The NPT of 1970 has produced three categories of members, two are parties to the Treaty: the nuclear weapon states and the non-nuclear weapon states. The third category consists of India, Israel and Pakistan, which have chosen not to join the NPT but have, nevertheless, agreed to facility-specific safeguards agreements (IAEA, 1965). For some time also, South Africa (until 1991), Argentina (1995), Brazil (1998) and Cuba (2002) were not parties to the NPT. The vast majority of states, however, were and are party to the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states and have concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA.

In contrast to the vertical proliferation during the Cold War, horizontal proliferation was minimal or, at least, not anywhere near Kennedy’s expectation in 1960. The cases of India, Pakistan and Israel, for example, fall outside the NPT and whether DPRK is in violation or not depends on the view taken of its exit from the NPT. While the NPT community has sometimes faced challenges, the verification regime of the IAEA has been able to defuse these, albeit with difficulty on occasion. The main substance of the NPT is reflected in its Articles I-VI and X: ‘Non-nuclear weapon States. . . undertake not to acquire, manufacture or obtain. . . nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. . .’ (Art. II); ‘Non­nuclear weapon States. . . undertake to accept safeguards. . . in accordance with. . . the Agency’s safeguards system. . .’ (Art. III); ‘Nothing. . . shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all Parties. . . to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination. . .’ (Art. IV); ‘Each of the Parties. . . undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith. . . relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament. . .’ (Art. VI); and, finally, ‘Each Party shall. . . have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if. . . extraordinary events. . . have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal. . . three months in advance’ (Art. X).

The application of safeguards verifications had started soon after the creation of the IAEA, with the first facility-based safeguards inspection in 1961 in the Norwegian research centre of Kjeller (Fischer, 1997). Since the first international safeguards system of 1961 (IAEA INFCIRC/26),[2] developments have responded to the needs of the nuclear community. A revised system was instituted between 1964-1968 (INFCIRC/66) and this remains as the safeguards framework applied for facilities in India, Israel and Pakistan (IAEA, 1965). Shortly after the NPT entered into force, in 1971, a new, more comprehensive way of implementing nuclear safeguards was established and INFCIRC/153 became the standard (IAEA, 1972). This standard is still today the universal framework for IAEA safeguards implementation although, based on the experience with the discovery of the clandestine nuclear programme in Iraq, the confrontation with DPRK and experience gained in South Africa, the system has been strengthened. A complement known as the Additional Protocol was approved in 1997 (IAEA, 1997/1). This is now considered to be an integral part of the IAEA universal safeguards regime. For states with no nuclear facilities and little or no nuclear material there is a Small Quantities Protocol simplifying the interaction with the IAEA. A new version was approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in 2004 (IAEA, 2006/1).

The safeguards objective is ‘the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material[3] from peaceful activities. . . and the deterrence of such a diversion. . .’ (para. 28-30 of INFCIRC/153). States ‘accept safeguards. . . on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities. . .’ (para. 1) and safeguards will be applied ‘for the purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons. . .’ (para. 2). ‘The State shall establish and maintain a system of accounting for and control of all nuclear material subject to safeguards’ (para. 7). Both states and the Agency maintain detailed nuclear books for nuclear accounting purposes. Verification is done ‘by inspections’ (para. 70) including access ‘at key measurement points’ (para. 75).

In the standoff with Iraq prior to the Second Gulf War, the restriction of access to key measurement points and the resulting difficulty for the Agency in determining that all nuclear facilities and all nuclear materials were under safeguards led to the strengthening of the IAEA’s safeguards regime, and to the Additional Protocol (AP) (INFCIRC/540). This requires a more comprehensive and expanded declaration of nuclear related activities (INFCIRC/540, Art. 2-3). It also provides for broader access of Agency inspectors in the form of complementary access (INFCIRC/540, Art. 4-10).

In practical terms, the state, through its State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC) (INFCIRC/153, paras 7 and 31-32), transmits to the Agency descriptive information, i. e. the technical characteristics, for each nuclear facility. Based on the processes and materials there, nuclear material areas, balances and periods are defined. These form the basis for the nuclear material accounting mandated by the safeguards agreement. Facility operating records are to be kept, and inventory and transaction reports are to be sent to the Agency by the state’s SSAC. Where the AP is in force, the required additional information is to be transmitted in a similar way.

States’ declarations are verified by inspection whose frequencies and activities will depend on the type of facility, amount and type of material and whether containment and surveillance can be provided by sealing or monitoring. Where the AP is in force, complementary access will also be used. Such access supports the expanded safeguards objective of ensuring that all facilities and all nuclear material have been declared (IAEA, 2011/2). Safeguards activities may also depend on the size and structure of the national fuel cycle capabilities.

At the end of 2009, safeguards were applied in 170 states (excluding DPRK), of which 89 had both a comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) and an AP in force, 73 a CSA but not an AP. In three states (India, Israel and Pakistan) safeguards were applied on the basis of INFCIRC/66-type agreements, and in the five (NPT-) nuclear weapon states (China, France, Russia, the UK and the US) under so-called voluntary offer safeguards agreements (with the UK as INFCIRC/263 in 1978, the US as INFCIRC/288 and France as INFCIRC/290 in 1981, the Soviet Union as INFCIRC/327 in 1985 and with China as INFCIRC/369 in 1989; all can be found on the IAEA’s website). The total number of significant quantities safeguarded in 2009 was over 165 000 in 1125 nuclear facilities (including 229 power and 153 research reactors), with 1650 inspections and 136 complementary accesses under the AP carried out. Inspectors spent 11 080 calendar-days of field verification for the above. Expenditures for IAEA safeguards exceeded 110 million euros (IAEA, 2010/3).