In normally operating nuclear power plants, the main exposure route for workers is external radiation originating from the reactor itself, from activated components and from stored fuel or waste. The potential for intakes of radioactive material by inhalation and ingestion usually only occurs during maintenance operations. At the same time, in planning for radiation protection, it has to be recognized that there is a risk of accidents in the operation of nuclear power plants, which could lead to significant radiation doses to workers and the public.

Radiation doses to workers should be kept as low as reasonably achievable taking into account a range of factors including the scheduling and management of different tasks related to the operation of the facility and trade-offs between doses to workers and the public related to decisions over radioactive waste management (IAEA, 2000a). Dose reduction in the workplace can be achieved through careful design in relation to both the generation of radioactive material and build-up of such material. For example, at the design stage of a nuclear power plant, consideration should be given to the choice of materials to minimize the formation of activated corrosion products while, during operation, techniques such as flushing, washing and decontamination should be employed to remove radioactivity from circuit components.

As a result of improved nuclear power plant designs and operating procedures, the average radiation exposure of workers employed at nuclear power plants worldwide has decreased in recent decades. Data from UNSCEAR indicate a world wide steady decline in the collective dose per unit power generation from 11 man Sv/GW y in the period 1975-1979 to 3.9 man Sv/GW y in the period 1990-1994 (UNSCEAR, 2000).

Small amounts of radionuclides are released by stack or pipeline into the atmospheric and aquatic environments respectively as part of the normal operation of nuclear power plants. Typical released radionuclides are tritium and the noble gases, Kr-85 and Xe-133; smaller amounts of fission products may also be released. The discharged radionuclides are dispersed and diluted in the atmospheric or aquatic environments. People living near to the power plant may be exposed to radiation as a result of the discharges. The amounts released must therefore be controlled and limited (by filters and separators) so that the radiation doses to the public are kept as low as reasonably achievable and below dose constraints (IAEA, 2012a). For this purpose, environmental assessment models are used to evaluate the transfer of radionuclides to persons living in the vicinity of the nuclear power plant via all possible pathways of exposure. Together with the results of environmental monitoring, the modelling assessment is used to confirm that the releases are acceptable and that doses to the representative person (formerly critical group) are within the dose constraints (IAEA, 2000b). In practice, radiation doses from the normal operation of nuclear power plants are low and usually they are well below the dose constraints set by national regulators (UNSCEAR, 2010).

To provide for the protection of workers under accident conditions, an assessment should be made at the design stage of the potential sources of radiation exposure that would exist during and after accidents. All potential accident scenarios, including severe accidents, should be considered in this assessment. The design should be such that the operator can ensure the safety of all persons on the site in the event of an accident or radiological emergency (IAEA, 2005a).

To address the protection of the public under accident conditions, the possible consequences of design basis accidents and severe accidents should be evaluated. In cases where the safety analysis shows that the established reference levels are not met, additional protective features should be incorporated into the design or operational measures should be developed to provide assurance that the reference levels will be met (IAEA, 2005a).

In the post-Chernobyl era, ‘safety culture’ has come to be recognized as an essential element of operational nuclear safety. In this context, a key international requirement is set out as follows: ‘A policy on safety shall be developed by the operating organization and applied by all site personnel. This policy shall give safety the utmost priority at the plant, overriding if necessary the demands of production and project schedules. The policy shall include a commitment to excellent performance in all activities important to safety and shall encourage a questioning attitude’ (IAEA, 2000c).

4.1.2 Assessments and perceptions

The main components of public concern with regard to the deployment of the nuclear fuel cycle are commonly listed as (e. g. International Nuclear Societies Council, 1998):

• the potential for serious nuclear reactor accidents

• the day-to-day operational safety of nuclear reactors

• the risks related to the transport of radioactive materials

• the association between nuclear power and nuclear weapons and

• the question of what to do with radioactive waste.

Such lists place risk and technical safety as the main determinants of public acceptability related to nuclear developments. Whereas scientists and engineers working on the nuclear fuel cycle have developed an international consensus that these risks are controllable, this view is not necessarily shared by the general public. For example, ‘experts tend to see high-level waste management as a relatively solvable problem, while for the public it may well be seen as a relatively intractable public policy issue’ (Kasperson et al., 1980: 16). Already by the 1970s, decision and risk researchers were fascinated by such discrepancies and the specificities of nuclear technology regarding public acceptability. The social sciences highlighted the more qualitative notion of risk perception, thus vastly broadening the more classical, quantitative approaches of risk assessment that the nuclear community was used to working with (e. g. Renn, 1986, Slovic, 1987). Notably, the psychometric paradigm developed by Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein and Read (e. g. 1978), the extended psychometric model developed by Sjoberg (e. g. 2000a and 2000b) and the work on risk governance by Renn et al. (e. g. Kasperson et al., 1988, Renn, 2008), provide advanced insights into the determinants of the acceptability of nuclear technology. This research makes clear that the classical formula of ‘risk = hazard x probability’ has limited explanatory power with regard to risk perception and consequent behaviour. Through extensive sociological research, the following factors of risk perception were discovered as crucial (a non­exhaustive list by the authors, based on the sources referenced above):

• Dread — perception of the catastrophic potential of the risk, doomsday images of damage

• Controllability — whether the risk is detectable, comprehensible and perceived as manageable, both on a personal and on an institutional level

• Trust — trustworthiness and credibility of the people and institutions involved with the risk

• Familiarity — visibility, commonness and understandability of the risk

• Voluntariness — degree in which the risk is deliberately and freely accepted

• Certainty and clarity — perception of the determinateness of impacts, knowing what to do, what will happen next

• Reversibility of adverse effects — perception about whether the consequences can be undone

• Clarity of the risk-benefit relation — clearness and perceived importance of benefits, the equality of the distribution of risks and benefits

• Tampering with nature — perception about the degree to which an activity interferes with the course of nature, about the artificiality of the source of the risk.

The nuclear fuel cycle as a whole scores rather badly on all of these factors of risk perception. Focusing on radiation alone, one cannot deny that it remains something rather mysterious, both at the level of cognition and at the level of the primary senses: it is hard to understand (for everybody, as estimating the hazards of radiation is also clouded by dispute among scientists) and you cannot sense it, yet it can kill you. Moreover, one of the two factors that construct the classical multiplication formula for risk assessment, namely probability, turns out not to be a major determinant for risk perception. When evaluating this ‘objectively’ and without taking into account the other factors that apparently do play a determining role in risk perception, one can but wonder about the effect this has in reality. For instance, how can people happily drive their cars every day (relatively low risk perception, relatively high risk assessment), yet oppose nuclear energy (relatively high risk perception, relatively low risk assessment)? Both nuclear scientists and risk researchers claim their objects of research to be measureable in quantitative terms. Nevertheless, by applying criteria drawn from conventional science, it is often (implicitly) concluded that risk perceptions cannot be granted the same status as risk assessments, because they are based on intuition rather than rational argument.

France has no significant sources of fossil fuel within its borders. In the wake of the 1973 oil crisis it made a strategic decision to rely on nuclear power for the bulk of its electricity generation. Prior to this the first NPP design was developed from the early plutonium producing reactors being fuelled with metallic natural uranium with a graphite moderator and gas-cooling; the last of these closed in 1994. In the late 1960s a decision was taken to abandon this technology in favour of light water reactors and in the period 1977 to 2000 the country commissioned 58 PWRs on 19 sites. Consequently nuclear power now supplies over 75% of France’s electricity as well as providing a significant surplus for export to neighbouring countries. In addition, France has a policy of spent fuel reprocessing and recycling so that about 17% of fuel is recycled MOX. Until quite recently, electricity generation and all nuclear activities were performed by companies that were wholly owned by the state and despite some sell-offs, the state still holds a majority share. France is also active in the provision of nuclear services such as the design, development and export of nuclear reactors and spent fuel reprocessing. Again, the main actors are wholly or partly state owned.

With a third of the reactors now more than 30 years old, a new 1650 MW European Pressurised Water Reactor (EPR) is currently under construction at Flamanville. The aim is that this should be the first demonstration unit for a new fleet of NPPs that will provide electricity through to the mid-century. Construction was originally scheduled to take 4^ years but is now about 4 years late with overnight costs almost double the original estimate. A second reactor is planned for Penly near Dieppe, a decision that was confirmed by the President of France after the Fukushima accident. The Atomic Energy Commission (CEA) has also embarked on the design of a Generation IV, sodium cooled fast reactor with the intention that this will be operational by 2020. This will enable France to make use of its store of depleted and reprocessed uranium as well as plutonium currently contained in irradiated MOX.27

The reliance on nuclear power for electricity generation allows France’s per capita GHG emissions to be amongst the lowest in Europe. It is expected that electricity generation will be almost completely decarbonised by 2020 through the installation of renewable generators. To comply with 2050 targets GHG emissions are to be reduced by a factor of four compared to 1990. The intention is that this will be largely achieved through energy saving measures backed up, if possible, by a carbon tax.28

Reprocessing

France is one of only four countries in the world that performs large scale reprocessing of spent fuel and it is useful to examine its role in the context of national energy policy. Reprocessing is difficult, expensive and not without risks, not least that of proliferation. Nevertheless, through the 1950s and 1960s it was thought to be an essential and inevitable component of any nuclear power programme because of the expectation that rapid expansion of this form of electricity generation would place a strain on uranium supplies. Furthermore, fuel from the French gas-cooled reactors had to be reprocessed because the fuel cladding was liable to corrode during storage. It was envisaged that reprocessing would eventually be used in combination with thermal and fast reactors so that the energy potential of both fissile and fertile uranium could be exploited. It is usually claimed that this will allow the amount of energy produced per kilogram of uranium to be increased by a factor of 60. Fast reactors were to be mostly fuelled by mixed oxide (MOX) fuel, made by mixing plutonium oxide produced by reprocessing with natural, depleted or reprocessed uranium oxide. For reasons explained above, however, nuclear power did not expand as envisaged and widespread use of fast reactors did not materialise.

I n the US, federal support for commercial reprocessing was removed by President Carter in 1977. The primary motivation was to set an example in reducing proliferation risks but there is no doubt the decision was facilitated by the reining in of expectations for future nuclear expansion. In France on the other hand reprocessing expanded to take account of the new PWRs being brought into operation. The plutonium produced by reprocessing could then be stored for future use (an important consideration given that France has no indigenous energy sources) or else fabricated into MOX fuel for thermal reactors. In the latter case the saving in fuel utilisation is relatively modest (around 22% for a single cycle that reuses both plutonium and uranium29) and the build-up of Pu-240, which cannot be fissioned by thermal neutrons, usually makes it uneconomic to recycle the fuel more than once unless, of course, a fast neutron device can be utilised.

In terms of cost, the use of plutonium in MOX fuel provides a saving because it removes the need for enrichment. Against this we have the cost of reprocessing and the higher cost of MOX fuel fabrication, which must be done in glove boxes. Chapter 16 maintains that the costs of MOX and UOX (once-through) fuel are ‘broadly comparable’. Against that, both the UK and French plutonium stocks have been allocated zero value and a 2000 official report commissioned by the French Prime Minister (reported in 30) concluded that, compared to direct disposal, reprocessing for the entire French nuclear program would increase average generation costs by about 5.5% over a 40-year reactor life. If we allow that fuel typically constitutes about 11% of total generation costs, an overall increase of 5.5% suggests that fuel from reprocessing is 50% more expensive than once — through. Richard Garwin, a noted critic of reprocessing on the grounds of non­proliferation, has estimated the ratio, using credible data, as a factor of five.31

It is often claimed that reprocessing has great benefits for disposal and, certainly, it produces a fundamental change in the nature of the wastes needing disposal. With the once-through (or no-reprocessing option) there is, essentially, only one waste, namely the spent fuel itself. When reprocessing is deployed, uranium and plutonium are removed for re use and the principal heat producing waste consists of fission products and minor actinides that are then immobilised by dissolving them in borosilicate glass. Typically this has a volume that is 5 to 7 times lower than the spent fuel from which it comes. Its heat production is, however, relatively unchanged and it is this, rather than the waste volume, that determines the overall size of a repository and, therefore to a large extent, the capital cost of disposal. In addition there will be a much greater volume of long-lived intermediate level waste to be disposed at depth although the low heat output of this allows waste packages to be stacked thus minimising the excavated volume of rock and, hence, cost. The removal of plutonium from spent fuel greatly reduces the long-term heat production and the toxicity of the waste and this is of great assistance in demonstrating the safety of disposal over the very long timescales of interest. On the other hand irradiated MOX fuel may be problematic for disposal because of its high and long-lived heat output and it may require reprocessing for this reason.

All this suggests that the benefits of nuclear reprocessing are essentially strategic: it provides an energy reserve, anticipates the advent of fast reactors and simplifies disposal. In economic terms it has no advantages over the once-through option until fast reactors are introduced, an eventuality that is foreseen by France. What is also clear is that, unless there is a massive shift in long-established policy, France will maintain its reliance on nuclear power for the foreseeable future. This was reaffirmed following the Fukushima accident.32

Protection of the public in planned exposure situations is achieved by controlling the source of exposure, that is, by limiting discharges to atmospheric or aquatic environments and ensuring the proper confinement of radioactive waste. Confirmation that the public is adequately protected is obtained through environmental monitoring.

• Responsibilities — (i) The government or the regulatory body shall establish the responsibilities of relevant parties that are specific to public exposure and shall establish and enforce requirements for optimization and for dose limits. (ii) Relevant parties shall apply the system of protection and safety to protect members of the public against exposure.

• Radioactive waste and discharges — Relevant parties shall ensure that radioactive waste and discharges of radioactive material to the environment are managed in accordance with the authorization (issued by the regulatory body).

• Monitoring and reporting — The regulatory body and relevant parties shall ensure that programmes for source monitoring and environmental monitoring are in place and that the results from the monitoring are recorded and are made available.

The three key principles of radiological protection are justification, optimization

and dose limitation.

These principles are defined as follows:

1 The Principle ofJustification — Any decision that alters the radiation exposure situation should do more good than harm.

2 The Principle of Optimization of Protection — The likelihood of incurring exposure, the number of people exposed, and the magnitude of their individual doses should all be kept as low as reasonably achievable, taking into account economic and societal factors.

3 The Principle of Application ofDose Limits — The total dose to any individual from regulated sources in planned exposure situations other than medical exposure of patients should not exceed the appropriate limits specified by the ICRP.

The principles of justification and optimization apply in all three exposure situations whereas the principle of application of dose limits applies only for doses expected to be incurred with certainty as a result of planned exposure situations.

Exposure categories

Three categories of exposure are distinguished: occupational exposures, public exposures, and medical exposures of patients (and comforters, carers, and volunteers in research). This chapter is concerned with radiation protection in the nuclear fuel cycle and so the emphasis is on occupational and public protection in planned and emergency exposure situations.

Production of nuclear energy must be safe; only then it can be successful in the long term.

Achieving and maintaining a high level of safety in nuclear installations is related to site evaluation, design and long term operation, including ageing management, periodic safety review and configuration management and must be the primary concern of any party planning a nuclear installation.

This must apply to the entire cycle to cover location, design, construction, operation and decommissioning, to include: (a) the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle (NFC): uranium milling and refining, conversion and enrichment, fuel fabrication and fuel cycle research and development facilities; (b) reactor technology: power and research reactors; and (c) the back end of the NFC: spent fuel storage, reprocessing and waste conditioning facilities.

The IAEA addresses a large number of topics in the safety field: it promotes international conventions and agreements, foremost the ‘Convention on Nuclear Safety’ (additional safety-related conventions and codes are listed below). The

IAEA maintains a number of safety standards, inter alia on site evaluations, power plants, research reactors, fuel cycle facilities, radioactive waste and disposal facilities and on transport of radioactive material (IAEA, 2010/5).

The Agency maintains The International Nuclear Event Scale (INES) system (IAEA, 2009/1) and the International Response System (IRS, jointly operated with OECD’s NEA) to assist in the case of nuclear accidents or radiological emergencies and to help to determine the actual, potential or perceived radiological significance of such incidents for more than one state. INES and IRS deal with incidents and accidents in nuclear facilities and activities including nuclear reactors and any other nuclear fuel cycle facility. They also include the transport and storage of nuclear materials, radioactive waste management facilities, the transport and storage of radioactive wastes, and the manufacture, use, storage, disposal and transport of radioisotopes for agricultural, medical and related scientific or research purposes. The scope of the IAEA IRS also covers incidents, nuclear or radiological, such as those involving loss, unauthorized removal, misuse or abuse of radioactive or nuclear material, the spill or spread of radioactive material, incidents involving health effects and provision of medical care. It also includes situations resulting from the malicious use of radioactive or nuclear material. The Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA), a specialized agency of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), had started the exchange of information on safety related events in nuclear power plants in 1978, but it was only in 1995 that close cooperation resulted in the transfer of the system to the IAEA (IAEA/NEA, 2010).

On 26 April 1986 the most serious accident in the history of the nuclear industry occurred at the Chernobyl power plant in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Since that time much has been said about the real consequences of the accident, including implications for health, environment, safety, society and the economies of areas affected by the accident. A number of comprehensive reports with an analysis of the accident were provided to the UNSCEAR General Assembly in 2000 (UNSCEAR, 2000). A more indirect consequence of the Chernobyl accident was the formulation of two new conventions: the ‘Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident’ (IAEA, 1986/1) and the ‘Convention on Assistance in Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency’ (IAEA, 1986/2). These oblige the Agency to develop appropriate radiation monitoring standards and to assist states in developing their own preparedness arrangements for nuclear and radiological emergencies. They include the collection and dissemination of information on methodologies and techniques relating to the response to nuclear accidents or radiological emergencies, how to prepare emergency plans and their appropriate legislation, the provision of training programmes for personnel to deal with accidents and emergencies, and radiation monitoring programmes, procedures and standards.

The IAEA’S Incident and Emergency Centre (IEC) was set up in 2005 — it is available around the clock and cooperates with other international organizations.

The centre operates the global Response Assistance Network, which provides assistance in case of a nuclear or radiological emergency on a regional basis. It is a system for international assistance to minimize the actual or potential radiological consequences for health, environment and property. The activities of the IEC aim to strengthen Member States’ preparedness in response to these needs. In addition to safety standards relating to the preparedness for and response to incidents and emergencies, technical manuals and training materials for the application of those standards are being developed (IAEA, 2011/4).

An additional important element for a global safety and security system is the assurance that radioactive sources are kept in a safe and secure manner; this has become more important in the light of terrorist attacks in the early years of the twenty-first century. To support states in this activity, codes and guidelines were developed and strengthened after September 2001 (IAEA, 2004; IAEA, 2005/1).

1.1.1 Early science and the making of the bomb

Nuclear fission was first recognised by Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassmann in Berlin in 1938. They bombarded uranium with neutrons and found that atoms of barium — roughly half the atomic weight of uranium — were produced. They showed the results to their colleague, Lise Meitner, exiled in Stockholm with her nephew Otto Frisch. Together they used Bohr’s liquid drop model to explain how the addition of a neutron had caused resonant vibrations in the uranium nucleus, splitting it in two. The following year, 1939, Frederic Joliot and his co-workers, Kowarski and von Halban, showed that each fission event releases neutrons, which introduces the possibility of a chain reaction. This was something that had been foreseen by Leo Szilard in 1933 and even patented by him for the production of bombs. That same year, Niels Bohr had established that it was the isotope U-235 — constituting only 0.7% of natural uranium — which fissioned; in fact, the physics of the vibrating nucleus were such that it was only the odd numbered isotopes that could be fissioned by low energy neutrons.

Until 1939 progress in understanding fission and nuclear reactions generally had been slow. But with war in Europe, American scientists, many of them refugees, began working together secretly to see if fission could be put to military use. America entered World War II in December 1941 and the following year the work was brought together officially under the umbrella of the Manhattan project.

Even as early as 1939, however, it was clear that, so far as bomb-making was concerned, kilogram quantities of U-235 would be needed and at that time there was no way of separating the isotopes. Based on Bohr’s work, however, it was realised that odd-numbered isotopes of element 94 (later named plutonium) should also be fissile and, unlike uranium isotopes, it should be possible to isolate this chemically. Experiments in which U-238 was bombarded with sub-atomic particles in the Berkeley cyclotron eventually led, in February 1941, to the separation of a minute quantity of plutonium. But in order to produce enough to manufacture a bomb, the nuclear chain reaction had first to be demonstrated.1

Enrico Fermi and Leo Szilard had been working on arrays of graphite and uranium at Columbia University and, based on this work, they succeeded in creating the world’s first nuclear reactor at the University of Chicago in December 1942. Fermi’s reactor contained 349 tonnes of graphite, 36 tonnes of uranium dioxide and 5 tonnes of uranium metal; it had a power of 2 watts. Scaling this up to produce a reactor of 250 MW was a major undertaking but design and construction were completed in less than two years. Fermi and his team later (1946) formed the nucleus of the Argonne National Laboratory (ANL). The first of the three Hanford piles went critical in September 1944. The fuel was metallic natural uranium clad in aluminium and loaded into horizontal aluminium tubes within a graphite moderator. Cooling was provided by water from the Columbia River, which was pumped through the aluminium tubes. Such a reactor is capable of producing about 0.25 kg of plutonium per day. To limit formation of Pu-240 and higher isotopes, fuel was discharged at low burn up and this was facilitated by the ability to load and unload fuel at power. The plutonium was separated from the irradiated fuel and was then shipped in the form of plutonium nitrate slurry to Los Alamos, where it was reduced to plutonium metal.

Meanwhile, work had been progressing on isotopic separation of U-235. Four methods were investigated: gas centrifuge, gaseous diffusion, mass spectrometry and liquid thermal diffusion. Mechanical problems with the centrifuges caused this technique to be abandoned but the other three yielded useful quantities. This work was performed at Clinton Laboratories (later to become Oak Ridge National Laboratory, ORNL), Tennessee and quantities of U-235 were shipped from there to Los Alamos for construction of a gun-type device in which two sub-critical masses of U-235 are quickly brought together. For the plutonium bomb, however, it was discovered that the material supplied by Hanford contained small quantities of Pu-240, spontaneous fission of which would cause premature detonation. Consequently a more sophisticated implosion design was needed for which a test would be necessary. Enough plutonium had been shipped from Hanford to Los Alamos to create three bombs and it was decided to use one for a full scale trial in the Nevada desert. This was the Trinity test of 16 July 1945. Three weeks later (6 August) the uranium bomb (nicknamed ‘Little Boy’) was dropped on Hiroshima. Three days later, the second plutonium bomb (‘Fat Man’) was used to destroy Nagasaki; the third plutonium bomb was never used.1

What is clear from this brief description is that much of the applied science and technology that, even today, underpins the exploitation of nuclear energy came about as a direct result of a concerted effort to make these fearful weapons. Small wonder then that the public has difficulty in disassociating nuclear power from nuclear weapons.

The main aim of decommissioning is to place facilities in such a condition that they pose no unacceptable risks to the public, to workers or to the environment. To achieve this, some action is normally required. If facilities were not decommissioned they could degrade and present an environmental hazard in the future. Simply abandoning or leaving a facility after cessation of operations is not considered to be an acceptable alternative to decommissioning. The approach to decommissioning is not always the same. Some countries have chosen to decommission their nuclear facilities as soon as they cease to generate nuclear energy (immediate dismantling), others delay the process for a number of years (deferred dismantling) while others convert their facilities into a form of waste store, after ensuring that they are safe (entombment) (IAEA, 2011c).

Irrespective of the decommissioning strategy chosen, it is necessary to ensure the protection of workers and the public. However, the potential radiation doses to workers can vary depending upon the option chosen. In the case of nuclear power plants, the removal of the fuel, process fluids and operational waste from a reactor and, if practicable, from the site, removes the main radiological and security risks presented by the facility. The remaining residual radioactive material presents a smaller, but still significant, risk to workers, the public and the environment during decommissioning. One argument for delayed dismantling in the past has been that a prolonged period of safe enclosure between the initial and final phases of decommissioning allows radioactive decay, which reduces both local dose rates to workers and the amount of radioactive waste needing disposal. Technological progress over the last 10-15 years in electronics, robotics and remote handling has considerably reduced the need for manned access to the more highly radioactive areas and, for large scale commercial operations, this has reduced the importance of radiological factors in choosing a decommissioning strategy (IAEA, 2011c).

Immediate decommissioning is normally the preferred strategy; however, it is associated with the greatest amounts of radioactive waste since there is no time for radioactive decay to occur. This is more important for some types of facility than for others; for nuclear power plants there are usually significant benefits, in terms of reduction of waste amounts and worker doses due to radioactive decay, to be obtained from deferral, while for facilities in which long-lived radionuclides are used, such as reprocessing plants, the advantages brought by delay are much fewer.

If there is no available repository for the waste from decommissioning, the options are to proceed with immediate decommissioning and to temporarily store the spent fuel and radioactive waste from decommissioning at the facility itself or at an intermediate store, pending the availability of disposal facilities, or to defer or postpone the decommissioning, thereby not creating waste, until a waste management solution is available (IAEA, 2006b).

The view expressed in the previous sentence clearly fed into the lessons some of the proponents of nuclear technology learned from risk research and from public opinion polls such as, for instance, the Eurobarometer. Even though risk research works primarily on a descriptive, not on a prescriptive level, others have been eager to build on these results with a view to changing perception and behaviour.

As a first response, the idea that gaining public acceptance is a matter of communicating the facts in an understandable way became rather dominant. The combination of this idea with an expertocratic approach (cf. 4.2.2) leads to the assumption that the reason for public rejection is a techno-scientific knowledge gap, and that bridging it will bring the public’s view more in line with the nuclear experts’ view. Such an approach rapidly threatens to follow an instrumental approach to public acceptability, by putting the focus on creating acceptance. It cannot be denied that there exist several cases of a PR-style approach to ‘stakeholder management’, focusing on the remediation of public perception as a one-way route to public acceptance. But more substantial and genuine approaches can also go against the lessons drawn from risk research. The combination of an instrumental approach with the idea of a public knowledge gap easily develops into an approach in which the quantitative results of risk assessments are deployed to try to bridge the knowledge gap and change the public’s perception of risk. Within such an approach, attention is focused first and foremost, if not solely, on technical safety. And yet, ironically, scientists, engineers and industry leaders have always said that public acceptability with regard to the nuclear fuel cycle is much more a socio-political issue than a technical problem. Most of the budget nevertheless continues to be spent on research to improve the technical aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, largely ignoring the risk that in the end projects may be incapable of being implemented because of public opposition (International Nuclear Societies Council, 1998).

Although we want to highlight advances in regulation and considerable consequent efforts by the nuclear community, most notably with regard to radioactive waste management, to go beyond the conventional limits of risk assessments, and by no means wish to discourage this type of research, we do want to stress that technical proof of safety alone, or communication of that proof, will never suffice to influence public acceptability in a convincing manner. Valid techno-scientific arguments can be repeated endlessly, as has been done for Chernobyl (arguments such as ‘the West has completely different reactor types’) such as Fukushima (arguments in line with ‘earthquakes combined with tsunamis of the same magnitude cannot happen in Western European countries’), but they will not alter public acceptability, unless other conditions are met also. For one thing, the fundamental grounds of the factors of risk perception listed earlier will need to be thoroughly investigated and taken into account. Furthermore, it needs to be acknowledged that choosing nuclear power above other forms of energy production is coloured by fundamental values and beliefs, just as much as by technical, financial and other practical considerations. Throughout the remainder of this chapter, we will further explore these conditions and how they have been, or could be, taken up by the nuclear community. We will start by briefly considering how issues of acceptability have been taken into account so far in different parts of the nuclear fuel cycle.

Sweden is often cited as a model for good governance and stability and the history of nuclear power in that country is eventful and interesting. Sweden’s commercial nuclear power programme was implemented in two phases: six reactors were constructed in the 1970s and another six in the 1980s. In 1980, whilst the second tranche was still under construction, an advisory referendum was held in response to the accident at Three Mile Island. Primarily, this was a device to remove the issue from the forthcoming election. Three options were offered, all of which proposed the limiting of nuclear power in some way. After the election the parliament restricted the nuclear power programme to twelve reactors and decided that nuclear power should be phased out altogether by 2010. Since all the reactors were assumed to have a 25 year operating life, 2010 would not have represented an early shut down although it would rule out any lifetime extensions.

At the time of the referendum, nuclear power was contributing about 25% to electricity production with 60% from hydro and 15% from other sources (Fig. 1.4). In the next seven years demand for electricity went up by 50% and much of this increase was met by bringing the new nuclear plants into operation. Thus, since the late 1980s, most of Sweden’s electricity has been produced by roughly equal amounts of hydro and nuclear power (Fig. 1.4). Because hydro depends on the weather it can vary significantly from one year to the next and when there is a shortfall in supply the balance is met by nuclear. Given this long-standing situation, it was not surprising that, when a government commission was asked to review Sweden’s nuclear policy in 1994, it reported that, if the country was to

maintain its low levels of GHG emissions, a complete phase out of nuclear power by 2010 would not be possible. Nevertheless, one nuclear unit could be closed because at that stage there was an over-supply of electricity.

As a result, a compromise policy was hatched in 1997. An immediate start was to be made on the nuclear phase-out through the closure of the two Barseback reactors in 1998 and 2001 (commissioned 1975 and 1977 respectively). These were located only 25 km from Copenhagen and had been a source of tension between Denmark and Sweden. Due to a legal appeal by the plant’s owner and a re-negotiation there was a delay so that Unit 1 closed in 1999 followed by Unit 2 in 2005. By 2008, major investments by the utilities allowed most of the output lost by the closure to be recouped by uprating reactors at the other three sites.33 A less noticed feature of the new policy was the dropping of the 2010 deadline; now, the phasing out of nuclear power would only come about when it could be replaced by renewables. Since then renewables have failed to make a significant impact and, at the same time, Swedish public opinion has shown a steady increase in support for nuclear power since the low of 1986. Thus, in 2010 the percentage of people wanting to use nuclear power (as opposed to abolish it) had risen to 52%.34 A centre-right coalition government came into power in 2005 with an agreement between the parties that there would be no forced closures of NPPs for the next four years. In 2010 it reversed the phase-out policy and envisaged the construction of ten new reactors that will replace the existing ones when they come to be decommissioned in the 2020s. This policy was confirmed after the Fukushima accident35 but it is not difficult to imagine that it could change again if the next election brings in a more left-leaning government. Without doubt, Sweden’s progress in developing and implementing a permanent disposal solution for spent nuclear fuel has been of great assistance in achieving public acceptability.

Finally, it is notable that Sweden imposes a tax on nuclear capacity that currently stands at SEK 12 684 (€1400) per MW(th) per month. This raises a total of about €470 million per year for the government and represents an additional charge on nuclear electricity of about €7 per MWh(e).36