The evolution in the 1970s we described earlier (Section 4.2.2) made clear to both critics and supporters that radioactive waste was the Achilles’ heel of nuclear power (e. g. Blowers et al., 1991; Nuttall, 2005; Kasperson et al., 1980: 16 citing Brooks, 1976). Consequently, when looking at the core steps in the nuclear fuel cycle, it seems that, for the purpose of increasing public acceptance, the greater part of the effort has been directed towards the back end of the cycle, notably with regard to the siting of waste disposal facilities. In a way this comes as no surprise. On the one hand, siting directly and concretely affects the local community who, by hosting a nuclear waste disposal facility, are required to make a commitment of unimaginably long duration. On the other hand, the nuclear industry has a keen interest in resolving a situation that has the potential for bringing the industry to a standstill. When local communities resist, such situations are not uncommonly described by would-be developers under the rather narrow denomination of a NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard) or LULU (Locally Unwanted Land Use) case. The danger is that the ‘urgent’ need for a favourable decision can lead to the adoption of an instrumental approach towards public acceptability, i. e. acting with the sole aim of creating acceptance of an outcome already decided and defined, which, in all probability, will simply further antagonise the community concerned.

Nevertheless, throughout the past decade positive changes have been made in radioactive waste management. Today, a number of countries have developed dedicated programmes that are set up to go beyond an expertocratic, top-down, one-way communication approach and instead aim for dialogue and participation in an atmosphere of openness and transparency. What has been achieved in the field of radioactive waste management ‘often goes further than what is embedded in, for example, EU law. In many respects these efforts can be considered innovative and productive, if not completely unique’ (Bergmans et al., 2008: 4). For a relatively detailed overview of such efforts in OECD member states, we refer to the Forum on Stakeholders Confidence (FSC) report on ‘Partnering for Long-term Management of Radioactive Waste’ (NEA, 2010). The most advanced programmes can be described as integrated projects (investigating whether a definitive disposal is both technically feasible and socially acceptable) of co-design (implementer and representative local actors working together) to come to a collectively supported decision on (non-)acceptance (Bergmans, 2011).

Throughout such projects, the relevance of many of the factors of risk perception are confirmed. Referring back to the list in Section 4.3.1, considerable attention is given to understandability, familiarity, controllability and clarity with regard to the risks that a disposal site may entail (e. g. through items such as mutual learning, social vigilance and monitoring, stepwise decision making, . . .). Moreover, ‘added value programmes’ have become common practice in the light of the unequal distribution of costs and benefits that any waste disposal entails. Such programmes recognise that, even when optimal safety conditions are realised, one single local community serves the common good by accepting the waste resulting from activities that the country as a whole benefits from (through the various applications of radioactivity) (Bergmans, 2010). Last but not least, such programmes are restricted to volunteering communities, i. e. communities that themselves express a willingness to investigate the possibility and conditions of accepting a disposal, under the provision of having a right of veto.

To sum up, stakeholder participation in radioactive waste management can be broadly described as ‘ranging from giving policy advice towards emerging forms of co-decision-making, though focused at the operational level’ (Bergmans et al., 2008: 5). In most instances, however, key decisions have not been opened up to co-decision-making, because the remit of the concerned radioactive waste management agencies is often structurally limited in the extent to which it can provide full opportunities for power sharing and co-governance (Idem, 2008: 65).