Operational reviews by independent staff (for example, WANO reviews) are conducted to provide station management with an evaluation con­ducted by independent and experienced professionals. In addition, both national regulatory agencies and the IAEA are available to conduct reviews to ensure that correct operating procedures, training, and maintenance procedures are being followed.

Over the extended operating life of any given plant, new facts may come to light that were unknown at the time of first station operation. When these reviews reveal that some new knowledge has come to light that challenges the overall safety basis of the plant, it may be necessary to install corrective measures or equipment to establish adequate defences.

In no other field of scientific investigation does an international mechanism to achieve global consensus exist compared with that specifically set up for estimating health effects attributable to exposure to ionizing radiation. UNSCEAR has, for nearly half a century, annually assembled leading radia­tion specialists to provide the most plausible estimates of the health risks attributable to radiation exposure, and periodically submitted them to the 192 world governments via the UN General Assembly. The extremely detailed UNSCEAR reports on radiation effects are a synthesis of thou­sands of peer-reviewed references. While it is certainly unfeasible to sum­marize accurately such a vast amount of information, the author has made several brief accounts of UNSCEAR estimates aimed at a broad audience (Gonzalez, 2002, 2004b, 2004c).

UNSCEAR’s estimates have not changed substantially over the past years and can be categorized into two types of effects, namely (1) prompt tissue-reactions that are usually termed ‘deterministic’ effects, because they are determined to occur above certain dose thresholds, and (2) long-term late effects, such as cancer, which are termed ‘stochastic’ effects due to the aleatory nature of their manifestation.

Under the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, the IAEA has the function of collecting and dis­seminating to state parties and member states information concerning methodologies, techniques and available results of research relating to response to such emergencies. One of the actions undertaken by the IAEA to fulfilling its functions has been issuing several safety standards and rec­ommendations on preparedness and response to nuclear and radiological emergencies, as a significant part of its Safety Standards Series.

The Safety Standards Series are issued by the IAEA, hereafter the Agency, in compliance with the terms of Article III of its Statute. This statu­tory provision authorizes the Agency, in cooperation with other relevant international organizations, to establish standards of safety for protection against ionizing radiation and to provide for the application of these stand­ards to peaceful nuclear activities. The Safety Standards Series is composed of all regulatory related publications issued by the Agency, which covers nuclear safety, radiation safety, transport safety and waste safety, and also general safety that is of relevance in two or more of the four areas. These standards are not legally binding on Member States but may be adopted by them, at their own discretion, for use in national regulations in respect of their own activities. However, they are binding on the Agency in relation to its own operations and on states in relation to operations assisted by the Agency.

The Safety Standards Series is a set of publications structured in three

levels:

• Safety Fundamentals set up basic objectives, concepts and principles of safety and protection in the development and application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

• Safety Requirements establish the requirements that must be met to ensure safety. These requirements, which are expressed as ‘shall’ state­ments, are governed by the objectives and principles presented in the Safety Fundamentals.

• Safety Guides recommend actions, conditions or procedures for meeting safety requirements. Recommendations in Safety Guides are expressed as ‘should’ statements, with the implication that it is necessary to take the measures recommended or equivalent alternative measures to comply with the requirements.

Many publications in the Safety Standards Series include rules and rec­ommendations applicable to the nuclear emergency preparedness and response. The most recent restructuring of the series, dated 2006, considers nuclear and radiological emergencies as a general safety topic that has to be taken into account in every nuclear radiation facility or activity and it is treated at all level of the safety documents.

Principle 9 of the Fundamental Safety Principles is the basis for the standards and recommendations on nuclear emergency matters in the Safety Standards Series. Principle 9 is titled: ‘Arrangements must be made for emergency preparedness and response for nuclear or radiation inci­dents’ (IAEA, 2006, p. 14). According to this safety principle (IAEA, 2006, paragraph 3.34) the primarily goals of preparedness and response for a nuclear emergency are:

• ‘To ensure that arrangements are in place for an effective response at the scene and, as appropriate, at the local, regional, national and inter­national levels, to a nuclear or radiation emergency;

• To ensure that, for reasonably foreseeable incidents, radiation risks would be minor;

• For any incidents that do occur, to take practical measures to mitigate any consequences for human life and health and the environment.’

The scope and extent of arrangements for emergency preparedness and response have to reflect the likelihood and the possible consequences of a nuclear or radiation emergency, the characteristics of the radiation risks, and the nature and location of the facilities and activities.

The recommendations of the ICRP on nuclear and radiation emergency matters (ICRP, 1991) are the main basis of the Agency radiation safety standards, and its principles and recommendations are endorsed by the Agency in the document International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources (IAEA, 1996b) that is undergoing a deep revision, now in an advanced stage of development, which will be issued as a Generic Safety Requirement (GRS Part 3). The Basic Safety Standards are also based on assessments of the biological effects of irradiation made by the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, UNSCEAR, and on the recommendations of the Agency’s International Nuclear Safety Group, INSAG.

The Basic Safety Standards were co-sponsored by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, FAO, the International Labour Organization, ILO, the Nuclear Energy Agency, NEA, the Pan­American Health Organization, PAHO, and the World Health Organization, WHO, and represent an international consensus on qualitative and quanti­tative requirements for protection and safety for planned practices such as nuclear power generation and also for intervention in existing situations such as exposure following an accident. It is the most relevant international reference to establish national and regional regulation on radiological pro­tection on, among other relevant topics, occupational radiation protection, protection of the public and the environment from exposure to radioactive materials released to the environment, prevention of incidents giving rise to potential exposures, and intervention in a radiological emergency.

The Basic Safety Standards set out the basic requirements for nuclear and radiological emergency management, providing radiological criteria applicable to emergency response. They are established under the belief that, in most cases after a nuclear or radiological accident, emergency actions are needed if dose rates generated by the accident or the doses that can be prevented by applying emergency measures can lead to significant radiation injury. The Basic Safety Standards also provide guidelines for the implementation of the optimization principle to the measures to be applied in an emergency.

According to the Basic Safety Standards, the protective actions imple­mented to respond to an emergency situation should be oriented to protect individuals potentially affected by the accident, which includes the emer­gency workers and members of the public. Implementation of protective actions should be based on intervention levels expressed in terms of doses that can be avoided with the intervention, considering different exposure pathways, including direct irradiation by radiation emission coming from radioactive contamination of air, soil or water. The decision to implement any countermeasure should be based on the circumstances that actually exist when an emergency happens and, if possible, be taken in anticipation of a possible radioactive release better than when the issue has been con­firmed. The main protective actions recommended to protect individuals are sheltering and evacuation or prophylaxis with stable iodine to prevent internal contamination with radioactive iodine, of people potentially affected by an accidental release. In some special cases, decontamination of individuals and goods could be recommended to reduce the dose and spread of contamination to non-affected areas.

The Basic Safety Standards also give recommendations to prevent chronic exposure by controlling the use of contaminated land and facilities and the consumption of contaminated food and water. Reference levels set up by the FAO-WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission (FAO-WHO, 1991) are recommended to adopt such decisions. In some cases, these countermeasures should be implemented after a careful optimization process taking into account the averted dose and the social and economic consequences of implementing such measures. In this regard, reasonable steps have to be taken to assess exposure incurred by members of the public as a consequence of a nuclear accident, and the results of this assessment should be made public and periodically updated to optimize the implementation of protective measures, until conditions allow the implementation of protective actions according to intervention levels to be discontinued.

In 2002, the Agency issued a Safety Requirements document (IAEA, 2002) specifically applicable to preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency, which incorporates and establishes requirements so that emergency management can be seen in its entirety by the bodies concerned. This document was co-sponsored by the above-mentioned inter­national organizations and the United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs, which were concerned with the harmful potential consequences of nuclear accidents, as a result of the large impact of the Chernobyl accident.

These Safety Requirements compile, organize and augment all the requirements relating to emergency management established in other pub­lications of the Agency. The Safety Requirements are applicable to all those nuclear and radiation practices and sources that have the potential for causing radiation exposure or environmental radioactive contamination warranting an emergency intervention, particularly to facilities hosting nuclear reactors and other nuclear fuel cycle facilities.

The Safety Requirements establish requirements for an adequate level of preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency in any State. Their implementation is intended to minimize the consequences for people, property and the environment of any nuclear or radiological emergency. The fulfilment of these requirements also contributes to the harmonization of arrangements in the event of a transnational emergency. These requirements are intended to be applied by authorities at the national level by means of adopting legislation, establishing regulations and assign­ing responsibilities, and also apply to the off-site jurisdictions that may need to make an emergency intervention in a State.

The Agency also provides recommendations for the implementation of these Safety Requirements in a Safety Guide (IAEA, 2007), which is intended to assist Member States in the application of the Safety Requirements on Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency, and to help in fulfilling the Agency obligations under the Assistance Convention. The Safety Guide provides basic concepts that must be understood to apply the guidance and to meet the requirements, dis­cusses the concept of operations, and describes in general terms how the response should proceed for different types of emergency.

These standards and recommendations are complemented with a series of technical documents, called Emergency Preparedness and Response, oriented to assist Member States in the development of their own capacities to respond to nuclear and radiological emergencies (IAEA, 2003a). This series provides recommendations to establish suitable methods for, among other relevant topics, developing arrangements for response to a nuclear accident; organization and training of first responders to a nuclear emer­gency; preparing, conducting and evaluating emergency exercises; providing medical assistance in case of nuclear and radiation accidents; using radio­metric instrumentation for the response to nuclear and radiation emergen­cies; and developing and implementing adequate procedures for prompt notification and mutual assistance.

Milestone 1

In the early stages of development of a State’s nuclear power programme, valuable advice on staffing levels and organizational structure/responsibili — ties may be realized by asking other SSACs on their experience and per­spectives. In doing so, the questioner will be exposed to various organizational concepts and experiences, and at the same time, will see there are a variety of views on other State responsibilities that may be assigned to the SSAC staff (e. g., responsibility for safety, security, import/export control, safe­guards training). Such input is also helpful when assessing what may be needed in order to increase the effectiveness of an established SSAC, and determining how best to tailor the responsibilities and staffing level of the SSAC to the individual needs of the host country.

The size of an SSAC organization is ultimately determined by the respon­sibilities assigned to it, financial considerations and the experience level and effectiveness of the staff members in carrying out their assigned responsi­bilities. An SSAC may require only one or two professional staff in the beginning, assuming only a CSA is in force, there are no nuclear facilities, and there are no or only small quantities of safeguarded nuclear materials in the State. As the nuclear programme in the State is developed further, such as when the first nuclear power plant (or research reactor) is under construction or an AP is to be brought into force, the State would want to start looking ahead as the required technical capacity/capability of the SSAC will need to grow in size and importance.

15.1.1 What is new?

By the start of the twenty-first century, the background conditions for investing in new generating capacity had changed fundamentally. Fossil fuel prices increased dramatically (in large part by the accelerated demand in Asia, continued depletion of low-cost oil and gas occurrences and lack of investment in upstream operations) and fossil-sourced electricity no longer offered lower total generation costs in many markets. This improved not only the comparative economics of existing nuclear power plants (and spawned licence extensions) but also the prospects for new plant investment.

Energy security was back on the policy agenda of most countries, espe­cially those with high energy import dependence. Nuclear power offers not only diversification, a cornerstone of energy security, but also relatively stable and predictable generating costs in the long run due to its small share of uranium costs in total generating costs. As well, uranium occurrences are more widely spread globally than fossil resources,4 nuclear fuel volumes are small (and can be stored for several refuelling cycles) and refuelling schedules extend for as long as 18 to 24 months.

Next, climate change had become one of the most important energy and environmental policy challenges as manifested by the Kyoto Protocol (UN, 1998), the international environmental agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) aimed at the sta­bilization of atmospheric greenhouse gas (GHG) concentration at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system (UN, 1992). The Protocol was initially adopted in December 1997 in Kyoto, Japan, and entered into force in February 2005. On a life-cycle basis, nuclear power generates only a few grams of carbon dioxide (CO2) per kWh — orders of magnitude lower than fossil fuels (in the absence of [90]
costly carbon dioxide capture and storage) — at least comparable with the emissions of the best performing renewable supply options (see Fig. 15.5).

17.3.1 Background to European Union Environmental Impact Assessment

The Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), also known as the Enviornmental Impact Statement in the United States of America, is ‘an examination, analysis and assessment of planned activities with a view to ensuring environmentally sound and sustainable development’ (United Nations, 1987). Although the definition of EIA does appear strikingly similar to that of SEA, the fundamental distinction between EIA and SEA is essentially one of tiering: SEA is carried out at an early stage to assess the environmental impacts of a proposed plan or programme; EIA is carried out at a later stage in the development process when the authority has undertaken the SEA process and is considering granting development con­sents for a specific development activity. Specifically in the context of the development of new nuclear programmes, the approach to EIA can be contrasted with the high-level approach to regulatory justification required by ICRP 60 (International Commission on Radiological Protection, 1990) and other legislative instruments developed within the European Union (see EC Directive 96/29/EURATOM) and transposed into European Union Member States (for example, SI 2004/1769 on nuclear justification in the UK). EIA is a detailed, project-specific assessment of the environmental impacts of a proposed project.

Notwithstanding the fact that the EIA process comes after that of SEA, it remains paramount that EIA is undertaken at a very early stage in the decision-making process, crucially before a decision is taken as to whether consent for the development should be granted. Relevant significant envi­ronmental issues should be identified and impartially examined, so that national authorities do not undertake or authorise the activities in question without serious prior consideration of their environmental impacts. To this end, EIA is a necessary legislative tool in any regulatory system which aims to promote a certain level of concern between economic development and environmental protection.

It is commonly accepted that the concept of EIA has its earliest roots in legislation from the United States, the National Environmental Policy Act 1969 (NEPA), which was passed largely in response to the public’s height­ened concern for the environment raised by Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring. The express purpose of NEPA was to ‘promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment’ by establishing ‘a national policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment’ (NEPA, Section 2). NEPA established a legal mechanism whereby federal agencies were compelled to prepare a ‘detailed statement’ of the environmental impacts of proposed projects, a statement which became known as an Environmental Impact Statement, and to ‘study, develop, and describe appropriate alternatives’ to the proposed course of action (NEPA, Sections 102(2)(C) and (E)). The process under NEPA bears many similarities with the modern-day SEA and EIA processes, principally in that it aims to compel the institutionalisation of environmental concern, and to ensure that the views of a wide range of parties, including the public, are incorporated in the decision-making process.

Since the 1960s, the principles established by NEPA have been refined and developed and are now enshrined at an international level in a number of legal instruments. In 1987, the United Nations Environment Programme demonstrated its support for the concept of EIA through the publication of its ‘Goals and Principles of Environmental Impact Assessment’ (United Nations Environment Programme, 1987), a comprehensive overview of EIA methodology at national, regional and international levels. Further support was given to EIA by Principle 17 of the Rio Declaration which advocates the use of EIA as ‘a national instrument’ for ‘proposed activities that are likely to have a significant adverse impact on the environment’ (United Nations, 1992, Principle 17). The European Union has also passed several Directives requiring Member States to legislate for the assessment of the environmental effects of public and private projects, the most notable in this area being Directive 85/337/EEC (the EIA Directive) which, in general, has been transposed and implemented in all Member States.

It is clear, then, that the concept of EIA is widely accepted by the inter­national legal community, principally on the basis that the process should introduce a certain level of impartiality, transparency and accountability to decisions that will necessarily have a significant impact on the natural and human environment. EIA also provides a valuable opening for public par­ticipation in decision-making, even though public opinion will not neces­sarily prevent the project from proceeding. The United Kingdom House of Lords has held that the obligation on authorities is to ensure that the EIA process is an ‘inclusive and democratic procedure. . . in which the public, however misguided or wrongheaded its views may be, is given an opportu­nity to express its opinion on the environmental issues’ (Berkeley v Secretary of State for the Environment and Another [2001]). Public participation is a fundamental tenet of the EIA Directive regime, and is also a factor which becomes particularly poignant when considered in light of the obligations of many States under the Aarhus Convention (Aarhus, 1998) and certain international human rights agreements (such as the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms). Specifically in the context of nuclear new build, the IAEA International Nuclear Safety Group (INSAG) has emphasised the importance of public participation as a way of ensuring public confidence in the safety of nuclear installations (INSAG, 2006).

The requirements divide the meteorological events into two major groups: extreme meteorological phenomena and rare meteorological events. The extreme values of phenomena such as wind velocity, precipitation, snow packs, temperatures, seawater levels and storm surges should be measured to determine the design criteria for the affected structures and components. When using the probabilistic approach the probability of such values being exceeded should be given together with the associated uncertainties.

Rare meteorological events include lightning, tornadoes and tropical cyclones. The hazards associated with the above phenomena should include the expected frequency of occurrence and the expected maximum values of each phenomenon’s defining parameters: maximum rotational wind speed, pressure differences and rate of change of pressure for tornadoes, and wind speed pressure and precipitation for tropical cyclones. In both cases, missiles with potential to harm the plant generated by the phenom­enon itself should also be contemplated.

An IAEA safety guide on meteorological events in site evaluation (IAEA, 2003b) describes how data should be collected from extreme mete­orological phenomena and rare meteorological events, how to derive the hazards associated with such phenomena and events, and how to obtain the values needed for the design of structures and components potentially affected.

In the project implementation (PI) document, the owner specifies the requirements for implementing the project. To this end, the PI document should describe the project management and organisational, quality and environmental management, project planning and scheduling, project risk evaluation, project control, engineering and design management, procure­ment and supply chain management, project documentation, information management system (IMS) and project communication requirements which the bidder is required to follow to carry out the contract.

Preparing a good and complete PI document will increase the probability of having a well-organised project. The following paragraphs outline the proposed contents for the PI document.

19.9.1 Project management and organisation

This describes the owner’s project implementation model, the requirements for the project organisation and management manual to be prepared by the bidder, a description of the owner’s organisation, the requirements for the vendor’s organisation, the assignment of key organisational responsibilities, a description of the licensing process to be followed and a definition of licensing responsibilities. This section could conclude with a description of the risk management system to be applied to the project.

The overall purpose of commissioning is to demonstrate that the design requirements of the SSCs are met and to bring them to operating mode. Testing should establish that the NPP can operate in all the modes for which it has been designed. Commissioning is further addressed in Chapter 22.

Commissioning can be divided into four stages (IAEA, 2003d): (1) pre­operational tests; (2) fuel loading and subcritical tests; (3) initial criticality and low power tests; and (4) power tests. These stages are further subdi­vided into subtasks that are required by the licensee or regulator, or that depend on the technology being commissioned.

The pre-operational stage requires that construction activities associated with the system should be completed and documented, including all ele­ments of the quality assurance programme. The construction company nor­mally also carry out various pre-commissioning activities, such as flushing, cleaning and hydrostatically testing each system and piece of equipment individually. Also, the licensee must ensure that all equipment is ready for operation. This involves:

• Inspection of the SSCs to ensure proper construction, manufacturing and installation, such as welding, quality of workmanship, loose parts, and cleanliness

• Checking of electrical and protective devices

• Calibration of instruments

• Verification of operability of instrument loops and required response times

• Adjustment and settings of process controllers and limit switches.

Once the above has been completed, the pre-operational stage can be subdivided into two activities: cold performance tests and hot performance tests. These tests in most cases will be carried out sequentially; however, some cold tests, such as containment pressurization and leakage rate tests, might not be done until the end of the testing period, before fuel loading. Cold performance tests include the start-up of the fluid systems and support systems. The tests yield data that verify the operational functions of com­ponents and the compatibility between systems. If pressure tests on the primary and secondary systems were not previously done by the construc­tion group, the operator will also perform these tests at this sub-stage. Hot performance tests verify that systems conform to design requirements. These tests, where practicable, should simulate anticipated operational occurrences at typical plant operating conditions.

The tests should verify the effectiveness of the various heat transport phenomena as well as checking for vibration, clearances, effectiveness of insulation, thermal expansion, and the effects of high temperature on elec­trical and mechanical equipment performance. Hot performance testing should be carried out at least to the point where steady-state operating conditions are reached. Completion of the initial rotation test of the tur­bine-generators would typically mark the end of the hot commissioning phase. Operating staff should also use this opportunity to verify the operat­ing procedures, such as hot to cold shutdown, before fuel loading begins.

Main suppliers and equipment vendors that own the technology play a relevant role in the first NPP project in transferring the technology know-how.

Equipment manufacturing is the largest block of man-hours in a nuclear project, approximately 20 million man-hours for a 1000 MWe plant. The overall manpower requirements for the manufacture of equipment and components are estimated to be of the order of 3000 professionals, techni­cians and craftsmen.

Construction companies

Depending on the difficulties of the particular site, the tasks to be per­formed for site preparation will require normally 50 to 150 craftsmen and labourers during this stage as well as 10 to 20 professionals and managers, who have previously performed similar duties. The number of craftsmen and labourers could increase by as much as a factor of five for exceptionally difficult sites, taking into account that the above tasks should be completed as quickly as possible.

Usually the peak of concrete work occurs during the first year of con­struction and the peak for interior finish and masonry work is in the third year. The overall manpower requirements for civil construction will gener­ally peak during the second and third year of construction after which they will gradually decline.

To coordinate, manage and expedite component installation requires an experienced team at the site of at least 25 professionals during the peak period.

For equipment, component and systems erection and installation, a peak workforce (about four years after construction starts or earlier with the advanced reactor construction) of the order of 1300 people would be required. Many of the welders must be qualified for specialized cover-gas equipment. For difficult sites (climate, high rate of personnel turnover, low worker efficiency) the overall quantity of manpower could be 20-50% higher, or it can easily double.