While the Iraq nuclear case is now closed it provides a useful example of a special safeguards case. In 1991, the United Nations Security Council was requested to investigate weapons of mass destruction; the Council established[4] a UN Special Commission (UNSCOMM, since 1999 UNMOVIC) for chemical, biological and missile inspections in Iraq. The Iraq nuclear portfolio came to the IAEA. It included the responsibility to uncover and dismantle any clandestine nuclear programme found in Iraq and to develop and implement a system of ‘ongoing monitoring and verification’. The Agency responded with the creation of the Iraq Action Team (later known as the Iraq Nuclear Verification Office). Working together with UNSCOMM/UNMOVIC, multinational teams of inspectors of experts and nuclear scientists were assembled to develop a refined understanding of Iraq’s clandestine nuclear weapons programme. As a result of removal or destruction of nuclear related material and equipment and related inspections as mandated by the Security Council, the IAEA Director General reported in March 2003,that the IAEA had found no further evidence or plausible indication of the revival of a nuclear weapons programme in Iraq. Detailed information is available from the IAEA ‘Iraq Nuclear File: Key Findings’ (IAEA, 2011/1) and from ‘Timeline Iraq, Challenges and Lessons Learned from Nuclear Inspections’ (Baute, 2004). In 2007 the UNSC (UNSC, 2007) terminated the mandates of the IAEA (and UNMOVIC), closing the Iraq nuclear case. A very comprehensive analysis of the situation in Iraq was given by Hans Blix (Blix, 2004), until 1997 director general of the IAEA, since 2000 the head of UNMOVIC and as of 2004 chairman of the International Commission on Weapons of Mass Destruction. ElBaradei writes about Iraq, North Korea, Iran, Libya and the ‘nuclear bazaar’ of A. Q. Khan during his time as director general of the IAEA in ‘Age of Deception’ (ElBaradei, 2011).

The DPRK was a member of the IAEA with a facility-specific type of safeguards implemented (IAEA, 1977/1). It joined the NPT later, in 1985. In 1992 a comprehensive safeguards agreement (IAEA, 1992) based on the requirements of the NPT entered into force: this requires that all nuclear material and all nuclear facilities be declared to the IAEA and subsequently verified through inspections. Discrepancies between DPRK’s declarations and the findings of IAEA safeguards inspectors during one of their first inspections led to the call for a special inspection by the IAEA, which was refused by DPRK. In 1993 DPRK announced its withdrawal from the NPT and in 1994 it left the IAEA. On 9 October 2006 and, again, on 25 May 2009 DPRK announced that it had carried out underground nuclear weapons tests. Since 2009 no IAEA inspector has been allowed into the country; the most recent report on DPRK was provided (IAEA 2010/2) by the IAEA in August 2010.

Currently the Iran case is still wide open; in 2002, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCR) helped expose some of Iran’s undeclared nuclear activities by providing information about nuclear sites at Natanz and Arak. Since then the IAEA has implemented safeguards at Iran’s additional nuclear facilities, but is still waiting for further clarification on a number of issues, among which are questions relating to: the enrichment plants in Natanz and Fordow; clarification of plans for additional enrichment related activities; Iran’s announcement of ten new enrichment facilities to be built (references are in the IAEA report below); reprocessing activities in Teheran; nuclear projects at Arak (all heavy water related); and outstanding issues related to possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme (IAEA, 2010/1). The UN Security Council has adopted a number of resolutions on Iran (UNSC, 2010), in an attempt to enforce Iran’s compliance with IAEA resolutions, which, inter alia, include the suspension of uranium enrichment.

Syria has been requested to provide more information about some of its nuclear activities, since Israel’s air strike at the Dair Alzour site in September 2007. This site was alleged by Israel and the US to have been an undeclared plutonium production reactor under construction. The Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) reports also IAEA inspectors’ discovery of the presence of undeclared anthropogenic uranium particles at the small research reactor in Damascus (NTI, 2011).

Experience with Iraq, DPRK and others showed extensive networks (Cooper, 2004) that were ready to trade in nuclear goods, material, equipment, know-how, etc. Previously it was believed that proscribed nuclear goods were prevented from falling into the wrong hands by means of export restrictions and controls (IAEA, 2003).