Nuclear material in transit includes spent nuclear fuel and other high-activity materials that require physical protection. For material in transit the use of certified, structurally rugged, shipment containers or canisters is essential. Advance planning and coordination with local authorities, including law enforcement, along approved routes is also necessary. Information about transportation routes and schedules are to be protected to the extent possible. Along the transport routes regular communication between the transports and the transport control centre is important; where and when necessary, guards and escorts must be available.

In each individual case, the protection system will be specified using design basis threats that define potential adversaries who might attempt sabotage or unauthorized removal of nuclear (or other radioactive) material. In support, the IAEA provides a set of recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear material and facilities (IAEA, 1999/1). INFCIRC/255 provides a categorization for nuclear material, based on which different physical protection measures are to be considered. However, it is important to remember that the Agency has no responsibility either for the provision of a state’s physical protection system or for the supervision, control or implementation of it.

In 1980 the ‘Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material’ (CPPNM) was signed; it entered into force in 1987 (IAEA, 1980). It is the only internationally binding document in the area of physical protection of nuclear material. In 2005 the convention was amended and strengthened to make it legally binding for states parties[5] to protect nuclear facilities and material in peaceful domestic use, storage as well as transport. It also provides for expanded cooperation among states regarding rapid measures to locate and recover stolen or smuggled nuclear material, mitigate any radiological consequences of sabotage, and prevent and combat related offences.