D. SCHRIEFER, Consultant (formerly Director International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards), Austria

Abstract: The 3S concept, established in recent years, is a parcel of regulatory and protective measures applied to promote safety, security and safeguards in nuclear power generation. ‘Safety’ encompasses all technical and organizational measures taken during planning, design, construction, operation and decommissioning of nuclear plants (as part of the nuclear fuel cycle) to protect people and the environment against risks. ‘Security’ indicates measures to protect people, facilities and material against unauthorized human interference. ‘Safeguards’ relate to the protection against misuse of nuclear facilities and the diversion of nuclear material from peaceful use. The measures that are taken in these different, but connected, fields have a number of common features. They require a similar ‘discipline and culture’ built on years of experience and there can be synergies in approaches, particularly in the regulatory area. This chapter provides an overview of the 3S concept, which is of particular relevance as a nuclear energy renaissance is anticipated.

Key words: international safeguards, nuclear conventions, nuclear fuel cycle, nuclear energy, nuclear liability, NPT, proliferation, safety, security.

3.1 Introduction

For future and further development energy is essential. The availability and access to energy is as important for developing economies as it is for the continued growth of industrialized regions. This has been acknowledged by the growing number of countries taking a fresh look at nuclear energy — some countries, again, some others for the first time. Either in the context of real, expected or perceived shortfalls of other energy sources, striving for greater independence from fossil fuels or desiring to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, now there maybe plans for a nuclear renaissance. The World Nuclear Association’s low estimate for 2030 indicates that, out of 32 countries with existing nuclear programmes, 28 are planning an expansion. In addition there are seven countries with currently no nuclear programmes plus states of the Gulf Cooperation Council with plans to go nuclear by 2030; the high estimate shows that 31 countries with existing nuclear power programmes may expand and more than 30 newcomers.

However, there are lessons to be learned from past experience: when embarking on a nuclear programme a country must become a member of a worldwide discipline dedicated to and solidly following a safe, secure and peaceful path.

‘Going nuclear is a 100-year commitment. A country should understand all the international obligations connected and also the internal consequence of going nuclear’ (Sokolov, 2010). This needs efforts by all national entities and authorities involved to ensure that the programme is supported by the best available technology during preparation, planning, building, operating, maintaining and decommissioning of the technology. It includes the safest designs and best operational standards, the provision of nuclear security, the physical protection of the nuclear installations and of all nuclear and radioactive materials involved. The international community requires transparency to show that nuclear facilities and material are only used for peaceful purposes. The safe, secure and safeguarded operation of a nuclear power plant must be carried on throughout its entire lifetime, and it requires legal and regulative support. The 3S concept of safety, security and safeguards encompasses all the measures relating to these issues.

Steps to provide nuclear safety have been discussed since the discovery of nuclear energy, particularly to protect people, both workers and the public, against dangerous radiation. For the same reason physical protection has played an essential role in the development and during the growth of the nuclear industry. Non-proliferation concerns were strongly expressed immediately after the horrific demonstration of the destructive power of non-peaceful nuclear devices and throughout the ensuing race for nuclear weapons.

More recently, the terrorist actions of 11 September 2001 in New York, and similar events later in the UK, Spain, Russia and elsewhere have generated additional concern for improved security. Even though none of these events involved nuclear technology, a new threat appeared: could a nuclear weapon be obtained by some terrorist group or could unauthorized removal of radioactive material lead to its use, with a malicious intent, for a radioactive dispersal device, a ‘dirty bomb’? How can nuclear or radioactive material be prevented from falling into the hands of criminal or terrorist groups and used to annihilate or contaminate large inhibited areas? Fear of such events has led nuclear security specialists to consider new threats and risks taking the scenarios beyond what was sufficient in the past. Nuclear security now aims to be better prepared to detect, prevent and respond to dangers raised by malicious intentions.

In July 2008, after the G8 Summit in Toyako, on Hokkaido in Japan, an official document, the ‘International Initiative on 3S-Based Nuclear Energy Infrastructure’, was produced; this document makes reference to the 3S concept as identified in the IAEA’s ‘Milestones in the Development of a National Infrastructure for Nuclear Power’ (IAEA, 2007). Since then, 3S has been used frequently to denote nuclear safeguards, safety and security.[1] This regime is designed to provide transparency and confidence for long-term support to current and future utilization of nuclear technology, including the expected renaissance of nuclear power.

Nuclear safety includes all technical and organizational measures taken during planning, design, construction, operation and decommissioning of nuclear plants (as part of the nuclear fuel cycle) to protect people and the environment against technical risks: radiation, incidents and accidents, emergencies during installation, processing, storage and transport involving nuclear and radioactive material or during the operation of facilities that use such material.

Nuclear security and its physical protection principles provide measures to protect people, facilities and material against human unauthorized interference, whether with malicious intent or not. Examples are negligence, theft, sabotage and terrorist acts.

Nuclear safeguards protect against misuse of nuclear facilities and the diversion of nuclear material from peaceful use. The application of safeguards is a consequence of a political choice of a state to be party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and forgo nuclear weapons. Once the country has become a party to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state, it must negotiate a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. This will be a legally binding international instrument; it foresees detailed declarations by the country and inspections and access to the country’s nuclear material and related facilities by IAEA safeguards inspectors as part of the mandatory verification regime. There are no similar international arrangements in the other regulatory areas.