The first fast reactor, Clementine (25kW(th)), was built in 1946 at Los Alamos as part of the weapons programme. Five years later a 1.4 MW(th) Experimental Breeder Reactor (EBR1) located at the Idaho National Reactor Testing Station became the first reactor in the world to generate electricity. This reactor was fuelled by a mixture of metallic plutonium and enriched uranium in a 20 cm diameter core. A ‘blanket’ of natural uranium surrounded the core and the whole was cooled by liquid metal — a mixture of sodium and potassium (NaK) that was liquid at room temperature. The 1950s also saw other liquid metal-cooled fast reactors operated in the US, Russia and UK. Throughout this period it was assumed that a rapid expansion of nuclear power in the decades to come would create a uranium shortage. One way around this perceived problem was to increase the utilisation of uranium or thorium by using fast neutrons to fission the even numbered isotopes of uranium and plutonium and, more especially, to ‘breed’ fissile material from the more abundant fertile material. Demonstration of breeding was provided by EBR1.

In the event, nuclear power did not expand as quickly as expected (total nuclear capacity today is an order of magnitude lower than the projections of the 1970s), uranium turned out to be more abundant than originally thought and difficulties were experienced in commercialising fast reactors which, hitherto, had existed only as small scale demonstrations. As a result, US research on fast reactors virtually ceased after 19857 and the UK programme was abandoned in 1988.8 France continued to operate the fast reactors Phenix and Superphenix until 2009 and 1998 respectively. Four countries (Russia, India, Japan and China) now have operating fast reactors which are expected to be an essential component of the complementary set of future reactor types known under the heading of Generation IV (Chapter 13).

Very low-level waste (VLLW) is waste that is low in activity concentration but above clearance levels. This waste contains some longer-lived radionuclides such that it would take many decades for it to decay to below clearance levels. It does not require a high level of containment although radiation protection provisions are needed while the waste is being processed. Its activity concentration does not usually exceed one hundred times clearance levels for each of the radionuclides concerned (IAEA, 2004b; IAEA, 2009c). For convenience, waste with activity concentrations in the region of, or below, clearance levels is sometimes processed together with VLLW. In some countries, VLLW is disposed of in purpose-built disposal facilities, in the form of earthen trenches with engineered covers. In other countries it is disposed of with other waste types, e. g., low-level waste. The decision on disposal method is usually made on economic and/or regulatory grounds.

In 2005 the IAEA organised a symposium on uranium production and raw materials for the nuclear fuel cycle. Several participants stated that a perceived increase in public acceptance for nuclear energy production at the time was not met by an increase in public acceptance for uranium mining (IAEA, 2006). By way of explanation, the finger is most often pointed at legacy issues:

legacy issues arising as a consequence of earlier environmental standards that fell well short of responsible industry practice at the time still impact perceptions of the current uranium mining and processing industry. While good progress has been made in some states, problems requiring attention still need to be resolved in several states to create broader confidence in governance and its acceptance of social responsibilities. (IAEA, 2009: 2)

In a 2009 IAEA study considering sustainable uranium mining and processing, both positive and negative economic and social impacts are recognised. Among the most important potential negative effects it counts (IAEA, 2009):

• contamination of the environment (particularly linked to mismanagement)

• displacement or disruption of community institutions and relations

• loss of land and access to natural resources for indigenous communities.

With regard to the issue of community disruption, the report particularly refers to the significant impact of migration into the area and the potential social conflict this brings (Idem, 2009). To counter the negative impact on local communities and the environment, it has become standard practice for the bigger mining companies to engage local communities and landholders from the outset in their plans in a process of environmental and social impact assessment. If taken seriously, this also means investments to enable the communities to participate effectively:

If mining operations are to help communities work towards sustainable development, communities need to be able to participate effectively in decision making processes for establishing mining and milling operations. Enabling communities to effectively participate in the decision making process will generally require a comprehensive communications and education strategy in order to provide participants with sufficient understanding of the issues in order to be able to make informed decisions. (Idem, 2009: 25)

Next to environment and health issues, the IAEA report considers the design of infrastructure to the mutual benefit of the mining operation and the local community, as an important element of an acceptable and sustainable mining development (IAEA 2009: 25). Another proven method to create positive relationships between the host community and the mining company is the engagement of local people in environmental monitoring activity around the site. This has for example been the case in Canada, in the region of Saskatchewan and for a clean-up project of uranium milling wastes in the Port Hope/Clarington area of Ontario (NEA, 2003).

Although major uranium producers Canada and Australia are noted for their long-term stability and good governance (Kovacs and Gordelier, 2009: 4), a problem remains in developing countries, which often do not have regulations covering the social and environmental impact of uranium production. Therefore, the IAEA stresses the importance of providing assistance to these countries to help them develop the necessary tools, and concludes that ‘companies must obtain a ‘social licence’ based on consultation and participation between primary stakeholders’ (IAEA, 2009: 2).

As the country where nuclear fission was discovered, Germany was an early enthusiast for nuclear power. Eurobarometer data show that, prior to 1986, fewer than 40% of people there thought that nuclear power represented an unacceptable risk — amongst the lowest figures in the EU. After Chernobyl the figure rose to around 60%. The 1998 Social Democrat-Green coalition government agreed to phase out nuclear power by 2022 but, following the 2009 election, the Christian Democrat-Liberal Democrat coalition softened this and negotiated with the NPP operators to extend the lifetime of the reactors by up to 14 years in return for additional taxes; this was approved by parliament in November 2010.44 Following the Fukushima accident, however, the government changed its policy resulting in an immediate and permanent shut down of the eight oldest reactors and the closure of the remaining nine by 2022. The new nuclear taxes have been retained, however, and some utilities are taking legal action.

Government policy is now45 to increase the renewable share of electricity production to more than 35% by 2020 and, at the same time, to reduce GHG emissions by 40% (compared to 1990 levels) while reducing energy consumption overall. The increase in renewable electricity from around 17% to 35% is almost equivalent to the loss in nuclear capacity (23% in 2009) so that, in round terms, one carbon-neutral source of electricity will simply substitute for another. Since the other energy sources will remain largely the same, it becomes clear that meeting the GHG emissions target is mostly dependent on a reduction in energy demand. Here the primary target is a 20% reduction in overall energy consumption by 2020. Simultaneously meeting this target and providing growth in the economy will be a significant challenge: the current rate of increase in energy productivity (GDP per unit of energy consumption) will need to at least double.

The targets set by the German government for 2050 are equally demanding: renewables to provide 85 to 95% of electricity production; and an 80 to 95% reduction in GHG emissions compared to 1990. Energy conservation is again central to meeting these longer-term targets and resolves into separate goals to reduce, by 2050, overall energy consumption to 50% of 2008 levels, electricity usage to 75% of 2008 and transport to 60% of 2005. When we consider that electricity will need to substitute for fossil fuels in, for example, transport, the target for electricity consumption appears to be especially ambitious. Whether savings can actually be made on this scale remains to be seen but, clearly, by eschewing any use of nuclear power, including importation, Germany has not made its task any easier. The country is, in effect, conducting a huge experiment that could significantly damage — or benefit — its economy. As the largest and most prosperous of the European nations it is, perhaps, the one best placed to succeed and it will be interesting to see whether, in the first decade of this policy, the country can simultaneously achieve its goals of reductions in GHG emissions, economic growth and phasing out of nuclear power while maintaining security of supply.

3.1.1 Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

The destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by atomic bombs marked the end of World War II. This act was accompanied by a hope that the proliferation of nuclear weapons could be stopped — or at least that their development be delayed by means of rigid controls over all nuclear activities (Baruch Plan, 1946). However, by 1952, in addition to the United States of America, two new nuclear weapons states (the Soviet Union in 1949 and the United Kingdom in 1952) had emerged. At the same time, many more nations were seeking to benefit from the peaceful use of nuclear technology, especially for the generation of energy. In 1953, U. S. President Eisenhower announced the ‘Atoms for Peace’ program to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy while demanding non-proliferation, i. e. preventing and discouraging any further military use. In the course of implementing this strategy, the IAEA was created in 1957 and entrusted with the international promotion and control of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Its purpose was given in the Agency’s Statute (IAEA, 1956), approved in 1956; amendments followed, most recently in 2009.

At about the same time the European Community was founded and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) was established with the signing of the EURATOM treaty in 1957 by the six founding member countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands). Chapter VII of the EURATOM treaty confers wide regulatory powers to the European Commission to ensure that civil nuclear materials are not diverted from their intended peaceful use (Euratom, 2010, in the Lisbon Treaty version).

During his election campaign in 1960 John F. Kennedy said that ‘. . . there are indications. . . , that 10, 15, or 20 nations will have a nuclear capacity, including Red China, by the end of. . . 1964. I think the fate. . . and the future of the human race is involved in preventing a nuclear war’ (Kennedy, 1960). Not long after, the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 showed, for the first time, that ‘mutual assured destruction’ was a real possibility and furthermore, by the end of 1964, two additional states had tested nuclear weapons, France in 1960 and China in 1964.

In 1968 the ‘Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons’ (NPT) opened for signature; it entered into force in March 1970 (UN, 1970), recognizing the then existing five nuclear weapon states, demanding that all other signatory states should forgo nuclear weapons and accept verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Since then, India (in 1974 and 1998), Pakistan (in 1998) and the People’s Republic of North Korea (DPRK, in 2006 and 2009) have tested nuclear explosives. Israel is believed to possess nuclear explosive devices but has never carried out a nuclear explosion. DPRK has been a party to the NPT but announced its withdrawal in 1993. The other three have never been parties to the Treaty.

South Africa had a nuclear weapons programme but dismantled all nuclear devices before joining the NPT in 1991 — as a non-nuclear weapon state. Upon the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991 there were nuclear weapons in Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine; these, however, were all returned to the Russian Federation, the successor of the Soviet Union, by 1996.

Vertical proliferation (i. e. within the nuclear weapon states) raged during the Cold War: the number of US nuclear warheads reached a peak of over 32 000 in 1967, the Soviet Union reached its maximum in 1986 with 45 000. According to the Federation of American Scientists there are still over 22 000 nuclear warheads in the world, with an estimated 9600 in the US, 12 000 in Russia, 300 in France, 240 in China and 185 in the UK. Israel is believed to possess about 80, India 60-80, Pakistan 70-90 and the DPRK less than ten (FAS, 2011). The weapons amassed during the cold war were reduced in numbers following the ‘Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty’ of 1991 (START I) between the US and Russia. Since the termination of START I, a new treaty has been agreed and weapons reduction is ongoing again (USSD, 2011). Additional impetus for these developments came from the ‘2000 Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement’ between the US and Russia (USSD, 2010/7) that itself followed on from a number of bilateral measures and the ‘Trilateral Initiative’ (Russia, US, IAEA) started in November 1996 (USDOE, 1996; Bunn, 2003). Most recently, a letter from Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov and US Secretary of State Clinton to IAEA Director General Amano indicated that both parties wished ‘to conclude. . . agreements with the IAEA. . . to implement verification measures with respect to each Party’s disposition program’ (IAEA, 2010/6). There will also be a follow-up by the five nuclear weapon states (P5), subsequent to a statement, at the 2010 NPT Review Conference (UKUN, 2010), of their determination ‘to continue to implement concrete actions aimed at ensuring full compliance with their obligation under the NPT’. This initiative is to be pursued at a meeting to be convened by France in early 2011 (France, 2010).

2.1.2 Introduction

From its inception in 1957, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was given the role of establishing international safety standards. Its standards on the safe transport of radioactive material were soon adopted globally but it was not until after the serious nuclear reactor accident at Chernobyl in 1986 that the importance and benefits of having common international safety standards for all activities involving the use of ionizing radiation was fully appreciated. In the last two decades the safety standards of the IAEA covering nuclear power plants and the rest of the nuclear fuel cycle as well as the medical and industrial applications of radioactive material have become accepted as the common basis for national safety regulations. This chapter describes the safety standards of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Some 60 countries have turned to the IAEA and other competent organizations for guidance as they consider whether introducing nuclear power may help solve an expected and sharp future jump in their energy demand, as well as improve the lives of over a billion people lacking access to sufficient energy. Some experts project the global energy demand will increase by more than 50% by 2030, with the majority of that increase coming from developing countries, many of which have limited access to electricity, and are in desperate need for a possible basis for improving nutrition, health and education, all key objectives of the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals.

Many interested countries will have to build or re-build the necessary political, legal and technical infrastructure to be successful with nuclear energy (IAEA, 2007). The creation or expansion of a nuclear power programme can be accomplished only with a sufficient understanding of the fuel cycle — and a strong and lasting commitment for a long time, possibly for as long as over a hundred years.

New reactor designs have been developed, which include all lessons learned from the past; they have new engineering features that promise a significantly enhanced safety system (for a list of new reactor designs, see NEI, 2011, and IAEA, 2011/7, on advanced nuclear reactors). Advanced nuclear reactor designs derive advantage from the extensive operating experience gained from current systems and results of world wide research and development, the aim being to provide very safe, reliable and economical nuclear power plants, which will also be friendly to the environment. Improved reactor systems and increasing public awareness and concern about global warming and environmental pollution have led national decision makers to look more closely at the nuclear option for their future electricity generation mix.

Proposals for new approaches to security and non-proliferation for certain parts of the nuclear fuel cycle have been made. The report on ‘Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle’ proposes an international regime and additional details have been discussed since then (IAEA, 2005/2). All options for multilateral approaches consider a small number of sensitive components in the fuel cycle — those that involve significant proliferation risks: uranium enrichment, spent-fuel reprocessing, spent-fuel storage and repositories. Two factors dominate the deliberations on these approaches: the assurance of supply and services together with the assurance of non-proliferation. In his introductory statement to the IAEA Board of Governors in March 2004, Director General ElBaradei said: ‘the wide dissemination of the most proliferation-sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle. . . could be the “Achilles’ heel” of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. It is important to tighten control over these operations, which could be done by bringing them under some form of multilateral control, in a limited number of regional centres. . . I am aware that this is a complex issue, . . . we owe it to ourselves to examine all possible options available to us.’

For the optimal implementation of an efficient and effective regulative system, common requirements for all three 3 S components must be considered. A joint office provides easy communication and understanding among authorities to implement nuclear law, including provisions for nuclear liability, new and on going education and training programmes, the implementation of appropriate information confidentiality requirements and documentation, and performance measurement. In Asia, the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) has started an initiative based on the further commitment mandated by the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit so that, in January 2011, the ‘Integrated Comprehensive Support Center for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Security for Asia’ (Denki Shimbun, 2011) opened. The existence of authorities for nuclear safety and safeguards are national and international obligations; the integration of a nuclear security support centre is a natural addition and, in some cases, the IAEA has already assisted in establishing such a centre.

In addition, technical issues, e. g. equipment acquisition and maintenance, measurement qualifications, procedures, material sampling, analysis and evaluation, a joint or common laboratory, including nuclear forensics where applicable, will benefit from close cooperation. The development and evaluation of risk scenarios and their assessment, the basic design threats (called diversion path analysis in safeguards), the defence-in-depth principle, export controls, tracking of sensitive technology and the use of all available information sources are worthwhile sharing between experts in all three areas. Collection and analysis capabilities are similar and need to be further developed jointly.

‘If the world does not change course, we risk self-destruction. Common sense and recent experience make it clear that the regime based on the nuclear Non­Proliferation Treaty, which served us well since 1970, must be tailored to fit twenty-first century realities’ (ElBaradei, 2004). The 3S regime is an essential part of this survival.

As with reactors, the first aim of nuclear fuel reprocessing was to obtain plutonium for bomb making. In 1943 the Clinton Laboratories developed a bismuth phosphate carrier process technique that successfully isolated plutonium. Uranium, which was not needed for the bomb, was removed, along with fission products, as waste. Clearly this was not satisfactory for commercial purposes and after the war attention turned to methods for separating both plutonium and uranium. A number of processes were investigated but in 1950 the PUREX (plutonium uranium extraction) process, developed at ORNL, was chosen for the reprocessing facilities to be built at Savannah River and Hanford.9 The details of this were later released as part of the UN ‘Atoms for Peace’ programme and it is now the standard technology. Processes were also developed by ORNL for thorium fuel.

Low-level waste (LLW) contains higher activity concentrations than VLLW but with a limit on the concentration of long-lived radionuclides, i. e., radionuclides with T,/2 greater than about 30 years. It requires isolation from the biosphere for periods of up to a few hundred years. It is common practice to dispose of LLW in engineered near-surface facilities. LLW is generated in most facilities involved in nuclear power production and nuclear research and also in nuclear medicine.

Intermediate-level waste

I ntermediate-level waste (ILW) has a higher concentration of radionuclides, especially long-lived radionuclides, than LLW; it may require shielding to provide adequate protection for workers and greater provisions to ensure its isolation from the biosphere. However, ILW needs no or only limited provision for heat dissipation during its storage and disposal. To provide for long-term safety, disposal at greater depths than for LLW is normally considered to be appropriate (at least several tens of metres). ILW typically comprises metals which have been irradiated in reactor cores, graphite waste, ion exchange resins and fuel cladding waste resulting from spent fuel reprocessing.

When looking at the past thirty years, public acceptability for nuclear energy production appears to have oscillated. As mentioned before, the unresolved waste issue coming to the fore in the 1970s, followed by the accidents at Three Mile Island (1979) and Chernobyl (1986), marked the end of the era of uni-vocal enthusiasm and confidence. In the last two decades of the twentieth century, many nuclear nations, particularly in Europe, placed a moratorium on the construction of new nuclear reactors or even decided to phase-out their nuclear power programmes altogether. Also, in countries where no official change in policy was adopted, nuclear did seem to have lost its popularity.

However, what halfway into the 1990s may have looked like the certain decline of the nuclear industry, some ten years later seemed overturned as two new influential discourses in the public arena, climate change and energy security, were mobilised to reframe nuclear power as a potential means to tackle both (e. g. Bickerstaff et al. , 2008). This shift heralded what supporters saw as a potential ‘nuclear renaissance’ and opponents as an unwelcome resurrection of nuclear power at the dawn of the new century. In Europe, Finland started building a new reactor, the UK launched a pro-nuclear policy and designated potential sites for new build, and other countries, among which were a number of countries who earlier had adopted phase-out policies, again started to consider building new reactors. In its annual report of 2009, the IAEA announced that: ‘More than 60 countries — mostly in the developing world — have informed the Agency that they might be interested in launching nuclear power programmes’ (IAEA, 2010: 19). A total of 55 new reactors were under construction in January 2010 (Idem 21). For those in favour of nuclear energy, there was reason to be optimistic again. Chernobyl was now well behind us and ‘major developments in the nuclear fuel cycle’ (Kazimi et al. , 2011: vii) were manifest. Among these: the start-up of a commercial nuclear fuel processing plant in Japan, and the siting of geological repositories for the disposal of spent fuel in Finland and Sweden (Idem). Nevertheless, results from a Eurobarometer survey on nuclear safety still showed that more than 50% of Europeans think that the risks of nuclear energy outweigh its advantages. Only one third saw nuclear energy more as an advantageous source of energy than as a risk (EC, 2007: 17).

Then, at the dawn of this new era in which talking about new nuclear was clearly no longer a taboo, 25 years after Chernobyl, a major earthquake and tsunami hit the Fukushima power plant in Japan. The precise impact of this accident on the environment is still unknown to date. So too are the consequences for the public acceptability of nuclear power generation. News bulletins show that in Japan, critical voices are rising against nuclear power generation, and against the confusing messages of the power company TEPCO and the government. The German government has announced a full phase-out after strong public protest, the Swiss government refused the application for three new nuclear reactors, and the Italian public overwhelmingly voted against a re-entry into nuclear energy production in a referendum in June 2011. However, in other countries, such as France and the Czech Republic, governments do not seem inclined to immediately review their positive attitude vis-a-vis nuclear power generation.

Both opponents and proponents of nuclear energy claim to see Fukushima as the beginning of yet another new era. For the former, it constitutes the one accident too many that is likely to announce the final downfall of the industry: ‘If there was no obvious sign that the international nuclear industry could eventually turn the empirically evident downward trend into a promising future, the Fukushima disaster is likely to accelerate the decline’ (Schneider et al., 2011: 5). Proponents, however, are sure that Fukushima will not mean the end of nuclear but, rather, the seed of a new beginning. They refer, among other things, to promising new technologies that could provide even safer reactors, with ‘walk-away safety’ reactors as the final goal, able to shut down and cool themselves without electricity or human intervention (Lester, 2011). While technological innovation remained slow and incremental after Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, Fukushima is anticipated to pave the way for the nuclear technology of the future, making nuclear energy production ‘demonstrably safer and less expensive, more secure against the threats of nuclear proliferation and terrorism, and more compatible with the capabilities of electric power systems and the utilities that run them’ (Idem). Who will be proven right or wrong, remains to be seen. What is clear, however, is that, with regard to the operation of nuclear reactors, the question of how safe is safe enough, which cannot be addressed or answered solely from a technical risk assessment perspective, will be at the core of any debate on the acceptability of future nuclear power generation.