Earlier (Section 4.2.1) we stated that, firstly, public acceptance was (taken for) granted in the early development of nuclear technology, and secondly, once the nuclear ball was rolling, public non-acceptance simply was not an option anymore. Both parts require further elaboration in the light of the ideas expressed throughout the previous sections.

Let us start first with the statement that public acceptance was taken for granted in the early development of nuclear technology. Referring back to the notion of trans-science and the general historical introduction (Section 4.2), most scientific research, even in universities, is ultimately aimed at developing practical outcomes. When technologies are introduced their desirability is treated in a more or less explicit manner, i. e. they are very often framed in understandings about ‘the good life’. Although many different factors (including the military one) were at play when nuclear energy was first introduced, the general enthusiasm with regard to the promises that nuclear technology offered in the framework of economic growth and scientific progress was outspoken and genuine. The following catchphrase at the stand of the Belgian Association for the Peaceful Development of Atomic Energy at the 1958 World Exhibition in Brussels illustrates this confidence and desirability really well: to present the ‘immeasurable potential arising from splitting the atom as well as the marvellous horizons it opens for the welfare of man and for a better standard of living’ (SCK^CEN, 2002:). However, as technologies are implemented and time passes, a thorough evaluation of whether their concrete functioning does indeed fulfil the original desires for which they were developed, is not always that straightforward, especially when this also entails certain (unforeseen) drawbacks. Moreover, values and beliefs that constitute the original desirability of certain technologies (such as the added value of nuclear energy to the paradigm of progress through growth) are not carved in stone.

This brings us to the second part where we said that, once the nuclear ball was rolling, public non-acceptance just was not an option anymore. One needs to be realistic about the fact that the development of the nuclear fuel cycle demands enormous investment and requires considerable structural adaptations of the energy system (in the broadest sense). Even leaving aside the very long back end of the nuclear fuel cycle, once these types of decision have been made and carried out, this more factual level cannot be turned around from one day to another, concretising the idea of ‘path dependency’. Moreover, such developments also necessitate revisions of institutions and decision-making processes, which have proven to be even more challenging than the financial and structural requirements. As IAEA Deputy Director General Yury Sokolov put it: ‘The introduction of a nuclear power programme involves a commitment of at least 100 years to maintain a sustainable national infrastructure throughout operation, decommissioning and waste disposal. Another important element is that a Member State contemplating initiating a nuclear power programme should have a stable political, economic and social environment.’

These two levels correspond well to what Weinberg refers to as ‘the Faustian bargain’ of nuclear energy. The expression ‘striking a Faustian bargain’ generally refers to a decision made in the light of present needs and gains without in-depth regard for future cost or consequences. What is striking is that the needs and gains behind nuclear energy mirror those of Faust in Goethe’s play, namely knowledge and power. The two elements of the Faustian bargain are both present in the nuclear enterprise: the promise of relatively abundant, cheap, safe and environment friendly energy on the one hand, yet the requirement of an unprecedented degree (both in scope and in time) of expertise, vigilance and social stability to safeguard both the technology and the waste it produces on the other hand (Weinberg, 1992: 234; Spreng et al, 2007: 852).

Although improvements have been made in all parts of the nuclear fuel cycle over the past half century, we shall never be able to totally eliminate any of the previously listed items (Section 4.3) of public concern (reactor safety, transport of radioactive materials, dual use and waste disposal). ‘When nuclear energy was small and experimental and unimportant, the intricate moral and institutional demands of a full commitment to it could be ignored or not taken seriously’ (Idem: 222). Today, however, with ca. 442 reactors in operation worldwide, the adequacy of human institutions to manage the nuclear fuel cycle in the broadest sense should be thoroughly reinvestigated. Moreover, the content of the bargain has evolved, as the post-war equation of development and growth is slowly but steadily challenged by the paradigm of sustainable development, which sprang exactly out of the idea of ‘limits to growth’.

The main physical quantities used in radiological protection are the rate of nuclear transformation of radionuclides (the activity) and the energy absorbed by a unit mass of a substance from the radiation to which it is exposed (the absorbed dose). The unit of activity is the reciprocal second, representing the number of nuclear transformations (or disintegrations) per second, which is termed the becquerel (Bq). The unit of absorbed dose is the joule per kilogram, termed the gray (Gy).

The absorbed dose is the basic physical dosimetric quantity. However, it is not entirely satisfactory for radiation protection purposes because effectiveness in damaging human tissue differs for different types of ionizing radiation. Consequently, the absorbed dose averaged over a tissue or organ is multiplied by a radiation weighting factor to take account of the effectiveness of the given type of radiation in inducing health effects; the resulting quantity is termed the equivalent dose. The quantity equivalent dose is used when individual organs or tissues are irradiated, but the likelihood of injurious stochastic effects due to a given equivalent dose differs for different organs and tissues. Consequently, the equivalent dose to each organ and tissue is multiplied by a tissue weighting factor to take account of the organ’s radiosensitivity. The sum total of such weighted equivalent doses for all exposed tissues in an individual is termed the effective dose. The unit of equivalent dose and of effective dose is the same as that of absorbed dose, namely joule per kilogram, but the name sievert (Sv) is used in order to avoid confusion with the unit of absorbed dose (Gy).

When radionuclides are taken into the body, the resulting dose is received throughout the period of time during which they remain in the body. The committed dose is the total dose delivered during this period of time, and is calculated as a specified time integral of the rate of receipt of the dose. Any relevant dose restriction is applied to the committed dose from the intake.

The IAEA runs a number of nuclear security related advisory services is available (IAEA, 2011/6) as described below.

The International Nuclear Security Advisory Service serves to identify a state’s nuclear security requirements and measures needed to meet them; the final report, once agreed by the host state and, with its consent, serves as the basis for further cooperation and as a vehicle for the coordination of bilateral nuclear security assistance.

The International Physical Protection Advisory Service establishes missions to evaluate existing physical protection arrangements in Member States. A mission carries out a detailed review of the legal and regulatory basis for the physical protection of nuclear activities in the requesting state and of compliance with obligations from the CPPNM. It also compares the established national practices with guidance provided as best international practices. The findings of missions are formulated as confidential mission reports for further action on a multilateral, bilateral or unilateral basis. Specific missions provide assistance such as training and technical support and more targeted assessments constitute an essential feature of the service.

The IAEA’s SSAC Advisory Service provides national authorities with recommendations for improvements to their state systems for accountancy and control (SSAC) of nuclear material, i. e. on the implementation of basic safeguards requirements. The missions evaluate the regulatory, legislative, administrative and technical components of the SSAC at both the state and facility level, and assess how the SSAC meets the obligations contained in the state’s agreement and additional protocol as applicable (see also under ‘safeguards’).

The International Team of Experts advisory missions are convened as a primary mechanism to reach out to states regarding their adherence to or implementation of international instruments relevant to enhancing protection against nuclear terrorism.

In 2006 the Agency introduced the Integrated Regulatory Review Service, to help states to improve the effectiveness of national regulatory bodies and to implement national safety legislation and regulations. The outcome has usually also a beneficial effect on the state’s nuclear security infrastructure.

The Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan provides a holistic approach to nuclear security capacity-building and is based on findings and recommendations from the IAEA’s range of nuclear security missions. It is drafted in consultation with individual states and tailored to country-specific needs. The establishment of this mechanism has brought ad hoc interventions into a more systematized approach.

The above shows the close relationship between nuclear security, safety and safeguards. On a broader basis the IAEA cooperates not only with its member states, but also with a number of other international organizations on matters relating to security. Such co operation has existed with Interpol since 2006, with EUROPOL, with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Unit, the Universal Postal Union and the World Customs Organization, who have contributed in the development of security guidance documents. The Agency continues to provide assistance upon request to the United Nations Committees for Security Council resolutions 1540 and 1373.

Over the last two decades the IAEA safety standards have been developed — from a collection of individual safety documents addressing particular safety areas and issues — to a unified body of documents developed from a central set of safety principles. The top level document is the Fundamental Safety Principles published in 2006 (IAEA, 2006a).

The fundamental safety objective is ‘to protect people and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation’. To ensure that facilities are operated and activities conducted so as to achieve the highest standards of safety that can reasonably be achieved, measures have to be taken:

• To control the radiation exposure of people and the release of radioactive material to the environment;

• To restrict the likelihood of events that might lead to a loss of control over a nuclear reactor core, nuclear chain reaction, radioactive source or any other source of radiation;

• To mitigate the consequences of such events if they were to occur.

The fundamental safety objective applies for all facilities and activities, and for all stages over the lifetime of a facility or radiation source, including planning, siting, design, manufacturing, construction, commissioning and operation, as well as decommissioning and closure. This includes the associated transport of radioactive material and management of radioactive waste.

Ten safety principles have been formulated, on the basis of which safety requirements and relevant safety measures are developed in order to achieve the fundamental safety objective. The safety principles form a set that is applicable in its entirety; although, in practice, different principles may be more or less important in relation to particular circumstances.

1 Responsibility for safety — The prime responsibility for safety must rest with the person or organization responsible for facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks.

2 Role of government — An effective legal and governmental framework for safety, including an independent regulatory body, must be established and sustained.

3 Leadership and management for safety — Effective leadership and management for safety must be established and sustained in organizations concerned with, and facilities and activities that give rise to, radiation risks.

4 Justification of facilities and activities — Facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks must yield an overall benefit.

5 Optimization of protection — Protection must be optimized to provide the highest level of safety that can reasonably be achieved.

6 Limitation of risks to individuals — Measures for controlling radiation risks must ensure that no individual bears an unacceptable risk of harm.

7 Protection ofpresent andfuture generations — People and the environment, present and future, must be protected against radiation risks.

8 Prevention of accidents — All practical efforts must be made to prevent and mitigate nuclear or radiation accidents.

9 Emergency preparedness and response — Arrangements must be made for emergency preparedness and response for nuclear or radiation incidents.

10 Protective actions to reduce existing or unregulated radiation risks — Protective actions to reduce existing or unregulated radiation risks must be justified and optimized.

The three general principles of radiation protection, which are justification, optimization of protection and limitation of exposure, are expressed in Safety Principles 4, 5, 6 and 10.

Safety requirements

On the basis of the Fundamental Safety Principles (IAEA, 2006a), safety requirements have been developed covering all areas of nuclear application including nuclear power plants and other nuclear fuel cycle facilities, research reactors, radioactive waste disposal facilities and the transport of radioactive material. In addition, safety requirements have been developed to cover general safety topics such as governmental, legal and regulatory frameworks, leadership and management, radiation protection, safety assessment, decommissioning and emergency preparedness (IAEA, 2011b).

The Code of Conduct for the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, when implemented, will help national authorities ensure that radioactive sources are used within an appropriate framework of radiation safety and security.

The Code of Conduct for the Safety of Research Reactors strengthens the international nuclear safety arrangements for civil research reactors, taking due account of input from INSAG and the views of others.

IAEA Safety Glossary Terminology used in Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection, 2007 edn.

Safety Standards Series: The IAEA safety standards reflect an international consensus on what constitutes a high level of safety for protecting people and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation. They establish fundamental safety principles, requirements and measures to control the radiation exposure of people and the release of radioactive material to the environment, to restrict the likelihood of events that might lead to a loss of control over a nuclear reactor core, nuclear chain reaction, radioactive source or any other source of radiation and to mitigate the consequences of such events if they do occur. The standards apply to facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks, including nuclear installations, the use of radiation and radioactive sources, the transport of radioactive material and the management of radioactive waste.

IAEA Safety Reports Series: Publications in the Safety Reports Series report on practical examples and detailed methods for the application or use of Safety Requirements or Safety Guides. Other publications in the Safety Reports Series may be in the form of monographs on various scientific and technical subjects that are safety related.

IAEA Technical Documents (TECDOCS): The IAEA-TECDOC Series includes both the proceedings of meetings and monograph type documents. Publications are issued in the TECDOC series if it is expected that the lifetime of the publication may be short, or if the subject matter is of a tentative nature or of relatively low significance to Member States (TECDOCs are also issued by the IAEA in areas other than nuclear safety and security).

Emergency Preparedness and Response Series: Publications in the EPR Series are practical publications that support the use of the Safety Guides, or the relevant conventions. They are developed by the IAEA’s Incident and Emergency Centre.

INSAG Series: This series was introduced for reports to the Director General on safety matters by the International Nuclear Safety Group (INSAG), an independent expert group established in 1985 by the Director General of the IAEA.

Training Course Series: These publications contain lecture notes or other training material. (Publications in the Training Course Series are also issued in areas other than nuclear safety and security.)

Radiological Assessment Reports Series: Reports on assessments of radiological conditions, such as conditions of exposure to radiation due to radioactive residues from nuclear weapon testing, are published in the Radiological Assessment Reports Series. Their purpose is to report on radiological conditions and to disseminate conclusions and recommendations for any further actions necessary for the protection of human health and the environment.

Provision for the Application of Safety Standards: The IAEA’s Statute authorizes it to apply its standards at the request of any state, including through independent peer review appraisal services to determine the status of compliance with its standards.

Proceedings Series: Proceedings are the published record of conferences and symposia; they typically contain the opening addresses, keynote speeches,

contributed papers, presentations, topical discussions held during the gathering,

conclusions and summaries of sessions.

Chernobyl reinforced the downward trend in favourable attitudes to nuclear power that began with TMI. Figure 1.2 illustrates the results of surveys by CBS in the USA and shows that, prior to TMI, those in favour in building new NPPs were in a significant majority. After TMI, this majority was converted to a minority which became even smaller after Chernobyl. Even ignoring Fukushima, the pre-TMI situation has still not been recovered. That said, of the many questions that might be asked in a survey, those that, as here, refer to the building of new NPPs are the

most likely to produce a negative response to nuclear power. A ‘softer’ question relating to, say, ‘the use of nuclear energy as one of the ways to provide electricity’ is more likely to elicit a positive response and, using this and similar questions, the Nuclear Energy Institute has been able to demonstrate a steady increase in positive attitudes to nuclear power in the USA since 198220 (62% answering favourably to this question in September 2011).

The Eurobarometer surveys22 show that public acceptance of nuclear power in the European Union reached a low point in the few years after Chernobyl and, depending on how acceptance is measured, has recovered slowly. There is significant variability between member states but a consistent finding over the years is that people are more likely to believe that the risks of nuclear power are tolerable if they live in a country that has NPPs. Nevertheless, France, with the largest reactor fleet in Europe, is the most sceptical of the ‘has-NPPs’ group. Here, the percentage of people who believe that NPPs present a high risk to the population fluctuated between 40 and 48% in the period 1997-2010, jumping to 55% after Fukushima.23 Nuclear power was thought to be the most risky of a long list of suggested industrial activities and, 25 years on, Chernobyl was most often cited in support of this view.

An extreme example of the impact of Chernobyl is Italy, which had four reactors in operation in 1986. In terms of risk perception, its opinion spread prior to the accident was quite typical of a country that operates NPPs. Shortly after Chernobyl, however, the country voted to close all the operating reactors since when its views have come into line with the ‘no-NPPs’ group. Notwithstanding that 10% of Italy’s electricity is nuclear, imported from France, the anti-nuclear stance formed by Chernobyl seems to have been reinforced by the Fukushima accident because a new build programme proposed by the government in 2008 was rejected by a referendum in June 2011.

The World Nuclear Association notes that there have been three major reactor accidents in the history of civil nuclear power (Table 1.1) and estimates that, over the same period, world experience extends to 14 500 reactor years. This is equivalent to a major accident probability of about 1 in 4800 reactor years. There are currently around 450 nuclear reactors worldwide which suggests that, if safety

standards remain unchanged, a major accident may be expected roughly every decade. Given the reactions to previous accidents, such a frequency must raise doubts about the continuing social and political acceptability of nuclear power. Of course, safety standards do evolve and, each time there is an accident, regulators become more vigilant and measures are taken to improve safety. What is clear, however, is the absolute necessity of doing this. A parallel may be made with airlines where the accident rate for commercial jets has fallen by about two orders of magnitude in fifty years.24

1.7.1 General requirements for protection and safety

The BSS establishes many requirements for radiological protection and safety;

some are for general application and some are more specific to different exposure

situations and exposure categories. The first five requirements apply to the

regulation of all activities involving the use of ionizing radiations.

1 Application of the principles of radiation protection — Parties with responsibilities for protection and safety shall ensure that the principles of radiation protection are applied for all exposure situations. (It may be helpful to note that the BSS adopts the basic concepts of the ICRP (as set out in Section 2.4) in relation to the framework for radiation protection, that is, the exposure situations (planned, existing and emergency), the protection principles (justification, optimization and dose limits) and the exposure categories (occupational, public and medical)).

2 Establishment of a legal and regulatory framework — The government shall establish and maintain a legal and regulatory framework for protection and safety and shall establish an effectively independent regulatory body with specified responsibilities and functions.

3 Responsibilities of the regulatory body — The regulatory body shall establish or adopt regulations and guides for protection and safety and shall establish a system to ensure their implementation.

4 Responsibilities for protection and safety — The person or organization responsible for facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks shall have the prime responsibility for protection and safety. Other parties shall have specified responsibilities for protection and safety.

5 Managementforprotection and safety — The principal parties shall ensure that protection and safety elements are effectively integrated into the overall management system of the organizations for which they are responsible.

I. CROSSLAND, CrosslandConsulting, UK

Abstract: This chapter compares the Levelised Cost of Electricity (LCOE) for nuclear power with those of conventional and removable energy sources. This reveals that the economics of nuclear power are dominated by the high capital cost of nuclear power stations, which is itself strongly influenced by the cost of capital and, therefore, the applicable discount rate. Once built, the profitability of a nuclear power plant is ultimately determined by the price of electricity. Fossil fuel price is a key determinant of this but policy-related matters such as the rules for electricity trading and penalties on carbon dioxide emissions are also important.

Key words: energy costs, levelised cost of electricity, LCOE, nuclear power costs.

4.3 Introduction

While nuclear power remains controversial, in a world with no easy energy choices it offers the possibility of secure supplies of electricity with no carbon dioxide emissions. This is attractive to governments who understand that electricity is an essential of modern life, and while it cannot be stored, a shortfall in its supply is something devoutly to be avoided. Setting aside the issues of nuclear proliferation and safety, the next most important question is that of cost and, in particular, how the cost of nuclear power compares with the alternatives. This, it transpires, is surprisingly complicated, primarily because the various generating technologies are so different.

We begin, therefore, by explaining the concept of the Levelised Cost of Electricity (LCOE), which allows the cost of electricity generation to be fairly compared across different systems. This is followed by illustrative calculations of the LCOE that aim, not to derive definitive LCOE values, but to highlight the key economic differences between nuclear power and other forms of electricity production. We also explore the inbuilt biases in the LCOE method. Following that we consider the important issues of financing and risk management before drawing some conclusions. Amongst other things, we aim to explain why, when seeking to implement a nuclear power programme, prospective sponsors of nuclear power are so anxious to obtain sureties from the government about the nature of future electricity pricing mechanisms, regulation and much else.

Exposure to radiation at high doses can cause effects such as nausea, reddening of the skin or, in severe cases, more acute syndromes that are clinically expressed in exposed individuals within a short period of time after the exposure. Such effects are termed ‘deterministic effects’ because they are certain to occur if the dose exceeds a threshold level. Radiation exposure can also induce somatic effects such as malignancies, which are expressed after a latency period and may be epidemiologically detectable in a population; this induction is assumed to take place over the entire range of doses without a threshold level (ICRP, 2007). Also, hereditary effects due to radiation exposure have been statistically detected in other mammalian populations and are presumed to occur in human populations also. These epidemiologically detectable effects — malignancies and hereditary effects — are termed ‘stochastic effects’ because of their random nature.

Deterministic effects are the result of various processes, mainly cell death and delayed cell division, caused by exposure to high levels of radiation. If extensive enough, these can impair the function of the exposed tissue. The severity of a particular deterministic effect in an exposed individual increases with the dose above the threshold for the occurrence of the effect. From reviews of biological and clinical data it is concluded that in the range of absorbed dose up to and around 100 mGy no tissues express clinically relevant functional impairment. This applies to both single acute doses and to situations where the doses are experienced in a protracted form as repeated annual exposures (ICRP, 2007).

Stochastic effects may ensue if an irradiated cell is modified rather than killed. Modified cells may, after a prolonged process, develop into a cancer. The body’s repair and defence mechanisms make this a very improbable outcome at small doses; nevertheless, there is no evidence of a threshold dose below which cancer cannot result. The probability of occurrence of cancer is higher for higher doses, but the severity of any cancer that may result from irradiation is independent of the dose.

If the cell damaged by radiation exposure is a germ cell, whose function is to transmit genetic information to progeny, it is conceivable that hereditary effects of various types may develop in the descendants of the exposed individual. The likelihood of stochastic effects is presumed to be proportional to the dose received, without a dose threshold. For the purposes of practical radiological protection the ICRP recommends the use of a risk coefficient for stochastic effects of around 0.05 per Sv (effective dose) for exposure to radiation at low dose rate and at doses below about 100 mSv; this is a combined coefficient of detriment that includes all cancers and hereditable effects recognizing that the risks may be different for different organs and tissues (ICRP, 2007). In recent years, there has also been considerable discussion on such things as cellular adaptive responses, genomic instability and bystander signalling (ICRP, 2005). However, the ICRP considers that any contribution from these biological mechanisms is implicitly included in its estimated risk coefficient because it is based on human epidemiological data.

I n addition to the aforementioned health effects, other health effects may occur in infants due to exposure of the embryo or foetus to radiation. These effects include a greater likelihood of leukaemia and, for exposure above various threshold dose values during certain periods of pregnancy, severe mental retardation and congenital malformations. However, the ICRP concludes that the doses received from properly conducted prenatal diagnostic tests would lead to no measurably increased risk of prenatal or postnatal death or developmental damage but that higher doses from therapeutic procedures have the potential to result in developmental harm (ICRP, 2007).

In recent years evidence has accumulated that the frequency of non-cancer diseases is increased in some irradiated populations particularly for heart disease, stroke, digestive disorders, and respiratory disease. These effects have been seen at high doses but, at present, the ICRP considers that there is insufficient information to determine if these effects occur at low doses and without a threshold (ICRP, 2007).

Physical protection provides for securing the health, safety and welfare of people at work, the public and the environment against the misuse of nuclear installations and nuclear and radioactive material. It consists of a variety of measures against sabotage, theft and diversion. The measures are usually based on the significance of the material or facilities being protected. For nuclear safety the requirements are set by a government authority and given to owners or operators of a nuclear installation with the operating licence. The authority also assesses the compliance with the given requirements. The protection measures are based on threat assessment scenarios, which define the level of physical security necessary.

Nuclear facilities

Nuclear facilities and nuclear material used in facilities require physical protection. Facilities include nuclear reactors and other fuel cycle facilities, including spent fuel storage and disposal facilities. In line with nuclear safety and some safeguards requirements, physical protection areas are defined so that defence in depth can be applied in these graded areas: exclusion, protected and vital areas, together with material access areas and associated barriers and controls. Perimeters are defined, usually indicated by walls or fences, and guards that monitor both the perimeter and gates. Intrusion detection is a frequently applied principle; detection alarms must be able to distinguish between false or nuisance alarms and actual intrusions, which require the initiation of a response. Assessment of detection and alarm systems is essential to an effective protection system. Based on intrusive events a graded system of responses is required and will be tested regularly. Responses include offsite assistance from local and other agencies as needed.