Earlier (Section 4.2.1) we stated that, firstly, public acceptance was (taken for) granted in the early development of nuclear technology, and secondly, once the nuclear ball was rolling, public non-acceptance simply was not an option anymore. Both parts require further elaboration in the light of the ideas expressed throughout the previous sections.

Let us start first with the statement that public acceptance was taken for granted in the early development of nuclear technology. Referring back to the notion of trans-science and the general historical introduction (Section 4.2), most scientific research, even in universities, is ultimately aimed at developing practical outcomes. When technologies are introduced their desirability is treated in a more or less explicit manner, i. e. they are very often framed in understandings about ‘the good life’. Although many different factors (including the military one) were at play when nuclear energy was first introduced, the general enthusiasm with regard to the promises that nuclear technology offered in the framework of economic growth and scientific progress was outspoken and genuine. The following catchphrase at the stand of the Belgian Association for the Peaceful Development of Atomic Energy at the 1958 World Exhibition in Brussels illustrates this confidence and desirability really well: to present the ‘immeasurable potential arising from splitting the atom as well as the marvellous horizons it opens for the welfare of man and for a better standard of living’ (SCK^CEN, 2002:). However, as technologies are implemented and time passes, a thorough evaluation of whether their concrete functioning does indeed fulfil the original desires for which they were developed, is not always that straightforward, especially when this also entails certain (unforeseen) drawbacks. Moreover, values and beliefs that constitute the original desirability of certain technologies (such as the added value of nuclear energy to the paradigm of progress through growth) are not carved in stone.

This brings us to the second part where we said that, once the nuclear ball was rolling, public non-acceptance just was not an option anymore. One needs to be realistic about the fact that the development of the nuclear fuel cycle demands enormous investment and requires considerable structural adaptations of the energy system (in the broadest sense). Even leaving aside the very long back end of the nuclear fuel cycle, once these types of decision have been made and carried out, this more factual level cannot be turned around from one day to another, concretising the idea of ‘path dependency’. Moreover, such developments also necessitate revisions of institutions and decision-making processes, which have proven to be even more challenging than the financial and structural requirements. As IAEA Deputy Director General Yury Sokolov put it: ‘The introduction of a nuclear power programme involves a commitment of at least 100 years to maintain a sustainable national infrastructure throughout operation, decommissioning and waste disposal. Another important element is that a Member State contemplating initiating a nuclear power programme should have a stable political, economic and social environment.’

These two levels correspond well to what Weinberg refers to as ‘the Faustian bargain’ of nuclear energy. The expression ‘striking a Faustian bargain’ generally refers to a decision made in the light of present needs and gains without in-depth regard for future cost or consequences. What is striking is that the needs and gains behind nuclear energy mirror those of Faust in Goethe’s play, namely knowledge and power. The two elements of the Faustian bargain are both present in the nuclear enterprise: the promise of relatively abundant, cheap, safe and environment friendly energy on the one hand, yet the requirement of an unprecedented degree (both in scope and in time) of expertise, vigilance and social stability to safeguard both the technology and the waste it produces on the other hand (Weinberg, 1992: 234; Spreng et al, 2007: 852).

Although improvements have been made in all parts of the nuclear fuel cycle over the past half century, we shall never be able to totally eliminate any of the previously listed items (Section 4.3) of public concern (reactor safety, transport of radioactive materials, dual use and waste disposal). ‘When nuclear energy was small and experimental and unimportant, the intricate moral and institutional demands of a full commitment to it could be ignored or not taken seriously’ (Idem: 222). Today, however, with ca. 442 reactors in operation worldwide, the adequacy of human institutions to manage the nuclear fuel cycle in the broadest sense should be thoroughly reinvestigated. Moreover, the content of the bargain has evolved, as the post-war equation of development and growth is slowly but steadily challenged by the paradigm of sustainable development, which sprang exactly out of the idea of ‘limits to growth’.