Two main considerations — scientific and social — govern the siting of a radioactive waste disposal facility and it is fair to say that, in the past 15-20 years the emphasis has shifted from the first to the second. Thus, if we look at two 1994 (though still current) IAEA publications 1 617 on the siting of near-surface and deep-disposal facilities, we find a site screening process that, for the most part, is technically driven. The first consideration is that the site should be stable — free of natural phenomena that might destroy the engineered and natural barriers that contain the radionuclides. Typical unwanted effects are volcanism, seismicity, tectonism and, for surface sites, flooding. Water is usually the main vector for radionuclide migration and so another important issue is to find a site with suitable hydrogeology. The list of pertinent site properties goes on to include geochemistry, erosion, proximity of natural resources, transport links, potential for urban sprawl and so on. Despite this somewhat prescriptive approach, both documents take care to emphasise that the search is not for the ‘best’ site, which can never be known, but merely one that is adequate.

1n practice, this technocratic, top-down approach has met with strong public opposition and many national site selection programmes have succumbed at the hands of well-organised local campaigns. The US Yucca Mountain Project, for example, inched forward year after year in the face of locally mounted legal obstacles only to fail in 2011 when all funding was removed and the Department of Energy (DOE) shut down the project. This fulfilled a pledge made by Barack Obama when (presumably) seeking to influence the voters of Nevada during his 2008 run for the US Presidency.18 The DOE subsequently said that a Yucca Mountain repository was not a workable option and there were better solutions.19 Since then, in a further development, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has ruled that the DOE did not have the authority to withdraw a plan approved by Congress.18 All this only underlines the view of the US Government Accountability Office19 that:

First, social and political opposition to a permanent repository, not technical

issues, is the key obstacle.

In the UK, no less than three attempts to find radioactive waste disposal sites have ended in defeats for government policy: the HLW site investigation programme was cut short in 1981 following strong public opposition, the mid-1980’s search for a near-surface site was abandoned shortly before the 1987 General Election20 and the attempt to construct an underground Rock Characterisation Facility at Sellafield, widely viewed as a Trojan horse, was rejected at a local Public Inquiry.21 In the light of this history, the House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology22 concluded that:

Public acceptance of a national plan for the management of nuclear waste is

essential and it has to be achieved at the local level (i. e. close to potential

repository sites), as well as within the country as a whole.

A new UK policy came into being in June 200823 in which the Government opted for a ‘voluntarism and partnership approach’. Recognising that ‘a community which hosts a geological disposal facility for higher activity radioactive wastes will be volunteering an essential service to the nation’, an Engagement Package and a Community Benefits Package will form part of the quid pro quo. There has been one Expression of Interest to date that has come jointly from two communities close to the Sellafield site where around 60% of the UK’s radioactive waste is in storage. There is hope that further volunteers will come forward. If they don’t, then those Sellafield communities have two choices: keep the waste on the surface, building additional stores as they are needed, or allow it to be taken underground and accept the promised community benefits.

In contrast to the stories of failure, the Swedish radioactive waste management company, Svensk Karnbranslehantering AB (SKB), was established in the 1970s by the NPP owners and began a site selection programme in the early 1990s. Swedish national policy requires a volunteer approach. Provided the regulators are satisfied, local municipalities have the final say on whether a repository can be constructed in their locality or not. This approach obliges SKB to work hand-in­hand with those who have offered their ‘backyards’ as potential sites. Three communities, soon reduced to two, came forward. Each already hosts a nuclear power plant. In March 2011, SKB finally submitted an application for construction of a deep repository for spent nuclear fuel at Forsmark in the Osthammar Municipality, about 100 km north of Stockholm. Osthammar already hosts a nuclear power plant and a repository for LILW (also operated by SKB) at a depth of 100 m.

Radioactive waste is a burden on society at large, but the example of Sweden (and others) demonstrates that it is most effectively dealt with when ways are found of working with host communities to turn it to mutual political, social and economic advantage.