Following the terrorist attacks in the early years of the twenty-first century, it was decided that security measures were required for all radioactive materials in transit and, in response, the IAEA developed relevant guidance (IAEA, 2008c). This document states the following objective:

Since transport occurs in the public domain and frequently involves intermodal transfers, it is a potentially vulnerable phase of domestic and international commerce. This guide is intended to facilitate a uniform and consistent approach to security.

The objective of this guide is to provide States with guidance in implement­ing, maintaining or enhancing a nuclear security regime to protect radioactive material (including nuclear material) while in transport against theft, sabotage or other malicious acts that could, if successful, have unacceptable radiological consequences. From a security point of view, a threshold is defined for determin­ing which packages or types of radioactive material need to be protected beyond prudent management practice. Minimizing the likelihood of theft or sabotage of radioactive material during transport is accomplished by a combination of measures to deter, detect, delay and respond to such acts. These measures are complemented by other measures to recover stolen material and mitigate pos­sible consequences, to further reduce the risks.

It establishes as its scope the following:

This guidance applies to the security of the international and domestic transport of all packages containing nuclear material as defined in the CPPNM and associated publications, and radioactive material that may pose a significant radiological hazard to individuals, society and the environment as a consequence of a malicious act.

The recommended actions for security during transport of all radioactive materials follows a graded approach and, generally, are similar to the provisions listed in detail above for nuclear material. Since many of the shipments associated with the nuclear fuel cycle will contain nuclear material, the focus here has been on the requirements from Nuclear Security Series No. 13 (IAEA, 2011). For those shipments that do not involve nuclear material, the shippers and carriers should consult Nuclear Security Series No. 9 (IAEA, 2008c) for further guidance.