Geotechnical hazards are caused by slope instability, collapse, subsidence or uplift of the site surface, solid liquefaction and anomalous behaviour of foundation materials. Slope instabilities can be produced by landslides or snow avalanches with the possibility of affecting the electrical grid and the water intakes; caves, karstic formations, underground rivers, mines and water, gas or oil wells may cause collapse, subsidence or even uplifts of the site surface, affecting building structures; solid liquefaction induced by earthquakes has the potential of causing differential movements among builds connected by pipes and cables; and foundation materials may also produce differential movements among buildings, requiring a good knowl­edge of the foundation materials and their properties under static and seismic loadings.

An IAEA safety guide addresses the geotechnical aspects to be consid­ered in site evaluation and foundations for NPPs (IAEA, 2005). The guide describes the many geological aspects that must be evaluated, the observa­tions to be conducted and the laboratory tests to be performed. Special attention is given to the stability of the site and the foundations, necessary for the design basis of the major buildings. Such parameters, mainly the stability of the foundations, need to be reassessed during site preconstruc­tion activities and monitored during the operational life of the plant.

The requirements for adequate project control by the owner should be established in this section. Subjects to be covered are schedule updating and periodic submittal procedures; project progress control and prepara­tion guidelines for project progress reports, indicating the minimum infor­mation to be included and the frequency of submittal; control of project design criteria to be prepared by the vendor, and containing the project design basis, as well as functional and technical baselines, organised by project discipline (e. g. nuclear safety, mechanical, electrical, instrumentation and control, civil engineering); licensing and permitting process, covering both the nuclear licensing of the facility and the conventional permits to be obtained; project design changes and configuration control requirements; description of the vendor’s system for procurement and material manage­ment, including vendor procedures for requesting bids for the purchase of equipment and materials, preparation of subcontract packages, award and administration of subcontracts, as well as indication of the procurement documentation required both from the vendor and his subcontractors (such as equipment specifications, inspection plans, test procedures, quality reports, manufacturing schedules); control and follow-up of subcontractors; and traceability system implemented to follow up on the procurement process, and how it should be supported by an information management system accessible to the owner.

The responsibility for safety requires that the operator establishes and maintains the necessary competencies of both staff and management for safe operations. This entails providing adequate training and effective knowledge management, establishing a culture and methodologies to main­tain safety under all conditions, and verifying that all activities and pro­cesses carried out by the plant staff are safe. Since several generations of operators will likely be involved over the lifetime of the plant, which could be 60 years or longer for modern plants, knowledge management must include effective knowledge transfer mechanisms. The IAEA has published a Safety Guide that provides information on the recruitment, qualification and training of NPP staff (IAEA, 2002d). The need for human resources in establishing a nuclear power programme is considered in Chapter 6.

Operator qualifications are usually prescribed by the operating license. To approve the qualifications, the regulator requires that the licensee provide information that the licensed operator meets the applicable quali­fication requirements in the license, has successfully completed the relevant training programme and examinations referred to in the license, and is capable in the opinion of the licensee of performing the duties for the posi­tion. Usually, the certification is for a set period of time and must be renewed. To renew the certification, the regulator may require the licensee to provide evidence that the licensed operator has safely and competently performed the duties of the position, has continued to receive the relevant training referred to in the license, has completed the requalification tests required by the licensee, and in the view of the licensee is capable of con­tinuing to perform the duties of the position.

A license may also require an operator to successfully complete an exam­ination administered by the RB to become certified. The operator may take the examination only after the regulator receives from the licensee an application that includes a statement that the person has successfully com­pleted the applicable training programme referred to in the license. The licensee is required to keep detailed records of staff training. This can include the status of each worker’s qualification, requalification and train­ing, including the results of all tests and examinations required under the license.

The minimum essential activities which must be performed by a country itself are:

• Procurement of uranium, uranium conversion and enrichment and fuel fabrication, involving 4-6 persons.

• Fuel management at the power plant and disposal of spent fuel. It is usually the responsibility of the owner of the nuclear power plant to carry out these tasks.

• Waste management: without reprocessing, the back-end activities will possibly require 100-200 people.

If additional fuel cycle activities are taken up in the country, such as uranium exploration and production, or fuel element fabrication, specific organiza­tions and the corresponding manpower will be required to carry out the tasks.

At the end of the plant life and for decommissioning purposes, including decontamination, dismantling, asset recovery, waste processing, storage and disposal, around 500-1000 staff will be necessary.

An example of the overall manpower requirements during the different stages of a nuclear power project is illustrated in Fig. 6.1 adapted from

IAEA (1980). The data do not include resources for equipment and com­ponent manufacturing.

During the pre-project and early implementation phases, a relatively small number of highly qualified professionals are needed. The require­ments start to substantially increase when commitments are made (letter of intent, contract) to install the plant. The activities which have by far the largest manpower requirements are manufacturing and construction.

The training process needs to be well documented following international training quality standards. It will be necessary, therefore, to develop a minimum set of training procedures relating to:

• Training needs analysis

• Training programme design

• Training material development

• Exam development

• Delivering training sessions

• Trainee performance evaluation

• Instructor training and qualification

• Training system effectiveness evaluation.

Training programmes and materials

The development of the training materials (instructor guidelines, student handouts or training aids) is one of the activities that require most time and resources.

Training programmes include proposed long-range training schedules for each programme and a description of how these training schedules will be updated and maintained.

The documentation needed for plant operation and maintenance and design updating needs to be included in the vendor’s scope of supply. This documentation should be structured in such a way as to facilitate effective knowledge transfer to be included in training materials.

184 Infrastructure and methodologies for justification of NPPs Instructors

It is very important to define the recruitment sources, selection criteria and training programmes for instructors and subject matter experts. Usually instructors need to demonstrate proficiency and experience in the field they are going to teach and to be trained on a specific training programme for trainers, in order to acquire the pedagogical skills needed to be able to put into practice the training quality assurance programme.

At this stage it is necessary to have:

• The instructor training programme description for initial and continuing training

• The initial and continuing training requirements for on-the-job trainer and task performance evaluator qualification (or the references to the procedure requirements)

• The process for maintaining instructors’ technical knowledge and proficiency

• Guidelines for the observations of instructor performance.

Towards building adequate human resources for the longer term and for the future expansion of the nuclear power programme in the country, there should be regular induction of fresh manpower. These personnel should be trained in the various aspects of nuclear science and technology as described in Section 7.2.2. Further training in specific fields should be provided while working in their respective areas in the country and by deputing them to institutions abroad engaged in advanced work.

At the NPP site a training centre should be established for training of personnel in O&M of the NPP. This centre should have facilities for class­room training, training using models of equipment and a training simulator. The training centre should also conduct refresher training and training for relicensing and upgrading the licenses of staff as necessary.

Experienced O&M personnel should be inducted in technical services functions such as refuelling outage planning, development of plant modifi­cation proposals and review of operational activities for possible improve­ments. Subsequently these experienced personnel can be engaged in the task of setting up new NPPs. Experienced O&M personnel can also be effectively utilized in carrying out the regulatory and technical support functions.

The Advanced Pressurized Water Reactor (APWR) is a four-loop PWR developed jointly by a group of Japanese utilities, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) and Westinghouse, that relies on a combination of active and passive safety systems. It is currently made available by MHI. The high-capacity APWR, with 1534 MWe (1700 MWe in Europe and the US), takes advantage of economies of scale and uses high-performance steam generators and low-pressure turbines with very large last-stage blades. The APWR allows operation with long fuel cycles, and increased flexibility such as the use of low-enriched fuel in order to reduce uranium requirements, the use of MOX cores and high burn-up fuels. The neutron economy and the long-term reliability of the reactor vessel have been improved with the use of a neutron reflector. The container includes a steel liner to prevent leakage surrounded by the concrete structure that provides structural protection. As in other evolutionary designs, the con­struction of the APWR also takes advantage of modularization and advanced design, simulation and management computer programs. Two APWRs are planned to be built at Tsuruga-3 and 4 in Japan, and several more in the United States.

The concept of safety culture was introduced to the nuclear industry in 1986, shortly after the disastrous accident at the Chernobyl Unit 4 in the Ukraine. The concept originated in the chemical industry, where it had been shown to enhance human performance by emphasizing the individual responsibili­ties of operators for the safe performance of the facility.

The International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG) has issued two documents, INSAG-4 (1991) and INSAG-15 (2002), on the subject of safety culture. Safety culture is included as one of the important manage­ment principles (IAEA, 2006, p. 8). Safety culture has been defined many times in several different ways. On the other hand, the idea itself seems to be quite simple — it is a methodology intended to maximize human perform­ance. Figure 10.2 represents a cycle of human performance that we all can recognize. Some days we feel bright and confident, ready to deal with any situation that arises during our working day. On other days we feel that we are (almost) superhuman. Then, there are days when boredom sets in, and nothing seems to be worth doing. And lastly, there are days when we are unsure of our ability to perform any complex task in a competent fashion.

Now, imagine a group of people trying to complete a cooperative task. Some happen to be at the high point in their cycle and others at the low point. The supervisor’s job description says that he is to make the whole group perform in the upper-right quadrant of the cycle; that is, with safety and confidence. However, he or she is also human, and subject to the same cyclic behaviour.

If the group is ‘in sync’, and all are operating in the upper right quadrant, a great deal of valuable work can be done. But if the group is ‘in sync’ and all are at a low point in their personal cycles, then the whole group is inef­fective, and possibly unsafe.

The job descriptions often referred to as ‘senior management’ can exert a powerful influence on this success-failure cycle. They can consistently encourage staff to work up to their best potential and thereby tend to keep them in the high-performance category, or they can discourage staff by their own attitude, job performance, or opinions of their work groups they peri­odically express.

‘Safety culture’ refers, therefore, to a complex matter involving human behaviour in groups. Since human beings are by far the most complex element in any power plant, it is vital to study and maintain sound

methodologies and organizational infrastructure that work best within the larger social culture of the local community. This subject is at least as impor­tant to safe operations as are the hardware and equipment installed in the plant.

Risk experts (Mullane, 2006) have identified a pattern of human response that helps to explain many similar accident events; it is called the ‘normal­ization of deviation’. Looking back at the Toronto Airport case, suppose that the practice of using older tires beyond their service life had succeeded in the past. Since the apparent result showed better airline economics, the practice would be encouraging to management; it would become the normal practice. Certainly, this pattern emerged in the case of the Challenger booster rockets. Previous launches had succeeded even though the O-ring seals had leaked — the practice of launching with off-normal seals had become normal. The same behaviour pattern existed in the case of the Columbia external fuel tank insulation failure. Insulation had fallen off the tank during launch several times and had sometimes hit the orbiter, but the mission still succeeded. Observing insulation loss during launch had become normal. It will not be surprising if this same pattern emerges from the Deepwater Horizon investigation when that is completed. There are many other earlier examples that could be cited.

Radiation protection applies to all conceivable radiation exposure situa­tions, which can be classified as planned, emergency and existing exposure situations, as follows (ICRP, 2007a):

• Planned exposure situations refer to circumstances involving the planned introduction and operation of sources that may expose people to radiation.

• Emergency exposure situations refer to unexpected accidental condi­tions that may occur during the operation of a planned situation, or from a malicious act, and which require urgent protective attention.

• Existing exposure situations refer to a radiation environment that already exists when a decision on control has to be taken, e. g., natural back­ground radiation exposure situations.

For NPPs, the design and operation stages are clearly planned exposure situations. If an accident occurs, it should be treated as an emergency expo­sure situation. The residual risks that might remain after the decommission­ing and closure of NPPs may be treated as an existing exposure situation (Gonzalez, 2009b).