France has no significant sources of fossil fuel within its borders. In the wake of the 1973 oil crisis it made a strategic decision to rely on nuclear power for the bulk of its electricity generation. Prior to this the first NPP design was developed from the early plutonium producing reactors being fuelled with metallic natural uranium with a graphite moderator and gas-cooling; the last of these closed in 1994. In the late 1960s a decision was taken to abandon this technology in favour of light water reactors and in the period 1977 to 2000 the country commissioned 58 PWRs on 19 sites. Consequently nuclear power now supplies over 75% of France’s electricity as well as providing a significant surplus for export to neighbouring countries. In addition, France has a policy of spent fuel reprocessing and recycling so that about 17% of fuel is recycled MOX. Until quite recently, electricity generation and all nuclear activities were performed by companies that were wholly owned by the state and despite some sell-offs, the state still holds a majority share. France is also active in the provision of nuclear services such as the design, development and export of nuclear reactors and spent fuel reprocessing. Again, the main actors are wholly or partly state owned.

With a third of the reactors now more than 30 years old, a new 1650 MW European Pressurised Water Reactor (EPR) is currently under construction at Flamanville. The aim is that this should be the first demonstration unit for a new fleet of NPPs that will provide electricity through to the mid-century. Construction was originally scheduled to take 4^ years but is now about 4 years late with overnight costs almost double the original estimate. A second reactor is planned for Penly near Dieppe, a decision that was confirmed by the President of France after the Fukushima accident. The Atomic Energy Commission (CEA) has also embarked on the design of a Generation IV, sodium cooled fast reactor with the intention that this will be operational by 2020. This will enable France to make use of its store of depleted and reprocessed uranium as well as plutonium currently contained in irradiated MOX.27

The reliance on nuclear power for electricity generation allows France’s per capita GHG emissions to be amongst the lowest in Europe. It is expected that electricity generation will be almost completely decarbonised by 2020 through the installation of renewable generators. To comply with 2050 targets GHG emissions are to be reduced by a factor of four compared to 1990. The intention is that this will be largely achieved through energy saving measures backed up, if possible, by a carbon tax.28

Reprocessing

France is one of only four countries in the world that performs large scale reprocessing of spent fuel and it is useful to examine its role in the context of national energy policy. Reprocessing is difficult, expensive and not without risks, not least that of proliferation. Nevertheless, through the 1950s and 1960s it was thought to be an essential and inevitable component of any nuclear power programme because of the expectation that rapid expansion of this form of electricity generation would place a strain on uranium supplies. Furthermore, fuel from the French gas-cooled reactors had to be reprocessed because the fuel cladding was liable to corrode during storage. It was envisaged that reprocessing would eventually be used in combination with thermal and fast reactors so that the energy potential of both fissile and fertile uranium could be exploited. It is usually claimed that this will allow the amount of energy produced per kilogram of uranium to be increased by a factor of 60. Fast reactors were to be mostly fuelled by mixed oxide (MOX) fuel, made by mixing plutonium oxide produced by reprocessing with natural, depleted or reprocessed uranium oxide. For reasons explained above, however, nuclear power did not expand as envisaged and widespread use of fast reactors did not materialise.

I n the US, federal support for commercial reprocessing was removed by President Carter in 1977. The primary motivation was to set an example in reducing proliferation risks but there is no doubt the decision was facilitated by the reining in of expectations for future nuclear expansion. In France on the other hand reprocessing expanded to take account of the new PWRs being brought into operation. The plutonium produced by reprocessing could then be stored for future use (an important consideration given that France has no indigenous energy sources) or else fabricated into MOX fuel for thermal reactors. In the latter case the saving in fuel utilisation is relatively modest (around 22% for a single cycle that reuses both plutonium and uranium29) and the build-up of Pu-240, which cannot be fissioned by thermal neutrons, usually makes it uneconomic to recycle the fuel more than once unless, of course, a fast neutron device can be utilised.

In terms of cost, the use of plutonium in MOX fuel provides a saving because it removes the need for enrichment. Against this we have the cost of reprocessing and the higher cost of MOX fuel fabrication, which must be done in glove boxes. Chapter 16 maintains that the costs of MOX and UOX (once-through) fuel are ‘broadly comparable’. Against that, both the UK and French plutonium stocks have been allocated zero value and a 2000 official report commissioned by the French Prime Minister (reported in 30) concluded that, compared to direct disposal, reprocessing for the entire French nuclear program would increase average generation costs by about 5.5% over a 40-year reactor life. If we allow that fuel typically constitutes about 11% of total generation costs, an overall increase of 5.5% suggests that fuel from reprocessing is 50% more expensive than once — through. Richard Garwin, a noted critic of reprocessing on the grounds of non­proliferation, has estimated the ratio, using credible data, as a factor of five.31

It is often claimed that reprocessing has great benefits for disposal and, certainly, it produces a fundamental change in the nature of the wastes needing disposal. With the once-through (or no-reprocessing option) there is, essentially, only one waste, namely the spent fuel itself. When reprocessing is deployed, uranium and plutonium are removed for re use and the principal heat producing waste consists of fission products and minor actinides that are then immobilised by dissolving them in borosilicate glass. Typically this has a volume that is 5 to 7 times lower than the spent fuel from which it comes. Its heat production is, however, relatively unchanged and it is this, rather than the waste volume, that determines the overall size of a repository and, therefore to a large extent, the capital cost of disposal. In addition there will be a much greater volume of long-lived intermediate level waste to be disposed at depth although the low heat output of this allows waste packages to be stacked thus minimising the excavated volume of rock and, hence, cost. The removal of plutonium from spent fuel greatly reduces the long-term heat production and the toxicity of the waste and this is of great assistance in demonstrating the safety of disposal over the very long timescales of interest. On the other hand irradiated MOX fuel may be problematic for disposal because of its high and long-lived heat output and it may require reprocessing for this reason.

All this suggests that the benefits of nuclear reprocessing are essentially strategic: it provides an energy reserve, anticipates the advent of fast reactors and simplifies disposal. In economic terms it has no advantages over the once-through option until fast reactors are introduced, an eventuality that is foreseen by France. What is also clear is that, unless there is a massive shift in long-established policy, France will maintain its reliance on nuclear power for the foreseeable future. This was reaffirmed following the Fukushima accident.32