2.1.3 Safety requirements

The IAEA started issuing recommendations on radiation protection soon after its creation in 1957. The recommendations have been regularly revised and updated to reflect changes in philosophy, knowledge and data. Usually the revisions have been prompted by the issue of new recommendations by the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP). In 2012 a revised version of the International Basic Safety Standards for Protection Against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources (the BSS) was issued (IAEA, 2012a). This revision of the 1996 edition of the BSS (IAEA, 1996) was prompted by the issue of the 2007 recommendations of the ICRP (ICRP, 2007) as well as the IAEA’s own Fundamental Safety Principles (IAEA, 2006a).

The revised BSS show a significant shift in emphasis compared to previous versions to accommodate more explicitly the key safety principles established in the Fundamental Safety Principles, for example, the need to establish an appropriate national legal and regulatory framework, to establish the responsibilities for safety, the need for safety assessment of planned practices and the effective incorporation of safety within management systems of organizations.

Greater emphasis is given to the need for security, particularly of radiation sources that could be targets for malevolent actions, and for safety culture by promoting individual and collective commitment to protection and safety at all levels of organizations.

Emphasis is placed on applying a graded approach to safety in which the stringency of application of the requirements is commensurate with the magnitude and likelihood of the exposures. For example, in the case of planned exposure situations, practices may be exempted, notified, registered or licensed depending on the level of risk associated with the practice.

An extract of the requirements of the BSS governing planned exposure situations and emergency exposure situations is contained in the Appendix to this chapter.

2.1.4 Safety guidance

Guidance on how to implement the requirements of the previous BSS (IAEA, 1996) is published by the IAEA in its Safety Guides (IAEA, 2011b). These Safety

Guides, which cover all the important areas of the BSS, are currently being revised and updated to bring them in line with the new BSS (IAEA, 2012a).

J. SCHRODER, Universityof AntwerpandBelgianNuclear Research Centre SCK^CEN, andA. BERGMANS, University of Antwerp, Belgium

Abstract: Public acceptability has become recognised as an indispensable prerequisite for technological development in democratic societies. Nuclear technology is not an exception in this regard, quite the contrary. This chapter starts by sketching a historical overview of the rise of the need for public acceptability with regard to nuclear developments, continues by outlining the main focus and outcomes of contemporary research accompanying this evolution, then explains why the subject continues to demand attention by unravelling the complexity of public acceptability and the nuclear fuel cycle, and ends with some reflections that may guide the future treatment of the topic.

Key words: public acceptability, risk perception, nuclear safety, nuclear technology, participation.

4.1 Introduction

Public acceptability with regard to technological developments has vastly gained in importance and attention during the past decades. It has become commonly recognised as an indispensable prerequisite for the development of technological programmes in democratic societies. Nuclear technology is no exception in this regard. On the contrary, it has played an important role in the development of public debate about technological developments, which has led to a vast amount of dedicated research.

The first section of this chapter sketches an historical overview of this rise of the need for public acceptability with regard to nuclear developments. Consequently we will outline the main focus and outcomes of contemporary research accompanying this evolution, i. e. on issues of the public perception about nuclear technology and the determinants of public acceptability of the nuclear fuel cycle specifically. This will show that, although interesting research about public acceptability and positive progress with regard to its treatment in the nuclear field has taken place, the subject demands continuing attention. The chapter will continue to explain why caution is needed with regard to an instrumental approach to public acceptability, which we define as acting with the sole intent of gaining acceptance for a predefined outcome, as opposed to acting with the more even-handed intent of deliberating acceptability with regard to an open-ended decision. The chapter will end with some reflections that may guide the future treatment of public acceptability and the nuclear fuel cycle.

Notwithstanding the near collapse in public support, the period 1970-1989 was a time of rapid growth in nuclear power, with world nuclear electrical generating capacity increasing by a factor of around 20. The USA saw 98 new NPPs started up in this period, 49 of them prior to TMI. In France, five new PWR reactors were commissioned by the end of 1979 and another 43 in the following decade. In the UK, four new gas-cooled reactors were brought on line in 1976-1977 followed by another ten through the 1980s. Also in the UK, 1977 was notable for the Windscale public inquiry, which found in favour of a proposal to build the THORP reprocessing plant despite strong opposition.

Thereafter, installed nuclear capacity rose much more slowly (Fig. 1.3). There is no doubt that the abrupt change of pace was, to some extent, a consequence of TMI and Chernobyl but the collapse in world oil prices (Fig. 1.1) will also have had an effect. Between 1987 and 2007 installed capacity grew by roughly 25% whilst, over the same period, actual electricity production from nuclear power plants rose by more than twice this. Thus, against a background of steadily

increasing total electricity production, nuclear power managed to maintain its share at around 16%. This increased output came from improved plant performance (e. g. fewer scrams and breakdowns) and, coming in towards the end of the period, increases in the rated output of plant resulting from the use of more highly enriched fuel. These developments were often accompanied by plant life extensions so that NPPs whose nominal operational period was 30 years have often been extended to 40 or even 50 years.

The following radiation protection requirements are relevant to most activities in

the planning, operation and decommissioning of nuclear fuel cycle facilities.

• Graded approach — The stringency of application of the requirements in planned exposure situations shall be commensurate with the characteristics of the practice or the source within a practice, and with the magnitude and likelihood of the exposures.

• Notification and authorization — Any person or organization intending to operate a facility or to conduct an activity shall submit to the regulatory body a notification or an application for authorization. (Notification alone is sufficient provided that the exposures expected to be associated with the practice are unlikely to exceed a small fraction, as specified by the regulatory body, of the relevant limits, and that the likelihood and magnitude of potential exposures and any other potential detrimental consequences are negligible. Authorization can take the form of either registration or licensing. Typical practices that are suitable for registration are those for which: (a) safety can largely be ensured by the design of the facilities and equipment; (b) the operating procedures are simple to follow; (c) the safety training requirements are minimal; and (d) there is a history of few problems with safety in operations. Registration is best suited to those practices for which operations do not vary significantly.)

• Exemption and clearance — The government or the regulatory body shall determine which practices or sources within practices are to be exempted from some or all of the requirements of these Standards. The regulatory body shall approve which sources, including materials and objects, within notified practices or authorized practices can be cleared from regulatory control. (The BSS provides criteria for the exemption and clearance of practices and sources within practices from regulatory control.)

• Responsibility — Registrants and licensees shall be responsible for protection and safety in planned exposure situations.

• Justification of practices — The government or the regulatory body shall ensure that only justified practices are authorized.

• Optimization of protection and safety — The regulatory body shall establish and enforce requirements for the optimization of protection and safety, and registrants and licensees shall ensure that protection and safety are optimized. (The regulatory body is required to establish or approve constraints on dose and on risk, as appropriate, to be used in the optimization of protection and safety. The BSS does not prescribe such constraints (but see ICRP guidance in Section 2.2.4).)

• Dose limits — The government or the regulatory body shall establish and enforce dose limits for occupational exposure and public exposure, and registrants and licensees shall apply these limits. (The dose limits specified in the BSS are similar to those recommended by the ICRP (see Section 2.2.4).)

• Safety assessment — The regulatory body shall establish and enforce requirements for safety assessment, and the person or organization responsible for a facility or activity that gives rise to radiation risks shall conduct an appropriate safety assessment of this facility or activity.

• Monitoring for verification of compliance — Registrants, licensees and employers shall conduct monitoring to verify compliance with the requirements for protection and safety.

• Prevention and mitigation of accidents — Registrants and licensees shall apply good engineering practice and shall take all practicable measures to prevent accidents and to mitigate the consequences of those accidents that do occur.

4.3.1 Net present value accounting

In terms of cash flow, most business investments follow a similar pattern: money is sunk into creating an asset, which then operates to create a revenue stream. Clearly, a rational investor will expect that the turnover of the business will be sufficient to meet the running costs (workers, materials, services and taxes) and to repay the investment with some profit. But it is not only the arithmetic of income and expenditure that must ‘add up’ — timing, too, is crucial. Imagine, for example, a scheme in which backers were required to wait decades before seeing a return on their investment. Intuitively, it is clear that this would have little attraction — for one thing, the longer one has to wait for a return, the greater will be the risk of default; for another, an investor might guess that he could be dead before the scheme comes into profit. Clearly, there is a preference for returns to be delivered sooner rather than later. We must acknowledge, too, that a lender of money will expect to be recompensed for the risk taken when providing a loan, for the loss of an opportunity to do something else with the money and, not least, for the administration of the loan. These costs accumulate year on year and a convenient way of accounting for this is to discount future income and expenditure at an annual rate. The classical equation expressing the discount rate r is

r = 6 + в [5.1]

Here, 6 is the rate of pure time preference i. e. the additional value (expressed as a fraction or a percentage) that an immediate payment would be considered to have compared to a payment in a year’s time assuming that interest rates are zero. The parameter i is the (normalised) per-capita growth rate of consumption and в is a constant known as the elasticity of marginal utility or, equivalently, the coefficient of relative risk aversion.1 The parameter і approximates to the average rate of interest on capital and the multiplier в may therefore be seen as a measure of the risk of the venture compared to an investment, say, in safe government stocks. Typical (and easily remembered) values for 6, i and в are 2%, 2% and 2 producing a discount rate of 6%. The discount rate may also be seen as the rate of return that the proposer of a project (e. g. a would-be electricity generator) must offer the market in order to persuade it to invest in his project. A direct consequence of the application of this discount rate is that future revenues or costs are assumed to be worth less than they would be if they arose today.

The application of cost discounting (also known as net present value accounting) provides a standard means of assessing the financial viability of schemes in which investments, costs and earnings occur in different amounts and at different times. In the case of electricity generation it becomes possible to compare, for example, the cost of nuclear energy, where the capital costs are high and running costs are low, with combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT), which has exactly the opposite properties.

Following a similar algorithm to that for compound interest, if the discount rate is r, the value of an item that arises in year j is discounted by a factor (1+r)-. This applies whether the item is a debit or a credit. If the life of a power station is, say, 40 years and the discount rate is 6% (i. e. r = 0.06), the discount factor just before plant closure will be 0.10 so that, for instance, the income from electricity sales in year 40 will be assumed to be worth only 10% of its present day value. Thus, any discount rate, but especially a high one, will favour businesses (forms of electricity generation in this case) where the investment is quickly recouped. Situations where it takes many years to recover the investment will tend to be rejected. A secondary consequence of the method is that it becomes very difficult to argue the benefits of long-lived plant because, for example, income generated between, say, 60 and 70 years, is discounted so heavily. Thirdly, long­term costs, such as the inevitable expenditure on decommissioning of a nuclear power plant, are also discounted so that, when set against the up-front investment in plant, they may appear largely irrelevant. This approach seems to operate against sustainability and inter-generational equity, and some have proposed2 that net present value accounting should not be used over time periods of more than a few decades.

In fixing upon an appropriate discount rate, it is often argued that private investors will demand higher rates of return than governments. This may be rationalised on the grounds that governments are able to control some of the risks to which a private investor would be subject. It is also possible that a government may be willing to accept a lower rate of return on the investment, seeing it as a means of gaining the greater prize of economic growth.

The ICRP, in its most recent recommendations (ICRP, 2007), has updated its system of radiological protection. However, the changes in relation to its previous recommendations (ICRP, 1991) are comparatively minor and for the most part are concerned with clarifying the previous recommendations (Wrixon, 2008).

The central assumption of a linear dose-response relationship for the induction of cancer and heritable effects, according to which an increment in dose induces a proportional increment in risk even at the lowest doses, continues to provide the basis for the protection system.

Nuclear material in transit includes spent nuclear fuel and other high-activity materials that require physical protection. For material in transit the use of certified, structurally rugged, shipment containers or canisters is essential. Advance planning and coordination with local authorities, including law enforcement, along approved routes is also necessary. Information about transportation routes and schedules are to be protected to the extent possible. Along the transport routes regular communication between the transports and the transport control centre is important; where and when necessary, guards and escorts must be available.

In each individual case, the protection system will be specified using design basis threats that define potential adversaries who might attempt sabotage or unauthorized removal of nuclear (or other radioactive) material. In support, the IAEA provides a set of recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear material and facilities (IAEA, 1999/1). INFCIRC/255 provides a categorization for nuclear material, based on which different physical protection measures are to be considered. However, it is important to remember that the Agency has no responsibility either for the provision of a state’s physical protection system or for the supervision, control or implementation of it.

In 1980 the ‘Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material’ (CPPNM) was signed; it entered into force in 1987 (IAEA, 1980). It is the only internationally binding document in the area of physical protection of nuclear material. In 2005 the convention was amended and strengthened to make it legally binding for states parties[5] to protect nuclear facilities and material in peaceful domestic use, storage as well as transport. It also provides for expanded cooperation among states regarding rapid measures to locate and recover stolen or smuggled nuclear material, mitigate any radiological consequences of sabotage, and prevent and combat related offences.

Although the sources of radiation in the various parts of the nuclear fuel cycle can be very different, the essential features of radiation protection are the same. Workers must be adequately protected from radiation in the workplace and the public and the environment must be protected from any radioactive materials that are transported or released from the nuclear facilities. All practicable measures must be taken to prevent accidents and to mitigate any consequences should an accident occur. In this section the essential features of radiation protection in uranium mining and milling facilities, at nuclear power plants in operation and during decommissioning and at radioactive waste repositories are discussed.

2.1.5 Uranium mining and milling

The hazards to workers in uranium mines are due mainly to the presence of radon gas (Rn-222) and its short lived progeny (Po-218, Pb-214, Bi-214 and Po-214). Radon gas is inert but its daughter nuclides become attached to particles in the air and can deposit in the lungs of miners. The airborne radioactivity in mine dust also contains radionuclides from the U-238 and U-235 families (U-238, U-234, Th-230, Ra-226 and Po-210) and these too present a risk when inhaled. External radiation hazards in uranium mines are due to beta and gamma radiation emitted from the ore bodies. Both of these hazards can also exist in non-uranium mines; e. g., gold mines and some coal mines where uranium is present. External radiation does not normally constitute the major hazard but can be significant where the ore grade is relatively high. In the milling process, radon and its daughters usually present only a minor inhalation hazard compared to ore and uranium dusts, although significant radon concentrations may occur in certain parts of the plant. The exposure of workers in uranium mills to external beta and gamma radiation is generally comparable to that of workers in uranium mines but it may be significantly higher in some locations. The external radiation levels vary from mill to mill depending on the grade of ore, type and grade of concentration, and type of process, but generally, external radiation hazards assume significance in the final stages of precipitation, filtration, concentrate packing and storage.

Preventing and controlling the intake by inhalation of radionuclides is a key feature of radiation protection in uranium mines. This is usually achieved by ensuring adequate ventilation and dust suppression in the workplace. For this purpose, the position of Ventilation Officer is often established in mines. Ideally he/she should work together with the Radiation Protection Officer to provide for optimized radiation protection. Appropriate personnel and workplace monitoring arrangements should be in place to enable checks to be made on the ongoing radiological situation and to ensure that local dose limits are not exceeded. A particular feature of verifying that dose limits are complied with in the case of the monitoring of radon progeny is the need to convert from the measured quantity, the potential alpha energy in the air, to committed effective dose. Detailed guidance on this and other aspects of occupational radiation protection in uranium mines is given in reference (IAEA, 2004a). Other types of hazard exist in uranium mining and milling, including those associated with the chemical toxicity of uranium and its compounds, and these must also be appropriately managed.

I n the course of the twentieth century, the methods by which uranium was obtained changed — with increasing amounts being obtained by non-underground mining methods. In situ leach (ISL) mining has been steadily increasing its share of the total. In 2009, production was as follows: conventional underground and open pit 57%, in situ leach 36%, by-product 7%. The alternative methods do not present the same occupational hazards as underground mining but can create a greater environmental impact. Although active uranium mines exist in 20 countries, about 60 % of the world’s production of uranium from mines is currently from Kazakhstan, Canada and Australia (WNA, 2011).

The radioactive waste generated in mining and milling activities differs from that generated at nuclear power plants and most other industrial operations in that it contains only low concentrations of radioactive material but is generated in much greater volumes. The management methods to be employed are therefore different and usually involve waste disposition on or near the surface, in the vicinity of the mine and/or mill sites. Furthermore, the waste contains long-lived radionuclides (i. e., radionuclides with a half-life of more than about 30 years) and this has important implications for its management because of the long time periods for which control is necessary. Radioactive waste arises from all stages of mining and milling processes and includes, in addition to mill tailings, waste rock, mineralized waste rock and process water, including leaching solutions. The hazards to humans and to the environment posed by mining and milling waste arise not only from its radioactivity but also from the presence of toxic chemicals and other materials in the waste.

A conventional mill uses uranium ore extracted by either open pit or deep mining. The ore is then crushed and sent through the mill, where extraction processes concentrate the uranium into uranium-oxygen compounds called yellowcake. The remainder of the crushed rock, in a fluid slurry, is placed in a tailings dam. Due to the long half-lives of the radioactive constituents involved, the safety of the deposit has to be guaranteed for very long periods of time. Over such long timescales, tailings piles can be subject to erosion by various processes. Rainfall, floods and animals burrowing can lead to the dispersion of material. Wind action can remove and disperse material from the surface of piles as they dry out. Seepage from tailings can transfer material into ground and surface water.

Legislation to improve the condition of tailings piles was slow to develop and in most of the affected countries it is only in the last 20 years that the situation has changed. Typical regulations define maximum contaminant concentrations for soils and admissible contaminant releases (in particular for radon). The period of time during which the measures taken must be effective is also defined (typically 200-1000 years). A further requirement is that the measures taken must assure safe disposal for the prescribed period of time without active maintenance. International guidance on the safe management of uranium mine and mill tailings can be found in reference (IAEA, 2002).

Uranium was mined and processed in many countries of the world for military purposes in the Cold War period and the residues remain — often in an untreated or partially remediated form. A number of international projects aimed at improving this situation are currently under way (NATO, 2009; IAEA, 2012b).

4.1.1 Public acceptability, science and technology

Both the impinging role of science and technology as well as the importance of its public acceptability can be said to have their roots in the spirit of the Enlightenment. Throughout the eighteenth century a great belief in progress and the controllability of the world through science developed. Longing to be relieved from the dominance of religion and superstition and to be guided by the egalitarian concept of common sense (‘sapere aude’ or ‘dare to know’, as Immanuel Kant captured the programme of the Enlightenment, urging people to start thinking for themselves), the idea of a society in progress through rationalisation gained ground. Science gradually was no longer solely about elite, ‘isolated’ knowledge gathering, but received a societal, ‘applied’ function: the betterment and advancement of the human condition. By the nineteenth century the ‘enlightened research drive’ had greatly improved our understanding of many aspects of the world and its state of affairs, and confidence in science grew. Yet the more advanced it became, the more specialisation it required, thus challenging the egalitarian principle of common sense. For the expert, confidence with regard to one’s research field continued to be based on self-assurance, but for the broader public, for a growing number of topics, it became more a matter of reliance. At the same time the outward, applied character of science became irrevocably entrenched throughout the Industrial Revolution. Thus everybody profited from and marvelled over the wonders of technologies, while its technicalities became more and more difficult to grasp without thorough education and training, and its impacts impinged fundamentally on the organisation of society as a whole (economics, politics, spatial planning, education, . . .).

The social sciences quite rapidly became wary of the more ambiguous societal consequences of these evolutions (e. g. Marxism). Yet the Enlightenment’s enthusiasm towards science and technology was clearly echoed through the concretisation of the paradigm of ‘progress through growth’ in the aftermath of World War II. In fact, it still does. Nevertheless, the (mis)use of science in the World Wars (poison gas, atomic bombs) and a series of well-publicised industrial accidents with serious consequences for human health and the environment slowly but steadily started to blunt the initial overall enthusiasm. Such events illustrated that our current knowledge has it limits and that experts can and do make mistakes. It thus became clear that science and technology can also be deployed negatively, and, moreover, that even without bad intentions they can lead to unforeseen and even unforeseeable consequences. It was realised that science and technology included not only a distribution of ‘goods’, but also of (potential) ‘bads’ (Beck, 1992). Therefore, within more democratic societies a more knowledgeable public found it increasingly difficult to base confidence in technology solely on expert reliance. Both the importance as well as the complexity of public acceptability of science and technology thus came to the foreground.

Starting in the mid-1990s, many nuclear experts came to believe that an expansion of nuclear power or, at the very least, a retention of existing capacity was inevitable. The reason is simple: governments have been setting themselves increasingly ambitious targets in terms of reductions in future greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Achieving these targets will be expensive. It will require a decarbonisation of electricity generation coupled with complete electrification of transport and heating. Renewable generators will be introduced, no doubt, but it would make no sense to abandon an existing carbon-free source of energy, especially if its contribution is significant. On a more theoretical level, the very nature of much renewable energy — low intensity and intermittent — suggests an incompatibility with industrialised societies where people concentrate in mega-cities and follow lifestyles that require secure and adequate electricity supplies. In addition to this, the rate of progress in installing renewables has been less than expected due, in part, to public resistance. These and other factors caused a number of governments to turn to nuclear power — reluctantly perhaps in view of the continuing antipathy of the public. According to a 2010 Eurobarometer26 (field work September-October 2009) all those concerns that were raised by the early opponents still carry weight today: safety of operation, disposal, diversion of nuclear materials, lack of trust or confidence in the operators and regulators. But to these concerns is now added the possibility of terrorism with 52% of respondents thinking that nuclear power plants are not sufficiently secured against terrorist attacks. Overall, more than 50% of Europeans still believe that the risks of nuclear power outweigh the benefits.

This growing (if grudging) acceptance that future energy supplies must include a nuclear component was undermined by the Fukushima accident of March 2011. Thus, a number of countries that were tentatively moving towards life extensions or new NPPs have now rejected nuclear power outright. Here we examine the range of responses to the climate challenge and the Fukushima accident by describing four case histories.