Some 60 countries have turned to the IAEA and other competent organizations for guidance as they consider whether introducing nuclear power may help solve an expected and sharp future jump in their energy demand, as well as improve the lives of over a billion people lacking access to sufficient energy. Some experts project the global energy demand will increase by more than 50% by 2030, with the majority of that increase coming from developing countries, many of which have limited access to electricity, and are in desperate need for a possible basis for improving nutrition, health and education, all key objectives of the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals.

Many interested countries will have to build or re-build the necessary political, legal and technical infrastructure to be successful with nuclear energy (IAEA, 2007). The creation or expansion of a nuclear power programme can be accomplished only with a sufficient understanding of the fuel cycle — and a strong and lasting commitment for a long time, possibly for as long as over a hundred years.

New reactor designs have been developed, which include all lessons learned from the past; they have new engineering features that promise a significantly enhanced safety system (for a list of new reactor designs, see NEI, 2011, and IAEA, 2011/7, on advanced nuclear reactors). Advanced nuclear reactor designs derive advantage from the extensive operating experience gained from current systems and results of world wide research and development, the aim being to provide very safe, reliable and economical nuclear power plants, which will also be friendly to the environment. Improved reactor systems and increasing public awareness and concern about global warming and environmental pollution have led national decision makers to look more closely at the nuclear option for their future electricity generation mix.

Proposals for new approaches to security and non-proliferation for certain parts of the nuclear fuel cycle have been made. The report on ‘Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle’ proposes an international regime and additional details have been discussed since then (IAEA, 2005/2). All options for multilateral approaches consider a small number of sensitive components in the fuel cycle — those that involve significant proliferation risks: uranium enrichment, spent-fuel reprocessing, spent-fuel storage and repositories. Two factors dominate the deliberations on these approaches: the assurance of supply and services together with the assurance of non-proliferation. In his introductory statement to the IAEA Board of Governors in March 2004, Director General ElBaradei said: ‘the wide dissemination of the most proliferation-sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle. . . could be the “Achilles’ heel” of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. It is important to tighten control over these operations, which could be done by bringing them under some form of multilateral control, in a limited number of regional centres. . . I am aware that this is a complex issue, . . . we owe it to ourselves to examine all possible options available to us.’

For the optimal implementation of an efficient and effective regulative system, common requirements for all three 3 S components must be considered. A joint office provides easy communication and understanding among authorities to implement nuclear law, including provisions for nuclear liability, new and on going education and training programmes, the implementation of appropriate information confidentiality requirements and documentation, and performance measurement. In Asia, the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) has started an initiative based on the further commitment mandated by the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit so that, in January 2011, the ‘Integrated Comprehensive Support Center for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Security for Asia’ (Denki Shimbun, 2011) opened. The existence of authorities for nuclear safety and safeguards are national and international obligations; the integration of a nuclear security support centre is a natural addition and, in some cases, the IAEA has already assisted in establishing such a centre.

In addition, technical issues, e. g. equipment acquisition and maintenance, measurement qualifications, procedures, material sampling, analysis and evaluation, a joint or common laboratory, including nuclear forensics where applicable, will benefit from close cooperation. The development and evaluation of risk scenarios and their assessment, the basic design threats (called diversion path analysis in safeguards), the defence-in-depth principle, export controls, tracking of sensitive technology and the use of all available information sources are worthwhile sharing between experts in all three areas. Collection and analysis capabilities are similar and need to be further developed jointly.

‘If the world does not change course, we risk self-destruction. Common sense and recent experience make it clear that the regime based on the nuclear Non­Proliferation Treaty, which served us well since 1970, must be tailored to fit twenty-first century realities’ (ElBaradei, 2004). The 3S regime is an essential part of this survival.