As we have seen from the four case studies, the challenge of climate change has evoked a range of responses and strategies. Thus we see that France maintains its policy of heavy reliance on nuclear energy, strongly backed by government — funded research and development. Sweden, reluctantly perhaps, has accepted that a significant nuclear contribution to electricity supply is inevitable while California may be categorised as still deciding but with the indicators firmly pointing to a large increase in nuclear capacity. Germany on the other hand has adopted an entirely non-nuclear course: in effect it has rejected a technical risk in favour of an economic one. The goal of heroic reductions in GHG emissions with no economic damage will be difficult enough to achieve even with the use of nuclear power; achieving it without nuclear power may be impossible. Germany will prove the argument one way or the other but in the meantime it is likely that most other countries will prefer to keep their options open.

Once a decision has been taken to adopt or to continue with nuclear power, a whole new rank of subsidiary decisions must be taken: what type of reactor, which fuel cycle, where to obtain fuel, how to ensure safety and security, when to decommission, how to manage spent fuel and so on. All these questions concern one of the many specialities that fall within the overall framework of nuclear power and all are covered in succeeding chapters.

The NPT of 1970 has produced three categories of members, two are parties to the Treaty: the nuclear weapon states and the non-nuclear weapon states. The third category consists of India, Israel and Pakistan, which have chosen not to join the NPT but have, nevertheless, agreed to facility-specific safeguards agreements (IAEA, 1965). For some time also, South Africa (until 1991), Argentina (1995), Brazil (1998) and Cuba (2002) were not parties to the NPT. The vast majority of states, however, were and are party to the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states and have concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA.

In contrast to the vertical proliferation during the Cold War, horizontal proliferation was minimal or, at least, not anywhere near Kennedy’s expectation in 1960. The cases of India, Pakistan and Israel, for example, fall outside the NPT and whether DPRK is in violation or not depends on the view taken of its exit from the NPT. While the NPT community has sometimes faced challenges, the verification regime of the IAEA has been able to defuse these, albeit with difficulty on occasion. The main substance of the NPT is reflected in its Articles I-VI and X: ‘Non-nuclear weapon States. . . undertake not to acquire, manufacture or obtain. . . nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. . .’ (Art. II); ‘Non­nuclear weapon States. . . undertake to accept safeguards. . . in accordance with. . . the Agency’s safeguards system. . .’ (Art. III); ‘Nothing. . . shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all Parties. . . to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination. . .’ (Art. IV); ‘Each of the Parties. . . undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith. . . relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament. . .’ (Art. VI); and, finally, ‘Each Party shall. . . have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if. . . extraordinary events. . . have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal. . . three months in advance’ (Art. X).

The application of safeguards verifications had started soon after the creation of the IAEA, with the first facility-based safeguards inspection in 1961 in the Norwegian research centre of Kjeller (Fischer, 1997). Since the first international safeguards system of 1961 (IAEA INFCIRC/26),[2] developments have responded to the needs of the nuclear community. A revised system was instituted between 1964-1968 (INFCIRC/66) and this remains as the safeguards framework applied for facilities in India, Israel and Pakistan (IAEA, 1965). Shortly after the NPT entered into force, in 1971, a new, more comprehensive way of implementing nuclear safeguards was established and INFCIRC/153 became the standard (IAEA, 1972). This standard is still today the universal framework for IAEA safeguards implementation although, based on the experience with the discovery of the clandestine nuclear programme in Iraq, the confrontation with DPRK and experience gained in South Africa, the system has been strengthened. A complement known as the Additional Protocol was approved in 1997 (IAEA, 1997/1). This is now considered to be an integral part of the IAEA universal safeguards regime. For states with no nuclear facilities and little or no nuclear material there is a Small Quantities Protocol simplifying the interaction with the IAEA. A new version was approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in 2004 (IAEA, 2006/1).

The safeguards objective is ‘the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material[3] from peaceful activities. . . and the deterrence of such a diversion. . .’ (para. 28-30 of INFCIRC/153). States ‘accept safeguards. . . on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities. . .’ (para. 1) and safeguards will be applied ‘for the purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons. . .’ (para. 2). ‘The State shall establish and maintain a system of accounting for and control of all nuclear material subject to safeguards’ (para. 7). Both states and the Agency maintain detailed nuclear books for nuclear accounting purposes. Verification is done ‘by inspections’ (para. 70) including access ‘at key measurement points’ (para. 75).

In the standoff with Iraq prior to the Second Gulf War, the restriction of access to key measurement points and the resulting difficulty for the Agency in determining that all nuclear facilities and all nuclear materials were under safeguards led to the strengthening of the IAEA’s safeguards regime, and to the Additional Protocol (AP) (INFCIRC/540). This requires a more comprehensive and expanded declaration of nuclear related activities (INFCIRC/540, Art. 2-3). It also provides for broader access of Agency inspectors in the form of complementary access (INFCIRC/540, Art. 4-10).

In practical terms, the state, through its State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC) (INFCIRC/153, paras 7 and 31-32), transmits to the Agency descriptive information, i. e. the technical characteristics, for each nuclear facility. Based on the processes and materials there, nuclear material areas, balances and periods are defined. These form the basis for the nuclear material accounting mandated by the safeguards agreement. Facility operating records are to be kept, and inventory and transaction reports are to be sent to the Agency by the state’s SSAC. Where the AP is in force, the required additional information is to be transmitted in a similar way.

States’ declarations are verified by inspection whose frequencies and activities will depend on the type of facility, amount and type of material and whether containment and surveillance can be provided by sealing or monitoring. Where the AP is in force, complementary access will also be used. Such access supports the expanded safeguards objective of ensuring that all facilities and all nuclear material have been declared (IAEA, 2011/2). Safeguards activities may also depend on the size and structure of the national fuel cycle capabilities.

At the end of 2009, safeguards were applied in 170 states (excluding DPRK), of which 89 had both a comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) and an AP in force, 73 a CSA but not an AP. In three states (India, Israel and Pakistan) safeguards were applied on the basis of INFCIRC/66-type agreements, and in the five (NPT-) nuclear weapon states (China, France, Russia, the UK and the US) under so-called voluntary offer safeguards agreements (with the UK as INFCIRC/263 in 1978, the US as INFCIRC/288 and France as INFCIRC/290 in 1981, the Soviet Union as INFCIRC/327 in 1985 and with China as INFCIRC/369 in 1989; all can be found on the IAEA’s website). The total number of significant quantities safeguarded in 2009 was over 165 000 in 1125 nuclear facilities (including 229 power and 153 research reactors), with 1650 inspections and 136 complementary accesses under the AP carried out. Inspectors spent 11 080 calendar-days of field verification for the above. Expenditures for IAEA safeguards exceeded 110 million euros (IAEA, 2010/3).

As required by its Statute (IAEA, 1957), the IAEA began to issue ‘standards of safety for protection of health and minimization of danger to life and property. . .

and to provide for the application of these standards to its own operations. . soon after its inception. While the standards are obligatory for its own operations, they are non-binding recommendations for IAEA member states. Eventually, standards were developed to cover all of the areas of safety related to the use of ionizing radiations; they included the safety of nuclear installations, radiation protection in all applications of radioactive materials, including transport, medicine, industry and research, and radioactive waste management. They were created by groups of experts drawn from the member states of the IAEA and were intended to reflect international good practice. However, in the early days, they were not necessarily used as the main source for the drafting of national regulations. One exception was the IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material. Because shipments of radioactive material regularly crossed national boundaries there was an obvious need for a common international regulatory approach. The first IAEA transport regulations were issued in 1961 and they have been developed and refined in successive editions up to the present time (IAEA, 2009a). All national regulations dealing with safety in the transport of radioactive material are based on the IAEA transport regulations.

In the period up to the mid-1980s other areas were considered to be in need of international regulation. One example was the disposal of radioactive waste at sea. Until the 1980s, ‘sea dumping’ was a common method for radioactive waste disposal, but as concerns about the practice increased, there was pressure for some form of regulation. The London Dumping Convention (now the London Convention 1972) requested guidance from the IAEA on how radioactive waste disposal at sea could be conducted safely (IMO, 1972). A number of IAEA safety standards and guides were issued in the 1970s and 1980s prescribing an approved approach and setting limits on dumping amounts. (In 1993, the practice of dumping radioactive waste at sea was forbidden by the Contracting Parties to the London Convention.) Another area in which the IAEA’s guidance was sought was in relation to the control of discharges to the atmosphere and to the aquatic environment and, at the request of IAEA member states, in the 1970s and 1980s a number of safety standards reflecting accepted international policy in this area were issued.

It is clear that, up to this time, governments considered that it was only practices that had obvious international implications that required international regulation. For most applications of nuclear energy, they were content to develop their own regulatory approaches although, inevitably, there was a high degree of commonality. In particular, the policies and regulations adopted for radiation protection were universally based on the recommendations of the ICRP and the IAEA’s Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation.

Treaties and conventions Safeguards

The Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (the EURATOM Treaty) brought together the six founding states of the European Economic Community to form Euratom, to address the issue of greater energy independence by looking into nuclear power. The main objective was to benefit from the development of atomic energy, to establish the nuclear industry and to ensure security of supply. The treaty guarantees high safety standards and the safeguarding of civilian nuclear materials to prevent them from being diverted to military use. Euratom’s powers are limited to peaceful civil uses of nuclear energy. The treaty entered into force at the beginning of 1958 (Euratom, 2010).

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), United Nations, New York, 1970, is a landmark international treaty whose objectives are to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology; to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. The NPT represents the only binding multilateral commitment to the goal of disarmament by the nuclear-weapon states (UN, 1970).

The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (the Tlatelolco Treaty) was opened for signature in February 1967 and entered into force in April 1969 (OPANAL, 2002). Similar nuclear weapon free zones have been developed in other areas of the world, e. g. Antarctica, with the treaties of Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba and Semipalatinsk for their respective regions, and for Mongolia.

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Substantive negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty began in January 1994 and, although disagreement blocked tangible progress for years, a final draft was presented in

June 1996. Despite objections from India, the draft was submitted to the UN General Assembly in September 1996, adopted and opened for signature. The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) was established in November 1996, it is based in Vienna (CTBT, 1996).

Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the New START Treaty) was signed in April 2010 in Prague and entered into force in February 2011. It provides for further reductions of strategic offensive nuclear arms of the two signatory states. The treaty has a duration of ten years (USSD, 2011).

1.1.2 The roots of opposition to nuclear power

From the 1950s through to the early 1970s there was a rising tide of optimism that nuclear power would provide limitless cheap power. Opposition to the technology gathered momentum throughout the 1970s not as a result of accidents but, rather, as an offshoot of opposition to nuclear weapons and a more general disquiet over the unknown and unwanted consequences of society’s increasing reliance on technology. Rachel Carson’s polemic against agri-chemicals, Silent Spring (1962), and E. F. Schumacher’s rejection of advanced technology in Small is Beautiful (1973) were both important influences. The campaign against nuclear weapons led to a ban on atmospheric nuclear tests through the Partial Test Ban Treaty, although it failed to halt either the build-up in nuclear weapons by the nuclear powers or their proliferation to other states. The testing of a ‘peaceful’ nuclear bomb by India in May 1974 was especially worrying. India had extracted plutonium from uranium fuel irradiated in the CIRUS reactor, breaking an agreement previously made with Canada and the USA, who had supplied the reactor.10 In the later 1970s this led to a tightening of the IAEA’s non-proliferation regime.

In the field of civilian nuclear power, the number of NPPs under construction increased rapidly in the early 1970s (Fig. 1.1) — a consequence, no doubt, of the first oil crisis. This was a cause of concern to local activists and well-organised actions led to the cancellation of some nuclear projects. In California, for example, plans for NPPs at Bodega Bay, Malibu and Sundesert San Diego were cancelled (in 1964, 1970 and 1978 respectively). In Germany, the occupation of a proposed nuclear power plant site at Wyhl in 1975 led to the abandonment of the project and, it is sometimes claimed, the beginnings of a concerted anti-nuclear movement. In Austria a BWR was constructed at Zwentendorf (1968-1978) but was then prevented from operating by a referendum in November 1978. The following month a law was enacted forbidding the use of nuclear fission for energy production in the country. Austria’s anti-nuclear stance has continued in campaigns against nuclear power plants at Mochovce (1990-1999) in Slovakia and Temelin (1994-2000) in the Czech Republic.11

The waste management strategy for spent fuel and high-level waste is affected by the nuclear fuel cycle policies being adopted. Two distinct nuclear fuel cycles are employed (recognizing that some countries have postponed the decision on which approach to adopt (‘wait and see’ approach)):

• Open fuel cycle in which the spent fuel is considered to be a high-level waste (HLW);

• Closed fuel cycle in which the spent fuel is reprocessed to recover unused uranium and the plutonium generated from U-238 by neutron capture, with the production of HLW.

Spent fuel and HLW are highly radioactive and heat generating and need to be cooled and shielded. Deep disposal in geological repositories is generally considered to be the best way to provide a permanent management solution for spent fuel and HLW. While most countries with spent fuel and HLW are working towards national solutions, others, for mainly economic reasons, have indicated an interest in developing multi national disposal facilities.

Disused sealed radioactive sources

The preferred option for the management of disused sealed radioactive sources is to return them to their supplier for reuse or disposal. Sometimes this is not possible, especially for older sources whose supplier is not known or is no longer in business. Alternative solutions are therefore necessary.

Disposal options for disused sealed radioactive sources vary depending on the activity levels and types of radionuclides in the sources. Near-surface repositories may be suitable for low-activity short-lived sources. For long-lived disused sources with activity levels exceeding the criteria for disposal in a near-surface repository, underground disposal is the preferred option. For countries without the prospect of such repositories, the possible development of multinational geological repositories in the future would be of interest. Another possibility is the development on national territory of a special type of borehole disposal facility intended specifically for the disposal of disused sealed radioactive sources.

The current state of affairs in the area of radioactive waste disposal is that repositories for the disposal of all types of low — and intermediate-level waste exist in many countries. Most spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste is held in storage in above ground structures. Progress is being made in the development of geological repositories for spent fuel and high-level waste in several countries and, in particular, the repositories in Sweden and Finland are expected to be in operation within ten years.

The evolution in the 1970s we described earlier (Section 4.2.2) made clear to both critics and supporters that radioactive waste was the Achilles’ heel of nuclear power (e. g. Blowers et al., 1991; Nuttall, 2005; Kasperson et al., 1980: 16 citing Brooks, 1976). Consequently, when looking at the core steps in the nuclear fuel cycle, it seems that, for the purpose of increasing public acceptance, the greater part of the effort has been directed towards the back end of the cycle, notably with regard to the siting of waste disposal facilities. In a way this comes as no surprise. On the one hand, siting directly and concretely affects the local community who, by hosting a nuclear waste disposal facility, are required to make a commitment of unimaginably long duration. On the other hand, the nuclear industry has a keen interest in resolving a situation that has the potential for bringing the industry to a standstill. When local communities resist, such situations are not uncommonly described by would-be developers under the rather narrow denomination of a NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard) or LULU (Locally Unwanted Land Use) case. The danger is that the ‘urgent’ need for a favourable decision can lead to the adoption of an instrumental approach towards public acceptability, i. e. acting with the sole aim of creating acceptance of an outcome already decided and defined, which, in all probability, will simply further antagonise the community concerned.

Nevertheless, throughout the past decade positive changes have been made in radioactive waste management. Today, a number of countries have developed dedicated programmes that are set up to go beyond an expertocratic, top-down, one-way communication approach and instead aim for dialogue and participation in an atmosphere of openness and transparency. What has been achieved in the field of radioactive waste management ‘often goes further than what is embedded in, for example, EU law. In many respects these efforts can be considered innovative and productive, if not completely unique’ (Bergmans et al., 2008: 4). For a relatively detailed overview of such efforts in OECD member states, we refer to the Forum on Stakeholders Confidence (FSC) report on ‘Partnering for Long-term Management of Radioactive Waste’ (NEA, 2010). The most advanced programmes can be described as integrated projects (investigating whether a definitive disposal is both technically feasible and socially acceptable) of co-design (implementer and representative local actors working together) to come to a collectively supported decision on (non-)acceptance (Bergmans, 2011).

Throughout such projects, the relevance of many of the factors of risk perception are confirmed. Referring back to the list in Section 4.3.1, considerable attention is given to understandability, familiarity, controllability and clarity with regard to the risks that a disposal site may entail (e. g. through items such as mutual learning, social vigilance and monitoring, stepwise decision making, . . .). Moreover, ‘added value programmes’ have become common practice in the light of the unequal distribution of costs and benefits that any waste disposal entails. Such programmes recognise that, even when optimal safety conditions are realised, one single local community serves the common good by accepting the waste resulting from activities that the country as a whole benefits from (through the various applications of radioactivity) (Bergmans, 2010). Last but not least, such programmes are restricted to volunteering communities, i. e. communities that themselves express a willingness to investigate the possibility and conditions of accepting a disposal, under the provision of having a right of veto.

To sum up, stakeholder participation in radioactive waste management can be broadly described as ‘ranging from giving policy advice towards emerging forms of co-decision-making, though focused at the operational level’ (Bergmans et al., 2008: 5). In most instances, however, key decisions have not been opened up to co-decision-making, because the remit of the concerned radioactive waste management agencies is often structurally limited in the extent to which it can provide full opportunities for power sharing and co-governance (Idem, 2008: 65).

G. LINSLEY, Private Consultant (Formerly Head, Waste Safety Section, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna), UK

Abstract: The regulatory framework for providing the radiological protection of workers and the public is based on the recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP). In the safety standards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) the recommendations of the ICRP are adapted to a form suitable for regulatory use. In this chapter, the international system for radiological protection as applied to operations in the nuclear fuel cycle is described with reference to the relevant recommendations of the ICRP and the safety standards of the IAEA. The scientific basis for the recommendations of the ICRP is briefly described and key aspects of radiation protection in uranium mining and milling, in the operation of nuclear power plants, in the decommissioning of facilities and in radioactive waste management are discussed.

Key words: radiological protection, radiological quantities and units, effects of radiation, ICRP system of radiological protection, justification, optimization, dose limits, IAEA safety standards, uranium mining and milling, nuclear power plants, decommissioning, radioactive waste management.

2.1 Introduction

The various activities of the nuclear fuel cycle inevitably involve the exposure of workers and, in some cases, the public to the hazards of ionizing radiation. This means that precautions, in the form of design features and operational procedures, are necessary at each stage to avoid or minimize human exposure. Radioactive materials are different from most other hazardous materials because, in addition to the hazard presented due to the possible intake of the materials into the human body, they present an external hazard. The need to both shield radioactive material to absorb radiation and to contain it in order to prevent or reduce human exposure by intake influences the design and operation of nuclear fuel cycle activities.

The framework for providing radiological protection is usually contained in laws and regulations, which make it legally binding on users of ionizing radiation to provide for the protection of workers and the public. While regulatory frameworks providing for the radiation protection of workers and the public are in place in all countries of the world where ionizing radiations are being applied in medicine, research and industry, they vary both in form and currency. The reasons for this are related to the differences in the nature of the legal and regulatory systems in each country. Furthermore, the process for updating laws and regulations can be slow — leading to regulations on radiation protection in many countries being out of date in relation to current international recommendations. For these reasons, the focus in this chapter is on the international recommendations and standards that serve as a basis for national regulations.

In this chapter, radiation protection in the context of the nuclear fuel cycle is addressed, first, by describing the international system of radiological protection as recommended by the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP). Next, the international safety standards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which adapt the recommendations of the ICRP into a regulatory form, are described. The radiological protection issues associated with some of the main areas of the nuclear fuel cycle are then discussed and, finally, some possible future issues and trends are considered.

While the Iraq nuclear case is now closed it provides a useful example of a special safeguards case. In 1991, the United Nations Security Council was requested to investigate weapons of mass destruction; the Council established[4] a UN Special Commission (UNSCOMM, since 1999 UNMOVIC) for chemical, biological and missile inspections in Iraq. The Iraq nuclear portfolio came to the IAEA. It included the responsibility to uncover and dismantle any clandestine nuclear programme found in Iraq and to develop and implement a system of ‘ongoing monitoring and verification’. The Agency responded with the creation of the Iraq Action Team (later known as the Iraq Nuclear Verification Office). Working together with UNSCOMM/UNMOVIC, multinational teams of inspectors of experts and nuclear scientists were assembled to develop a refined understanding of Iraq’s clandestine nuclear weapons programme. As a result of removal or destruction of nuclear related material and equipment and related inspections as mandated by the Security Council, the IAEA Director General reported in March 2003,that the IAEA had found no further evidence or plausible indication of the revival of a nuclear weapons programme in Iraq. Detailed information is available from the IAEA ‘Iraq Nuclear File: Key Findings’ (IAEA, 2011/1) and from ‘Timeline Iraq, Challenges and Lessons Learned from Nuclear Inspections’ (Baute, 2004). In 2007 the UNSC (UNSC, 2007) terminated the mandates of the IAEA (and UNMOVIC), closing the Iraq nuclear case. A very comprehensive analysis of the situation in Iraq was given by Hans Blix (Blix, 2004), until 1997 director general of the IAEA, since 2000 the head of UNMOVIC and as of 2004 chairman of the International Commission on Weapons of Mass Destruction. ElBaradei writes about Iraq, North Korea, Iran, Libya and the ‘nuclear bazaar’ of A. Q. Khan during his time as director general of the IAEA in ‘Age of Deception’ (ElBaradei, 2011).

The DPRK was a member of the IAEA with a facility-specific type of safeguards implemented (IAEA, 1977/1). It joined the NPT later, in 1985. In 1992 a comprehensive safeguards agreement (IAEA, 1992) based on the requirements of the NPT entered into force: this requires that all nuclear material and all nuclear facilities be declared to the IAEA and subsequently verified through inspections. Discrepancies between DPRK’s declarations and the findings of IAEA safeguards inspectors during one of their first inspections led to the call for a special inspection by the IAEA, which was refused by DPRK. In 1993 DPRK announced its withdrawal from the NPT and in 1994 it left the IAEA. On 9 October 2006 and, again, on 25 May 2009 DPRK announced that it had carried out underground nuclear weapons tests. Since 2009 no IAEA inspector has been allowed into the country; the most recent report on DPRK was provided (IAEA 2010/2) by the IAEA in August 2010.

Currently the Iran case is still wide open; in 2002, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCR) helped expose some of Iran’s undeclared nuclear activities by providing information about nuclear sites at Natanz and Arak. Since then the IAEA has implemented safeguards at Iran’s additional nuclear facilities, but is still waiting for further clarification on a number of issues, among which are questions relating to: the enrichment plants in Natanz and Fordow; clarification of plans for additional enrichment related activities; Iran’s announcement of ten new enrichment facilities to be built (references are in the IAEA report below); reprocessing activities in Teheran; nuclear projects at Arak (all heavy water related); and outstanding issues related to possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme (IAEA, 2010/1). The UN Security Council has adopted a number of resolutions on Iran (UNSC, 2010), in an attempt to enforce Iran’s compliance with IAEA resolutions, which, inter alia, include the suspension of uranium enrichment.

Syria has been requested to provide more information about some of its nuclear activities, since Israel’s air strike at the Dair Alzour site in September 2007. This site was alleged by Israel and the US to have been an undeclared plutonium production reactor under construction. The Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) reports also IAEA inspectors’ discovery of the presence of undeclared anthropogenic uranium particles at the small research reactor in Damascus (NTI, 2011).

Experience with Iraq, DPRK and others showed extensive networks (Cooper, 2004) that were ready to trade in nuclear goods, material, equipment, know-how, etc. Previously it was believed that proscribed nuclear goods were prevented from falling into the wrong hands by means of export restrictions and controls (IAEA, 2003).

The situation changed after the Chernobyl accident of 1986 when it was seen that a nuclear accident in one country could affect the whole world. It was recognized that it is in everyone’s interest to ensure that the nuclear facilities in each country are operated to the highest standards of safety.

In the decades after the Chernobyl accident there were several international initiatives aimed at improving nuclear safety worldwide. They included the establishment of binding international conventions concerned with early notification of accidents, assistance to affected states, emergency response, nuclear safety and radioactive waste management (IAEA, 2011a). It was also recognized as desirable to strengthen the relevant international standards to encourage a more unified and rigorous approach to nuclear safety. The aim was to make the international safety standards more authoritative and, while they remained non-binding on member states of the IAEA, greater pressure was brought to bear on states to comply with the standards through the mechanisms of the international conventions, international expert safety missions, international conferences, etc. An important new element in the nuclear safety standards was the concept of ‘safety culture’ — an important lesson from the Chernobyl experience (IAEA, 1991). It means the promotion of the understanding, at all levels of management and the workforce, that safety is of fundamental importance and must be the responsibility of every individual who is involved in the activity and be incorporated within the management strategy of organizations.

The mechanisms within the IAEA for producing the safety standards were also overhauled with the objective of improving their authority in member states. The new committees responsible for approving the standards now contain top level nuclear regulators from member states. The structures of the approval committees and of the standards themselves were also changed.