19.3.1 Security during the transport of nuclear material

Security provisions for the transport of nuclear material are established through the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) (IAEA, 1980) for those countries that are parties to that Convention. The Convention entered into force on 8 February 1987 and, as of June 2011, 145 states were parties to it.

An amendment to the CPPNM was promulgated in 2005 (IAEA, 2005). This will not enter into force until the 30th day after the date when two thirds of the states party to the Convention have ratified, accepted or approved the amendment. As of June 2011, 47 states had deposited their instruments of ratification.

A guidance document, which is based on the requirements of the CPPNM and its amendment was issued in 2011 (IAEA, 2011). The document recognizes that the ‘challenges associated with protecting nuclear material from unauthorized removal and sabotage during transport are unique compared to when it is held at nuclear facilities, and thus require a dedicated approach’. Nuclear materials are categorized according to the provisions in the CPPNM and then the protection requirements are graded according to that categorization based upon the total nuclear material present in a single conveyance.

The categorization of nuclear material as mandated by the CPPNM is shown in Table 19.1. The recommended security provisions for all nuclear material should follow a graded approach using this categorization. [33]

Table 19.1 CPPNM nuclear fuel categorization* Material Form Category I Category II Category III 1. Plutonium Unirradiated 2 kg or Less than 2 kg 500g or less more but more than but more 500 g than 15 g 2. Uranium-235 Unirradiated 5 kg or Less than 5 kg 1 kg or less (235U) Uranium more but more but more enriched to than 1 kg than 15 g 20% 235U or 10 kg or Less than more more 10 kg but Uranium more than enriched to 1 kg 10% 235U but 10 kg or less than 20% 235U Uranium enriched above more natural, but less than 10% 235U 3. Uranium-233 Unirradiated 2 kg or Less than 2 kg 500 g or less (233U) more but more than but more 500 g than 15 g 4. Irradiated fuel (The categorization of irradiated fuel in the table is based on international transport considerations. A state may assign a different category for domestic use, storage and transport taking all relevant factors into account.)

The following summarizes the recommendations made in the guidance document, Nuclear Security Series No. 13 (IAEA, 2011). In applying these recommendations, the shipper, carrier and receiver work with the involved competent authority (authorities) to ensure that the entity responsible for each action is clearly defined.

Common requirements for the transport of all nuclear material include:

• minimizing the total time in transport

• minimizing the number and duration of transfers

• protecting the material during transport and temporary storage in a manner consistent with the category of that material

• avoiding use of predictable movement schedules

• predetermining the trustworthiness of involved individuals

• limiting advance knowledge to the minimum number of individuals necessary

• using a transport system with physical protection measures appropriate for the threat assessment or design basis threat

• using routes that avoid areas of natural disaster, civil disorder or with a known threat

• minimizing the time that packages and/or conveyances are left unattended For all categories of nuclear material, steps should be taken to:

• ensure the confidentiality of related information based on the need to know

• establish procedures to ensure the security of keys to conveyances and security locks

• ensure security during unexpected stops and during storage incidental to transport

• ensure that the carrier provides the receiver with advance notification

• provide that all transfers between involved entities are accomplished using prior agreements

• carry materials in closed, locked conveyances, compartments or freight containers with exceptions for heavy packages

• use locks and seals on conveyances, compartments and freight containers

• search conveyances to ensure security provisions have not been violated

• provide sufficient guards and/or response forces based on the category of material and the threat posed

• check the integrity of the packages, locks and seals by the receiver upon arrival of the shipment

For categories I and II nuclear material, additional requirements should be applied, including:

• placing the cargo under surveillance by guards

• ensuring that the receiver confirms readiness to accept delivery

• developing a transport security plan by the shipper and providing the plan to the competent authority for approval

• ensuring that the carrier verifies all physical protection measures are in place in accordance with the plan prior to commencing transport

• using armed guards or compensating measures when justified by the threat assessment

• ensuring sufficient delay is provided by the physical protection measures used

• searching the conveyance prior to loading and then placing the conveyance in a secure area or keeping it under guard

• providing written instructions to personnel with physical protection responsibilities

• providing enhanced protection of confidentiality of information

• providing continuous, two-way communications

• providing an adequately sized response force

Finally, for category I nuclear material, additional requirements should be applied, including:

• providing an enhanced procedure for approval of security plans

• providing competent authorization to ship just prior to commencing transport considering the most current threat assessment

• ensuring guards are appropriately equipped and trained

• providing enhanced security for large packages transported in open vehicles

• establishing and operating a transport control centre (TCC), including providing for secure and continuous two-way communication between involved personnel

• ensuring guards and/or conveyance crew report frequently to the TCC

• applying mode-specific requirements as specified in Nuclear Security Series No. 13 (IAEA, 2011)