The view expressed in the previous sentence clearly fed into the lessons some of the proponents of nuclear technology learned from risk research and from public opinion polls such as, for instance, the Eurobarometer. Even though risk research works primarily on a descriptive, not on a prescriptive level, others have been eager to build on these results with a view to changing perception and behaviour.

As a first response, the idea that gaining public acceptance is a matter of communicating the facts in an understandable way became rather dominant. The combination of this idea with an expertocratic approach (cf. 4.2.2) leads to the assumption that the reason for public rejection is a techno-scientific knowledge gap, and that bridging it will bring the public’s view more in line with the nuclear experts’ view. Such an approach rapidly threatens to follow an instrumental approach to public acceptability, by putting the focus on creating acceptance. It cannot be denied that there exist several cases of a PR-style approach to ‘stakeholder management’, focusing on the remediation of public perception as a one-way route to public acceptance. But more substantial and genuine approaches can also go against the lessons drawn from risk research. The combination of an instrumental approach with the idea of a public knowledge gap easily develops into an approach in which the quantitative results of risk assessments are deployed to try to bridge the knowledge gap and change the public’s perception of risk. Within such an approach, attention is focused first and foremost, if not solely, on technical safety. And yet, ironically, scientists, engineers and industry leaders have always said that public acceptability with regard to the nuclear fuel cycle is much more a socio-political issue than a technical problem. Most of the budget nevertheless continues to be spent on research to improve the technical aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, largely ignoring the risk that in the end projects may be incapable of being implemented because of public opposition (International Nuclear Societies Council, 1998).

Although we want to highlight advances in regulation and considerable consequent efforts by the nuclear community, most notably with regard to radioactive waste management, to go beyond the conventional limits of risk assessments, and by no means wish to discourage this type of research, we do want to stress that technical proof of safety alone, or communication of that proof, will never suffice to influence public acceptability in a convincing manner. Valid techno-scientific arguments can be repeated endlessly, as has been done for Chernobyl (arguments such as ‘the West has completely different reactor types’) such as Fukushima (arguments in line with ‘earthquakes combined with tsunamis of the same magnitude cannot happen in Western European countries’), but they will not alter public acceptability, unless other conditions are met also. For one thing, the fundamental grounds of the factors of risk perception listed earlier will need to be thoroughly investigated and taken into account. Furthermore, it needs to be acknowledged that choosing nuclear power above other forms of energy production is coloured by fundamental values and beliefs, just as much as by technical, financial and other practical considerations. Throughout the remainder of this chapter, we will further explore these conditions and how they have been, or could be, taken up by the nuclear community. We will start by briefly considering how issues of acceptability have been taken into account so far in different parts of the nuclear fuel cycle.