This refers to all sub-professional level personnel who have scientific and technical training at an appreciable level beyond the 12th grade but less than the minimum educational requirement of the professional level. Technicians are trained persons who are broadly knowledgeable in such disciplines as mechanical, chemical, electrical or electronic technology, or who have specialized knowledge and capability in specific fields such as radiation protection, instrumentation, materials testing, quality control and process control.

A typical distribution of the technician-level workforce for a nuclear power programme might be approximately as shown in Fig. 6.2.

For servicing a nuclear power programme over an extended period of time, it would be essential to have national capabilities in a number of technical and operational management areas beyond conventional engineering. Some of the technical areas are reactor physics, reactor chemistry, radiation protection, management of reactor core, management of spent fuel, reactor control and management of radioactive waste arising from reactor opera­tion. Examples of operational management areas are development of tech­nical specifications for operation and operational procedures including those for upset conditions and for accident management, configuration control of the plant and various administrative procedures for round-the — clock operation of the NPP. Technical capabilities are also necessary for carrying out thermal hydraulic analysis, ageing assessment of systems, struc­tures and components and probabilistic safety assessment. National capa­bilities in these fields can be developed by getting personnel trained abroad in theory as well as in operation of a nuclear power plant of a design similar to the one envisaged to be established in the country. A good method could be to begin with setting up a research reactor and getting personnel trained in this facility first.

Justification has to prove that the benefits from a programme, or from the installation of the activity analysed, will override the ensuing risks and detriments. Therefore, all terms in the equation have to be defined and quantified to the best possible level. Not all elements can be quantified, nor do they use the same metrics. Moreover, not all benefits, or the risks and detriments, relate to the same recipients. Economic, social and environmen­tal benefits should apply to well-defined receptors, defined as follows: [3]

• The nation: an improvement of the country’s energy independence; an upgrading of the reliability and security of electricity production; an improvement in the country’s scientific and technical expertise

• Individuals within the area of influence: an increase in monetary reve­nues through taxes and subsidies; a development of business and com­mercial transactions; a reduction of unemployment.

Similarly, risks and detriments also have an effect on the same receptors:

• The world: expansion of proliferation risks; an increase of radiation risks coming from worldwide activities related to fuel cycle activities; a growth in the international transportation of nuclear materials and radioactive waste

• The nation: an increase in the final repository of radioactive waste; an increase in activities related to emergency management; the radiological environmental impact of installations and related activities

• Individuals within the area of influence: risks from radiation exposure to radioactive effluents (planned exposures); risks associated with emer­gency situations (potential exposures); non-radiological environmental impacts.

Some of the items above are amenable to quantification in monetary terms or by other means, but most of them are subjective and country-dependent. The items amenable to quantification will be considered in detail, whilst those which are subjective are treated as such in the following paragraphs. Both the benefits and the risks and detriments are closely associated with characteristics specific to nuclear energy, and discussion of them constitutes the backbone of this chapter. The risks and detriments come from the need to prevent and mitigate accidents with radiological effects, the generation of radionuclides by fission and activation, and the generation of strategic materials.

The Indian Advanced Heavy Water Reactor (AHWR) has been designed by Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) to achieve large-scale use of thorium for the generation of commercial nuclear power. This reactor will produce most of its power from thorium, with no external input of uranium- 233 in the equilibrium cycle. The AHWR is a 300 MWe, vertical, pressure tube type, boiling light water-cooled, and heavy water-moderated reactor. The reactor incorporates a number of passive safety features and is associ­ated with a closed fuel cycle, thus having reduced environmental impact. At the same time, efforts have been made to incorporate several features that are likely to reduce its capital and operating costs. The basic design of the reactor and detailed design of its major nuclear systems have been com­pleted. The research, design, and demonstration (RD&D) for AHWR has been and is being performed at the BARC. The Indian Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) has carried out a pre-licensing safety appraisal of the AHWR. Subsequently, the regulatory clearances for different stages of construction, starting from plant siting and procurement of long-delivery major equipment, will be progressively sought. The construction of the AHWR prototype is likely to commence in 2011.

The group is defined in terms of professional standing. The operating company may employ some members of this group, while others may report to organizations such as governments, engineering companies, research laboratories, and universities. Their common goal is to establish and main­tain the scientific and technical information necessary to carry on the nuclear enterprises. In addition, it is their responsibility to carry on their activities within the bounds of high professional and ethical standards. On occasion, these goals come into conflict with some of the goals of the orga­nizations in which these professionals are employed, particularly in matters of judgment on the importance of particular technical facts. In such cases their employer must recognize the requirements of professional conduct under which the scientific/technical group operates.

The scientific/technical group assists the designer/builder and the operat­ing company in defining the equipment and procedures necessary to achieve safe operation. This group also deals directly with the public in explaining the details of nuclear power technology and answering any concerns that they express. In our society, the scientific/technical group has a very high rating of credibility with the public. This trust rests, of course, on their con­tinued adherence to the high professional and ethical standards noted above. One this credibility is lost it can be very difficult to recover. This is one reason that employers must recognize their need to speak openly and honestly in areas of their own professional competence. The scientific/tech — nical group must also recognize their special position as trusted interpreters of technology to the public. In recent years there have been many cases in which members of this group misused this trust by making unsubstantiated claims on one side or the other of the nuclear power controversy. The overall effect has been a reduction in the credibility of this group with the public. In summary, the major roles of the scientific/technical group are (a) to provide reliable technical data for design, operation, and licensing, and (b) to inform the public of the realities of nuclear energy technology.

In the older Canadian licensing tradition, three special safety functions were designated — shut down, close the containment boundary, and cool the fuel. (These functions are universally recognized in international docu­ments and practice.) The unavailability of each system was required to be less than 10-3 per demand. Recognizing the primary importance of reactor shutdown after some abnormal occurrence, two independent shutdown systems were required after the first commercial 43-unit plant was installed at Pickering. Regular testing of each of the special safety systems was required during plant operation; test results were reported to the regulatory agency in order to ensure that each unavailability requirement was being met. (In practice they were not always met; subsequent effort then imme­diately became an action item on the part of the operating organization.)

In order to meet its second responsibility — to provide for the application of its standards — the IAEA carries out a number of safety-related activities. These include fostering information exchange, encouraging research and development, providing technical assistance to developing Member States, promoting education and training and rendering a number of safety ser­vices, such as radiological assessments of contaminated environments, the evaluation of accidents, and radiation protection appraisals carried out by international peers. In addition, any Member State may request the assis­tance of the IAEA in setting up a project involving nuclear technology and, before approving the project, the IAEA’s Board of Governors is required to give due consideration to ‘the adequacy of proposed health and safety standards. . .’. The IAEA is also responsible for international nuclear safe­guards and — with respect to any IAEA project, or other arrangement where the IAEA is requested by the parties concerned to apply safeguards — has the right and responsibility ‘to require the observance of any health and safety measure prescribed by the IAEA’ and ‘to send into the territory of the recipient State or States inspectors. . . to determine whether there is compliance with [such] health and safety measures.’

In the case of the five NPT declared NWSs, the provisions contained in Articles I, III, IV and VI of the NPT are of direct relevance to the issue of safeguards. For example, each NWS undertakes ‘. . . not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices’.[17] NWSs are also obliged not to provide any NNWS with source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material unless the material is subject to the safeguards.[18]

In exchange for the commitments made by the NNWS Parties to the NPT, the NWSs affirm that the NWS shall undertake negotiations on effective measures for nuclear arms reductions with the goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons (i. e., nuclear disarmament).[19]

Though they are not required to have a safeguards agreement with the IAEA, each NWS has chosen to do so. A NWS’s safeguards agreement with the IAEA is referred to as a Voluntary Offer Agreement (VOA).[20] The IAEA recognizes that VOAs serve two purposes: to ‘broaden the IAEA’s safeguards experience at advanced facilities, and to demonstrate that nuclear-weapon States are not commercially advantaged by being exempt from safeguards on their peaceful nuclear activities’, as explained in IAEA (2007b), page 7. In practice, the safeguards measures implemented in accordance with VOAs are only applied with regard to declared nuclear material in selected facilities in one or more of the five States.

The main reason for reprocessing is to separate the remaining uranium and plutonium in the fuel from fission products and transuranic elements other than plutonium, so that these materials can be reused as material for new fuel (MOX fuel with plutonium mixed with uranium or REPU fuel with reprocessed uranium).

During reprocessing the spent fuel is dissolved in hot nitric acid and the solution is subsequently exposed to several chemical processing steps to

separate the different components. In the present reprocessing facilities four main product streams can be distinguished:

• Uranium

• Plutonium

• Fission products and transuranic elements other than plutonium

• The metal components of the fuel element (fuel cladding, end pieces and spacers).

The uranium and plutonium are purified such that they can be either reused as MOX fuel or re-enriched to form REPU fuel, while the waste streams are treated and conditioned as described in Section 14.3.3.

At present two large reprocessing facilities, La Hague in France and Sellafield in the UK, are in operation, with a capacity of 1600 and 800 tonnes of spent fuel per year (measured as heavy metal (HM)) respectively. A third large facility (800 tonnes HM/year) is in pre-commercial testing at Rokkasho in Japan. Smaller reprocessing plants (100-400 tHM/year) are in operation in Russia, India, Japan and China. Approximately 15-20% of the spent fuel being generated today is reprocessed. The remainder is stored for direct disposal or a future decision to reprocess.

Reprocessing is a proven industrial technology. Development work is going on to increase the proliferation resistance (e. g. by not producing separated plutonium). Recycling of the plutonium as MOX fuel in light water reactors as well as the reprocessed uranium is also performed on a routine basis, in particular in France. The economy of reprocessing and recycling in LWR will differ from country to country. The situation is quite different for a country with its own reprocessing facility than for a customer country. Some countries also have political concerns about reprocessing. All in all this has led to the situation that today reprocessing plants are not fully utilized and most countries have adopted a wait-and-see position.

The increasing expectations for nuclear power use in the future have, however, revived the interest in reprocessing and recycling. Several initia­tives have been launched over the last few years to increase the interna­tional cooperation in this field, e. g. the International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO) (IAEA, 2010), the Generation IV International Forum (GIF, http://www. gen-4.org/ ), and the International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation (IFNEC, earlier the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP)).

For nuclear energy to be sustainable in the long term (more than a few hundred years) it will be necessary to introduce at some time fast reactors that will utilize the uranium resource in a more efficient way. The real eco­nomic value of recycling will only come with the development of fast reac­tors. The important question for spent fuel management is when fast reactors will be introduced such that recycling can have a real impact.

The waste from reprocessing, i. e. HLW containing fission products and transuranic elements, and ILW containing the metal components of the fuel elements and secondary waste, will require geological disposal after condi­tioning. The heat generation from the HLW needs to be considered in the design of the repository. Development work is going on to also separate out the transuranic elements during reprocessing to reduce the long-term heat generation (over >100 years) and also the radiotoxicity of the high-level waste (advanced reprocessing). This would have the potential to simplify the design of the repository and the long-term safety assessment (although the transuranic elements rarely are dominating the doses in the safety assessment). To achieve this gain, the separated transuranic elements will need to be recycled and burned in a fast reactor system. As for fast reactors, this development will require at least another 50 years for commercial introduction.

Launching a nuclear programme has social impacts at different levels: at a national level it can mean a political choice regarding the energy mix and a carbon-free energy policy; at a local level, it can mean local development and employment on one hand, and environmental impacts on human health and nature on the other. Both these two levels need to be addressed. In a newcomer country, national public opinion needs to be prepared, which means providing educational information about the energy mix, and on the advantages and drawbacks of each energy source, and analysing nuclear power’s risks and benefits from the perspective of a comparison with other sources of electricity generation, notably by distinguishing carbon-free sources (nuclear power, hydraulics and new renewable energies) and fossil sources. Such programmes need to give people objective information about all energy sources and not just about nuclear power. If nuclear power is considered without comparison to other sources, a large part of the public will probably focus on accident risks, on radioactivity’s potential risk to human health, and on long-term radioactive waste — the main arguments developed by nuclear opponents everywhere in the world. All dimensions of energy policy need to be taken into account, including security of supply and the prevention of global climate change, and not just assessed over the short term.

Many studies have been implemented in order to help decision-makers plan an energy policy and to define the respective shares of different energy sources, particularly electricity generation sources. No approach benefits from a total consensus, and social impacts of the choice of energy source are the more controversial, since they are the most difficult to quantify. The tools proposed therefore have to be considered as an heuristic framework to discuss the different energy options, and to make the choices more trans­parent and open to debate. A comprehensive set of indicators to compare technologies is given by Hirschberg et al. (2004).

Table 16.1 provides a framework of indicators covering the main aspects of nuclear choice. The respective weight of each dimension is an important part of the political choice. They depend, of course, on the national context,

political stability, economic data, financing capacities, geographical con­straints (primary resources, geopolitics, etc.), the country’s development and growth, and so on. Countries like Japan or France, which have few or no fossil fuel resources, have a more evident need for nuclear power, for security of supply and to reduce costly imports of fossil fuels. However, the total costs of a nuclear programme must include what might be called ‘infrastructure costs’: human resources, a legal framework, a safety author­ity, perhaps an industrial supply chain, etc. In a non-nuclear country envi­sioning the launch of a nuclear programme, it is necessary to undertake an opportunity study, to assess energy and electricity needs and to compare the merits of each energy source. In 2007, IAEA published a guide for newcomers, known as Milestones in the Development of a National Infrastructure for Nuclear Power, which precisely exposes the infrastructure requirements needed, and indicates the steps needed to assess their readi­ness (IAEA, 2007).