Part 2 of the PA 2008 empowers the Secretary of State to publish NPS, fol­lowing Parliamentary scrutiny, in relation to specified descriptions of devel­opment. The introduction of NPS is part of the strategy to expedite planning timeframes. By formalising government policy in advance in an overarching document, NPS are meant to avoid policy disputes being raised further down the line in respect of specific project applications. In November 2009, the UK government published a draft overarching NPS for energy (EN-1) and a draft NPS specific to nuclear power generation (EN-6) which, at the time of publication, are still in draft form. The consideration of environ­mental impacts figures prominently in both draft NPS and certain core areas have been specifically highlighted in the context of nuclear develop­ment such as flood risk, water quality and resources, coastal change and biodiversity and geological conservation (EN-6, p. 27). These impacts will need to be addressed by applicants in their environmental assessments and the IPC is obliged to ensure that they have been adequately factored into their decision-making. Another way in which environmental impacts have been taken into account in the draft nuclear NPS is in the siting of new power stations. Part 5 of the NPS identifies 10 potentially suitable sites for new development. The assessment criteria included a consideration of certain environmental impacts, and the sites were chosen following consul­tation with the UK environment agencies.

Principle 3 of the INSAG document on NPP siting described in Section 18.3 addresses the study of the feasibility of an emergency plan in the site selected. Emergency planning, the last barrier to protect the health and safety of the population, has a considerable relevance. In the IAEA safety guide already quoted (IAEA, 2002b) the site-related aspects of nuclear emergencies are introduced: ‘There should be no adverse site conditions which could hinder the sheltering or evacuation of the population in the region or the ingress or egress of external services needed to deal with an emergency.’ Sheltering in people’s own houses is the most elementary way to protect people; to make sheltering effective some basic procedures have to be put in place. Electricity and sufficient water and food should be avail­able; special population groups such as residents in hospitals and prisons will also demand special services.

Poorly developed transport and communications networks or the pres­ence of industrial activities may impair the rapid and free movement of people and vehicles in case of evacuation to safer places. Such places should be defined and be prepared beforehand, with alternatives in case they also become contaminated. In case evacuation routes have to pass close to the affected plant new routes have to be open. The Chernobyl-4 and Fukushima-1 accidents have demonstrated the need for permanent or prolonged dis­placement, a situation that needs government attention. The cited IAEA safety guide includes the following list of items to be considered for an efficient emergency plan:

• Population density and distribution in the region

• Distance of the site from population centres

• Special groups of the population who are difficult to evacuate or shelter, such as people in hospitals or prisons, or nomadic groups

• Particular geographical features such as islands, mountains and rivers

• Characteristics of local transport and communications networks

• Industrial facilities which may entail potentially hazardous activities

• Agricultural activities that are sensitive to possible discharges of radionuclides

• Possible concurrent external events.

The last item has particular interest. Evacuation may have to be conducted under heavy fog or snowfall or concurrent with other major natural phe­nomena such as an earthquake and tsunami as in the case of the 2011 Fukushima event.

The IAEA has developed a series of requirements and safety guides on emergency planning. A requirements document (IAEA, 2002c) addresses the logistic support and facilities needed as well as the training drills and exercises which should be conducted on a periodic basis. These require­ments are further developed in a safety guide (IAEA, 2007b) in which Appendix VIII describes the conditions that emergency facilities and loca­tions should comply with.

The commercial conditions (CC) is the BIS document in which the owner establishes the information required from the bidder as regards prices, price breakdown, price escalation formulae, payment terms and schedule, and other commercial conditions for the scope of supply and services offered.

The owner must request all information regarding prices and commercial conditions to be provided in sufficient detail to facilitate the economic and financial evaluation of the bids and to serve as the basis for establishing the commercial conditions of the contract.

All safety-related anomalies should be reported to the RB within the stipu­lated time frame. These should cover safety-related anomalies in operation, violation of any licensing condition or technical specifications for operation and exceeding of any prescribed limits, like those for radiation exposure of personnel or discharge of radioactive effluents to the environment. The reports should describe the incident in reasonable detail together with an analysis that identifies the apparent causes, and the root cause of the inci­dent. They should also include the proposed corrective actions and schedule for their implementation.

If a safety limit, as prescribed in the technical specifications for operation, gets violated, the reactor must be shut down immediately and a report on the incident submitted to the RB giving details of the incident and the circumstances that caused the violation. Reactor operation can be resumed only after a detailed review of the incident and clearance from the RB. The RB should review these reports in detail according to a laid-down proce­dure with the primary aim of determining whether the incident occurred due to equipment failure or human error, or on account of any shortcoming in procedures or their implementation.

The following list of activities, discussed in more detail in Sections 4.6 to 4.10, should be considered as the core regulatory functions:

• Development of a regulatory pyramid (Section 4.6)

• Licensing (Section 4.7)

• Verification and oversight during construction and operation (Section 4.8):

— independent review and assessment

— regulatory inspections

• Enforcement function (Section 4.9)

• Transparency and openness, and the relationship with the operating organization and other stakeholders (Section 4.10).

This section will describe a systematic approach to organisational design; it will also describe the reasons for and the means of monitoring and evaluating organisational effectiveness and identification of areas for improvement.

5.1.5 Systematic approach to organisational design

When designing any organisation the first requirement is to determine the purpose of the organisation:

• The business it will serve

• The functions that must be performed

• The tasks that must be performed

• The responsibilities that must be discharged

• The competencies that will be required

• The resources that will be needed.

Using the systematic approach to organisational design, it is also possible to determine the knowledge skills and attitudes required to fulfil those tasks.

In the preconstruction and construction phases the work will involve, for example:

• Design appraisal

• Financial appraisal

• Site selection

• Contract management

• Project management

• Quality assurance

• Legal and regulatory activities.

In the construction phase, industrial safety management is a very important and significant challenge. It is also necessary to have the capability of moni­toring and evaluating the standard of construction, the integrity of plant installation and, in the case of turnkey contracts, establishing a project management overview.

Commissioning activities require the plant installation to be physically checked for compliance with legal and safety requirements as well as sound engineering practices prior to the test programmes to demonstrate compli­ance with safety and design performance characteristics. The skill sets will not be dissimilar to those required for normal operation and maintenance. In many cases these activities are carried out directly, or independently verified by members of the operating organisation that will eventually run the plant.

The construction and commissioning phases will be the subject of regula­tory licence conditions in respect of staffing and competencies required (see Chapter 22 on commissioning).

The functions and activities performed in nuclear power plants are described in the WANO/INPO/IAEA Performance Objectives and Criteria (POs and Cs) used in peer reviews and OSART missions. Similar POs and Cs exist for the corporate functions associated with the management of NPPs.

For a nuclear power plant typical functions are:

• Organisation and administration

• Operations

• Maintenance

• Engineering

• Chemistry

• Radiological protection

• Emergency preparedness

• Training

• Fire protection.

In addition there are a number of what are called cross-functional areas which address such things as safety culture, industrial safety and work man­agement. NPP organisations also need functions such as organisational administration, human resources, quality assurance and finance that are not prescribed in the WANO/INPO and IAEA POs and Cs.

In addition to determining the functional groups required, the structure has to be determined. Spans of control and the number of direct reports for leaders and managers, aggregation of synergistic groups, and the levels in the organisation must be determined. In many cases the management structure and resources associated with the management of nuclear power installations will need to be formally approved by the regulatory authorities and will be the subject of regulatory oversight for the duration of the licence.

Changes to such organisations are usually treated in a similar way to design changes for plant and equipment, including the need for regulatory approval prior to any change in some cases.

A. CARNINO, Consultant in Safety, Management of Safety,

Safety Culture and Security, France

Abstract: This chapter deals with the nuclear fuel cycle and briefly reviews all its phases. Nuclear power plants are then considered through their lifecycle and the development of new power plants is examined from the time of decision to embark on a nuclear programme to the decommissioning phase.

Key words: nuclear fuel cycle, nuclear power plant lifecycle, safety principles, requirements for new NPPs, international conventions, site selection, design, construction, commissioning, operation, transportation, security, decommissioning and dismantling, nuclear waste management.

2.1 Introduction

For countries deciding to launch or rebuild a nuclear power programme it is important to understand that it is a commitment of some 100 years which also requires the accomplishment of a number of steps before the final construction decision is taken. Considerations need to be given to the knowledge of the whole fuel cycle, its constraints and its requirements. In addition, economic factors linked to loan availability as well as the means to implement good safety procedures constitute prerequisites.

Before construction, the main design features are assessed and approved. At this point the potential regulatory uncertainties need to be clarified. The regulatory body needs detailed construction plans, clear schedules, outlines of responsibilities of parties and information on resources required and how the licensee is to assess its own work. It is also necessary to review the way in which the licensee will promote a safety culture to its subcontractors. Significant regulatory effort is necessary during inspections to verify that new manufacturing techniques and new types of equipment meet the speci­fications set by the designer. The regulatory body has to review, assess and inspect, on a systematic basis, the development of the design of the instal­lation as demonstrated in the safety documentation, in accordance with an agreed programme.

During construction, the regulatory body assesses and verifies the follow­ing: the management system of the applicant or licensee and the vendors and its subcontractors; the documentation relating to demonstration of compliance of the selected design with safety objectives and criteria, includ­ing validated results from experiments and research programmes; and the organizational and financial arrangements for decommissioning and for management of radioactive waste and spent fuel.

The World Association of Nuclear Operators unites every company and country in the world with an operating commercial nuclear power plant to achieve the highest possible standards of nuclear safety. The WANO Mission is to maximize the safety and reliability of nuclear power plants worldwide by working together to assess, benchmark and improve performance through mutual support, exchange of information and emulation of best practices.

5.1.1 Responsibility for safety

The prime responsibility for safety in nuclear power plants must rest with the person or organisation responsible for the facilities and activities that give rise to risks.

Principle 1 of the IAEA Fundamental Safety Principles (IAEA, 2006a, page 6) states: ‘The responsibilities are defined in a license, granted to the licensee by the state regulators.’ In summary, the licensee is responsible for ensuring that the workforce, the general public and the environment are protected from risks and hazards that might arise from the operation of nuclear facilities. The licence describes those measures that must be taken by the licensee to safeguard against those risks.

Those responsibilities cannot be delegated but work associated with the enactment of those responsibilities can be delegated or outsourced. In such circumstances the licensee must be able to demonstrate effective control over the specification, procurement and enactment of such work.

The management of risks involves maintenance of organisational effec­tiveness and design integrity, and compliance with operating rules and procedures.