amendments to the Atomic Energy Act, which were sponsored and approved by the Eisenhower administration. In order to

relinquish its authority under these provisions of the Act, the aec must find that a state’s regulatory program is adequate to protect the public health and safety and is compatible with the aec’s regulatory program. To date twenty-one states have entered into agreements with the aec to as­sume the regulatory responsibilities which it is permitted to relinquish.

Regulating nuclear power is a complex and difficult task which re­quires a high level of technical expertise. There are several types of re­actors and many different types of effluent control systems. All of these design features interact with one another, and are related not only to con­trol of radioactive effluents but also to other important safety considera­tions. This makes evaluation of the complex interrelationship of radio­logical and design considerations and other plant safety considerations difficult. For example, the in-depth safety reviews by the aec regulatory staff of an application for a construction permit for a single nuclear power plant require the full-time efforts of several highly trained technical per­sonnel over a period of many months. Safety reviews for an operating li­cense require a comparable effort. Additional extensive efforts are devoted to reviews by the acrs, by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, and by a Licensing Appeals Board or the Commission itself.

Considerations such as these led Congress to reserve regulation of the radiological safety aspects of nuclear power plants to the aec rather than to the individual states. It is quite possible that conflicting design and operation requirements in this highly complex area by dual regula­tion might detract from the public health and safety.

This leads to the question of how the states can most effectively par­ticipate in the area of radiological safety. First of all, they can take advan­tage of the mechanism specifically provided by Congress — namely, in regulating the use of reactor-produced isotopes, to accommodate the in­terests of the states in this area. This would help them acquire the exper­tise which is needed in the technically complex field of radiological health and safety. Another area relating to nuclear power plants which lends itself to much closer cooperation between the states and the aec is envir­onmental monitoring in the vicinity of nuclear facilities. Such monitoring is intended to confirm that the environment is being adequately protected from contamination by radioactivity.

It appears to me that the aec might work out programs with the states on environmental monitoring. Under such programs, the federal government could provide technical assistance and perhaps some finan­cial support where required. In this regard, the aec is cooperating with the Public Health Service in its efforts to develop criteria for planning en­vironmental monitoring programs appropriate for nuclear power reactors.

At the present time there are at least two states that carry out sizable en­vironmental monitoring programs around the nuclear facilities in their states, and eight others carry out more limited programs. The data devel­oped in these programs have been very useful in evaluating the signif­icance of releases from some of the nuclear facilities. The aec already is beginning discussions with a few of the states toward a contractual ar­rangement for collaboration with the aec in collecting and evaluating environmental data. The aec is placing high priority on developing this program and, as experience is gained, will explore the interest of other states in the program.